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FOREWORD 
As A YOUTH, near the beginning of this 20th century, Robert Hutchins 
Goddard began to dream of spatial voyages, thereafter becoming the great 
pioneer of astronautics. The Vanguard project, which this book records, was 
a major step in transforming his dreams to reality. It may be said to have 
rooted into Goddard’s New Mexico rocket launching, and to have stretched 
far upward toward man’s landing on the moon. 
This is a record of amazing human accomplishment. It: is also a record 
of conflicting values, policies, and ideas, from which we have much to learn. 
It shows how easily an admirable framework of scientific success can be 
screened from public view by a fictitious coating of failure; yet how impor- 
tant that coating is in its effect on world psychology and national prestige. 
Herein is portrayed both the genius and the ineptness of our American 
way of life. On one hand, Vanguard history rests proudly with outstanding 
accomplishments; on the other, it emphasizes clearly how much more could 
have been accomplished through inter-service cooperation and support that 
was withheld. One is made aware of the penalties brought by such diverse 
elements as extended wartime hatred and a sensation-seeking press. Even 
in retrospect, we view Project Vanguard through the haze of an environ- 
ment that was out of its control-an environment including atomic weapons, 
Sputnik, and cold war with the Soviet Union. 
These chapters bring out again the age-old conflict that continues 
between security and progress, in spite of their relationship. My own first 
contact with the Vanguard program was a part of this conflict. It exemplifies 
the obstacles, sometimes unavoidable, that delayed the launching of 
America’s Number I satellite. 
In 1955, I was sitting as a member of one of the ballistic-missile scien- 
tific committees when the subject of orbiting a satellite was broached. 
Everyone present agreed that a satellite-launching project was practical, 
important, and deserving of support. But what priority should be assigned 
to it? We were working under staggering concepts of nuclear warfare, and 
the imperative need to prevent a strike against the United States by the 
Soviet Union. Our mission was to speed the development of intercontinen- 
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tal ballistic missiles with sufficient retaliatory power to discourage attack. 
Members of the committee believed that the security of our nation and 
civilization would depend on our ability to shoot across oceans quickly and 
accurately by the time Russia had missiles available for shooting at us. 
A shortage of scientists, engineers, and facilities existed in fields of 
missiles and space. Military projects needed every man available. The con- 
sensus of committee opinion was that we should concentrate on security 
requirements and assign to the Vanguard program a secondary place. 
There would be time to orbit satellites after our nuclear-warhead missiles 
were perfected and adequate marksmanship achieved. 
My second contact with American satellite development relates largely 
to the realm of “might have been.” It impinged only indirectly on Project 
Vanguard; but it throws light on our apparent early space-backwardness in 
relation to the Soviet Union. During my visit to the Army’s Redstone 
Arsenal at Huntsville on a military mission, Wernher von Braun showed 
me one of his mock-ups and told me of his plans for orbiting a satellite. He 
had been unable to obtain the authorizations and, funds required to put an 
actual satellite in orbit; but according to his estimates, he could have done 
so many months before Russia’s Sputnik I was launched-at a minute cost 
as measured by present-day space expenditures. 
Why was the Redstone-von Braun satellite project not supported? An- 
swers vary with the person talked to: The  Navy’s brilliant developments in 
satellite instrumentation had tipped the choice to Vanguard, and budgetary 
restrictions had prevented a paralleling project. The name Redstone was 
too closely associated with military missiles. Vanguard offered lower costs, 
more growth potential, longer duration of orbiting. We would eventually 
gain more scientific information through Vanguard than through Redstone. 
T o  these observations, I can add from my own experience that inter-service 
rivalry exerted strong influence; also, that any conclusion drawn would be 
incomplete without taking into accounk the antagonism still existing toward 
von Braun and his co-workers because of their service on the German side of 
World War 11. 
My third contact with the satellite program was one nearly every 
American experienced: the effect of a superficial and sensational press. This 
has retarded the development of many important projects, Vanguard among 
them. It places such an unrealistic penalty on developmental errors that 
increased costs and delays result through excessive attempts to avoid them. 
Generally speaking, success comes faster when a percentage of error is not 
only accepted but included in planning schedules. 
In addition to the over-caution caused by press and public monitoring, 
the emphasis of scientific perfection had its retarding effect on our launch- 
ing of a satellite. How often I heard the statement that only the quality of . 
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data obtained mattered, and that the United States should not take part in 
a race with the Soviet Union to orbit a few pounds of matter around the 
earth. In spite of frequent warnings both from within and without scien- 
tific circles, an ivory tower of intellect was built-and suddenly shattered by 
Sputnik. 
The amazing effectiveness of Sputnik was due even more to the 
American reaction than to the Soviet satellite. That the Russians are a 
great people has been proven beyond doubt. Over and over again through 
generations, they have made outstanding contributions to fields of scientific 
progress. One of these fields is astronautics. From Tsiolkovskiy through 
Gagarin to scientists, engineers, and astronauts of current days, Russians 
have been acclaimed throughout the world. The launching of Sputnik Z was 
another great Russian accomplishment, and it was proper that we regarded 
it as such. One might have expected Washington to cable congratulations to 
Moscow, possibly to add that we would soon complement with our own 
satellites this Russian contribution to the International Geophysical Year, 
and then to proceed with the carefully considered plans we bad adopted. 
Instead, an atmosphere bordering on hysteria pervaded the United 
States. After having decided that we were not primarily in a race to launch 
the world's first satellite, we seemed to start running, laps behind, in a race 
already won, and to convince ourselves that we had been in it right along. 
In convincing ourselves, we went far toward convincing the rest of the world 
along with us-with a resulting lowering of American prestige. 
Why did America, starting with the lead that Robert Goddard gave us, 
permit another country to be first in orbiting a satellite? I think we would 
gain more basic enlightenment from asking why we were so disturbed 
psychologically by the orbiting of Sputnik. We led the world in science, 
technology, and military power, even in the development of astronautics 
scientifically. Our leading minds had suppressed the spectacular in space in 
order to emphasize the scientific. Yet when the spectacular appeared as a 
pinpoint of light above our heads, it seemed to obliterate our great accom- 
plishments of science. From such an irrational reaction, what rational con- 
clusions can we draw? 
That the spectacular and psychological exert tremendous influence on 
life is obvious. That we underestimated this influence in planning our early 
satellite program is just as clear. That, in hindsight, we should have changed 
the relative priority between missiles and satellites can still be argued. That 
we missed an opportunity to have held the established priority and still 
orbited the world's first satellite seems highly probable. 
In rational analysis, two facts emerge to silhouette against a turbulent 
background. The Project Vanguard objective was accomplished during the 
International Geophysical Year, as planned, and our military forces . 
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achieved a retaliatory power before the Soviet Union could have destroyed 
our civilization by a ballistic-missile attack. Both programs were successful 
despite the many obstacles encountered. 
This carefully researched history of Project Vanguard, resulting from 
years of study by Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, es- 
corts the reader step by step through planning, setbacks, successes, and final 
launchings, including effects of individual and mass psychology. Since con- 
tributions by the armed services form the web on which the following 
chapters pattern, it seems appropriate to apply to the authors, as well as to 
Vanguard, those high compliments of military terminology: Mission accom- 
plished and well done. 
T o  this decade-later evaluation, I believe it is pertinent to add that 
Project Vanguard contributed in major ways to the manned lunar orbitings 
and landings in which principles of scientific perfection were maintained 
and America was first. 
Charles A .  Lindbergh 
11 August 1969 
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PREFACE 
THIS BOOK deals with the origin, course of development, and results of the 
first American earth satellite project, one of several programs planned for the 
International Geophysical Year. Primarily an analysis of the scientific and tech- 
nical problems in this pioneering venture in the exploratiotl of outer space, 
the text also examines the organization of an undertariing bound by an inex- 
orably fixed time limit, discusses briefly the climate of American opinion both 
before and after the launchings of the first Russian Sputniks, and concludes 
with a somewhat cursory evaluation of what the satellite program contributed 
to human knowledge. 
Written in lay language insofar as the authors could translate scientific and 
technical terms into everyday English, the book nevertheless is not one for 
casual reading. The very multiplicity of Federal agencies, quasi-governmental 
bodies, and private organizations that shared in the project complicates the 
story. Indeed in some degree the interrelationships of these groups and key 
individuals within them constitute a central theme of this study. Even so, by no 
means all the several hundred people whose dedicated work made satellite 
flights possible are mentioned by name in the text. To have identified each 
person and explained his role would have turned this book into a large tome. 
As authors we divided our responsibilities by topic: Milton Lomask wrote 
the chapters on the field tests and satellite launchings at Cape Canaveral, 
Constance McLaughlin Green the rest. Jointly and separately we are deeply 
indebted to the late Alan T. Waterman, the late Lloyd V. Berkner, Hugh 
Odishaw, Homer E. Newell, John P. Hagen, Milton Rosen, and a score of other 
men for their help in sorting out the pieces of a complex tale and for drawing 
upon their memories or private papers for information nowhere officially re- 
corded. We are equally grateful to Charles A. Lindbergh for writing an intro- 
duction that puts the material into the perspective of the mid-1950s. NASA 
historians Eugene M. Emme and Frank W. Anderson assisted us at many points, 
and Nancy L. Ebert of the NASA Scientific and Technical Infbrmation Division 
devoted many hours of overtime to typing the text. We want to thank also the 
men who subjected the manuscript in whole or in part to a critical reading. 
Time has modified many judgments about Project Vanguard, but a good 
deal of the story is still controversial. While we have endeavored to present it 
dispassionately, doubtless few of the participants will subscribe to our every 
interpretation. Scientists, engineers, technicians, industrial managers, the Presi- 
xv 
dent and the White House staff, the Bureau of the Budget, and members of 
Congress tended to view the program as it progressed from markedly different 
standpoints. In the finaI analysis the verdict of our readers may determine the 
place of Vanguard in history. 
Constance McLaughlin Green 
Milton Lomask 
Washington, D.C. 
September 1969 
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VANGUARD-A HISTORY 
A 
BACKGROUND OF 
SPACE EXPLORATION 
PEOPLE the world over speak of the “Space Age” as beginning with the 
launching of the Russian Sputnik on 4 October 1957. Yet Americans might 
well set the date back at least to July 1955 when the White: House, through 
President Eisenhower’s press secretary, announced that the United States 
planned to launch a man-made earth satellite as an American contribution 
to the International Geophysical Year. If the undertaking seemed bizarre to 
much of the American public at that time, to astrophysicists and some of the 
military the government’s decision was a source of elation: after years of 
waiting they had won official support for a project that promised to provide 
an invaluable tool for basic research in the regions beyond the upper atmos- 
phere. Six weeks later, after a statement came from the Pentagon that the 
Navy was to take charge of the launching program, most Americans appar- 
ently forgot about it. It would not again assume great importance until 
October 1957. 
Every major scientific advance has depended upon two basic elements, 
first, imaginative perception and, second, continually refined tools to ob- 
serve, measure, and record phenomena that support, alter, or demolish a 
tentative hypothesis. This process of basic research often seems to have no 
immediate utility, but, as one scientist pointed out in 1957, it took Samuel 
Langley’s and the Wright brothers’ experiments in aerodynamics to make 
human flight possible, and Hans Bethe’s abstruse calculations on the nature 
of the sun’s energy led to the birth of the hydrogen bomb, just as Isaac 
Newton’s laws of gravity, motion, and thermodynamics furnished the prin- 
ciples upon the application of which the exploration of outer space began 
and is proceeding. In space exploration the data fed back to scientists from 
instrumented satellites have been of utmost importance. The continuing 
improvement of such research tools opens up the prospect of greatly enlarg- 
1 
ing knowledge of the world we live in and making new applications of that 
knowledge. 
In the decade before Sputnik, however, laymen tended to ridicule the 
idea of putting a man-made object into orbit about the earth. Even if the 
feat were possible, what purpose would it serve except to show that it could 
be done? As early as 1903, to be sure, Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy, a Russian 
scientist, had proved mathematically the feasibility of using the reactive 
force that lifts a rocket to eject a vehicle into space above the pull of the 
earth’s gravity. Twenty years later Romanian-born Hermann Oberth had 
independently worked out similar formulas, but before the 1950s, outside 
a very small circle of rocket buffs, the studies of both men remained virtu- 
ally unknown in the English-speaking world. Neither had built a usable 
rocket to demonstrate the validity of his theories, and, preoccupied as each 
was with plans for human journeys to the moon and planets, neither had so 
much as mentioned an unmanned artificial sate1lite.l Indeed until com- 
munication by means of radio waves had developed far beyond the tech- 
niques of the 1930s and early 1940s, the launching of an inanimate body 
into the heavens could have little appeal for either the scientist or the 
romantic dreamer. And in mid-century only a handful of men were fully 
aware of the potentialities of telemetry.2 
Of greater importance to the future of space exploration than the 
theoretical studies of the two European mathematicians was the work of 
the American physicist, Robert Goddard. While engaged in post-graduate 
work at Princeton University before World War I, Goddard had demon- 
strated in the laboratory that rocket propulsion would function in a vacuum, 
and in 1917 he received a grant of $5,000 from the Smithsonian Institution 
to continue his experiments. Under this grant the Smithsonian published 
his report of his theory and early experiments, Method of Reaching Ex- 
treme AZtitudes. In 1918 he had successfully developed a solid-fuel ballistic 
rocket in which, however, even the United States Army lost interest after 
the Armistice. Convinced that rockets would eventually permit travel into 
outer space, Goddard after the war had continued his research at Clark 
University, seeking to develop vehicles that could penetrate into the iono- 
sphere. In contrast to Tsiolkovskiy and Oberth, he set himself to devising 
practical means of attaining the goal they all three aspired to. In 1926 he 
successfully launched a rocket propelled by gasoline and liquid oxygen, a 
“first” that ranks in fame with the Wright brothers’ Kitty Hawk flights of 
1903. With the help of Charles Lindbergh after his dramatic solo trans- 
atlantic flight, Goddard obtained a grant of $5,000 from Daniel Guggenheim 
and equipped a small laboratory in New Mexico where he built several 
rockets. In 1937, assisted by grants from the Daniel and Florence 
Guggenheim Foundation, he launched a rocket that reached an altitude of 
2 
A t  Roswell, New Mexico, Robert H. Goddard and colleagues examine 
rocket components after a successful flight on 19 May 1937. 
(Photo courtesy of Mrs. Robert H .  Goddard) 
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9,000 feet. Although not many people in the United States knew much 
about his work, a few had followed it as closely as his secretiveness allowed 
them to; among them were members of the American Interplanetary Space 
Society, organized in 1930 and later renamed the American Rocket Society. 
With the coming of World War I1 Goddard abandoned his field experi- 
ments, but the Navy employed him to help in developing liquid propellants 
for JATO, that is, jet-assisted takeoff for aircraft. When the Nazi “buzz” 
bombs of 1943 and the supersonic “Vengeance” missiles-the “V-2s” that 
rained on London during 1944 and early 1945-awakened the entire world 
to the potentialities of rockets as weapons, a good many physicists and 
military men studied his findings with attention. By a twist of fate, Goddard, 
who was even more interested in astronautics than in weaponry, died in 
1945, fourteen years before most of his countrymen acknowledged manned 
space exploration as feasible and recognized his basic contribution to it by 
naming the government’s new multi-million-dollar experimental station at 
Beltsville, Maryland, “The Goddard Space Flight Center.” 
During 1943 and early 1944, Commander Haryey Hall, Lloyd Berkner, 
and several other scientists in Navy service examined the chances of the 
Nazis’ making such advances in rocketry that they could put earth satellites 
into orbit either for reconnaissance or for relaying what scare pieces in the 
press called “death rays.” While the investigators foresaw well before the 
first V-2 struck Britain that German experts could build rockets capable 
of reaching targets a few hundred miles distant, study showed that the state 
of the art was not yet at a stage to overcome the engineering difficulties of 
firing a rocket to a sufficient altitude to launch a body into the ionosphere, 
the region between 50 and 250 miles above the earth’s surface. In the proc- 
ess of arriving at that conclusion members of the intelligence team, like 
Tsiolkovskiy and Oberth before them, worked out the mathematical formu- 
las of the velocities needed. Once technology had progressed further, these 
men knew, an artificial earth-circling Satellite would be entirely feasible. 
More important, if it were equipped with a transmitter and recording 
devices, it would provide an invaluable means of obtaining information 
about outer space.4 
At the end of the war, when most Americans wanted to forget about 
rockets and everything military, these men were eager to pursue rocket 
development in order to further scientific research. In 1888 Simon New- 
comb, the most eminent American astronomer of his day, had declared: “We 
are probably nearing the limit of all we can know about astronomy.” In 
1945, despite powerful new telescopes and notable advances in radio tech- 
niques, that pronouncement appeared still true unless observations made 
above the earth’s atmosphere were to become possible. Only a mighty 
rocket could reach beyond the blanket of the earth’s atmosphere; and in 
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the United States only the armed services possessed the means of procuring 
rockets with sufficient thrust to attain the necessary altitude. At the same 
time a number of officers wanted to experiment with improving rockets as 
weapons. Each group followed a somewhat different course during the next 
few years, but each gave some thought to launching an “earth-circling space- 
ship,” since, irrespective of ultimate purpose, the requirements for launch- 
ing and flight control were similar. The character of those tentative early 
plans bears examination, if only because of the consequences of their re- 
jection. 
“Operation Paperclip,” the first official Army project aimed at acquir- 
ing German know-how about rocketry and technology, grew out of the 
capture of a hundred of the notorious V-2s and out of interrogations of key 
scientists and engineers who had worked at the Nazi’s rocket research and 
development base at Peenemuende. Hence the decision to bring to the 
United States about one hundred twenty of the German experts along with 
the captured missiles and spare parts. Before the arrival of the Germans, 
General Donald Putt of the Army Air Forces outlined to officers at Wright 
Field some of the Nazi schemes for putting space platforn’is into the iono- 
sphere; when his listeners laughed at what appeared to be a tall tale, he 
assured them that these were far from silly vaporings and were likely to 
materialize before the end of the century. Still the haughtiness of the Ger- 
mans who landed at Wright Field in the autumn of 1945 was not endearing 
to the Americans who had to work with them. The Navy wanted none of 
them, whatever their skills. During a searching interrogation before the 
group left Germany a former German general had remarked testily that 
had Hitler not been so pig-headed the Nazi team might now be giving 
orders to American engineers; to which the American scientist conducting 
the questioning growled in reply that Americans would never have per- 
mitted a Hitler to rise to power.6 
At the Army Ordnance Proving Ground at White Sands in the desert 
country of southern New Mexico, German technicians, however, worked 
along with American officers and field crews in putting reassembled V-2s to 
use for research. As replacing the explosive in the warhead with scientific 
instruments and ballast would permit observing and recording data on the 
upper atmosphere, the Army invited other government agencies and univer- 
sities to share in making high-altitude measurements by this means. Assisted 
by the German rocketeers headed by Wernher von Braun, the General 
Electric Company under a contract with the Army took charge of the 
launchings. Scientists from the five participating universities and from 
laboratories of the armed services designed and built the instruments placed 
in the rockets’ noses. In the course of the next five years teams from each of 
the three military services and the universities assembled information from 
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successful launchings of forty instrumented V-2s. In June 1946 a V-2, the 
first probe using instruments devised by members of the newly organized 
Rocket Sonde Research Section of the Naval Research Laboratory, carried 
to an altitude of sixty-seven miles a Geiger-counter telescope to detect 
cosmic rays, pressure and temperature gauges, a spectrograph, and radio 
transmitters. During January and February 1946 NRL scientists had inves- 
tigated the possibility of launching an instrumented earth satellite in this 
fashion, only to conclude reluctantly that engineering techniques were still 
too unsophisticated to make it practical; for the time being, the Laboratory 
would gain more by perfecting instruments to be emplaced in and recovered 
from V-2s. As successive shots set higher altitude records, new spectroscopic 
equipment developed by the Micron Waves Branch of the Laboratory’s 
Optics Division produced a number of excellent ultraviolet and x-ray 
spectra, measured night air glow, and determined ozone concentration.s 
In the interim the Army’s “Bumper” project produced and successfully 
flew a two-stage rocket consisting of a “WAC Corporal” missile super- 
imposed on a V-2. 
After each launching, an unofficial volunteer panel of scientists and 
technicians, soon known as the Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel, 
discussed the findings. Indeed the panel coordinated and guided the re- 
search that built up a considerable body of data on the nature of the upper 
atmosphere. Nevertheless, because the supply of V-2s would nbt last indefi- 
nitely, and because a rocket built expressly for research would have distinct 
advantages, the NRL staff early decided to draw up specifications for a new 
sounding rocket. Although the Applied Physics Laboratory of the Johns 
Hopkins University, under contract with the Navy’s Bureau of Ordnance 
and the Office of Naval Research, was modifying the “WAC Corporal” to 
develop the fin-stabilized Aerobee research rocket, NRL wanted a model 
with a sensitive steering mechanism and gyroscopic controls. In August 
1946 the Glenn L. Martin Company won the contract to design and con- 
struct a vehicle that would meet the NRL requirements.” 
Four months before the Army Ordnance department started work on 
captured V-Zs, the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics had initiated a more ambi- 
tious research scheme with the appointment of a Committee for Evaluating 
the Feasibility of Space Rocketry. Unmistakably inspired by the ideas of 
members of the Navy intelligence team which had investigated Nazi capa- 
bilities in rocketry during the war, and, like that earlier group, directed by 
the brilliant Harvey Hall, the committee embarked upon an intensive study 
of the physical requirements and the technical resources available for 
launching a vessel into orbit about the earth. By 22 October 1945, the 
committee had drafted recommendations urging the Bureau of Aeronautics 
to sponsor an experimental program to devise an earth-orbiting “space ship” 
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launched by a single-stage rocket, propelled by liquid hydrogen and liquid 
oxygen, and carrying electronic equipment that could collect and trans- 
mit back to earth scientific information about the upper atmosphere. Here 
was a revolutionary proposal. If based on the speculative thinking of Navy 
scientists in 1944, it was now fortified by careful computations. Designed 
solely for research, the unmanned instrumented satellite weighing about 
two thousand pounds and put into orbit by a rocket motor burning a new 
type of fuel should be able to stay aloft for days instead of the seconds 
possible with vertical probing rockets. Nazi experts at Peenemuende, for all 
their sophisticated ideas about future space flights, had never thought of 
building anything comparable.* 
The recommendations to the Bureau of Aeronautics quickly led to 
exploratory contracts with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California 
Institute of Technology and the Aerojet General Corporation, a California 
firm with wartime experience in producing rocket fuels. Cal Tech’s report, 
prepared by Homer J. Stewart and several associates and submitted in 
December 1945, verified the committee’s calculations op the interrela- 
tionships of the orbit, the rocket’s motor and fuel performance, the vehicle’s 
structural characteristics, and payload. Aerojet’s confirmation of the coin- 
mittee computations of the power obtainable from liquid hydrogen and 
liquid oxygen soon followed. Thus encouraged, BuAer assigned contracts to 
North American Aviation, Incorporated, and the Glenn L. Martin 
Company for preliminary structural design of the “ESV,” the earth satel- 
lite vehicle, and undertook study of solar-powered devices to recharge the 
satellite’s batteries and so lengthen their life. But as estimates put the cost 
of carrying the program beyond the preliminary stages at well over $5 
million, a sum unlikely to be approved by the Navy high brass, ESV pro- 
ponents sought Army Air Forces collab~ration.~ Curiously enough, with the 
compartmentation often characteristic of the armed services, BuAer ap- 
parently did not attempt to link its plans to those of the Naval Research 
Laboratory.lo 
In March 1946, shortly after NRL scientists had decided that a satellite 
was too difficult a project to attempt as yet, representatives of BuAer and 
the Army Air Forces agreed that “the general advantages to be derived 
from pursuing the satellite development appear to be sufficient to justify 
a major program, in spite of the fact that the obvious military, or purely 
naval applications in themselves, may not appear at this time to warrant 
the expenditure.” General Curtis E. LeMay of the Air Staff did not concur. 
Certainly he was unwilling to endorse a joint Navy-Army program. On 
the contrary, Commander Hall noted that the general was resentful of 
Navy invasion into a field “which so obviously, he maintained, was the 
province of the AAF.” Instead, in May 1946, the Army Air Forces pre- 
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sented its own proposition in the form of a feasibility study by Project 
Rand, a unit of the Douglas Aircraft Company and a forerunner of the 
RAND Corporation of California.ll Like the scientists of the Bureau of 
Aeronautics committee, Project Rand mathematicians and engineers de- 
clared technology already equal to the task of launching a spaceship. The 
ship could be circling the earth, they averred, within five years, namely 
by mid-1951. They admitted that it could not be used as a carrier for an 
atomic bomb and would have no direct function as a weapon, but they 
stressed the advantages that would nevertheless accrue from putting an 
artificial satellite into orbit: “To visualize the impact on the world, one 
can imagine the consternation and admiration that would be felt here 
if the United States were to discover suddenly that some other nation had 
already put up a successful satellite.” l2 
Officials at the Pentagon were unimpressed. Theodore von KLrmLn, 
chief mentor of the Army Air Forces and principal author of the report 
that became the research and development bible of the service, advocated 
research in the upper atmosphere but was silent about the use of an artificial 
satellite. Nor did Vannevar Bush have faith in such a venture. The most 
influential scientist in America of his day and in 1946 chairman of the 
Joint Army and Navy Research and Development Board, Bush was even 
skeptical about the possibility of developing within the foreseeable future 
the engineering skills necessary to build intercontinental guided missiles. 
His doubts, coupled with von KLrmAn’s disregard of satellite schemes, inev- 
itably dashed cold water on the proposals and helped account for the luke- 
warm reception long accorded them.13 
Still the veto of a combined Navy-Army Air Forces program did not 
kill the hopes of advocates of a “space ship.” While the Navy and its con- 
tractors continued the development of a scale model 3,000-pound-thrust 
motor powered by liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, Project Rand com- 
pleted a second study for the Army Air Forces. But after mid-1947, when 
the Air Force became a separate service within the newly created Depart- 
ment of Defense, reorganization preoccupied its officers for a year or more, 
and many of them, academic scientists believed, shared General LeMay’s 
indifference to research not immediately applicable to defense problems. 
At BuAer, on the other hand, a number of men continued to press for 
money to translate satellite studies into actual experiments. Unhappily for 
them, a Technical Evaluation Group of civilian scientists serving on the 
Guided Missiles Committee of the Defense Department’s Research and 
Development Board declared in March 1948 that “neither the Navy nor 
the USAF has as yet established either a military or a scientific utility 
commensurate with the presently expected cost.” l4 In vain, Louis Ridenour 
of Project Rand explained, as Hall had emphasized in 1945 and 1946, that 
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“the development of a satellite will be directly applicable to the develop- 
ment of an intercontinental rocket missile,” since the initial velocity re- 
quired for launching the latter would be “4.4 miles per second, while a 
satellite requires 5.4.” 15 
In the hope of salvaging something from the discard, the Navy at this 
point shifted its approach. Backed up by a detailed engineering design 
prepared under contract by the Glenn L. Martin Company, BuAer proposed 
to build a sounding rocket able to rise to a record altitude of more than 
four hundred miles, since a powerful high-altitude test vehicle, HATV, 
might serve the dual purpose of providing hitherto unobtainable scientific 
data from the extreme upper atmosphere and at the same time dramatize 
the efficiency of the hydrogen propulsion system. Thus it might rally finan- 
cial support for the ESV. But when T h e  First Annual Report of the 
Secretary of Defense appeared in December 1948, a brief paragraph stating 
that each of the three services was carrying on studies and component de- 
signs for “the Earth Satellite Vehicle Program” evoked a public outcry at 
such a wasteful squandering of taxpayers’ money; one outraged letter-writer 
declared the program an unholy defiance of God’s will for‘mankind. That 
sort of response did not encourage a loosening of the military purse-strings 
for space exploration. Paper studies, yes; hardware, no. The Navy felt 
obligated to drop HATV development at a stage which, according to later 
testimony, was several years ahead of Soviet designs in its proposed 
propulsion system and structural engineering.16 
In seeking an engine for an intermediate range ballistic missile, the 
Army Ordnance Corps, however, was able to profit from North American 
Aviation’s experience with HATV design; an Air Force contract for the 
Navaho missile ultimately produced the engine that powered the Army‘s 
Jupiter C, the launcher for the first successful American satellite. Thus 
money denied the Navy for scientific research was made available to the 
Army for a military r0cket.l’ Early in 1949 the Air Force requested the 
RAND Corporation, the recently organized successor to Project Rand, 
to prepare further utility studies. The paper submitted in 1951 concentrated 
upon analyzing the value of a satellite as an “instrument of political strat- 
egy,” and again offered a cogent argument for supporting a project that 
could have such important psychological effects on world opinion as an 
American earth satellite.l* Not until October 1957 would most of the offi- 
cials who had read the text recognize the validity of that point. 
In the meantime, research on the upper atmosphere had continued to 
nose forward slowly at White Sands and at the Naval Research Laboratory 
in Washington despite the transfer of some twenty “first line people” from 
NRL’s Rocket Sonde Research Section to a nuclear weapons crash program. 
While the Navy team at White Sands carried on probes with the Aerobee, 
9 
HIGH-ALTITUDE TEST VEHICLE 
OVERALL LENGTH.. . . 86 FEET 
MAXIMUM DIAMETFR. 16 FEET 
FORWARD BULKHEAD 
DISTRIBUTES NOSE DEAD 
WEIGHT, ACTIVATED BY 
GAS PRESSURE IN OXYGEN TANK PERIPHERAL UNITS: 28,400 POUNDS THRUST 
CENTRAL UNIT: 73,000 POUNDS THRUST 
TOTAL: 300,000 POUNDS THRUST 
CKET IN DESIRED 
NOSE COMPARTMEN 
GUIDANCE AND CO 
INSTRUMENTS 
(INTERMEDIATE BULKHEAD 
DESIGNED TO CARRY 
LOADING 
TURBO PUMP A 
HEMISPHERICAL DIAPHRAG 
R O C K E ~  MOTORS \ MOTOR ACCESSORIES 
AERODYNAMIC 
VANES 
T h e  Navy’s High-Altitude Test Vehicle (HATV) .  I t  was proposed in 1946 
and was to have launched a satellite by 1951. 
by then known as “the workhorse of high altitude research,”I9 a Bumper- 
Wac under Army aegis-a V-2 with a Wac-Corporal rocket attached as a 
second stage-made a record-breaking flight to an altitude of 250 miles in 
February 1949. Shortly afterward tests began on the new sounding rocket 
built for NRL by the Glenn L. Martin Company. Named “Neptune” at 
first and then renamed “Viking,” the first model embodied several im- 
portant innovations: a gimbaled motor for steering, aluminum as the prin- 
cipal structural material, and intermittent gas jets for stabilizing the vehicle 
after the main power cut off. Reaction Motors Incorporated supplied the 
engine, one of the first three large liquid-propelled rocket power plants 
produced in the United States. Viking No. 1, fired in the spring of 1949, 
attained a 50-mile altitude; Viking No. 4, launched from shipboard in May 
1950, reached 104 miles. Modest compared to the power displayed by the 
Bumper-Wac, the thrust of the relatively small single-stage Viking never- 
theless was noteworthy.20 
While modifications to each Viking in turn brought improved perform- 
ance, the Electron Optics Branch at NRL was working out a method of 
using ion chambers and photon counters for x-ray and ultraviolet wave- 
lengths, equipment which would later supply answers to questions about 
the nuclear composition of solar radiation. Equally valuable was the 
development of an electronic tracking device known as a “Single-Axis 
Phase-Comparison Angle-Tracking Unit,” the antecedent of “Minitrack,” 
which would permit continuous tracking of a small instrumented body in 
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RAND Corporation proposal for a rocket to launch 
an “Earth Circling Satellite,” 1951. 
space. When the next to last Viking, No. 11, rose to an altitude of 158 miles 
in May 1954, the radio telemetering system transmitted data on cosmic ray 
emissions, just as the Viking 10, fired about two weeks before, had furnished 
scientists with the first measurement of positive ion composition at an alti- 
tude of 136 miles.21 This remarkable series of successes achieved in five years 
at a total cost of less than $6 million encouraged NRL in 1955 to believe 
that, with a more powerful engine and the addition of upper stages, here 
was a vehicle capable of launching an earth satellite. 
Essential though this work was to subsequent programs, the Naval 
Research Laboratory in the late 1940s and the 1950s was hampered by not 
having what John P. Hagen called “stable funding” for its projects. Hagen, 
head of the Atmosphere and Astrophysics Division, found the budgetary 
system singularly unsatisfactory. NRL had been founded in 1923, but a 
post-World-War-I1 reorganization within the Navy had brought the Office 
of Naval Research into being and given it administrative control of the 
Laboratory’s finances. ONR allotted the Laboratory a modest fixed sum 
annually, but other Navy bureaus and federal agencies frequently engaged 
the Laboratory’s talents and paid for particular jobs. The arrangement 
resembled that of a man who receives a small retainer from his employer 
but depends for most of his livelihood on fees paid him by his own clien- 
tele for special services. NRL’s every contract, whether for design studies or 
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hardware, had to be negotiated and administered either by ONR or by one 
of the permanent Navy bureaus-in atmospheric research, it was by the 
Navy Bureau of Aeronautics. The cancellation of a contract could seriously 
disrupt NRL functioning, as the years 1950 to 1954 illustrated?12 
With the outbreak of the Korean War, the tempo of missile research 
heightened in the Defense Department. While the Navy was working on a 
guided missile launchable from shipboard and a group at NRL on radio 
interferometers for tracking it, rocketeers at Redstone Arsenal in Alabama 
were engaged in getting the “bugs” out of a North American Aviation 
engine for a ballistic missile with a 200-mile range, and RAND was carrying 
on secret studies of a military reconnaissance satellite for the Air Force. In 
June 1952 NRL got approval for the construction of four additional Vikings 
similar to Viking No. 10 to use in ballistic missile research, but eleven 
months later BuAer withdrew its support and canceled the development 
contract for a high-performance oxygen-ammonia engine that was to have 
replaced the less powerful Viking engine; this cancellation postponed by 
over three years the availability of a suitable poyer plant for the first stage 
of the future Vanguard rocket. Similarly in 1954 lack of funds curtailed an 
NRL program to design and develop a new liquid-propelled Aerobee-Hi 
probing rocket. At the request of the Western Development Division of the 
Air Force in July 1954, the Laboratory investigated the possible use of an 
improved Viking as a test vehicle for intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
ICBMs. The study, involving a solution of the “reentry problem,” that is, 
how to enable a missile’s warhead to return into the atmosphere without 
disintegrating before reaching its target, produced the design of an M-10 
and M-15 Viking, the designations referring to the speeds, measured by 
Mach number, at which each would reenter the atmosphere. But the Air 
Force later let the development contracts to private industry.23 In these years 
the Department of Defense was unwilling to spend more than token sums 
on research that appeared to have ohly remote connection with fighting 
equipment. 
The creation of the National Science Foundation in May 1950 tended 
to justify that position, for one of the new agency’s main functions was to 
encourage and provide support for basic research chiefly by means of grants- 
in-aid to American universities. The mission of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force was national defense, that of the Foundation the fostering of scien- 
tific discovery. It was a responsibility of the Foundation to decide what lines 
of fundamental research most merited public financial aid in their own 
right, whereas other federal agencies must by law limit their basic research 
to fields closely related to their practical missions. While the Foundation’s 
charter forbade it to make grants for applied research and development- 
the very area in which the military would often have welcomed financial 
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assistance-any government department could ask the National Academy 
of Sciences for help on scientific problems. The Academy, founded in 1863 
as a self-perpetuating body advisory to but independent of the government, 
included distinguished men in every scientific field. When its executive 
unit, the National Research Council, agreed to sponsor studies for federal 
agencies, the studies sometimes involved more applied than pure research. 
The Academy’s Research Council, and the Science Foundation, however, 
frequently worked closely together in choosing the problems to in~est igate .~~ 
Certainly the composition of the ionosphere, the region that begins 
about fifty miles above the earth’s surface, and the nature of outer space 
were less matters for the Pentagon than for the National Academy, the 
Science Foundation, and the academic scientific world. Indeed, the panel of 
volunteers which analyzed the findings from each instrumented V-2 shot 
and later appraised the results of Aerobee, Viking, and Aerobee-Hi flights 
contained from the first some future members of the Academy. Among the 
participants over the years were Homer J. Stewart and William H. Pickering 
of Cal Tech’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Milton W. Rosen, Homer E. 
Newell, Jr., and John W. Townsend, Jr., of NRL, and James A. Van Allen of 
the Applied Physics Laboratory of the Johns Hopkins University and later 
a professor at the State University of Iowa. Under Van Allen’s chairman- 
ship, the Panel on Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research came to be a strong 
link between university physicists and the Departmect of Defense, a more 
direct link in several respects than that afforded by civilian scientists who 
served on advisory committees of the DoD’s Research and Development 
Board.26 
While the armed services were perforce confining their research and 
development programs chiefly to military objectives, no service wanted to 
discourage discussions of future possibilities. In the autumn of 195 1 several 
doctors in the Air Force and a group of physicists brought together by 
Joseph Kaplan of the University of California, Los Angeles, met in San 
Antonio, Texas, for a symposium on the Physics and Medicine of the Upper 
Atmosphere. The participants summarized existing knowledge of the 
region named the “aeropause,” where manned flight was not yet possible, 
and examined the problems,of man’s penetrating into that still unexplored 
area. The papers published in book form a year later were directly instru- 
mental, Kaplan believed, in arousing enthusiasm for intensive studies of 
the ionosphere.26 
A few months before the San Antonio sessions, the Hayden Planetarium 
of New York held a first annual symposium on space exploration, and 
about the same time the American Rocket Society set up an ad hoc Com- 
mittee on Space Flight to look for other ways of awakening public interest 
and winning government support for interplanetary exploration. From a 
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few dozen men who had followed rocket development in the early 1930s the 
society had grown to about two thousand members, some of them connected 
with the aircraft industry, some of them in government service, and some 
who were purely enthusiasts caught up by the imaginative possibilities of 
reaching out into the unknown. The committee met at intervals during the 
next two years at the Society’s New York headquarters or at the Washington 
office of Andrew Haley, the Society’s legal counsel, but not until Richard W. 
Porter of the General Electric Company sought out Alan T. Waterman, 
Director of the National Science Foundation, and obtained from him 
an assurance that the Foundation would consider a proposal, did a formal 
detailed statement of the committee’s credo appear. Milton Rosen, the 
committee chairman and one of the principal engineers directing the 
development and tests of the Viking sounding rocket, then conceived and 
wrote the report advocating a thorough study of the benefits that might 
derive from launching an earth satellite. Completed on 27 November 1954, 
the document went to the Foundation early the next year?? 
Without attempting to describe the type of launching vehicle that 
would be needed, the paper spelled out the reasons why space exploration 
would bring rich rewards. Six appendixes, each written by a scientist deal- 
ing with his own special field, pointed to existing gaps in knowledge which 
an instrumented satellite might fill. Ira S .  Bowen, director of the Palomar 
Observatory at Mt. Wilson, explained how the clearer visibility and longer 
exposure possible in photoelectronic scanning of heavenly phenomena from 
a body two hundred miles above the earth would assist astronomers. 
Howard Schaeffer of the Naval School of Aviation Medicine wrote of the 
benefits of obtaining observations on the effects of the radiation from outer 
space upon living cells. In communications, John R. Pierce, whose proposal 
of 1952 gave birth to Telstar a decade later,28 discussed the utility of a relay 
for radio and television broadcasts. Data obtainable in the realm of geodesy, 
according to Major John O’Keefe of the Army’ Map Service, would throw 
light on the size and shape of the earth and the intensity of its gravitational 
fields, information which would be invaluable to navigators and map- 
makers. The meteorologist Eugene Bollay of North American Weather 
Consultants spoke of the predictable gains in accuracy of weather forecast- 
ing. Perhaps most illuminating to the nonscientifically trained reader was 
Homer E. Newell’s analysis of the unknowns of the ionosphere which data 
accumulated over a period of days could clarify. 
Confusing and complex happenings in the atmosphere, wrote Newell, 
were “a manifestation of an influx of energy from outer space.” What was 
the nature and magnitude of that energy? Much of the incoming energy was 
absorbed in the atmosphere at high altitudes. From data transmitted from a 
space satellite five hundred miles above the earth, the earth-bound scientist 
15 
might gauge the nature and intensity of the radiation emanating from the 
sun, the primary producer of that energy. Cosmic rays, meteors, and micro- 
meteors also brought in energy. Although they probably had little effect on 
the upper atmosphere, cosmic rays, with their extremely high energies, pro- 
duced ionization in the lower atmosphere. Low-energy particles from the 
sun were thought to cause the aurora and to play a significant part in the 
formation of the ionosphere. Sounding rockets permitted little more than 
momentary measurements of the various radiations at various heights, but 
with a satellite circling the earth in a geomagnetic meridian plane it should 
be possible to study in detail the low-energy end of the cosmic ray spectrum, 
a region inaccessible to direct observation within the atmosphere and best 
studied above the geomagnetic poles. Batteries charged by the sun should be 
able to supply power to relay information for weeks or months. 
Contrary to what an indifferent public might have expected from 
rocket “crackpots,” the document noted that “to create a satellite merely for 
the purpose of saying it has been done would not justify the cost. Rather, 
the satellite should serve useful purposes-purposes which can command the 
respect of the officials who sponsor it, the scientists and engineers who pro- 
duce it, and the community who pays for it.” The appeal was primarily to 
the scientific community, but the intelligent layman could comprehend it, 
and its publication in an engineering journal in February 1955 gave the 
report a diversified audience.29 
A number of men in and outside government service meantime had 
continued to pursue the satellite idea. In February 1952 Aristid V. Grosse of 
Temple University, a key figure in the Manhattan Project in its early days, 
had persuaded President Truman to approve a study of the utility of a 
satellite in the form of an inflatable balloon visible to the naked eye from 
the surface of the earth. Aware that Wernher von Braun, one of the Ger- 
man-born experts from Peenemuende, was interested, the physicist took 
counsel with him and his associates ’at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, 
Alabama. Fifteen months later Grosse submitted to the Secretary of the 
Air Force a description of the “American Star” that could rise in the West. 
Presumably because the proposed satellite would be merely a show piece 
without other utility, nothing more was heard of itPo 
A series of articles in three issues of Collier‘s, however, commanded 
wide attention during 1952. Stirred by an account of the San Antonio 
symposium as Kaplan described it over the lunch table, the editors of the 
magazine engaged Wernher von Braun to write the principal pieces and 
obtained shorter contributions from Kaplan, Fred L. Whipple, chairman of 
the Harvard University Department of Astronomy, Heinz Haber of the Air 
Force Space Medicine Division, the journalist Willy Ley, and others. 
The editors’ comment ran: “What are we waiting for?”, an expression of 
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alarm lest a communist nation preempt outer space before the United 
States acted and thereby control the earth from manned space platforms 
equipped with atomic bombs. On the other hand, von Braun’s articles 
chiefly stressed the exciting discoveries possible within twenty-five years if 
America at once began building “cargo rockets” and a wheel-shaped 
earth-circling space station from which American rocket ships could depart 
to other planets and return. Perhaps because of severe editing to adapt the 
material to popular consumption, the text contained little or no technical 
data on how these wonders were to be accomplished; the term “telemetry” 
nowhere appeared. But the articles, replete with illustrations in color, and 
a subsequent Walt Disney film fanned public interest and led to an ex- 
change of letters between von Braun and S. Fred Singer, a brilliant young 
physicist at the University of Maryland.31 
At the fourth Congress of the International Astronautics Federation in 
Zurich, Switzerland, in summer 1953, Singer proposed a Minimum Orbital 
Unmanned Satellite of the Earth, MOUSE, based upon a study prepared 
two years earlier by members of the British Interplanetary Society who had 
predicated their scheme on the use of a V-2 rocket. The Upper Atmosphere 
Rocket Research Panel at White Sands in turn discussed the plan in April 
1954, and in May Singer again presented his MOUSE proposal at the 
Hayden Planetarium’s fourth Space Travel Symposium. On that occasion 
Harry Wexler of the United States Weather Bureau gave a lecture entitled, 
“Observing the Weather from a Satellite Vehicle.” 32 The American public 
was thus being exposed to the concept of an artificial satellite as something 
more than science fiction. 
By then, Commander George Hoover and Alexander Satin of the Air 
Branch of the Office of Naval Research had come to the conclusion that 
recent technological advances in rocketry had so improved the art that the 
feasibility of launching a satellite was no longer in serious doubt. Hoover 
therefore put out feelers to specialists of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency 
at Huntsville. There von Braun, having temporarily discarded his space 
platform as impractical, was giving thought to using the Redstone rocket to 
place a small satellite in orbit. Redstone, a direct descendant of the V-2, 
was, as one man described it, a huge piece of “boiler plate,” sixty-nine feet 
long, seventy inches in diameter, and weighing 61,000 pounds, its power 
plant using liquid oxygen as oxidizer and an alcohol-water mixture as fuel. 
A new Redstone engine built by the Rocketdyne Division of North Ameri- 
can Aviation, Inc., and tested in 1953 was thirty percent lighter and thirty- 
four percent more powerful than that of the V-2.33 If Commander Hoover 
knew of the futile efforts of BuAer in 1947 to get Army Air Forces collabo- 
ration on a not wholly dissimilar space program, that earlier disappoint- 
ment failed to discourage him. And as he had reason to believe he could 
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now get Navy funds for a satellite project, he had no difficulty in enlisting 
von Braun’s interest. At a meeting in Washington arranged by Frederick 
C. Durant, 111, past president of the American Rocket Society, Hoover, 
Satin, von Braun, and David Young from Huntsville discussed possibilities 
with Durant, Singer, and Fred Whipple, the foremost American authority 
on tracking heavenly bodies. The consensus of the conferees ran that a 
slightly modified Redstone rocket with clusters of thirty-one Loki solid- 
propellant rockets for upper stages could put a five-pound satellite into 
orbit at a minimum altitude of 200 miles. Were that successful, a larger 
satellite equipped with instruments could follow soon afterward. Whipple’s 
judgment that optical tracking would suffice to trace so small a satellite at 
a distance of 200 miles led the group to conclude that radio tracking would 
be needless.34 
Whipple then approached the National Science Foundation begging it 
to finance a ccnference on the technical gains to be expected from a satellite 
and from “the instrumentation that should be designed well in advance of 
the advent of an active satellite vehicle.” The Foundation, he noted some 
months later, was favorable to the idea but in 1954 took no action upon it.35 
Commander Hoover fared better. He took the proposal to Admiral Fred- 
erick R. Furth of the Office of Naval Research and with the admiral’s 
approval then discussed the division of labor with General H. T. Toftoy 
and von Braun at Redstone Arsenal. The upshot was an agreement that the 
Army should design and construct the booster system, the Navy take re- 
sponsibility for the satellite, tracking facilities, and the acquisition and anal- 
ysis of data. No one at ONR had consulted the Naval Research Laboratory 
about the plan. In November 1954 a full description of the newly named 
Project Orbiter was sent for critical examination and comment to 
Emmanuel R. Piore, chief scientist of ONR, and to the government-owned 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena which handled much of the Army 
Ballistic Missile Agency’s research. Before the end of the year, the Office of 
Naval Research had let three contracts totaling $60,000 for feasibility anal- 
yses or design of components for subsystems. Called a “no-cost satellite,” 
Orbiter was to be built largely from existing 
At this point it is necessary to examine the course scientific thought had 
been taking among physicists of the National Academy and American uni- 
versities, for in the long run it was their recommendations that would most 
immediately affect governmental decisions about a satellite program. This 
phase of the story opens in spring 1950, at an informal gathering at James 
Van Allen’s home in Silver Spring, Maryland. The group invited by Van 
Allen to meet with the eminent British geophysicist Sydney Chapman con- 
sisted of Lloyd Berkner, head of the new Brookhaven National Laboratory 
on Long Island, S. Fred Singer, J. Wallace Joyce, a geophysicist with the 
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A Redstone rocket on the static-firing test stand at th'e Army 
Ballistic Missile Agency, Huntsville, Alabama. 
Navy BuAer and adviser to the Department of State, and Ernest H. Vestine 
of the Department of Terrestrial Magnetism of the Carnegie Institution. 
As they talked of how to obtain simultaneous measurements and observa- 
tions of the earth and the upper atmosphere from a distance above the 
earth, Berkner suggested that perhaps staging another International Polar 
Year would be the best way. His companions immediately responded enthu- 
siastically. Berkner and Chapman then developed the idea further and put 
it into form to present to the International Council of Scientific Unions. 
The first International Polar Year had established the precedent of inter- 
national scientific cooperation in 1882 when scientists of a score of nations 
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Meeting on Project Orbiter, 17 March 1955 in Washington, D. C.: left to 
right, seated, Commander George W .  Hoover, Ofice of Naval Research; 
Frederick C. Durant ZZZ, Arthur D. Little, Znc.; James B. Kendrick, 
Aerophysics Development Corp.; William A .  Giardini, Alabama Tool and 
Die; Philippe W .  Newton, Department of Defense; Rudolf H.  Schlidt, 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA); Gerhard Heller, ABMA; Wernher 
von Braun, ABMA. Standing-Lieutenant Commander William E. 
Dowdell, USN; Alexander Satin, O N R ;  Commander Robert C. Truax, 
USN; Liston Tatum, International Business Machines (ZBM); Austin W .  
Stanton, Varo, Inc.; Fred L. Whipple, Harvard Observatory; George W .  
Petri, ZBM; Lowell 0. Anderson, Ofice of Naval Research; Milton W .  
Rosen, Naval Research Laboratory. (Smithsonian Znstitution photo.) 
agreed to pool their efforts for a year in studying polar conditions. A second 
International Polar Year took place in 1932. Berkner's proposal to shorten 
the interval to 25 years was timely because 1957-1958, astronomers knew, 
would be a period of maximum solar activity?' European scientists sub- 
scribed to the plan. In 1952 the International Council of Scientific Unions 
appointed a committee to make arrangements, extended the scope of the 
study to the whole earth, not just the polar regions, fixed the duration at 
eighteen months, and then renamed the undertaking the International 
Geophysical Year, shortened in popular speech to IGY. It eventually em- 
braced sixty-seven nations.38 
In the International Council of Scientific Unions the National Academy 
of Sciences had always been the adhering body for the United States. The 
Council itself, generally called ICSU, was and is the headquarters unit of a 
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nongovernmental international association of scientific groups such as the 
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, the International Union 
of Pure and Applied Physics, the International Scientific Radio Union, and 
others. When plans were afoot for international scientific programs which 
needed governmental support, Americans of the National Academy natu- 
rally looked to the National Science Foundation for federal funds. Relations 
between the two organizations had always been cordial, the Foundation 
often turning for advice to the Academy and its secretariat, the National 
Research Council, and the Academy frequently seeking financing for proj- 
ects from the Foundation. At the end of 1952 the Academy appointed a 
United States National Committee for the IGY headed by Joseph Kaplan 
to plan for American participation. The choice of Kaplan as chairman 
strengthened the position of men interested in the upper atmosphere and 
outer space. 
During the spring of 1953 the United States National Committee 
drafted a statement which the International Council later adopted, listing 
the fields of inquiry which IGY programs should encompasvceanographic 
phenomena, polar geography, and seismology, for example, and, in the 
celestial area, such matters as solar activity, sources of ionizing radiations, 
cosmic rays, and their effects upon the atm0sphere.3~ In the course of the 
year the Science Foundation granted $27,000 to the IGY committee for 
planning, but in December, when Hugh Odishaw left his post as assistant to 
the director of the Bureau of Standards to become secretary of the National 
Committee, it was still uncertain how much further support the government 
would give IGY programs. Foundation resources were limited. Although in 
August Congress had removed the $15,000,000 ceiling which the original act 
had placed on the Foundation’s annual budget, the appropriation voted for 
FY 1954 had totaled only $8 million. In view of the Foundation’s other 
commitments, that sum seemed unlikely to allow for extensive participation 
in the IGY. In January 1954 the National Conimittee asked for a total of 
$13 million. Scientists’ hopes rose in March when President Eisenhower 
announced that, in contrast to the $100 million spent in 1940 on federal 
support of research and development, he was submitting a $2-billion re- 
search and development budget to Congress for FY 1955, Hope turned to 
gratification in June when Congress authorized for the IGY an over-all 
expenditure of $13 million as requested and in August voted for FY 1955 
an appropriation of $2 million to the National Science Foundation for IGY 
preparati~ns.~O 
Thus reassured, the representatives from the National Academy set out 
in the late summer for Europe and the sessions of the International Scien- 
tific Radio Union, known as URSI, and the International Union of Geodesy 
and Geophysics, IUGG. As yet none of the nations pledged to take part in 
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the IGY had committed itself to definite projects. The U.S.S.R. had not yet 
joined at all, although Russian delegates attended the meetings. Before the 
meetings opened, Lloyd V. Berkner, president of the Radio Union and vice 
president of ComitC SpCciale de 1’Annke GCophysique Internationale 
(CSAGI) set up two small informal committees under the chairmanship of 
Fred Singer and Homer E. Newell, Jr., respectively, to consider the scien- 
tific utility of a satellite. The National Academy’s earlier listing of IGY 
objectives had named problems requiring exploration but had not suggested 
specific means of solving them. For years physicists and geodesists had talked 
wistfully of observing the earth and its celestial environment from above 
the atmosphere. Now, Berkner concluded, was the time to examine the 
possibility of acting upon the idea. Singer was an enthusiast who inclined to 
brush aside technical obstacles. Having presented MOUSE the preceding 
year and shared in planning Project Orbiter, he was a persuasive proponent 
of an IGY satellite program. Newell of NRL was more conservative, but he 
too stressed to IUGG the benefits to be expected from a successful launching 
of an instrumented “bird,” the theme that he incorporated in his later essay 
for the American Rocket Society. URSI and IUGG both passed resolutions 
favoring the scheme. But CSAGI still had to approve. And there were 
potential difficulties. 
Hence on the eve of the CSAGI meeting in Rome, Berkner invited ten 
of his associates to his room at the Hotel Majestic to review the pros and 
cons, to make sure, as one man put it, that the proposal to CSAGI was not 
just a “pious resolution” such as Newton could have submitted to the Royal 
Society. The group included Joseph Kaplan, U.S. National Committee 
chairman, Hugh Odishaw, committee secretary, Athelstan Spilhaus, Dean 
of the University of Minnesota’s Institute of Technology, Alan H. Shapley 
of the National Bureau of Standards, Harry Wexler of the Weather Bureau, 
Wallace Joyce, Newell, and Singer. The session lasted far into the night. 
Singer outlined the scientific and technical problems-the determination of 
orbits, the effects of launching errors, the probable life of the satellite, 
telemetering and satellite orientation, receiving stations, power supplies, 
and geophysical and astrophysical applications of data. Newell, better 
versed than some of the others in the technical difficulties to be overcome, 
pointed out that satellite batteries might bubble in the weightless environ- 
ment of space, whereupon Spilhaus banged his fist and shouted: “Then we’ll 
get batteries that won’t!’’ Singer’s presentation was exciting, but the ques- 
tion remained whether an artificial body of the limited size and weight a 
rocket could as yet put into orbit could carry enough reliable instrumen- 
tation to prove of sufficient scientific value to warrant the cost; money and 
effort poured into that project would not be available for other research, 
and to attempt to build a big satellite might be to invite defeat. 
22 
Both Berkner and Spilhaus spoke of the political and psychological 
prestige that would accrue to the nation that first launched a man-made 
satellite. As everyone present knew, A. N. Nesmeyanov of the Soviet Acad- 
emy of Sciences had said in November 1953 that satellite launchings and 
moon shots were already feasible; and with Tsiolkovskiy’s work now recog- 
nized by Western physicists, the Americans had reason to believe in Russian 
scientific and technological capabilities. In March 1954 Moscow Radio had 
exhorted Soviet youth to prepare for space exploration, and in April the 
Moscow Air Club had announced that studies in interplanetary flight were 
beginning. Very recently the U.S.S.R. had committed itself to IGY partici- 
pation. While the American scientists in September 1954 did not discount 
the possible Russian challenge, some of them insisted that a satellite experi- 
ment must not assume such emphasis as to cripple or halt upper atmosphere 
research by means of sounding rockets. The latter was an established useful 
technique that could provide, as a satellite in orbit could not, measurements 
at a succession of altitudes in and above the upper atmosphere, measure- 
ments along the vertical instead of the horizontal plane. Nevertheless 
at the end of the six-hour session, the group unanimously agreed to urge 
CSAGI to endorse an IGY satellite project.*l 
During the CSAGI meeting that followed, the Soviet representatives 
listened to the discussion but neither objected, volunteered comment, nor 
asked questions. On 4 October CSAGI adopted the American proposal: 
“In view,” stated that body, 
of the great importance of observations during extended periods of time 
of extra-terrestrial radiations and geophysical phenomena in the upper at- 
mosphere, and in view of the advanced state of present rocket tech- 
niques, CSAGI recommends that thought be given to the launching 
of small satellite vehicles, to their scientific instrumentation, and to the 
new problems associated with satellite experiments, such as power supply, 
telemetering, and orientation of the vehic1e.a 
What had long seemed to most of the American public as pure Jules Verne 
and Buck Rogers fantasy now had the formal backing of the world’s most 
eminent scientists. 
Thus by the time the United States Committee for the IGY appointed 
a Feasibility Panel on Upper Atmosphere Research, three separate, albeit 
interrelated, groups of Americans were concerned with a possible earth sat- 
ellite project: physicists, geodesists, and astronomers intent on basic re- 
search; officers of the three armed services looking for scientific means to 
military ends; and industrial engineers, including members of the American 
Rocket Society, who were eager to see an expanding role for their compa- 
nies. The three were by no means mutually exclusive. The dedicated scien- 
tist, for instance, in keeping with Theodore von KPrmin’s example as a 
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founder and official of the Aerojet General Corporation, might also be a 
shareholder in a research-orientated electronics or aircraft company, just as 
the industrialist might have a passionate interest in pure as well as applied 
science, and the military man might share the intellectual and practical in- 
terests of both the others. Certainly all three wanted improvements in 
equipment for national defense. Still the primary objective of each group 
differed from those of the other two. These differences were to have subtle 
effects on Vanguard’s development. Although to some people the role of the 
National Academy appeared to be that of a Johnny-come-lately, the impel- 
ling force behind the satellite project nevertheless was the scientist speaking 
through governmental and quasi-governmental bodies. 
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4 
SEEKING GOVERNMENT 
SUPPORT FOR A 
SATELLITE PROGRAM 
NINE and a half years after studies of an artificial satellite bad begun in the 
United States, top level government officials gave the idea serious consider- 
ation. Indeed until then few of them had had more than fleeting exposure 
to the seemingly extravagant notion of creating a man-made moon. Due, 
however, to interest in plans for the IGY, matters came to a head in the first 
half of 1955. In January, Radio Moscow announced that a satellite launch- 
ing might be expected in the not distant future. In Washington, while the 
National Science Foundation was examining the American Rocket Society’s 
plea and copies of the Orbiter proposal were going the rounds in the De- 
fense Department, the National Academy’s IGY Committee, having spent 
the autumn in sounding out American scientific opinion, set up a Technical 
Panel on Rocketry, consisting of Kaplan, Qdishaw, Newell, Singer, Spilhaus, 
Whipple, Van Allen, Nathaniel Gerson, Bernhard Haurwitz of the Acad- 
emy’s Meteorology Panel, and Gerhardt F. Schilling of the IGY staff. At the 
first meeting in late January 1955 the panel created a special study group 
called the Subcommittee on the Technical Feasibility of a Long Playing 
Rocket, that is, a satellite. The name coined by Joseph Kaplan not only was 
descriptive but also provided protective coloration, a safeguard against pre- 
mature publicity about a plan the Academy might decide to reject. 
Why further studies of feasibility seemed necessary to the panel may at 
first puzzle the layman, inasmuch as over the years feasibility reports had 
accumulated steadily at the Pentagon. But not more than five or six men at 
the Academy had ever seen the earlier Navy and RAND studies. Besides, 
who could be sure that what would suffice for a military satellite would also 
do for a scientific one? And, as Homer Newell observed, there was feasibility 
and feasibility. It depended upon the scale of the plan and the effort to be 
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expended-factors related to costs and to expected rewards. The American 
delegates who thrashed over the problem in Rome had not seen entirely 
eye to eye about how much or how little was worth trying for and what 
would be attainable within the eighteen-month span of the IGY, July 1957 
through December 1958. Hence the “LPR’ subcommittee to appraise the 
details of the evidence.l 
William H. Pickering, director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at 
Cal Tech, John W. Townsend, assistant head of NRL’s Rocket Sonde 
Branch, and Milton Rosen of Viking fame, who composed the LPR sub- 
committee, were to report to the panel before 10 March 1955 on the feasi- 
bility and “geophysical possibilities” of an LPR, on the needed controls, the 
engine, the desired orbit, manpower requirements, and estimated costs. 
Three men better qualified for the job would have been hard to find. All 
three had served on the Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel at 
White Sands and were familiar with the engineering problems involved in 
rocketry and with most, if not all, of the satellite plans prepared to date. 
Pickering had seen the Project Orbiter proposal at, JPL, and Townsend and 
Rosen had studied it when the Office of Naval Research sent a copy 
for review to NRL’s Atmosphere and Astrophysics Division and its Rocket 
Development Branch. 
In the course of the investigation undertaken for the Air Force in 1954 
on guided missile reentry into the atmosphere, Rosen, Townsend, and other 
NRL rocket specialists had gone a long way toward solving the problem of 
putting a satellite into orbit.2 After examining the Army-ONR satellite 
plan, they concluded they could offer something better, a system which 
would obviate the weaknesses of Orbiter’s low injection altitude, lack of 
guidance, the dubious reliability of the upper stages, and the dependence on 
optical tracking. Long after the event, critics would imply that NRL was 
guilty of reprehensible oneupmanship. The authors of the plan based on 
the Viking rocket believed, however, ’that the better should always super- 
sede the inferior, and they had on hand the design studies made for the 
Air Force. Rosen, moreover, had discussed the NRL idea with the chief 
scientist of the Office of Naval Research who, while pointing out that ONR 
was at least partly committed to the Redstone launching scheme, saw the 
advantages of an alternative and encouraged Rosen and his associates to 
complete their counter proposal. The NRL scheme of a three-stage Iaunch- 
er, an instrumented satellite, and an electronic tracking system was taking 
form while the LPR subcommittee was drafting its recommendations for 
the Academy’s rocketry panel? 
Members of the LPR subcommittee had made it clear to the panel 
from the beginning that they were not prepared to advocate any one satel- 
lite plan over any other. In a preliminary report in early February 1955 
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they declared that existing propulsion systems, if given somewhat more 
power, could lift a ten-pound payload to the necessary altitude, and existing 
control and guidance components, “after an appreciable amount of develop- 
ment work,” could direct the bird into orbit. If enough competent men and 
enough money were assigned to the task, the feat could be accomplished 
within two or three years. On 9 March the panel and subcommittee pre- 
pared their findings to present to the United States National Committee the 
next day. Rosen, speaking for the subcommittee, pointed out that any one of 
three launching techniques would suffice for an LPR: that is, a large single- 
stage rocket, of which three were already available, could release “a number 
of small rockets at or near the top of the flight path,” a method which would 
require guidance accuracy to within a one degree arc; or, second, a two- or 
three-stage launcher, though more difficult to guide accurately, could carry a 
large instrumented payload; or, third, around the most powerful engine 
then under development a new test vehicle could be built which would have 
the capability of putting into orbit a much bigger satellite with many more 
elaborate scientific measuring devices. The drawback in the last lay in the 
amount of time and study that would be needed to design, construct, and test 
the vehicle. Unbeknownst to some panel members, these three possibilities 
bore fairly close resemblance to Orbiter, to NRL’s as yet uncompleted 
proposal, and to a system calling for use of the Air Force’s only partly 
developed Atlas rocket. The Air Force at that moment was just beginning to 
solicit design studies for a military satellite. 
The panel was concerned only with making sure that hope was not 
beclouding judgment on the feasibility of a satellite big enough and well 
enough equipped with instruments to transmit scientifically useful data 
during the IGY. Spilhaus, to be sure, arguing that “we must crawl before 
we walk,” thought instrumentation unimportant in a first man-made satel- 
lite; study of the orbital pattern would supply scientists with ample data to 
begin with. His associates considered him overdautious. Whipple remarked 
that a one-pound satellite would be valueless, too small to be observable 
from the ground; a ten-pound, on the contrary, about twenty inches in 
diameter painted white or with reflecting surfaces would be optically visible 
at twilight and dawn and trackable by binoculars and telescopic camera. 
In an equatorial orbit with a 250-mile perigee, its closest point to earth, 
and a 500-mile apogee, the most distant, a ten-pound instrumented body 
could relay by radio data which would enable scientists to make precise ob- 
servations of the orbit, fix intercontinental distances to within one hundred 
feet, and determine the mass and density distribution of the earth’s crust. 
Newell, concurring in Whipple’s view that a solar or a nuclear power sup- 
ply would be impractical for the next three years, described a recent NRL 
engineering study of instrumentation for a fifteen-inch, thirty- to fifty- 
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pound satellite in equatorial orbit. The outcome of the panel’s discussion 
was a unanimous endorsement of a satellite project and the conclusion that 
use of the second launching technique named and a thirty-pound instru- 
mented orbiting body held the most promise of success. The estimate of 
costs was vague.* 
The report reached the Executive Committee of the United States Na- 
tional Committee (USNC) on 10 March. What response it would evoke was 
uncertain, for a good many Academy officials and some at the Science Foun- 
dation had misgivings about the wisdom of including the project in the 
American IGY program. One reason was the risk involved in having to de- 
pend on a totally untried research technique; if, the judgment of the LPR 
group and the panel notwithstanding, the launching attempts failed to put 
a satellite in orbit, the United States would have invested a large sum of 
money only to win ridicule and taxpayers’ censure. Any such outcome would 
also weaken congressional confidence in the National Science Foundation. 
Second was the likelihood that so spectacular a project, if adopted, would 
overshadow every other part of the IGY, thereby ,belittling undertakings of 
equal scientific importance, albeit, in Hugh Odishaw’s words, with “less 
sex appeal.” Third was the possibility that, in spite of the USNC’s every 
effort, the project might take on a military aura that would conflict with 
IGY purposes.6 
In accord with Academy policy, the IGY secretariat always kept itself 
out of the limelight, in a position of anonymity, but people in close touch 
with Academy affairs were aware that Hugh Odishaw played a large part 
in preventing the satellite proposal from dropping out of sight amid the 
flurry of planning for more orthodox IGY programs. He was constantly on 
the scene, as committee members were not, and he carried on most of the 
IGY correspondence. Trained both as a humanist and as an engineer, the 
Executive Secretary believed Academy policymakers must carefully examine 
the satellite scheme along with the rbcket experts’ recommendations. The  
moment had now come for the IGY Committee to support or bury the plan. 
The official minutes of the Executive Committee meeting were cryptic. 
Containing no hint of any controversial discussion, they merely recorded the 
committee decision: to ask for ten thirty- to fifty-pound instrumented satel- 
lites in hopes of getting up five that could circle the earth for at least two 
weeks at an altitude of 250 miles in an equatorial orbit. That program 
would require five ground stations and the services of twenty-five scientists. 
The costs would probably run to over $7 million. Joseph Kaplan then dis- 
patched letters to the Academy’s president, Detlev Bronk, and to Alan T. 
Waterman, head of the Science Foundation, stating the reasons for request- 
ing government support for such a project. Kaplan’s letter opened with an 
explanation that a fifty-pound “bird” which international agencies could 
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inspect before launching and track while in flight would be in accord with 
the CSAGI recommendation of 4 October 1954. Kaplan quoted that resolu- 
tion in full. In concluding he wrote: “The Executive Committee of the 
U.S. National Committee, basing its opinion on the study of the expert 
panel on rocketry, feels that a small artificial satellite for geophysical pur- 
poses is feasible during the IGY if action is initiated promptly, and that 
realization of such a satellite would give promise of yielding results of 
geophysical interest.” 
While counting on the United States Treasury to foot the bills for this 
difficult undertaking, the Executive Committee foresaw that the organiza- 
tional ramifications of authority and responsibility always to be expected in 
government offices were likely to be more complex than usual. If intricate 
crisscrossing of bureaucratic channels later observable inspired academics to 
wish that a private organization, untrammeled by the checks and balances 
that attend government operations, had taken sole charge, that arrangement 
was from the first patently impossible. Costs alone would pose a nearly 
insuperable obstacle. Men attached to the Academy’s National Committee 
would naturally determine what data were most wanted and would assign to 
qualified scientists the task of designing and making the satellite and the 
instruments necessary to obtain the desired information. But the launching 
vehicle inevitably would come within the purview of the Department of 
Defense and hence under DoD security regulations. Moreover, use of a mil- 
itary launching site, a virtual necessity, would mean government surveil- 
lance. Yet under government sponsorship the circuitous chain of command 
and the number of federal agencies that would be involved were bound to 
create delays, regardless of which agency or who took charge. In the spring 
of 1955 the mere mechanics of getting government acceptance were elabo- 
rate. 
Since over five months had already elapsed since announcement of the 
CSAGI resolution, the Executive Committee, chose to start negotiations 
without waiting for formal USNC endorsement. Detlev Bronk, as president 
of the Academy, and Alan Waterman, as director of the National Science 
Foundation, were to make the first overtures. Because the launching of an 
instrument-carrying earth satellite would be expensive, and because, as a 
contribution to the IGY, it would entail sharing information with other 
nations, approval of the plan had to come from the President of the United 
States. Before he made a decision, the proposal would have to undergo the 
scrutiny of the Science Foundation’s National Science Board, and, as an 
enterprise that might affect foreign relations, would have to receive the 
blessings of the Department of State. Next the President would consult his 
Scientific Advisory Committee at the White House, his special assistants on 
Security Affiirs and Economic Affairs, the directors of CIA and the Bureau 
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of the Budget, and the National Security Council. Once convinced that the 
undertaking was worth the risks, the President would decide what agency 
should do what. Even if a special appropriation were unnecessary, probably 
Congress would later have to vote money to the Science Foundation for the 
project. Although the Executive Committee of the USNC was anxious to 
have matters settled before the beginning of the new fiscal year on 1 July, 
there was nothing to do but present the case, explain the whys and where- 
fores, and then wait. Optimists at the Academy hoped that a forceful presen- 
tation would persuade the President not only to support the venture but to 
give it the standing of a major national enterprise comparable to a Manhat- 
tan Project. 
Waterman and Bronk lost no time in getting in touch with the key 
people. On 22 March the two men, accompanied by Lloyd Berkner, ac- 
quainted Robert Murphy of the Department of State with the project and 
asked for the department’s approval. They then took the Academy’s recom- 
mendation to the White House and awakened President Eisenhower’s 
interest in it. A conference with Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson fol- 
lowed. Wilson, averse to all military excursions into basic research, was 
unenthusiastic but referred the proposition to his Assistant Secretary for 
Research and Development, Donald Quarles. Quarles already had before 
him a copy of the Orbiter proposal, a note from the Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Air commenting favorably upon it, and two memoranda of 3 
March forwarded from the NRL Rocket Development Branch, one memo 
written by Milton Rosen describing the utility of an M-10 Viking as a 
satellite launcher and one entitled “Proposal for Minimum Trackable Sat- 
ellite (Minitrack) ” prepared by John T. Mengel and Roger Easton. At the 
same time, as Secretary Quarles knew, the Air Force had in progress plans 
€or a military satellite using the Atlas or the Titan long-range ballistic 
missile. Confronted with three service schemes, Quarles secured from Sec- 
retary Wilson instructions to commit no funds to any of the three until the 
General Sciences Coordinating Committee had reviewed the situation. The 
completed NRL proposal combining the data contained in the two memos 
of early March was in the hands of the Coordinating Committee by mid- 
April. 
Discussions with Alan Waterman, however, had strengthened Quarles’ 
convictions that one plan or another was worth pursuing. When the Coordi- 
nating Committee, with representatives on it from all three services, recom- 
mended support for each of the three projects and a reappraisal at the end 
of six months, Quarles rejected the arrangement as wasteful. Instead he 
appointed an ad hoc Group on Special Capabilities composed of eight dis- 
tinguished civilian scientists to assess the relative merits of the proposals, 
if and when the President decided to proceed. The group met once in early 
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May to map out a work schedule, but then waited for a green light from the 
White House.’ 
On 6 May the Science Foundation received from Kaplan of the USNC’s 
Executive Committee its estimated budget of $9,734,500 for “ (i) approxi- 
mately ten ’birds’ and five observation stations, including the necessary 
scientific instrumentation, related equipment, and minimum civilian scien- 
tific staff and . . . (ii) approximately ten vehicles and their associated flight 
instrumentation. Cost estimates for (i) are $2,234,500; for (ii) $7,500,000.” 
The committee had come to believe that item (ii) ought to be part of the 
IGY budget in order to emphasize the nonmilitary nature of the program, to 
minimize classification problems, and to keep clear lines of demarcation 
between the National Committee and the Department of Defense. The $7.5 
million for the ten vehicles was to include “procurement, construction, and 
necessary system design and development.” The other $2,234,500 was to 
cover “procurement, construction and design relating to the ‘birds’ and ob- 
serving equipment.” The committee felt it ought to have the money by 1 
July, inasmuch as the USNC had made its original recommendations con- 
tingent upon starting the program “promptly.” 
When the National Committee met on 18 May, Merle Tuve of the Car- 
negie Institution, to the consternation of some committee members, objected 
to the proposition: it would entangle the Academy in Defense security 
regulations, thereby barring the free exchange of data with other nations 
and defeating the very purposes of the IGY; the program was !ikely to net 
scientists too little information to justify the risk of unwholesome political 
repercussions throughout the world. Supported by Lloyd Berkner’s elo- 
quent defense of the plan, his associates overrode Tuve: they concluded that 
under Science Foundation and Academy sponsorship the program would re- 
main civilian in nature and would prove rewarding. But Eisenhower, torn 
between his loyalty to Secretary Wilson and his profound respect for Water- 
man and Quarles, still hesitated.* How would Congress and American 
taxpayers respond to news that the United States proposed to spend millions 
of dollars to obtain information that it would then give free to other nations, 
Iron Curtain countries included? 
In mid-May a military evaluation prepared by Quarles’ staff reached the 
President’s special assistant, Nelson A. Rockefeller, and, with Rockefeller’s 
comments appended, went to the Secretary of the Treasury, the directors of 
CIA and the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and then the National Security Council. Under the heading “General 
Considerations,” the paper noted that “recent studies” within the Defense 
Department indicated that an adaptation of existing rocket components 
could launch a five- to ten-pound satellite before the end of 1958; a panel of 
the President’s Scientific Advisory Committee had declared such a program 
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warranted partly because of its scientific merit but especially because it 
would test “Freedom of Space” as a principle of international law. “On 
April 15, 1955,” the exposition stated, 
the Soviet Government announced that a permanent high-level, interde- 
partmental commission for interplanetary communications had been created 
in the Astronomics Council of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. A group 
of Russia’s top scientists is now believed to be working on a satellite 
program. In September 1954 the Soviet Academy announced the estab- 
lishment of the Tsiolkovsky Gold Medal which would be awarded every 
three years for outstanding work in the field of interplanetary 
communications. 
A scientific satellite should furnish data on air drag at extreme altitudes by 
means of observation and analysis of the orbital decay, and on “the shape of 
and gravitational field of the earth.” Information obtainable on the ion con- 
tent of the ionosphere, moreover, should benefit missile research and de- 
fense communications. An annex to the paper noted that a small satellite 
would not serve for military surveillance, but a successful orbiting would be 
a step toward that goal.g 
Rockefeller’s memorandum gave the proposal ‘enthusiastic endorsement. 
“I am impressed,” he wrote, “by the costly consequences of allowing the 
Russian initiative to outrun ours through an achievement that will symbol- 
ize scientific and technological advancement to people everywhere. The 
stake of prestige that is involved makes this a race that we cannot afford to 
lose.” The more guarded military comment spoke of “considerable prestige 
and psychological benefits” for the nation that was first successful since a 
demonstration of such advanced technology and its “unmistakable relation- 
ship to intercontinental ballistic missile technology might have important 
repercussions on the political determination of free world countries to resist 
Communist threats.” The military appraisal subtly conveyed the impression 
that the Soviets were unlikely to outstrip the United States in a satellite 
endeavor. Both statements, however, underscored the idea that here would 
be a race between the two nations. Post-Sputnik declarations that the 
United States was not racing with the U.S.S.R. obviously ignored the points 
of view expressed at the White House level in May 1955.1° The United 
States, Rockefeller argued, should promptly announce to the world that it 
was embarking upon a scientific project the results of which would be made 
available to all nations. At the same time, to fend off any Russian attempt to 
label the satellite a threat to peace, the announcement must stress that mili- 
tary missions were not involved. Lest the Soviets claim to have already 
launched a satellite or to be working on one with a shorter timetable for 
launching, the American government must publicize its plans quickly. Con- 
current with the development of a small, simple satellite, the United States 
should pursue work on a more sophisticated type so that the U.S.S.R. could 
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not undercut American prestige by putting a bigger, more impressive body 
into orbit on the heels of the American. 
The initial presentation declared that government support for a scien- 
tific satellite and recognition of its peaceful purposes must not prejudice 
freedom of action to develop military satellites. Nor should the project delay 
major defense programs. “The satellite itself and much information as to 
its orbit would be public information; the means of launching would be 
classified.” Development of the vehicle would probably cost $10 to $15 
million, the tracking equipment $2.5 million, and the logistics for launch- 
ing and tracking another $2.5 million, all told $15 to $20 million. Quarles’ 
staff, after examining the USNC Executive Committee’s figures, had delib- 
erately doubled them. As the size, complexity, and longevity of the satellite 
and the duration of the scientific observation program would affect costs, the 
staff paper noted that the total might well run higher than the estimate. 
The $15 to $20 million excluded the costs of research and development 
work that was already part of military programs. Orbiter and Viking both 
held promise, but exploratory studies should go forward on a backup pro- 
gram based upon the Air Force Atlas missile and the Aerobee research rocket. 
A technical annex analyzed in somewhat greater detail the scientific and 
military value of the proposed project. While the amount of information a 
satellite might supply would depend on its size and “whether” it could carry 
instruments, precise observation of the orbital path of even a small, inert, 
body should give data on air density, pressure, and temperatures at high 
altitudes-information important for both manned aircraft and missiles- 
and at the same time furnish more exact knowledge about the shape of the 
earth. From an instrumented satellite accurate data should be forthcoming 
on the position of the continents, the gravitational constants over long dis- 
tances, the earth’s semimajor axis, and the rate of the earth’s rotation. Or- 
ganizing and operating any satellite launching should give missile crews 
useful experience. Research in electronic tracking would promote the devel- 
opment of antimissile missiles, since the satellite would have the speed and 
altitude of an ICBM. Optical tracking, though cheaper, would be possible 
only in clear weather and then only during a few minutes at dawn and a few 
at dusk. 
Some explanation followed about the advantages of an orbital plane 
inclined about thirty-five degrees to the equator in contrast to a polar orbit. 
With a 200-mile perigee and a 1,000-mile apogee, the satellite would circle 
the earth in about ninety minutes. A polar orbit would require observation 
stations in the arctic regions, whereas launching at an inclination to the 
equator from the Air Force Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral, Florida, 
would permit the use of tracking stations at the Navy centers at Point Mugu 
and Inyokern, California, White Sands, and the British-Australian Guided 
Missile Range at Woomera, Australia, as well as the numerous astronomical 
observatories located in the free world. More important, an eastward 
launching in an approximate equatorial orbit would impart about one 
thousand additional miles per hour to the orbital speed, a gain ensured by 
the eastward rotation of the earth. Cape Caraveral, furthermore, provided 
an opportunity to launch over a 5,000-mile stretch of the Atlantic Ocean and 
thus minimize the hazards to human life; if, after the rocket burned out, the 
booster case did not disintegrate or burn up, it would fall harmlessly into 
the sea. 
Most of the arguments for supporting a satellite project rested 
throughout on the premise that relatively minor modifications of existing 
rockets would suffice for the launches. In the ensuing discussion White 
House advisers weighed the dangers of having development of the vehicle 
interfere with the ballistic missile program and of -spending an excessive 
amount of money on a comparatively unimportant venture. Consequently 
when on 26 May the Security Council endorsed a satellite program, the 
recommendation carried two conditions: the peaceful purposes of the 
undertaking must be stressed, and it must not interrupt work on inter- 
mediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.ll Although the formal 
memorandum put no specific ceiling on expenditures, the tacit relegation of 
the project to a secondary role and the vesting of overall responsibility for 
the launcher in the Secretary of Defense constituted safeguards against ex- 
travagent spending on a scientific will-o’-the-wisp. Moreover, some of the $13 
million authorized by Congress for the IGY might well go into the satellite 
program and thus lighten any monetary burden on the Department of De- 
fense. The endorsement in effect scaled down the project to far smaller 
dimensions than its staunchest advocates had hoped for, but the Academy 
proposal had at least escaped outright rejection. With all official obstacles 
now apparently removed, a start on the great experiment had to wait only 
for a decision about which launching system to use and who was to take 
charge. 
The choice of launching plan lay with Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Quarles, for in a secret directive of 8 June Secretary Wilson delegated to 
him “responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the scientific 
satellite program within the Department of Defense.” Informal conversa- 
tions between Waterman and Quarles during April and May had produced 
a tentative agreement on a division of labor whereby the DoD was to pro- 
vide the rocket, launching facilities, and that somewhat vaguely all-inclusive 
commodity known as “logistic support,” while the IGY National Committee 
took charge of choosing the experiments and of devising and procuring the 
satellite instrumentation, the satellite shell, and the scientific equipment for 
the observation stations. The Science Foundation was to be the official inter- 
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Homer J .  Stewart. 
mediary between the Academy and the Pentagon. If, as KapIan’s letter of 6 
May to Waterman implied, the USNC would have preferred to keep control 
of the entire program, the National Research Council nevertheless welcomed 
the proposed arrangement, since the Academy could not with propriety 
serve as a governmental operating agency. And Quarles’ Advisory Group 
on Special Capabilities was now in a position to examine the alternative 
satellite plans and select the most suitable. Quarles himself had named two 
of the eight-man group, and the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force had each 
nominated two, but which service had chosen which members was never 
revealed.= 
Generally called the Stewart Committee for its chairman, Homer J. 
Stewart of the Jet PropuIsion Laboratory at the California Institute of 
Technology, the group included Charles 6. Lauritsen, an eminent physicist 
and, like Stewart, a professor at Cal Tech, Joseph Kaplan, chairman of the 
United States National Committee for the IGY, Richard Porter, consultant 
for Advanced Developments to the General Electric Company’s Missile Di- 
vision, George H. Clement of the RAND Corporation, Clifford C. Furrias, 
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Chancellor of the University of Buffalo, J. Barkley Rosser, rocket ballisti- 
cian and professor of mathematics at Cornel1 University, and Robert 
McMath, professor of astronomy and head of the McMath Hulbert Observ- 
atory at the University of Michigan. None of the committee saw the paper 
submitted to the Security Couricil or Nelson Rockefeller’s appraisal of the 
urgency of having the United States be first to launch a satellite, but every 
member knew of the Soviet’s interplanetary communications commission 
and was aware of what that might foreshadow. Instructed, however, to bear 
in mind that noninterference with ballistic missile development was imper- 
ative and to regard the satellite program as purely scientific rather than 
politically significant, the Stewart Committee logically could be expected to 
put less emphasis upon an early performance than upon the scientific con- 
tributions that would derive from the system chosen. Any successful launch- 
ing between 1 July 1957 and the end of 1958 would meet the IGY objective; 
what the satellite relayed back might well be more important than whether 
it began its orbiting in the autumn of 1957 or in 1958. In actuality, the staff 
of the Academy’s National Committee inclined tol attribute to the ad hoc 
group as a whole more interest in applied than in basic science-more con- 
cern, in short, for the solution of a technical problem than in the accumula- 
tion of fundamental scientific knowledge. 
Stewart, Lauritsen, Furnas, and Clement, together with Lieutenant 
Colonel George F. Brown and Alvin Waggoner of the Guided Missiles 
Committee staff of the DoD Research and Development Division, spent two 
days in late June at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena and a third 
day at the Air Force’s Western Development Division. The full committee 
met at the Pentagon on 6 July. After a morning of briefing by Quarles’ staff 
and a summary of “pertinent satellite studies” given by a RAND representa- 
tive, the committee met at the Naval Research Laboratory and heard the 
proposal entitled “A Scientific Satellite Program.” The Air Force and Army 
presentations came the next day. On 8 ’July, after an executive session, the 
committee visited the Glenn L. Martin plant to see the work layout on the 
Viking rocket, and to discuss with Martin engineers its adaptation to a 
satellite vehicle. On 9 July came a long conference with Army missile ex- 
perts from Redstone Arsenal during which Wernher von Braun spoke for 
two hours about Orbiter. From 20 to 23 July the committee hammered out 
a revised version of its first draft report, and on the 29th three members con- 
ferred with Quarles about a third draft.13 No critic then or later could 
accuse the group of making snap judgments. 
In the interim, while the USNC urged the Science Foundation to 
secure money from the Bureau of the Budget even before a $10-million 
appropriation bill for the IGY passed Congress on 30 June, Waterman 
briefed the President’s assistants and further discussed procedures and 
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responsibilities with Quarles. On 27 July at a morning session with the 
Foundation director and Under Secretary Herbert Hoover, Jr., as spokes- 
man for the Department of State, the President agreed to announce the 
United States satellite program on the 29th without waiting for the Stewart 
Committee’s choice of a launching system. Intelligence reports suggested 
that to postpone release of the news would be to risk having the U.S.S.R. 
make a similar announcement first. Joseph Kaplan immediately dispatched 
a letter to Sydney Chapman, president of CSAGI, telling him that the 
United States was about to act on the CSAGI recommendation.14 As 
Eisenhower’s press secretary James Hagerty wanted to dramatize the oc- 
casion, Waterman and-in the absence of President Bronk-the Academy’s 
executive officer Douglas Cornell acquiesced in Hagerty’s holding a secret 
preliminary press briefing at the White House on the 28th, followed by the 
public announcement the next morning and a press conference with TV 
and radio coverage that afternoon. The scientists stipulated, however, that 
no word of the President’s decision must leak out before they could notify 
the Secretary of CSAGI, Marcel Nicolet, in Brussels. T o  enable ICSU to 
hear the news at the same time as the American public!, Neil Carothers, 
Waterman’s assistant, caught a plane to New York that evening and turned 
over to a London-bound friend a letter containing the announcement for 
Dr. Bronk, who would transmit the message to Nicolet on the 29th. Until 
28 July, Dr. Waterman later estimated, not more than a hundred people 
had any inkling of the well-kept secret. 
Hagerty pulled all stops in his arrangements. Without mentioning the 
subject of the advance briefing, his invitation to White House correspond- 
ents merely hinted at an important revelation to come. At the opening of 
the two-hour session on the 28th, he described the satellite project briefly, 
whereupon the reporters rushed for the exits and the telephones outside, 
only to find the doors of the conference room locked. Hagerty was making 
sure that no one sprang the story before the next day’s official release of the 
news. He then called upon Waterman, Cornell, Alan Shapley, and Athelstan 
Spilhaus of the IGY committee to elaborate and answer questions about the 
plan. To the amusement of the scientists, that afternoon one irate news- 
paperman protested that he was a crime reporter; how was he to handle this 
scientific stuff? l6 
Hagerty’s statement of the next day ran: 
On behalf of the President, I am now announcing that the President 
has approved plans by this country for going ahead with the launching 
of small earth-circling satellites as part of the United States participation 
in the International Geophysical Year. . . . This program will for the 
first time in history enable scientists throughout the world to make sus- 
tained observations in the regions beyond the earth‘s atmosphere. 
The President expressed personal gratification that the American pro- 
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Principals at White House press conference, 28 July 1955, announcing U S .  
participation in the ZGY satellite program: left to right, seated, Alan T .  
Waterrnan, James C. Hagerty, S.  Douglas Cornell, and Alan H .  Shapley. 
Standing, J .  Wallace Joyce and Athelstan F.  Spilhaus. 
gram will provide scientists of all nations this important and unique op- 
portunity for the advancement of science. 
If some of Hagerty’s audience were discomfited at the confident tone of 
phrases like “will for the first time in history” and “will provide . . . unique 
opportunity,” the afternoon T V  and radio session enabled Cornell, Water- 
man, Spilhaus, and Shapley to allude to possible difficulties and still reassure 
listeners that the program involved no danger to world peace. Releases put 
out by the Secretary of Defense and jointly by the National Academy and the 
Science Foundation contained further specifics. The Pentagon statement 
summarized the fruits of space probes in the past, the advantages of a satel- 
lite which would circle the earth once every ninety minutes, and the plans 
to have the three armed services contribute their technical skills while other 
scientists determined the nature of the experiments to be undertaken. 
Bronk’s and Waterman’s release explained that although the Department 
of Defense would “provide the required equipment and facilities for 
launching the satellite,” the Academy and the National Science Foundation 
were sponsoring the program. A single succinct paragraph outlined the rea- 
sons for undertaking the project: 
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The atmosphere of the earth acts as a huge shield against many of 
the types of radiation and objects that are found in outer space. It pro- 
tects the earth from things which are known to be or might be harmful 
to human life, such as excessive ultra-violet radiation, cosmic rays, and 
those solid particles known as meteorites. At the same time, however, it 
deprives man of the opportunity to observe many of the things that could 
contribute to a better understanding of the universe. In order to acquire 
data that are presently unobtainable, it is most important that scientists 
be able to place instruments outside the earth’s atmosphere in such a 
way that they can make continuing records of the various properties about 
which information is desired. In the past vertical rocket flights to extreme 
altitudes have provided some of the desired information, but such flights 
are limited to very short periods of time. Only by the use of a satellite 
can sustained observations in both space and time be achieved. Such ob- 
servations will also indicate the conditions that would have to be met 
and the difficulties that would have to be overcome, if the day comes 
when man goes beyond the earth’s atmosphere in his travels.ls 
Four days later the Moscow press announced that the U.S.S.R. would 
put a satellite into orbit during the IGY. Furthermore, at the meeting of 
the International Astronautics Federation in Copenhagen, according to a 
story in the New York Herald Tribune of 3 August, a disthguished Russian 
physicist declared that the Soviet satellite would be launched in 1957 and 
would be much bigger than any the United States would attempt. Some 
Americans were alarmed, and some were disdainful about both nations’ 
announcements, but a greater number appeared to be more curious than 
uneasy. In Dr. Kaplan’s opinion, the record was now straight: 
The clear recognition of this program as that of the scientists of the 
nation as gathered into our [The Academy’s] Committee and Panel 
structure, aside from the hard facts of the matter stemming from their 
conception and intensive work on the program since October 5, 1954, 
provided, through the CSAGI, the international basis for friendly recep- 
tion of the program. I was glad to see, in the course of the announce- 
ment of the program and subsequent news inquiries, that much good use 
was made of the material prepared by our Committee, and particularly 
the material in the program budget document on LPR [long playing 
rocket]. This gave a good solid basis for our releases and comments. 
Fortunately for Dr. Kaplan’s peace of mind, he could not foresee that the 
budget by 1959 would have risen to eleven times the committee’s estimate. 
In the summer of 1955 most Americans wanted above all to know how the 
United States was going to accomplish this strange undertaking. On 3 
August 1955 the Stewart Committee itself had not agreed on the method.17 

3 
SELECTING A 
SATELLITE PLAN 
DAYS of discussion during July left the Stewart Committee divided about 
whether the Orbiter using the Army’s Redstone missile or the NRL satellite 
scheme based on the Viking rocket would best answer IGY purposes. The 
Air Force submitted a plan but only as a proposal that might be adopted if 
neither alternative were acceptable. The Air Force paper, containing nine- 
teen pages of text and twenty-one of drawings and charts, was an elaborate 
dissertation on the scientific information attainable from a 150-pound 
satellite if launched by the Atlas rocket then under development. Lieuten- 
ant Colonel R. F. Lang of the Air Research and Development Command in 
making the presentation explained that his service had chosen 150 pounds 
as a minimum payload; the Atlas would be powerful enough to put hun- 
dreds of pounds, “even thousands of pounds,” into orbit. The rocket held 
every promise of success and of growth possibilities, would use proven com- 
ponents and only two stages, would possess a low g factor, and would offer 
the advantage of simplicity of design. The Air Force, moreover, could 
supply full logistical support, and a preliminary estimate put the over-all 
cost at $16,350,000. But, Lang admitted, even if a minimim satellite were 
made part of the Atlas program, interference with the ICBM development 
would be inescapable because of competition for facilities, propulsion 
sources, and skilled personnel. Furthermore, the first launchings of Atlas-B 
were scheduled for January, February, and March 1958, by which time four 
launching stands and four assembly buildings would be available. At best 
that date would leave an uncomfortably narrow time margin for the IGY, 
and were the Air Force to take on responsibility for a satellite, flight tests of 
the rocket might have to be further p0stponed.l Homer Stewart remarked 
in 1963 that such caution had in actuality proved needless, but, at the time, 
the Air Force had every reason to fear delays in its ICBM developments. 
Under the circumstances the committee shelved the Atlas-B scheme.2 
41 
Atlas-J3 launch. 
The Army-ONR Orbiter proposal, dated 1 July 1955, offered a design 
considerably modified from the original scheme von Braun had tendered 
as a “Minimum Satellite Vehicle” in September 1954. As an alternative to 
the clusters of Loki rockets, von Braun and his associates had adopted a 
suggestion of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to use Sergeant solid-fuel 
rockets reduced in size to power the second, third, and fourth stages. Either 
configuration should be satisfactory. Other changes recommended by JPL 
and incorporated in the new version consisted of refinements in the engi- 
neering of the upper stages. Equally important, tacitly recognizing the 
“million-in-one chance” of locating a small body in the vast expanses of 
space by relying solely on optical equipment, the Orbiter team had 
added a provision for eIectronic tracking: it might employ either NRL’s 
“light, low-powered transmitter” and large radar directional antennas or 
else a device, upon which the Army’s Diamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratory 
was working, which would use Lincoln Laboratory radar and dipole an- 
tenna modified with a central coil. The Orbiter scheme still called initially 
for a satellite of only five pounds, although the launcher would be powerful 
enough to carry a much heavier payload. Estimated costs ran’ to $17,700,000, 
of which $6,400,000 would be for eight Redstone missiles for the first stage.3 
However inadequate this and the still smaller Air Force figure would look 
by 1958, both were less unrealistic than the $9,734,500 Kaplan mentioned 
to Waterman as sufficient for ten satellites and ten  launcher^.^ In the spring 
and summer of 1955 onIy guesses were possible about expenditures. 
The NRL presentation made no attempt to estimate total costs. While 
the proposal was explicit about the scientific advantages its orginators en- 
visaged, and in explaining the mathematical formulas upon which they based 
their calculations, data about the launching vehicle were more general than 
detailed. The plan called for a three-stage carrier capped by a twenty-inch- 
long instrumented cone as the satellite, but the text did not describe the 
mechanism for spinning and firing the second and third stages in flight or 
the device for separating the satellite from the third stage. After discussing 
the importance of analyzing the flight path in order to minimize possible 
errors in projection, the written proposal offered two alternative vehicle 
configurations. One comprised a M-10 Viking first stage and two solid- 
propellant stages, the other a liquid-liquid-solid combination consisting of 
the two-stage M-15 rocket and a solid-propellant third stage.6 
The M-10 was a modification of the Navy’s sounding rocket which had 
reached to over one hundred miles altitude in seven flights between 1950 
and June 1954. Stripped of fins and equipped with the General Electric 
Company’s Hermes power plant, the new version, NRL asserted, could at- 
tain an altitude of 216 miles with a tangential velocity of 5,060 feet a sec- 
ond. Much smaller than the Redstone, the M-10 would have a four-foot 
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diameter, a forty-foot length, and a dry weight of 2,250 pounds. The Glenn 
L. Martin Company had spent two years in studying the design and had 
prepared detailed drawings of what would be the smallest available vehicle 
that could serve as a first stage for a satellite. The small size made the M-10 
easily transportable by motor vehicle and reduced to a minimum the 
amount of logistic support needed. The Atlantic Research Corporation 
had designed the two solid-propellant stages, and both the Martin Company 
and NRL had scrutinized the plans and considered them sufficiently “con- 
servative” to permit developing and testing within the required time. This 
combination would put a forty-pound instrumented payload into orbit at a 
perigee of 216 miles unless an error in projection of the solid-propellant 
stages occurred; an 0.88O error would reduce perigee to 150 miles. A post- 
cutoff control system similar to that already in use in the Viking would tilt 
the carrier over to a predetermined angle to enter the circular orbit. 
Adoption of the second configuration would enable the vehicle to carry 
a forty-pound instrumented satellite into an elliptical orbit with a 303-mile 
perigee. The M-15 was the M-10 Viking with an Aerobee-Hi liquid-propel- 
lant second stage. As early as 1949 the Army’s Bumper-Wac, a liquid-fueled 
second-stage rocket fired by a V-2 in flight, had established the prac- 
ticability of that type of propulsion system. Under NRL scientific direction, 
the Aerojet General Corporation had spent two years in developing the 
Aerobee-Hi; the first flight was scheduled for August 1955. Since the angu- 
lar precision required to produce an orbit varies inversely with the altitude 
of projection, one major advantage this combination promised was the 
higher altitude of projection. At 200 miles, analysis showed, the toIerance 
would be 0.670; so that a very precise orienting mechanism would be neces- 
sary; at 300 miles the tolerance would be 2.0° and thus permit use of simple 
and more reliable orienting equipment. With the more efficient flight path 
made possible by the Aerobee-Hi, the two liquid stages would burn in 
succession; the second stage would coast to orbital altitude, be oriented, and 
then spin and fire the third stage. A disadvantage of the M-15 configura- 
tion, however, lay in its needing more time than would the M-10 for design 
and test of the second-stage controls. Whereas the latter would be ready to 
launch a first satellite two years after work began on the program, the M-15 
would have to have an additional six months. “Both configurations,” the 
statement noted, “could be carried forward simultaneousIy, since the M-10, 
the most expensive stage, is common to both. The liquid-liquid-solid com- 
bination appears to offer more in the way of growth potential.” 
As for contractors to produce the vehicle, the authors drew attention to 
the Glenn L. Martin Company’s nine years of experience in the design and 
production of Vikings and the company’s “many design and performance 
studies of satellite systems and components.” The Aerojet General Corpora- 
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tion was ready to supply the Aerobee-Hi for the second liquid-propellant 
stage, and the Atlantic Research Corporation had submitted designs for 
ARC solid-propellant second- and third-stage rockets. For “system contrac- 
tor,” the agency which would have primary responsibility for the entire 
program, the recommendation was that the Naval Research Laboratory 
take charge because of its long-term interest in and familiarity with atmos- 
pheric phenomena, radio and radar propagation, optics, radio astronomy, 
and upper-air research using rockets. The Army Map Service should handle 
the geodetic measurements and provide the optical tracking instruments, 
while the National Committee for the IGY should coordinate the geophys- 
ical measurements. NRL was ready to supply radio tracking equipment 
called “Minitrack” which John Mengel and Roger Easton of the Laboratory 
had devised. 
The description of the scientific devices for the satellite and the means 
of relaying data to recording stations on earth were the most impressive fea- 
tures of the NRL memorandum. Miniaturization, today a commonplace of 
technology, was a novelty in 1955. The Laboratory’s proposal, however, 
hinged on it. A satellite casing weighing eight pounds would carry minia- 
turized instruments weighing ten pounds for accumulating scientific data, 
tiny batteries weighing twelve pounds, Minitrack equipment weighing 
two pounds and consisting of a miniature electron-beam vacuum tube 
and a crystal-controlled radio receiver with a hearing-aid-type amplifier to 
respond to instructions sent by powerful radars at the ground stations, and 
two pounds of telemetering equipment to transmit information back to 
earth, bringing the total weight to thirty-four pounds. Although solar cells 
instead of conventional batteries would save weight, the NRL team 
discarded the solar-cell source because its dependability was not as yet estab- 
lished. In actuality, solar cells were later incorporated into Yurtguard 1. 
Investigation of the possibility that the temperature of the satellite might 
interfere with the proper operation of the instfuments indicated that the 
temperature change would not exceed loo C as the satellite moved from the 
day to the night side of the earth and that equilibrium temperature could be 
kept to IOo C by such simple means as coating half the casing with thick 
lead-base white paint and leaving the other half of the surface unpolished 
aluminum. 
In an appendix recommending scientific experiments to undertake in 
a first satellite the NRL team listed five conditions it had imposed upon 
itself: (1) the information should be significant and obtainable in no 
other way; (2) the instrumentation required should be of proven design 
and (3) it should weigh less than forty pounds; (4) the experimental data 
must be communicable by telemetry; and (5) the experiments must be 
applicable to a satellite with an equatorial orbit. On the basis of those 
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criteria NRL scientists proposed for the two first experiments to use instru- 
ments that could determine the distribution of hydrogen in outer space and 
could show whether or not a ring current encircles the earth in an equatorial 
plane beyond the ionosphere. 
Two Lyman-alpha detectors in the satellite would serve for the first 
experiment, one detector to measure the intensity of the ultraviolet radia- 
tion emitted by atomic hydrogen from interstellar space, the other less 
sensitive detector to measure radiation coming directly from the sun. The 
two together were expected not only to reveal the density of neutral and 
ionic hydrogen in space within ninety million miles of the earth but also to 
furnish data on the motions, densities, and sizes of streams of particles 
ejected from the sun. Physicists and astronomers suspected that the streams 
affect cosmic ray intensity, the aurora, and magnetic storms. For the second 
experiment a highly sensitive magnetometer, an instrument for measuring 
magnetic elements, would serve. Placed in the satellite, it could detect the 
presence of a ring current and gauge the intensity of the earth’s magnetic 
field, provided the altitude of the satellite were: known within 1.7 miles. 
The Minitrack system could probably meet that proviso. But to interpret 
the results of the hydrogen density experiment and to correct the roll and 
tumble rates for the magnetometer, the attitude of the satellite had to be 
known for any given moment of flight. The method outlined for obtaining 
that information was to measure by means of a miniature electron-beam 
vacuum tube the angle between an axis in the satellite and the earth’s 
magnetic field. The device would be actuated from the ground, allowed a 
minute for warm-up, and would then transmit for three minutes when the 
satellite was above the ground receiving station. A second signal from a 
ground-based transmitter or else a timer could turn the instrumentation 
off and thus lengthen its useful life.s 
The appendix of the memorandum wound up with the statement that 
the instrumentation was already available and would need only slight 
modification to fit into the container, the “pot,” as it came to be called. A 
total of $1 10,000 should cover the costs, including about $10,000 for instru- 
mentation. Construction of the telemetering ground station would come to 
about $30,000, and salaries of the men at the receiving station would add 
about $100 a day. The actuating station would be the most expensive 
item-apart, that is, from the launcher. The powerful “classified” radar 
would cost “a few million dollars,” unless it were possible to borrow the 
unit. The Orbiter cost analysis had slid over these elements. 
Accompanying the NRL text with its careful exposition and mathe- 
matical calculations were graphs and a photograph of “The Double-Axis 
Phase-Comparison Angle-Tracking Unit,” a forerunner of the Minitrack. 
The Minitrack in fact would be essentially identical with the unit pictured 
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Breadboard display of miniaturized components 
for Vanguard satellite. 
except for operating frequencies and antenna configurations. A phase com- 
parison angle tracking system in effect determiries the angle of arrival of a 
radio signal by measuring the difference in length between two radio paths 
from the signal source in the satellite to each of two receiving antennas 
located on the ground at a known distance apart. The system would provide 
three coordinates of satellite position and three vectors of satellite velocity, 
plus accurate time of transit at each ground station once during each pass 
of the satellite. Since radio transmissions from a subminiature transmitter 
in the satellite would be feasible at any time of day and under all normal 
weather conditions excepting severe local thunderstorms, the Minitrack 
would furnish complete tracking and position information throughout the 
life of the equipment. A diagram showing the layout of a single Mini- 
track ground station from the antennas to the recorder clarified the textual 
explanation .7 
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For scientists eager to get reliable data on the ionosphere and inter- 
stellar space beyond, the NRL presentation could hardly fail to have a 
strong appeal. The Orbiter and the Air Force propositions also discussed 
the scientific benefits they could offer, but neither was as specific about how 
its measuring and tracking schemes were to work. Furthermore, the five- 
pound satellite of Orbiter was manifestly a far less useful research tool than 
NRL’s bigger, more elaborately instrumented payload. The relative 
merits of the launchers were another matter. The Stewart Committee, 
several of whose members were interested in basic research as well as in 
engineering technology, faced a difficult choice, its difficulty doubtless 
heightened after the presidential announcement and the attendant pub- 
licity. The meeting on 3 August, at which the committee prepared its formal 
recommendations, took place without Professor McMath of the University 
of Michigan Observatory. Illness kept him from attending, a fateful circum- 
stance if, as rumored, he later declared that he would have voted with the 
minority.8 Had he been on hand to do so, the minority might easily have 
become the majority, for when three men endorsed the NRL proposal and 
two the Orbiter, the remaining two, explaining that they were not guided 
missile experts, chose to go along with the numerical majority; if the split 
had been three to three, the fence-sitters might have landed on the other 
side. Homer Stewart admitted privately in 1960 that some of the ad hoc 
Group disliked the idea of using a booster that was a modification of a Nazi 
Vengeance missile developed by German engineers; an American IGY 
satellite launcher should be an American product. But, Stewart added, that 
line of reasoning had had little bearing on the majority’s deci~ion.~ 
The report sent to Secretary Quarles on 4 August laid down first the 
general conditions that would have to be observed to attain success no 
matter which design was selected. These conditions included a satellite kept 
below fifty pounds and a perigee of the orbit of not more than one hundred 
fifty to two hundred miles above the earth. Whatever the launching system 
adopted, some development work would be necessary and so would pre- 
sent the risk of interference with military programs. Yet if properly carried 
out, the project would produce long-term military as well as scientific bene- 
fits. Only clear, undivided administrative responsibility could fulfill the 
objective. “Great caution is imperative to insure that existing techniques, 
existing contractors, group skills and facilities be used.” T o  forestall diver- 
sion of resources, top-level control would be essential: “otherwise additional 
and unnecessary delays will be inevitable.” The cost would probably total 
about $20,000,000, and would be more were “full advantage . . . [not 
taken] of existing programs, facilities, and reasonable logistical support.” 
The over-all undertaking should embrace two phases, the first realizable 
before the end of 1958, the second a long-term scheme which could ensure a 
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higher orbit and a payload of as much as a ton. For the second phase an 
ICBM booster, such as the Air Force Atlas-B, should be used and the Air 
Force put in charge of the program, but, in view of the uncertainty about 
whether the ICBM development could keep up to schedule, the Stewart 
Committee regarded specific recommendations about Phase I1 a matter be- 
yond its competence. For the IGY program the choice narrowed down to 
Orbiter or the modified Viking and a payload. 
In arriving at recommendations for the first phase, the committee, after 
agreeing upon the practicability of putting up “anything” during the IGY, 
considered nine factors: (1) the minimum payload and altitude that could 
provide “something useful”; (2) duration of the orbit; (3) tracking require- 
ments; (4) the growth potential of the equipment, meaning its chances of 
leading to more sophisticated scientific and military devices; (5) maxi- 
mum use of available facilities and skills; (6) minimum delay to military 
projects; (7) maximum scientific utility; (8) broad national interest; and 
(9) over-all economy during a five-year period. The group tacitly equated 
“broad national interest” with success in a launching achieved without 
interference with ballistic missile programs and at a cost the economy could 
stand and over which the public-or at least Congress-would not boggle. 
The relative dollar price of one proposal as over against the other and the 
effects on the American economy did not occupy the committee long. The 
estimates submitted were, after all, only estimates and those given in the 
NRL memorandum covered only the Minitrack system. Still, part of the 
committee believed the bigger, heavier Orbiter vehicle would cost consid- 
erably more than the Viking combination, and excessively high costs for a 
first satellite would imperil the chances of a continuing program.1° Nor did 
duration of orbit net much committee attention. Ironically enough, long 
orbiting life would prove to be one of Vanguard I’s notable features; not 
only is it still circling the earth and expected to remain in orbit for at least 
two centuries, but its telemetry system transmitted radio signals for over 
seven years. In August of 1955 the remaining six factors posed more impor- 
tant and more controversial questions. 
The choice of the committee majority was the M-15 with an Aerobee- 
Hi liquid-propellant second stage, even though that configuration would 
require six months more to develop than the M-10 with two solid-propel- 
lant stages. The proponents of the M-15 argued that, despite its small size 
and less than 30,000-pound thrust, it offered better performance and more 
reserve margin than Redstone with its 75,000-pound thrust. Doubts about 
the efficiency of the latter as a satellite booster in fact took George Clement 
to Huntsville on 28 July to look for himself. He concluded that the Red- 
stone was too heavy for the purpose and, even if  stripped of some of its 
boilerplate, would probably still be relatively unsatisfactory.11 Instead of 
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Orbiter’s four stages, the second and third consisting of multiple clusters 
and deemed proportionately less reliable than single-rocket stages, the three- 
stage design of the M-15 gave the NRL proposal another advantage. The 
smaller launcher would also require less logistic support and thus prove 
more economical for continued satellite use after the IGY was over. The 
modifications needed for the Viking appeared to be well within engineering 
capabilities and, because of the probable availability of a new General Elec- 
tric rocket engine, would avoid any interference with weapon projects. 
Unless an ICBM rocket motor replaced that of the Redstone in the near 
future, Orbiter, in the opinion of three committee members, was less likely 
to succeed than the Viking combination. 
Stewart and Furnas took exception to that interpretation. In their view 
the Redstone booster had more power and flexibility and fewer develop- 
ment problems; as part of an active weapon program it was already under 
test and had range facilities at its disposal which would minimize interfer- 
ence with military programs. Viking was a greater risk, if only because the 
margins of error allowed at each stage were so narrow as to be “at the limit 
of current engineering knowledge”; to correct malfunctions would take 
precious time. Since the IGY was to end in December 1958, the main ques- 
tion was, in Stewart’s words, “what could be done with things that already 
had some development history and could work at a small level without 
starting from scratch?” IZ The critics did not emphasize the fact that the 
Navy would have to beg for space at the Florida missile center, if, as NRL 
proposed, the Viking were to be projected eastward in order to take advan- 
tage of the earth’s rotation to heighten the vehicle’s velocity. Certainly 
neither NRL nor the Stewart Committee majority when making its decision 
envisaged fully the delays and general wear-and-tear that would spring from 
the Navy’s having to negotiate for a launchhg pad and blockhouse, and 
then fight for testing time at Cape Canaveral, not to mention the design 
changes in the rocket which the safety rules at the Air Force base required. 
Viking’s opponents did, however, point out that the adequacy of the 
second- and third-stage fuels was not firmly established. Increased perform- 
ance of the second-stage Aerobee-Hi by use of unsymmetrical dimethylhy- 
drazine, UDMH for short, had not yet been put to the test, although in the 
Air Force’s Bomarc motor the Aerojet Corporation had mixed UDMH with 
J P 4 ,  the standard kerosene fuel for jets, and had run one test of a twenty- 
five percent UDMH and seventy-five percent analine-furfural mixture. Even 
the time schedule for fuel tests was uncertain. The design of an attitude 
stabilization system was on hand, but the attitude control system would 
have to undergo careful testing with the new fkel. The third-stage solid 
fuel called for ammonium perchlorate dispersed and fused in a polyvinyl 
chloride matrix which the Atlantic Research Corporation had tested in 
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small motors but not in large. T o  get an efficient structural design in an 
end-burning configuration with a long burning time might take longer than 
the project could afford. For the spin-stabilized third stage, moreover, NRL 
had not presented any analysis of how to forestall low frequency oscilla- 
tions; those might prevent attainment of an accurate orbit. 
T o  these objections defenders replied that equal uncertainty applied 
to Redstone’s fuel, and the UDMH system looked like “a very straight- 
forward engineering procedure.” Inasmuch as the Glenn L. Martin Com- 
pany had a feasible approach with commercially available components for 
an attitude control system, the development presented no greater difficulty 
than that for a conventional missile autopilot system. Spin stabilization had 
to be worked out for Orbiter also; the problem was as hard for one as for the 
other. Although Redstone testing facilities already existed at Patrick Air 
Force Base, using them for testing the Orbiter satellite vehicle would inter- 
fere with ballistic missile programs as much as Viking satellite tests would. 
The military and scientific projects should be divorced from each other as 
completely as possible. The Viking was a research rocket, not a weapon. 
Without saying so in so many words, supporters of the NRL‘ plan apparently 
felt that under the aegis of a research laboratory manned by civilians, the 
satellite venture would avoid much of the military flavor likely to permeate 
it were it directed by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. NRL had had long 
experience in atmospheric research, had a deserved reputation for meeting 
time schedules, and at the moment had no high-priority work afoot. 
More significant, the Redstone satellite plan offered relatively little 
growth potential for future space exploration, whereas NRL’s opened up a 
variety of possibilities, a committee appraisal that was to prove sound. 
While that consideration doubtless loomed larger to some members than 
to others, no one dismissed it lightly. On the other hand, the very innova- 
tions in the Viking-based design presented greater risks of delay than did 
the more orthodox features of Orbiter.= 
Unanimity prevailed on one point: the superiority of the NRL tracking 
system and indeed all the NRL satellite instrumentation. What the com- 
mittee would have liked to recommend, Clifford Furnas said later, was the 
use of the Army’s rocket and the Navy’s “pot” of instruments. The hitch 
about that procedure was the intensity of service rivalries. No military serv- 
ice was willing to give “personnel, money-or even information, at times- 
to a project for which some other branch would get the most credit. We 
finally decided,” wrote Furnas, “that breaking the space barrier would be an 
easier task than breaking the interservice barrier.” That conclusion 
reached, it was a “toss-up between the Army and the Navy plans.”I4 
The committee was at pains to suggest needed improvements to both 
plans. Orbiter ought to include better satellite instrumentation; eventually 
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the Redstone motor should be replaced with a liquid-oxygen and gasoline 
motor, and, in the interest of reliability, possibly the second stage should 
also use a liquid propellant. NRL should schedule a far larger number of 
tests of components and rocket stages preliminary to attempting a satellite 
launch and should consider substitution of a Sergeant-type, solid-propellant 
third-stage rocket for the Arcite-type proposed. Those recommendations, if 
reflecting committee doubts about the adequacy of both plans as they stood, 
implied that modifications might make either one satisfactory. Both the 
Redstone and the NRL teams were ready to adopt the committee’s sug- 
gestions. Quarles, faced with a five to two decision in favor of the NRL 
proposal, put the matter up to his Policy Council. The council, after listen- 
ing to the arguments of its Army and Navy members, voted to postpone a 
final choice for two weeks.15 
During that interval, in response to vigorous protests from Major Gen- 
eral Leslie Simon of the Army Ordnance Corps, who insisted that misinter- 
pretation of facts had prejudiced the case for Orbiter, Quarles asked the 
Stewart Committee to reexamine the Navy-Redstoqe plan. General Simon’s 
memorandum, dated 15 August 1955, asserted: 
The substitution of the 135,000-pound North American rocket engine 
for the current 75,000-pound engine in the Redstone missiIe is a less com- 
plicated operation than the design of a new Viking missile. There is greater 
assurance the Redstone with 135,000-pound motor will be available within 
a 2-year period. Actually the first orbital flight of this improved Redstone 
motor can take place in August 1957. Using three scaled Sergeant high 
speed stages, a payload of 162 pounds can be placed in an orbit with 
a perigee of 216 miles. Payload can be traded for excess velocity. There 
is sufficient excess velocity to place a 100-pound payload on the moon.16 
In actuality the launcher thus described was never built.l7 Simon continued: 
The development problems confronting the Viking development make 
it obvious that the probability of suycess within the IGY is low. This 
conclusion is reinforced by looking at the development times of major 
missile programs already completed. Such programs are rarely completed 
on the originally predicted dates and require 5 years at the minimum 
and usually run for approximately 8 years. 
The improved Redstone 75,000-pound performance permits improved 
payloads at orbitable altitudes. The following table was computed with 
900 feet per second excess velocity and with existing propellants: 
Perigee altitude (miles) Payload (pounds) 
300 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 
The first orbital flight for this configuration can be scheduled for Jan- 
uary 1957 if an immediate approval is granted. Since this is the date by 
which the U.S.S.R. may well be ready to launch, U.S. prestige dictates 
that every effort should be made to launch the first U.S. satellite at that 
time. Although this time scale is dependent on Sergeant or Loki clusters, 
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the engineering feasibility has been approved by four competent agencies. 
The satellite missile does not interfere with the Redstone missile pro- 
gram because the program is in process of being turned over to the 
Chrysler Corp. and because the designers and planners are completing 
their work with the Redstone missile. A new program is therefore necessary 
for adequate utilization of the talent available. If a new and challenging 
project is not soon placed at Redstone Arsenal, the loss of key personnel 
will jeopardize the successful completion of the Redstone missile project. 
Therefore the scientific satellite program will strengthen rather than weaken 
the Redstone missile project. 
In view of the fact that Army Ordnance can provide heavier orbital 
payloads with shorter time scales and with greater assurance of success, 
and that the Naval Research Laboratory is already heavily committed to 
the Aerobee-Hi development for the IGY, it is obvious that the Naval 
Research Laboratories will be better employed instrumenting properly 
the large payloads (100 pounds or more) which can be made available.18 
The allusion to Aerobee-Hi development referred to improvements in 
sounding rockets which the IGY committee was anxious to use in continuing 
probes to supplement data from satellite experiments. 
That General Simon’s calculation of the perigee and payload in rela- 
tion to the velocity attainable in the new high-powered version of Orbiter 
would correspond almost exactly to those achieved in January 1958 by the 
Army’s Explorer satellite demonstrates the soundness of most of his predic- 
tions.19 His gloomy prophesy that rejection of Orbiter would cause “the loss 
of key personnel” at the Arsenal and thus jeopardize completion of the Red- 
stone ballistic missile, on the contrary, turned out to be erroneous. T o  some 
ears it sounded like a piece of special pleading smacking of high-pressure 
political maneuvering. His dictum about what NRL should be doing did 
not sit well with Navy men who had faith in the Laboratory’s special talents. 
And NRL and the Martin Company were to prove him mistaken in de- 
claring that the development of any missile required “5 years at the mini- 
mum”: Vanguard cut that time in half. 
When Captain Samuel Tucker, the director of NRL, learned that the 
Stewart Committee was again to review Orbiter, he discussed the situation 
with Milton Rosen. Rosen suggested enlisting the aid of Vice Admiral 
John Sides of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in getting a second 
hearing for NRL also. The sympathetic Admiral Sides advised them to put 
their case to Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, Deputy Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions. Briscoe at once volunteered to talk to Paul “Red” Smith, Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development. Indignant at the 
Army’s attempt to snatch from the Navy its fairly won victory, Smith 
arranged for a second NRL presentation to the Stewart Committee. By 
then cost estimates for the Viking-based plan were ready, putting the figure 
for the launchers at $10.4 million and the over-all cost at $12 million.20 
For the second NRL hearing Milton Rosen prepared a concise sum- 
mary of the new features the Laboratory had introduced into its initial 
proposition. Substitution of a Sergeant-type third-stage rocket in keeping 
with the committee’s recommendation necessitated a reduction in the 
weight of the satellite from 40 to 21.5 pounds for a 393-mile-perigee orbit, 
but specifications and performance data furnished by the Thiokol Chemical 
Corporation showed that a twelve-inch-diameter scale of its T-65 rocket 
which was then in production would meet NRL requirements. Laboratory 
calculations, moreover, indicated that the launcher thus modffied could 
achieve a final velocity of 27,730 feet per second with a ten-pound payload at 
a 200-mile-perigee orbit, while computations undertaken by the Glenn L. 
Martin Company put the velocity at 28,350 feet per second, twelve percent 
above the required speed. The test schedule was now to include three 
firings of the first and second stages separately, a “large number” of the new 
third stage, and three of second and third stage combined before attempting 
a satellite launch at all. “The Laboratory is copfident,” read the final sen- 
tence of the summary, “that the first satellite can be launched eighteen 
months from the start of the program.” 21 
Rosen had originally put the time needed at thirty months-an exactly 
accurate figure as events later showed-but the Martin Company believed 
a year and a half sufficient. Under pressure to pare down his estimate, espe- 
cially as “we were fighting for our lives against a competitor who confi- 
dently said he could do the job in eighteen months,” Rosen succumbed, 
accepting against his better judgment the more optimistic figure.22 
To fortify faith in the Laboratory’s capacity to meet so tight a time 
schedule, Rosen appended to his memorandum copies of telegrams and a 
letter from the four major industrial firms with whom NRL would expect 
to deal. A wire from the Thiokol Chemical Corporation on 22 August prom- 
ised delivery of an enlarged solid-fueled T-65 rocket in nine months from 
receipt of a contract. A similar nine-month delivery guarantee on the power 
plant for the first-stage booster came from the General Electric Company. 
The Aerojet General Corporation wired that it was prepared to make a 
first delivery of Aerobee-Hi engines for the launcher’s second stage eleven 
months after signing a contract, but as heat transfer difficulties were to be 
expected if UDMH fuel was to be used, “some development firings’’ would 
be necessary to test the propellant. 
The longest communication was from the Glenn L. Martin Company, 
producer of the Viking. The company’s executive vice president stated: 
“We see no reason why it should not be possible to put a satellite in being 
in approximately 18 months provided the program is well defined and 
effectively managed.” After reiterating that “the mission to be performed 
must be defined clearly,” he added: “both government and industry must 
understand clearly the part each is to play in the program execution.” A 
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curiously admonitory tone pervaded the message, but it concluded on an 
encouraging, if slightly boastful, note: “We recognize that we have systems 
management experience in addition to the specific experience gained from 
Viking, but”-and this passage in Rosen’s copy of the document was under- 
lined in red pencil-“whether we are called upon to manage the program 
or to provide the airframe alone, you can be assured that we will support 
the program in the aggressive fashion necessary to achieve a satellite at the 
earliest practical date.” 23 
These assurances from reputable industrial firms, particularly in re- 
gard to delivery dates, made an impression upon the Stewart Committee, 
since the time element, tellingly stressed by the Army general who spoke for 
Orbiter, now appeared to be about equal in both propositions. It left the 
strength of the pro-Viking arguments unimpaired-the sophistication of the 
instrumentation and the electronic tracking system, the miniaturization of 
parts, and the adaptability of the design to more elaborate spacecraft in the 
future. So the earlier verdict in favor of the NRL satellite stood.24 
Oral word of the decision reached the Laboratory an? Redstone Arse- 
nal some seven weeks after the first presentations to the Group on Special 
Capabilities and more than a fortnight before the Deputy Secretary of De- 
fense officially notified the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force on 
9 September that the Navy was to be in charge of a joint three-service pro- 
gram.25 The Army officers promoting Orbiter were incensed. General John 
Medaris of the Ordnance Corps privately labeled the rejection “a boon- 
doggle.” Commander George W. Hoover of ONR was incredulous that 
knowledgeable men who had listened to von Braun and examined the 
sheaves of detailed drawings prepared by him and his staff could have 
accepted an alternative consisting of “a blueprint of a pencil-shaped vehi- 
cle” many parts of which existed as yet only in the imagination of its 
authors. Frederick C. Durant 111, one of the original backers of Orbiter, 
recounted that in the post-Sputnik era-after ’the failure of the first at- 
tempted Vanguard satellite launching and the subsequent success of the 
Army’s vehicle-a National Academy official remarked ruefully that “one of 
the major reasons for the Army’s losing out was von Braun’s lousy presenta- 
tion.” Durant dubbed that explanation “odd” in view of von Braun’s gifts 
of lucid exposition and persuasiveness.26 Conceivably in the course of his 
two-hour speech to the committee in July, the German rocket expert ap- 
peared so to exaggerate Orbiter’s technical capabilities as to raise doubts in 
the minds of his audience.27 
If only because several members of the IGY National Committee had 
served in the Navy during World War I1 and had acquired high respect for 
the caliber of Navy research, one might speculate as to whether they had 
greater confidence in the scientific environment at the Naval Research 
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Laboratory than in that at Redstone Arsenal. Nothing, however, suggests 
that National Academy preferences, if known, influenced the Stewart Com- 
mittee’s choice. Outside the Department of Defense a number of scientists 
assumed that a big factor in the decision had been the relative security 
classification of the two boosters: Redstone, intended to be not only a test 
vehicle but a weapon in the American defense arsenal, would have to carry 
a secret tag, whereas the modified Viking would not; and secrecy would run 
counter to the IGY plan of sharing information with other nations. That 
idea was a misconception. The committee had known from the first that the 
guidance and control systems of any satellite vehicle would have to be 
military secrets; security considerations consequently had played little part 
in committee discussions.28 
At NRL the staff was at once elated and frankly surprised. T o  those 
who knew most about the competing proposals the chances had looked mini- 
mal that the slim forty-foot Viking booster with a third stage of only partly 
determined design could win against the powerful sixty-nine-foot Redstone 
into which nearly four years of development work had already gone. Al- 
though the magnitude of the task to be accomplished by the Laboratory in 
three years might well have induced a touch of stage fright, excitement over 
the challenge submerged every doubt. Then and later, the NRL team 
attributed its victory to the quality of the scientific data the plan promised 
to produce and to the prospects it held out for future advances in rocket 
technology and space exploration.29 
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GETTING THE LAUNCH 
PROGRAM STARTED 
SOME confusion and a number of conferences occurred at the Naval Re- 
search Laboratory during the fortnight before and the three weeks after 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Robertson issued his September 1955 
memorandum outlining the military departments’ respective obligations 
under the joint satellite program? With technical responsibility assigned to 
the Navy, it was a foregone conclusion at the Pentagon that the Laboratory, 
under the administrative aegis of the Office of Naval Research, would direct 
the project. As it happened, the Secretary of the Navy waited until 27 Sep- 
tember formally to designate ONR as administrator and not until 6 October 
did the Chief of Naval Research officially notify the Laboratory that it was 
to take charge? ONR, a Navy officer once remarked, served the Laboratory 
chiefly as a post office-transmitting funds, inquiries, and, occasionally, 
directives from higher authority. But an organization chart drawn up some- 
what later shows how many echelons of authority stood above NRL. Al- 
though a long and distinquished record in research and engineering had 
won a measure of independence for the Laboratory, its chiefs were still 
bound by orders from ONR and higher ranking officialdom. Small wonder 
that uncertainty reigned during late August and September 1955. 
As time was precious, the military and civilian directors of the Lab- 
oratory felt obliged to make a number of tentative decisions well before 
they received notice of their authority to proceed. They had to decide how 
large a proportion of their staff to assign to the satellite program, who was 
to head it, how much freedom of action he and his principal assistants should 
have, in consultation with them how to refine the budget estimates and 
initiate procedures to ensure a prompt and orderly flow of money, how to 
handle publicity in keeping with whatever security classification the Navy 
imposed upon the project, and, most urgent of all, what ground rules to lay 
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down in negotiating a contract with an industrial company for design and 
production of the launch vehicle. 
The Laboratory’s key men realized that the primary contract would 
have to deviate in some respects from the routine kind whereby the company 
selected through competitive bidding undertook to meet requirements for a 
prototype by building, test-firing, and making successive changes in a series 
of models. In this case, time forbade that orderly procedure. NRL, acting for 
the government on an intricate task involving a number of federal agencies, 
would have to exercise constant supervision over the producer and be free to 
rewrite specifications if necessary as the work progressed. Performance of 
mutually interdependent systems, designed in part by a process of extrap 
olation and analogy, rather than solely by proven, predetermined specifi- 
cations, would spell success or failure in this novel experiment. Hence, 
before making any other decisions, the day after NRL learned of its victory, 
Captain Samuel Tucker, the Laboratory’s director, invited two Martin 
Company executives to his office to hear the good news and talk over plans. 
For from the inception of the NRL satellite plan its originators had taken 
for granted that, were their proposal accepted, they would again be working 
with the engineers who had built the Viking. At Rosen’s suggestion, during 
early summer the Martin Company had prepared several analyses of 
aerodynamic problems affecting the project and had made a formal presen- 
tation to the Stewart Committee. The committee indeed had indicated that 
its selection of the NRL scheme was predicated partly on the assumption 
that Martin experience would expedite design and production of the launch 
vehicle. 
Two additional Vikings were already on order for continuation of 
NRL’s work on upper-atmosphere and guided missile research, including 
a study for the Air Force on electromagnetic wave propagation in rocket 
flames; cancellation of that commitment and diversion of Vikings 13 and 
14 to use as satellite launching test vehicles should get the program off to 
a good start. The Martin Company consequently was sure of its favored 
status. 
When the two Martin vice presidents appeared in Captain Tucker’s 
office on August 25, their confidence in their impregnable position became 
evident. Tucker, Wayne Hall, NRL’s deputy director of research, and 
Rosen all felt the chill in the atmosphere when the Martin men disclaimed 
interest in a contract unless the company had full control. As the job was 
unlikely to be a big money-maker, prestige was the sole inducement. Where- 
as the public always spoke of the Navy Viking rocket, this time the label 
must be the Martin satellite project. Equable but firm responses from the 
NRL men, however, led the manufacturers to agree to a more formal con- 
ference on August 31 and to transformation of the existing contract for 
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Schematic of Vanguard trajectory. 
Vikings 13 and 14 into one releasing the vehicles for the satellite program? 
T o  expedite matters at the meeting held on the 31st, William G. Purdy, 
chief spokesman there for the Martin Company, came armed with a draft 
“change-order” of the Viking contract, immediate acceptance of which, 
completed by filling in a few blanks, would constitute, he opined, a suitable 
contract for the satellite project and permit work at the Baltimore plant to 
begin at once. After stating that the government had designated ONR as the 
“procuring agency” for a program aimed at creating small scientific earth 
satellites, “the first of which is intended to be operational within approxi- 
mately eighteen months,” the draft change-order declared that the Martin 
Company as the prime contractor would “carry responsibility for the devel- 
opment, design, manufacture, and test of the complete system.” ONR 
should: 
assign to this program a Project Officer, who shall be the Government 
representative authorized to commit the Government on contractual and 
technical decisions. . . . The Contractor shall rely on the Project Officer 
for the proper coordination of Government furnished services, facilities 
and materials and for approvals, where required, of Contractor activities. 
Subsequent to acceptance by the Government of the system specification, 
changes in the specifications will require joint approval of the Project 
Officer and the Contractor. 
The contractor should then proceed immediately “to furnish the necessary 
services, materials and facilities” in accordance with the following require- 
ments: 
a) The mission of the system shall be to place a satellite of-pounds 
and-cubic inches in an orbital plane w i t h i n d e g r e e s  of the 
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plane of the equator and having a minimum altitude in any point 
in the orbit of-miles. 
b) The Government shall furnish the complete satellite package, including 
instrumentation, antennae and all ground equipment associated with 
the transmission and reception of scientific information. The config- 
uration of the satellite shall be established by mutual agreement between 
the Contractor and the Project Officer within 60 days of the date of 
this letter. 
c) The vehicle shall be launched from Patrick Air Force Base, with the 
Government furnishing propellants and such handling and test facil- 
ities, together with the necessary personnel to operate the same, as are 
not included in the Contractor’s responsibilities under (e) below. 
d) The Contractor shall develop, design, manufacture and test the com- 
plete vehicle, including all subsystems, except those defined by (b) 
and (c) above. Certain components may be sub-contracted at the dis- 
cretion of the Contractor. 
e) Handling and testing equipment facilities presently available to the 
Government shall be utilized whenever possible. . . . Additional han- 
dling and testing equipment required shall be furnished by the 
Contractor. 
The two Viking rockets on order were to be used: to advance the develop- 
ment of the satellite vehicle. Within ninety days of signing this contract 
the Martin Company would submit a firm proposal which would include a 
system specification, a test plan, and an estimate of the time and cost re- 
quired for completion of the entire program. Here, from the manufac- 
turer’s standpoint, was a straightforward plan of procedure. 
The Laboratory and ONR representatives objected: the scheme 
relegated NRL scientists to the sidelines and demanded of them a dele- 
gation of responsibility which, in light of the Defense Department’s man- 
date to the Navy, was out of the question. A single project officer, 
corresponding to the company’s operations manager, could not make final 
decisions for the government; any significant departure from the proposal 
approved by the Stewart Committee would have to have both committee 
and NRL concurrence, lest the end prbduct fall short of the scientific per- 
formance required. Captain Tucker pointed out that the contractor would 
be dealing with NRL, not with ONR, despite the latter’s acting as the 
Laboratory’s agent in drawing up  the contract. Everyone present acknowl- 
edged the importance of definition of the mission, prompt formulation of 
operational and logistic plans, definition of mutual responsibility, and 
centralized management; but the Navy representatives could not establish 
then and there a clear-cut division of responsibility between NRL and the 
contractor. Neither could they map out explicit operational and logistic 
plans as yet, since the Army and Air Force were also involved. For the 
present, Martin should put into writing its recommendations about “system 
responsibility,” vehicle specifications accompanied by delivery schedules, 
test firing schedules, firing responsibilities and procedures, launching sites, 
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range requirements, the company’s requirements for vehicle instrumen- 
tation, and a list of items the government should furnish. NRL itself 
would provide telemetering and tracking equipment and take charge of its 
operation. While the company was drafting its recommendations, the Labo- 
ratory staff would prepare specifications, undertake to integrate them with 
Martin’s, and define the Scientific Officer’s duties. A second meeting should 
take place on 8 September, by which time both parties ought to be able to 
arrive at a mutually satisfactory modus operandi. When the conference 
broke up, the only matters on which both sides had reached agreement were 
the necessity of further meetings, the “Confidential” classification for most 
components of the vehicle, and NRL’s providing the satellite pa~kage.~ 
During the week following this exchange, Laboratory specialists by 
twos and threes carried on a series of exploratory negotiations. Because 
a reliable engine for the third stage of the satellite launcher was a pressing 
need and the Thiokol Chemical Company, under contract with Army 
Ordnance, was working on a solid-fuel T-65 engine at Redstone Arsenal, on 
1 September James M. Bridger and Alton E. Jones of NRL and two Martin 
engineers met with a Thiokol Company official and a man from the Arsenal 
to discuss arrangements whereby Thiokol could use the Arsenal facilities in 
designing and developing a third-stage power plant for the NRL project. 
The group concluded that before proceeding further NRL and Martin 
must agree on specifications and the Thiokol Company must map out a 
research and development program on a schedule acceptable to the Arsenal. 
A few days later, while Milton Rosen, Bridger, and General Electric Com- 
pany engineers talked over preliminary plans for a new GE engine for the 
first-stage rocket, NRL telemetry experts, headed by Daniel G. Mazur, flew 
to Patrick Air Force Base in Florida to examine the instrumentation 
available there, to inquire about safety rules and test schedules, and to 
explain what facilities the Navy hoped to have the Air Force supply. Mazur 
brought back some discouraging news: owing to rhigh priority military proj- 
ects scheduled for tests during the next eighteen months, space for satellite 
vehicle tests would be hard to arrange; safety rules to forestall danger to 
ground installations and to Atlantic shipping lanes would require a power- 
cutoff device in each stage of the rocket; and, as the base lacked the type of 
telemetry equipment wanted for the satellite and its launcher, NRL would 
have to either supply and man its own or else modify its original plans! 
Meanwhile in Washington the Navy, accepting the name suggested by 
Mrs. Milton Rosen, christened the satellite venture Project Vanguard. At 
the same time consensus at NRL and ONR ran that the Laboratory should 
establish a separate Vanguard unit which would include the entire Rocket 
Development Branch and some men from other branches and divisions. 
Captain Tucker and Edward 0. Hulburt, the Laboratory’s research direc- 
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tor, then selected John P. Hagen to head the project. Although he had had 
no part in drafting the satellite proposal, he was the obvious choice, 
Hulburt averred. Superintendent of the Laboratory’s Astronomy and 
Astrophysics Division, Hagen possessed unquestioned stature as a scientist. 
If his slight build, his bespectacled brown eyes, his mild-mannered pro- 
fessorial mien and utter lack of facade led outsiders at first into thinking 
him a misfit for a difficult administrative job, his scientific knowledge and 
his imperturbability in dealing with temperamental prima donnas quickly 
impressed high-powered industrialists as well as his own staff. In spite of 
later complaints that he was incapable of “dynamic leadership,” he com- 
manded the respect and affection of his colleagues. Indeed one of his team 
attested that a more forceful chief would probably have cracked under the 
strains the job imposed; Hagen’s patience and tolerance were essential to 
seeing it through. 
Under Hagen the intense, hard-driving rocket expert Milton Rosen was 
to be technical director. The youthfullooking Homer E. Newell, named 
“Science Programs Coordinator,” would work closely with the National 
Academy’s IGY panels. Hagen early asked to have Thomas Jenkins, the 
Laboratory’s Deputy Comptroller, as his budget officer; Jenkins, a soft- 
spoken young man, thenceforward wore two hats, one for the Laboratory as 
a whole, one for Vanguard. Other appointments came from the Rocket 
Development Branch, the progenitor of the Vanguard plan: Leopold 
Winkler as Rosen’s engineering consultant on problems of mechanical 
design, James M. Bridger on rocket propulsion and control, John T. Mengel 
on satellite tracking, and Daniel G. Mazur on telemetry and data reduc- 
tion.6 The sad-eyed, big-eared Winkler, with his air of resignation to human 
vagaries, was as even-tempered as the short, slightly rotund, humorous 
Mazur was explosive in the face of crisis; tall, lanky, handsome Bridger 
tended to the laconic but at times was as emphatic as Mazur; Mengel, 
heavily built, sandy-haired and square;jowled, displayed the quiet self- 
possession of a man sure of his knowledge, yet ready to learn from others. 
All four shared a passionate interest in the satellite program and each 
brought a special expertise to it. 
How to map out financial procedures was more difficult than setting up 
an informal organization for Vanguard. On 8 September Captain Tucker 
issued a new budget estimate raising to $28.8 million the $ZO-million figure 
submitted to the Stewart Committee in mid-August. Deputy Secretary of De- 
fense Robertson’s directive of 9 September reiterated the National Security 
Council’s decree that the satellite venture must not interfere with military 
programs of higher priority, instructed each service to “provide for the 
immediate implementation” of action on its share of the joint undertaking, 
and specified that all information intended for public release must first be 
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submitted to the Office of Security Review for clearance. But the paragraph 
covering budgetary arrangements merely noted that “the Navy Department 
will manage the technical program with policy guidance from the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (R&D) and will provide the funds required . . . with 
the understanding that reimbursement will be made as soon as funds can be 
made available from other sources.” The decision as to how much money, 
when, and from what sources was left in abeyance!. 
Cryptic, unsigned notes on an informal conference held shortly there- 
after among representatives from Quarles’ office, ONR, and the Laboratory 
revealed the extent of uncertainties. Asked about what the Laboratory 
would expect to receive from the National Science Foundation, Admiral 
Furth said, “NSF is out,” whereupon Charles Weaver of Quarles’ staff 
observed that the Foundation could supply some funds. When the Admiral 
suggested that the Navy simply do what it could for $20 million, Weaver 
reminded him that that sum, the figure which the National Security Council 
had accepted, was not binding and in any case did not include the cost of 
satellite instrumentation. Apparently everyone assumed the availability, 
free, of a good deal of expensive equipment already in existence and a 
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number of services-test and launching facilities, for example, powerful 
radar, and telemetry instruments, as well as Army Engineer Corps con- 
struction, maintenance, and operating teams for the tracking station net- 
work. 
A decade later perusal of the early discussions of costs might awaken in 
the reader the suspicion that a lack of candor prevailed among participants 
fearful lest realistic figures cancel the entire program. But the Vanguard 
comptroller, the person most familiar with the financial problems, saw 
guesstimates”-all too often too low-as inescapable: there were no cost 
data to draw upon applicable to a satellite program. In 1955 no one had 
ever built a multistage launcher except as a vertical sounding rocket; no one 
had tried out an electronic tracking system for an artificial earth-circling 
body; and no one could predict accurately the expenses of developing 
reliable instrumentation capable of functioning for days in space. The vague- 
ness that shrouded early financial planning was a handicap to the men at 
NRL responsible for getting work started. For a first allotment of money 
they had to wait until December 1955 and in the interim had to draw on 
the Laboratory’s small Naval Industrial Fund.? In‘mid-September they were 
still engrossed in contract negotiations with the Glenn L. Martin Company. 
For both NRL and the Martin Company resumption of the contract 
discussions proved an uncomfortable experience. So far from achieving a 
meeting of the minds, the exchanges on the 8th of September and again on 
the 12th resulted in a sharpening of differences. As foreshadowed in the ear- 
lier session, the principal items of contention were two: who was to have 
overall “systems responsibility,” and whether unilateral changes in specifi- 
cations were to be permissible. NRL insisted that the Laboratory itself 
must hold the reins, the Martin mea  that the company must, once a firm 
contract had spelled out requiretnents. William Purdy declared that 
Martin’s authority must embrace not only fabrication and testing of the 
launching vehicle but also control of, supporting facilities and operations 
and of ground instrumentation for tracking and telemetering. In addition, 
Martin demanded freedom to “make design decisions within a systen 
specification,” an equal voice with NRL in defining the system specification, 
and, once that was fixed, no changes without company acquiescence. NRL 
replied that it would not accept “a closed-door policy on government-directed 
changes.” The impasse on the major issues was so complete that NRL 
representatives wondered briefly whether they dared risk looking for some 
other prime contractor. Obviously that step was no solution. The Martin 
Company had the Viking experience and had prepared satellite launching 
studies during the spring and summer. A switch to another company would 
require the express approval of Assistant Secretary Quarles and the Stewart 
Committee and would certainly be costly in time. One young NRL engineer 
“ 
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later said bitterly of the Martin negotiators, “They had us over a barrel, and 
they knew it.” 
The irritation was mutual. The Martin representatives were appar- 
ently following the line laid down in the company’s front office, but they 
also felt that concurrence with NRL’s siated policy would subject them to 
needless harassment-a succession of Laboratory scientists invading the 
Baltimore plant and breathing down the necks of company executives and 
engineers, or worse, a series of peremptory directives from Washington 
making impossible demands and causing endless delays in what would be at 
best a very tight time schedule. Purdy and Robert Schlechter, who had both 
worked harmoniously with Milton Rosen and other members of NRL’s 
Rocket Sonde Branch in developing the Viking rockets, were particularly 
irked at the reluctance on the part of the Laboratory to delegate authority 
to a contractor who had proved trustworthy and efficient in the past. But 
because the contract was important to the company as well as to the govern- 
ment agency, the men confronting each other across the conference table 
agreed to put to one side the question of specification changes and division 
of responsibility until Rosen and Schlechter had reviewed and revised the 
outlines of specifications and test schedules so as to permit drafting and 
signing of a “letter of intent.” The letter of intent should serve as a pre- 
liminary to a final contract that would pin down reciprocal obligations and 
financial arrangements. 
By 15 September the air had cleared slightly. The associate director of 
the Laboratory informed the Martin representatives that an “initiating 
contract” was ready for their scrutiny, that John Hagen was to be 
the administrator of the project with Rosen as technical director, that a 
redefinition of the mission had relaxed the eighteen-month requirement for 
launching but called for a “program of quality” at reasonable cost; the 
company was to submit cost figures the next day. Discussion then produced 
a specification outline that both groups considered a sound basis for “initi- 
ating system definition.” Either group could request further meetings on 
specifications, and the same rules were to apply to subcontracted items as to 
Martin’s. Disposition of the earlier contract for Vikings 13 and 14 was to 
be a separate negotiation. The flight test program presented by the Martin 
engineers, however, met with criticisms from James Bridger and Daniel 
Mazur because it was a minimum one with inadequate backup in some 
areas, and because more exact information on trajectories was needed, since 
Martin’s computations assumed at each stage mass ratios which were far 
from optimum. Mazur pointed out, furthermore, that tests without the right 
telemetering instrumentation would be useless and that the Air Force 
Missile Test Center’s safety doctrine was likely to impose severe “in- 
strumentation weight problems”; design of the controls in the second stage 
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in particular would require close attention to keep them within weight 
limits. John Mengel added that instrumentation for the third stage of vehi- 
cles spending substantial time above 200 miles of altitude was another 
problem to consider ~arefully.~ Those objections notwithstanding, the way 
now looked clear to signing a workable letter of intent within a few days. 
The agreement as it took form labeled the Glenn L. Martin Company 
“the supplier of the launching vehicle” which was to orbit a satellite that 
“will enhance the prestige of the United States.” The satellite was to be 
trackable by radio, optical instruments, or both. The contractor was to pre- 
pare the vehicle for launching, to suggest ways of helping the scientific 
phases of the undertaking, and by mid-January 1956 to have a complete time 
schedule worked out. The NRL Scientific Officer, the director of the 
Laboratory, or whomever he designated, namely Milton Rosen, was to have 
access to all data and, if he wished, to attend all conferences. Within forty- 
five days of signing the letter of intent the company was to submit to the 
Scientific Officer its recommended specifications and within sixty days 
have them in finished form. Any changes the government deemed essential 
were to go to the contractor in writing and any proposed by the latter must 
have Rosen’s written approval. The company must notify him of the effects 
of changes on deliveries and costs. The detailed design, if up to specifica- 
tions, need not have express government endorsement. The payload was to 
weigh 21.5 pounds. The minimal altitude of projection at the final stage 
must be 300 miles to ensure a perigee of more than 200 and an apogee of 
less than 800 miles. Eastward launchings from Cape Canaveral would give 
an inclination of the orbit to the equator of about 30°, but all vehicles were 
to be capable of achieving a 45O angle. Until a regular reporting system was 
evolved, the contractor was to submit semimonthly progress letters to NRL. 
A final contract containing the definitive specifications for the vehicle and a 
careful enumeration of government and contractor obligations should re- 
place the letter of intent within 120 dafrs.1° 
By 23 September, when the Navy and Glenn L. Martin officials signed 
the initial contract for Vanguard, Martin had set $13 million as its probable 
costs, although, in keeping with standard governmental procedures of 
“incremental financing,” the sum written into the contract was only 
$2,035,033.11 Despite the unresolved questions of specifications, both parties 
thought the agreement reasonable. 
Gratification at NRL evaporated a few days later: the Martin Company 
had just won the Air Force contract to build the airframe of the mighty 
Titan missile and was in the process of assigning a majority of its best men 
to start that job in Denver. Vanguard would have to get along without 
Purdy’s hand at the helm in Baltimore and without other experienced 
engineers who had helped develop the series of Vikings step by step. 
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While realizing that the Titan job would be bigger and more remunerative 
for the contractor, people at NRL were dismayed. So also were members of 
the Stewart Committee who had counted on Martin’s putting, not some but 
all, its top-flight designers and engineers to work on Vanguard. The IGY 
staff at the National Academy too felt uneasy. Indeed all the principal 
sponsors of Vanguard believed that Martin was relegating the satellite proj- 
ect to the role of poor relation; denied a high priority within the Depart- 
ment of Defense, it had now become a second-string project in the 
manufacturer’s books also. Martin executives denied the allegation when 
they learned of it; they were fully aware, they declared, that the satellite 
project was important and had assigned to it a fair proportion of their 
engineering talent. They had chosen Elliott Felt, Jr., to head the Vanguard 
team at the Baltimore plant. Though new to the responsibilities of top- 
level management, he was an able, hard-headed engineer who had worked 
on controls for Vikings 9 and 10. Still, as Titan would require 1,000 de- 
signers and engineers and Vanguard some 300, the company was obviously 
going to have to spread its manpower resources thin. Whe;her or not the 
Titan contract did in fact seriously impede progress on the satellite vehicle 
perhaps mattered less than NRL’s conviction that it was being shortchanged, 
for that belief shook the Laboratory’s confidence in the contractor’s good 
faith. 
Equally troublesome from NRL’s standpoint was Martin’s new “get- 
tough” policy, based apparently on the company’s ambition to enlarge its 
position in the industry and taking the form of a determination to yield as 
little as possible to extravagant demands of impractical scientists and 
government bureaucrats. Proud of having wider experience than any other 
firm in the country in designing and building rockets and ballistic missiles, 
the company considered itself entitled to speak with authority. At the first 
informal meeting in Captain Tucker’s office on 25 August, Martin execu- 
tives had outlined their position, but the NRL group had believed they 
would modify it when they understood more fully the purposes of the 
program. Unhappily, the contretemps between company officials and gov- 
ernment scientists in Washington assumed new proportions with every 
passing week of the autumn.12 
In essence the clash arose from conflicting philosophies, although not at 
first recognized as such. The “definition of mission” as stated in the initial 
contract fixed the Martin Company’s commitment: to produce a workable 
launcher for an earth-circling satellite before the end of 1958. A hard 
enough job in itself, in Elliott Felt’s view it should not be complicated by 
extraneous inquiries from the company’s customer into why something 
worked or did not; if it failed, investigation should be confined to finding 
something that would function properly. The scientist, Felt observed wryly, 
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always wanted to know the whys of success or failure; the practical engineer 
was intent on getting performance. It was for that reason that Martin had 
hoped to have a commissioned Navy officer, instead of a scientist, put in 
charge for the government. Felt was obviously oversimplifying, using the 
term “scientist” loosely, but the difference in attitude of mind he was 
pointing to was unmistakable before the end of 1955. NRL, as a scientific 
research body, contended that the study of failures could and shpuld be as 
constructive as chance success; learning the whys was part of the job, an 
essential process in building up knowledge to draw upon for future work. 
Where the manufacturer was ready to try shortcuts and rely upon empirical 
data, the Laboratory held out for a more carefully analyzed approach. 
Hence NRL’s insistence that it must not only supervise plans but monitor 
their execution. The ensuing controversies, intensified at times by the 
greater freedom the Air Force allowed the contractor on Titan, would wax 
and wane over the next two years but never entirely subside.13 
In beginning their common task, both NRL and Martin recognized the 
importance of determining promptly the dimensiops and estimated weight 
of the vehicle, the aerodynamic loads, and the thrust and efficiency of the 
engines. The first- and second-stage rockets had to have more powerful 
propulsion systems than either the Viking or the existing Aerobee-Hi 
carried. For the solid-fuel third stage even some of the preliminary require- 
ments were still uncertain. And the weight and configuration of each stage 
would affect those allowable in the other two as well as overall performance. 
Had perfect harmony obtained between the Vanguard team in Washington 
and the men at the Martin plant, the problems confronting them in their 
race against time must still have been gargantuan. Until the major specifica- 
tions were fixed for each part of the whole launcher, work at the drawing 
boards could not progress far. 
A first necessity was to decide upon the optimum distribution of weight 
within the vehicle. Taking as a point of departure the calculation of Joseph 
Siry of NRL that a launch vehicle of about twenty thousand pounds gross 
weight would produce the required orbital velocity, at the end of Septem- 
ber Bridger and Richard L. Snodgrass met with Robert Schlechter and 
other Martin engineers to discuss how much weight to allot to each of the 
three stages. The give-and-take at that session illustrates the difficulties of 
handling technical questions involving a number of unknowns. Although a 
large part of the vehicle was of standard design, recourse to extrapolation 
would be necessary at many points. When one of the Martin representatives 
argued that since nobody as yet had ascertained the minimum weights 
possible for various parts, a proposed “optimization parameter study” 
would be a waste of time, Snodgrass suggested that a rough guide 
based on preliminary estimated weights would save trouble, for if scrutiny 
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of the three-stage system indicated that the second stage must not weigh 
over 2,000 pounds, the designer would not consider a control system suited 
to a second stage weighing 4,000 pounds; a second study based on detailed 
design weights could follow and a final study based upon hardware weights 
could modify that. While the GLM men doubted the feasibility of keeping 
to Siry’s 20,000-pound figure, they agreed, since they had as yet no surer 
calculation to work from, to start with it in the endeavor to achieve a 
vehicle that could reach a peak altitude of 299.94 miles with a tangential 
velocity of 26,420 feet per second, an excess over orbital velocity of 2,890 
feet per second. Martin engineers later pointed to their skillful employment 
of the analog technique as one of the significant contributions Vanguard 
designers made to the nascent science of space exp10ration.l~ 
Concurrent with the weight optimization studies, work on the desired 
flight trajectory had to proceed, even though the computations had to be 
tentative until the weights of the vehicle stages were fixed and although a 
new plotting would have to be prepared for every flight. By means of special 
“calculation programs” employing both digital computers and Reeve 
Electronic Analog Computers (REAC) , Navy scientists and‘ Martin aerody- 
namic engineers arrived at attainable flight paths with an allowance of a 
six-degree deviation which would satisfy range safety requirements and 
still permit the transmission of scientific data to ground stations throughout 
the life of the satellite’s batteries. In plotting the optimum path from the 
initial vertical lift at takeoff to the horizontal altitude of the orbiting 
satellite, analytical work undertaken during the early winter at the Naval 
Ordnance Research Center at the proving ground in Dahlgren, Virginia, 
provided valuable data to start with. “The Vanguard 3-D [three-dimen- 
sional] trajectory program,” wrote a Martin engineer in 1960, “was 
probably the most important single tool of the project in defining and 
solving the design and flight problems.” In the later design specifications 
covering the trajectory, the only change from those of the preliminary 
version was, first, the extension of the apogee to 1,400 miles and eventu- 
ally the removal of any limit. In actuality, the first Vanguard satellite to 
attain orbit would have a 2,460-mile apogee but still proved able to transmit 
signals receivable on earth.16 
Anxious to get subcontractors started on the job, in mid-September 
1955 Martin with NRL concurrence had entered into negotiations with the 
General Electric Company to build the power plant for the first-stage 
booster. Reaction Motors Inc., the maker of the Viking engine, was working 
on a motor with a 75,000-pound thrust, but Rosen and Bridger thought that 
much power excessive for Vanguard and, furthermore, they dared not wait 
to see how the only partly developed RMI engine would perform. What GE 
had to offer looked like a better choice.16 Martin itself planned to 
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supply the tankage and vector control actuators, but requested GE to fur- 
nish a self-contained unit which was to include the thrust structure, gimbal 
ring, engine components, and engine starting equipment. T o  use tooling 
methods originally employed in building Vikings, the diameter of the 
cylindrical tanks constituting the rocket casing was to be forty-five inches; 
the configuration of the GE engine must mate with that dimension, just as 
engine inlet pressures and temperatures must integrate with the Martin 
tankage and pressurization systems. The new GE X405 engine was ex- 
pected to achieve 27,000 pounds thrust with a specific impulse of 254 seconds 
at sea level. The term specific impulse is a measure of a rocket engine’s 
efficiency-the higher the specific impulse, the better the engine. It is equal 
numerically to the pounds of thrust an engine produces by burning pro- 
pellant at a rate of one pound a second. Delivery of the first of ten X405 
engines was to be on 1 October 1956. General Electric engineers accepted 
the terms, but Rosen asked for more detailed specifications on propellant 
utilization and insisted that GE supply a complement of spare parts and an 
itemized price list. With those changes incorporated, the purchase order 
from Martin to GE was signed on 1 October.l? 
A contract for the second-stage engine was harder to arrange. The 
preliminary specifications based on modifications of the small Aerobee-Hi 
rocket called for hypergolic propellants-fuels that ignite spontaneously 
when mixed-and regenerative cooling of the thrust chamber. Those fea- 
tures together with pressure feeding of the fuel into the thrust chamber 
promised to provide reliable means of starting the engine at an altitude of 
about thirty-six miles, even though igniting a pump-fed engine at a high 
altitude was a still untried system.l* The Aerojet General Corpora- 
tion, maker of the Aerobee-Hi, had expressed interest in a contract in mid- 
August, but the Bell Aircraft Corporation also had claims to consider be- 
cause of its extensive experience in developing liquid-fuel engines, notably 
for the Nike antimissile missile. While Martin approached both contractors, 
Bridger took counsel with the Air Force and Redstone Arsenal. The Air 
Force put the competitors on a par; the Army gave Bell’s performance a 
slightly higher rating. When the two companies presented their proposals 
for second-stage propulsion systems complete with structure and tankage, 
Martin engineers judged Bell’s 8,000-pound-thrust, pressure-fed, integral- 
tank design technically superior to Aerojet’s 5,000- to 7,500-pound-thrust, 
turbopump system. But Aerojet’s request for a chance to prepare a pres- 
surized integral-tank design postponed a decision.19 
While Martin was drawing up a purchase order to the Minneapolis- 
Honeywell Company for the development of the rocket’s guidance and 
control system, Aerojet won the engine contract, partly, at least, by putting 
in a bid of $1.03 million, less than half Bell’s more carefully figured price 
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Vanguard engines: rear, GE's first-stage engine; 
foreground, Aerojet General's second-stage engine. 
of $2.675 million. As things turned out, the costs of the second-stage engine 
package exclusive of the thrust vector control actuator and its hydraulic 
tanks would exceed $4 million. The development of the entire second stage, 
with the complex of equipment it had to accommodate, came to be one of 
the principal bdtes noires of the project during the next two years. Yet 
eventually it would constitute one of Vanguard’s notable contributions to 
the design of reliable spacecraft.20 
In the autumn of 1955, however, it was the third-stage rocket that 
appeared to be the most formidable part of the undertaking. In August the 
Thiokol Chemical Company had seemed the most likely subcontractor and, 
with Redstone Arsenal collaboration, had prepared an exploratory study of 
how to meet the Martin-NRL tentative specifications. But at the end of 
September a Thiokol spokesman had declared that Martin’s demands went 
beyond the present state of rocketry art. Thiokol could meet the weight 
specifications for metal parts, but the required impulse would need twenty 
more pounds of propellant. He saw no way of producing the slow burning 
time in solid fuel of the diameter GLM called; for, and, he contended, 
under those circumstances it was impossible to reach the thrust level speci- 
fied; the safety requirement, moreover, was excessive, higher than that set 
for aircraft rockets. In reporting upon this gloomy analysis, James Bridger 
noted half-humorously: “A 11 Is Not Lost, however.” By increasing the 
diameter of the case, allowing “more optimum expansion,” a less exagger- 
ated safety requirement, and use of the new TRX-217 propellant which, 
tests indicated, could give a burning rate of 0.092 inch per second instead 
of the 0.28 inch per second of the earlier design, the solid-fuel rocket 
wanted for Vanguard should be realizable. Slow burning was important to 
minimize the jolt caused by a rapid buildup of thrust which might damage 
the delicate instruments in the satellite. As soon as a compromise was 
reached on those technical requirements, he concluded, progress should be 
rapid, provided funds were forthcoming promptly. 
Bridger’s optimism proved ill-founded. By early November, although 
Martin increased the allowable weight to 365 pounds, Thiokol declared 
it could not build a rocket of the type needed unless hydrostatic proof 
pressure were reduced, the case diameter were increased from 11 to 14y2 
inches, and 25 pounds were added to the gross weight, or else the allowable 
burning time of the fuel were shortened. Confronted with Thiokol’s 
ultimatum, Martin and NRL felt compelled to restudy the original specifi- 
cations and in the interim to seek proposals from four other companies for 
the third-stage engine. There the matter stood till mid-December?’ 
Organization of the Vanguard teams meanwhile had been taking form 
at the Martin plant and at the Laboratory. In Baltimore Raymond B. 
Miller, Jr., was made contracts manager; energetic, thirty-year-old Donald 
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Markarian became project engineer, with Robert Schlechter, Leonard 
Arnowitz, Joseph E. Burghardt, Russell Walters, and Sears Williams as his 
assistants. By the end of October, under this supervisory staff, about fifty 
designers and aerodynamic, electromechanical, and propulsion engineers 
were working on Vanguard plans. After the readying of production lines and 
test facilities began, the number rose to some three hundred. At NRL 
matters moved more slowly, largely because John Hagen wanted to work 
out a clearcut division of responsibility between one unit and another and 
to be sure that the head of each, irrespective of his individual attainments, 
could work effectively not only with his fellows at the Laboratory but also 
with his counterparts in other government agencies and 
As Hagen himself had to devote much of his time to arranging for 
collaborative services from other branches of the government, to obtaining 
money from the DoD Emergency Fund or the National Science Foundation, 
and to the preparation of memos, speeches, and formal reports, additionaI 
administrative staff was necessary. So J. Paul Walsh was transferred from 
another division to become Vanguard deputy director and planning man- 
ager; a young man, Walsh brought to his new assignment the vigor and 
technical leadership which had marked him early in his career in testing 
nuclear devices in the South Pacific. Charles De Vore, public relations 
officer for the Laboratory, took charge of that task for Vanguard during 
its first two years. At the same time, Rosen engaged a few new men, but 
most of his then thirty-five man staff was already part of NRL and familiar 
with particular aspects of its work; he estimated that within six months 
he would need fifty-three men and within a year sixty-six. In late Novem- 
ber he set up a technical board consisting of himself, his three branch chiefs 
(Bridger, Mengel, and Mazur) , his engineering consultant Winkler, Walsh, 
and James Fleming of the Laboratory’s Applications Research Division. 
Homer Newell, in charge of satellite instrumentation, had no separate staff 
as such; instead he drew on the special talents 06 some thirty men working 
in various divisions of the Laboratory but not assigned directly to Vanguard; 
later nearly a hundred experts worked with him in seeking solutions to 
such problems as excessive heating of the instruments. 
To compute the orbits of close-in satellites Hagen appointed a com- 
mittee composed of Joseph Siry of NRL, Gerald M. Clemence and R. L. 
Duncome of the Naval Observatory, and Paul Herget of the University of 
Cincinnati. For military liaison officers assigned full time to the Laboratory, 
the Navy first named Captain B. F. Herold and later Commander Winfred 
E. Berg: the Army appointed Major John T. O’Hea, the Air Force, 
Lieutenant Colonel Asa Gibbs. All told, what John Hagen called the 
“in-house management staff” consisted of fifteen men.% In view of the 
official DoD announcement that the satellite program was to be a three- 
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Some of Project Vanguard key stag: left to right, Commander W.  J. Peterson, 
planning coordinator; Leopold Winkler, engineering consultant; Homer E.  
Newell, Jr., science program coordinator; Milton W. Rosen, technical 
director; Mrs. Lillian M .  Campbell, secretary to  the director; Nagen; James 
M .  Bridger, Vehicle Branch; John T .  Mengel, Tracking and Guidance 
Branch; and Joseph W.  S i y ,  Theory and Analysis Branch. 
service undertaking, the question may arise as to why the Army and the Air 
Force had only one representative each on the Vanguard staff, and why 
Hagen did not invite Wernher von Braun, for example, to serve as a con- 
sultant. Inasmuch as ABMA in 1956 was making overtures to Hagen to 
enlist his support of an Army plea to use the Redstone-Orbiter launchers as 
a backup for Vanguard, there is some, reason to suppose that von Braun 
would have accepted the invitation to sit in on Vanguard councils. But, as 
Hagen later explained, Army collaboration had been wanting when he 
needed it and he had concluded that the DoD had never “envisioned a 
greater degree of interservice participation than we [NRL] were able to gen- 
erate.” 24 As it was, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Signal Corps gave 
the project unstinting cooperation from the beginning. Officers of both 
Corps went out of their way to cut through entangling departmental red 
tape and to open doors that might otherwise have long remained closed to 
civilians and officers a t  NRL. And after Vanguard field crews arrived at the 
Cape, the Air Force in turn tendered all possible help. 
The entire Vanguard team at its peak numbered 180 persons, including 
clerical help and shop hands. During 1955 some jockeying for positions of 
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authority went on and a few complaints sounded in other divisions of the 
Laboratory that Vanguard appointees were disrupting the rest of NRL, 
but although friction among members of the team recurred from time to 
time, the Vanguard group early came to be a tight-knit organization bound 
together by an exceptional esprit de corps. The excitement and passionate 
interest in the job extended also to the men not formally assigned to the 
project but who, whether working full time or only part of every month on 
constructing and testing the instruments for the satellites, considered them- 
selves and were considered part of the Vanguard team. “Team” was the key 
word. Set up in a fashion that defies exact charting, the organization func- 
tioned as a unit. No one within it or associated with it acted on any matter 
of importance without consulting with Hagen and his management staff, 
for every part of the operation affected every other. If that procedure some- 
times caused delays, it prevented confusion and trouble at a later time, and 
it heightened the sense of mutual responsibility that all members of the 
team shared.25 
Enthusiasm was put to a severe test during the late autumn of 1955. In 
the midst of skirmishes with Martin officials, NRL and ONR were strug- 
gling to secure from the Air Research and Development Command 
assurances of accommodations for Vanguard tests at the Air Force Missile 
Test Center at Cape Canaveral. After Mazur’s exploratory trip to the base 
in early September when the Air Force spokesman there outlined the objec- 
tions to such a plan, and after Vanguard administrators had seen the full 
text of AFMTC regulations, Vanguard heads had looked for an alternative 
site. White Sands Proving Ground, where the Navy had equipment for ver- 
tical launchings of sounding rockets, had to be ruled out for the satellite 
program because of the danger to populated areas from falling burned-out 
first- and second-stage rockets. Use of the Navy installation at Roosevelt 
Roads in the Caribbean would not involve that peril but would be pro- 
hibitively expensive, and inconvenient as well. Hence a formal request from 
the Navy for space and equipment at the Florida base went to the Air Force 
on 2 November. 
A month later an official Air Force endorsement approved “in principle 
the support of Project Vanguard at AFMTC” but warned that new con- 
struction would probably be necessary or else joint use of existing facilities. 
The Air Force could not pay for new installations and, if joint use of 
existing facilities were attempted, “it is possible that other missile pro- 
grams will be delayed.” 26 Unfortunately investigation revealed “that the 
Redstone facility is the only facility at AFMTC that is suitable with proper 
modifications for Vanguard operation.” And, as Captain Tucker informed 
the Chief of Naval Research and Assistant Secretary Quarles on 15 
December- 
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It is now stated by the Army representative at AFMTC that these facil- 
ities will not be available. . . . Since the first [Vanguard] launchings 
are scheduled for October 1956, it is apparent that even if money were 
available and an adequate priority obtained, scheduled commitments for 
the initial phases of the program cannot be met by totally new construction. 
Therefore, in order to meet the Vanguard schedule, funds for construction, 
suitable priorities, and sharing of existing launching facilities are 
mandatory. 
. . . The Test Center Commander also advises that he must have 
authorization and funds by 1 January 1956 for any construction necessary 
to the project.27 
Although the Laboratory won permission to draw for this purpose on 
the DoD Emergency Fund and had worked out with the Martin Company a 
statement of Vanguard test requirements, the road ahead looked thorny: 
the badly wanted high priority for the satellite project was not forthcoming. 
Lack of priority meant that the Vanguard team could hope for little con- 
sideration in obtaining a launch pad equipped with the necessary pipelines 
and wiring or the privilege of having Vanguard share a blockhouse with a 
guided missile project. T o  build those facilities from scratch would take 
more time and money than the IGY program could afford. And the question 
remained: how, without adding excessive weight to the rocket and conse- 
quently sacrificing velocity, to incorporate in the launch vehicle the safety 
devices upon which the AFMTC insisted? The Center’s headquarters 
declared that the first and second stages of the vehicle must have both a 
power cutoff and a destruct receiver capable of functioning lrom the first 
moment of flight, and demanded for each Vanguard trajectory such data 
as fuel weights at successive intervals from launching through the burnout 
of the final stage, the predicted number of lragments created by a destruct 
explosion, their velocity, and the time delay between activation of the firing 
circuits and the first motion. Altogethkr, the permission to launch Vanguard 
from Cape Canaveral appeared to introduce nearly as many problems as i t  
solved.28 
Negotiations for other facilities, on the other hand, proceeded fairly 
smoothly. Martin had asked in September and the Navy had arranged to 
have the Malta Test Facility north of Schenectady reactivated for tests of the 
General Electric engine. Hagen’s staff had endorsed the recommendation of 
Rosen and Robert Schlechter that static testing of the fully assembled first 
stage not be attempted at Malta because shipment of tankage and instru- 
mentation from the Martin plant to GE would be expensive and would 
delay production in Baltimore. Doubts later arose about the wisdom of the 
decision to dispense with full-scale first-stage static tests at Malta. Schlechter 
for one believed that they would have saved endless troubles at Cape Canav- 
era1 and in the long run have proved an economy, but even severe critics of 
the quality of the rockets sent from Martin to the Cape point out that equal 
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or worse difficulties might have followed from choosing the other course.29 
Although static firing tests could not be conducted in the heavily populated 
Baltimore area, NRL agreed to finance the building of other special test 
facilities on Martin property at Strawberry Point on Chesapeake Bay and to 
meet the cost of constructing at the main plant an elaborate steel tower to 
permit assembly and inspection of the entire first-stage rocket in a vertical 
position. The immovable gantry on a forty- by twenty- by three-foot concrete 
pad would be disassembled after the Vanguard program was over. 
In seeking approval of having the government foot the bills for these 
“costly” installations, Admiral Rawson Bennett, Chief of Naval Research, 
felt impelled to explain to the Secretary of the Navy that construction and 
testing for Vanguard involved problems for which there was no existing 
precedent. No contractor had ever undertaken this kind of job and no one 
had the testing facilities needed.3O Nor did that list include the new devices 
NRL had to have in its shop. For environmental testing, €or example, the 
Laboratory would need a pressure chamber big enough to hold a thirty-inch 
spherical satellite in which the pressures could be raised f r o p  that of 0.01 
millimeter of mercury to that of 1 atmosphere; the chamber should provide 
means of cooling or heating the satellite by radiation; for vibration tests an 
electromagnetic shaker capable of giving a 625-pound force, a longitudinal 
and centrifugal accelerator and a shock simulator for use in testing the spin- 
stabilized third-stage rocket. Equipment already on hand could be adapted 
to some of this work. Neither the Navy brass nor the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense protested over expenditures for testing facilities, even though 
the cost appeared likely to run to nearly $80,000 for Martin alone.3l 
Dealings with the Army Corps of Engineers also went well when NRL 
approached the Corps about constructing satellite tracking stations. Before 
discussing plans with the Army, Hagen, Walsh, Mengel, and Roger Easton, 
Mengel’s collaborator in devising the Minitrack system, concluded that 
eight stations spaced about 850 miles apart in a north-south “fence” along 
the 75th meridian from Maryland to Santiago, Chile, would provide a sixty 
percent probability of making a measurement on each orbit of the satellite at 
an average altitude of 200 miles. NRL proposed to place a station for 
testing the system and training field crews at Blossom Point, south of 
Annapolis, Maryland. The Navy itself would man a radar station at Anti- 
gua in the Bahamas to observe satellite performance at the moment of third- 
stage separation, but requested the Army Engineers to build, maintain, 
and operate the tracking stations in Cuba, Panama, and South America. The 
Engineers were willing to cooperate. Selection of the exact sites in foreign 
territory would have to await State Department approval and the results of 
an exploratory trip by a team composed of members of the Inter-American 
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Geodetic Survey, the Army Map Service, and NRL representatives. The  
survey of possible sites was set for late February 1956,32 
As 1955 drew to its close, men responsible for the satellite venture could 
see a good deal of progress. At the National Academy plans for choosing 
scientific experiments to attempt in the instrumented bird were moving 
forward under the aegis of an IGY satellite At NRL a well- 
organized team had been formed to ensure that a satisfactory launcher was 
available at the earliest possible moment, that a flyable bird was ready, and 
that tracking and data reduction were as accurate as scientific knowl- 
edge and technical knowhow permitted. The comptroller had set up 
orderly procedures which promised to ease, if not obliterate, difficulties 
in getting money released for approved purposes. NRL had enlisted the 
help of Army engineers in establishing tracking stations. The Martin 
Company had aligned three major subcontractors and had several studies 
in process calculated to ensure sound design of the vehicle. The chief mon- 
key wrench in the works was still the failure of the Laboratory and the pri- 
mary contractor for the launching vehicle to reach agreement on final 
specifications. 
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5 
BATTLE OVER. 
VEHICLE SPECIFICATIONS 
THE DESIGN specification for the Vanguard launching vehicle completed on 
29 February 1956-thirty-one pages of text and three appendixes-discloses 
little of the effort that went into drafting the document. As sharp differ- 
ences of opinion arose, virtually every sentence underwent minute scrutiny 
by both parties to the agreement, and several amendments elaborating 
policy had to be added later. The task of fixing the principal features of the 
vehicle was exceptionally difficult, inasmuch as success would have to de- 
pend in considerable measure upon innovative advances in the art of rocket 
design. But it was “policy considerations” rather than the design of the 
vehicle itself that underlay most of the conflict between top management kt 
the Martin Company and its counterpart at the Naval Research Laboratory. 
While arguments between government representatives and industrial execu- 
tives were-and are-routine in the course of negotiating an important 
contract, in this case they were peculiarly hard to settle because of the novel 
character of the undertaking: a combination of research and development 
with production of an operational vehicle to be built at minimal cost in 
time and money. And the question of prestige-who was to get most of the 
credit for success-was ever present, if rarely admitted. The final contract 
between NRL and the Martin Company consequently bore the date 30 
April 1956. 
On top of the troubles revealed by the Thiokol Company’s study of 
third-stage specifications, during the winter of 1955-6 the problems of 
weight, reliability, and engine power in the first and second stages harried 
Vanguard designers. While both NRL and the prime contractor examined 
the qualifications of companies competing for subcontracts, both teams ex- 
plored the possibilities of using new materials, of simplifying test proce- 
dures, and of making minor modifications in design to obviate the necessity 
of major changes. In early December, for example, Kurt Stehling vigorously 
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investigated alternatives. A Bell Aircraft rocket engineer whom Rosen 
engaged to head the Vanguard propulsion section, he pursued with GE men 
the feasibility of using ceramic liners for nozzles, plastics such as fiberglass 
for propellant tanks, teflon for tank liners, and aluminum components for 
the X-405 engine, provided structural instability could be overcome. 
These materials not only would be light but would not corrode. Since Hagen 
and Rosen thought a mixture of seventy percent liquid oxygen and thirty 
percent fluorine (as a high performance oxidizer) in the first-stage motor 
might heighten combustion efficiency and increase engine thrust to about 
30,000 pounds, they requested the Stewart Committee to sanction an inde- 
pendent study of the proposal, but the committee, which had to approve 
any significant change in the original plan of the vehicle, turned the request 
down. Teflon and metal-to-metal glandless seals in valves and lines might 
have to be used with fluorine oxidizers, and the Martin Company was leery 
of “fluorine hazards.” For the second-stage oxidizer white fuming nitric acid 
might give better performance than red because of the higher boiling point 
of white and hence its better cooling properties, but might it not have 
counterbalancing disadvantages? Should an inhibiting agent be added to 
reduce tank corrosion, or should the tanks be made of a noncorroding metal 
at the risk of excessive flexibility in the structure? 
Studies of alternatives were time-consuming. And how much time 
did the Vanguard teams dare invest in a search for the best in design and 
materials rather than settling for what was at hand? Rosen and Bridger at 
the Laboratory and Markarian and Sears Williams at the Martin plant, the 
men upon whom fell the major responsibility for vehicle design, were 
necessarily wary of the experimental. Days were slipping into weeks and 
weeks into months and vehicle specifications were still tentative.l 
As the size and configuration of the 211/2-pound payload and separa- 
tion mechanism would necessarily affect the design of the launcher, Martin 
had begun in September to lay out plans to accommodate a cone-shaped 
satellite twenty inches in diameter at the base, a configuration that corre- 
sponded to the general description included in the original NRL pro- 
posal to the Stewart Committee. But, although a cone would involve lesser 
weight and heat penalties and be much easier to attach to the nose of the 
third-stage rocket, by mid-October Laboratory scientists had reluctantly 
yielded to the wishes of men at the National Academy who argued that a 
spherical shape would better serve scientific purposes. It was a painful 
decision to make, since Hagen and his staff realized that use of a sphere 
would necessitate an increase in the size of the second stage, lengthen the 
time needed for its design and fabrication, and raise costs. 
When the Laboratory notified the company on 1 November that the 
government-furnished satellite was to be a thirty-inch sphere, Leo Winkler 
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explained the reasons to protesting Martin engineers: the effects of air drag 
on a sphere in flight would be easier to measure than those on a cone- 
shaped body and, as a cone was more likely to tumble and be lost to sight, the 
Academy’s optical tracking program depended on having a spherical body, 
preferably as large as thirty inches and in no case smaller than twenty inches 
in diameter. Unless Martin studies proved that a thirty-inch ball was techni- 
cally impractical, that requirement must stand. After describing NRL’s 
ideas on design of the satellite mounting and separation device, Winkler 
added that the Laboratory planned to make the sphere of 0.020 aluminum 
with a 0.001 coating of aluminum oxide. The antennas were to be four 
wires retracted during ascent of the launcher and released to spring out- 
ward after separation of the bird from the burned-out third-stage rocket. 
Excessive heating of the satellite during the last third of the booster’s flight 
and the first half of second-stage flight could probably be prevented by 
providing a heat-resisting, disposable, conical shield. Yet even were the cone 
jettisoned soon after first-stage burnout, it would add weight during the 
critical minutes after launching. With these strictures in mind, Martin 
engineers set themselves to computing the effects of twenty-inch and thirty- 
inch spherical satellites on vehicle performance and analyzing the desired 
characteristics of a disposable protective nosecone. Winkler remarked that 
GLM was reluctant “to incorporate many of NRL’s ideas” but agreed to 
consider them.2 
A sharper conflict occurred meanwhile over the type of telemetry to be 
used at ground stations, in the test vehicles, and in the satellites during 
flights. Daniel Mazur had discovered in early September that AFMTC had 
no pulse-width-modulation/frequency-modulation receiving equipment. If 
Vanguard were to use minimum size and weight PWM/FM airborne units, 
new ground antennas and receivers would have to be installed at that base. 
That would be an expensive undertaking. And, as soon became evident, Air 
Force officers in charge at the Cape disliked the idea of having special new 
radar and telemetry brought in for the sole use of any project, and particu- 
larly for what a few of them considered a relatively unimportant nonmili- 
tary program. The Martin Company, in turn, believed an elaborate new 
telemetry system for Vanguard a needless refinement. AFMTC furthermore 
announced that it would not assume responsibility for the reduction of 
telemetered data? The Vanguard organization would have to handle and 
pay for that and set up its own communications center as well. 
By November the Vanguard staff at NRL had perceived that, if it was 
to use the Florida site, it was going to have to convert part of the Cape from 
a ballistic missile test range to a space vehicle launching range. Even if the 
Air Force raised no objections, it would be a big job. Vanguard would need 
new telemetry equipment, a high-precision tracking radar, and “Dovap” an- 
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tenna. Dovap-an acronym for Doppler, velocity, and position-was a 
continuous-wave trajectory measuring system using the Doppler effect 
caused by a target moving relative to a ground transmitter and receiving 
station. Hope of borrowing Dovap antenna free of charge evaporated when 
the Army Ballistic Research Laboratory refused to lend its array. Of the 
FPS-16 tracking radars, the kind NRL experts wanted for Vanguard, only 
three were in existence, one at the plant of the maker, the Radio Corpora- 
tion of America: one in Navy hands at Point Mugu, California; and a third 
in the Army’s possession. A new XN-1 model would not be available before 
July 1956 and a more complex XN-2 not until December and then at a 
cost of $800,000.4 
In the vehicle, NRL had planned from the beginning to use for the 
first stage a pulse-position-modulation/amplitude-modulated telemetry 
system (PPM/AM) because of its high accuracy: for the second stage, where 
weight was critical, the lightweight pulse-width-modulation/frequency- 
modulated system (PWM/FM) would do. The Martin Company wanted to 
install FM/FM throughout, for it was the standard system with which 
Martin was familiar and the one in use by the Air Force at kape Canaveral. 
Implicitly denying NRL’s generally acknowledged preeminence in the 
field of telemetry, company officials labeled Daniel Mazur’s concepts 
“obsolete” and challenged his contention that FM/FM was heavier; he had 
not taken into account the weight of the antennas. Mazur, never prone to 
mince words, declared that Martin’s proposals “ignored pressurization 
problems, flame attenuation problems, and flame pluming problems,” 
difficulties which might seriously interfere with performance of the engine 
control systems. “GLM,” Mazur continued, 
insists on treating a combination of three undesigned and untested rockets 
as a fully engineered production guided missile which is far from the 
case. Their assumption that all equipment as prepared in the plant will 
fly without field preparation is not only fallacious but is not conducive 
to obtaining data which indicates [sic] how to get the best performance 
out of the Vanguard vehicles rather than merely verifying that something 
works. 
In his judgment, the company should neither have system responsibility 
for a complete radio frequency link, nor control procurement of equipment, 
nor take charge of checkout and the installation of flight units. Martin 
contended that these were properly its responsibilities: certainly it must 
have a voice in decisions about what was to go into the vehicles. Indignant 
at Mazur’s disparaging comments, company engineers pointed out that 
they had had far more experience in managing rocket and missile tests in 
the field then had anyone at NRL.6 
As the argument progressed, questions of policy entered into it more 
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largely than did technical considerations, for the crux of the matter, as 
Rosen saw it, was Martin’s determination to “run the whole satellite show.” 
If the Laboratory furnished the telemetering equipment and took charge 
of its operation, Martin responsibilities would be greatly reduced. A letter 
written at the end of November by the company’s Vanguard contract 
manager, R. B. Miller, Jr., lent color to that interpretation. He informed 
NRL that as the “original concept of an over-all Martin responsibility for 
the design, construction, testing, ground support and launching procedures 
. . . dictates that the specifications be limited in coverage to general require- 
ments,” he could not as yet submit an all-inclusive recommendation on 
“launching systems specifications.” Parts of Martin’s specifications “stipu- 
late design objectives rather than absolute requirements” because of 
designers’ doubts about the validity of some performance limitations. 
Further progress depended on decisions in four areas: configuration of the 
government-furnished satellite, the third-stage propulsion system, AFMTC 
facilities requirements, and the type of telemetry to be used.6 
When Hagen on 12 December submitted to Assistant Secretary Quarles’ 
Policy Council a first Vanguard progress report, the description of the main 
features of the telemetry system contained no concessions to Martin’s ideas. 
The test vehicles were each to have a PPM/AM AN DKT-7 transmitter 
in the first stage and a small PWM/FM transmitter in the second along with 
a radar beacon adapted to use with the best radar available at AFMTC at 
the time of tests. In the satellite itself telemetry instrumentation would 
be kept to the minimum necessary to indicate satellite performance and 
transmit tracking signals to Minitrack ground stations. The Minitrack 
system called for a radio transmitter within the satellite operating at a 
frequency of 108 megacycles and having a power output of 50 to 80 milli- 
watts. The radio signals from this transmitter would illuminate the an- 
tennas of the ground station which were so designed as to measure the 
differences in the path lengths from the source to the individual antennas 
in the array and thereby obtain the angular position of the radio source in 
the satellite. T o  save weight in the satellite, the tracking experts planned to 
combine use of the Minitrack transmitter and antenna system with the 
satellite telemetering system. A telemetering command transmitter on the 
ground would signal to a receiver in the satellite to turn on a telemetering 
modulator unit and a power amplifier just before the satellite entered the 
Minitrack antenna beams. A miniaturized transmitter fed with about 0.5 
watt power from batteries would then telemeter data to the ground stations 
over the Minitrack link. One Vanguard contract had already gone to the 
Elsin Electronics Corporation of Brooklyn for ground station telemetry and 
another for development of telemetry antennas to the Physical Science 
Laboratory of the New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts.7 
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As the interim contract with Martin stated that the government would 
take charge of tracking, as well as communications control and data com- 
puting, it seemed logical to the Laboratory to exclude the contractor for the 
vehicle from negotiations relating to those tasks. Martin’s job would be 
finished when one or more of the six satellite launching vehicles which the 
company was to furnish had placed a satellite in orbit. But Miller’s memo- 
randum indicated that the company felt hamstrung by lack of information 
about NRL plans and commitments. His comment on the dubious validity 
of some limitations imposed on Martin designers, moreover, struck an 
ominous note. When the Stewart Committee met at the Martin plant in 
late November, members expressed their dissatisfaction with the situation 
but had no constructive advice to offer on how to improve it.* 
At a heated session in early December, a company vice president 
asserted that Martin would never have accepted the Vanguard job had the 
company known it was not to be the systems manager with full responsibil- 
ity for the entire project-the vehicle, all supporting facilities, and tracking 
of the satellite in its orbit. He excepted only the packqge of scientific 
instruments and, by implication, the computing center which would trans- 
late the data relayed from the satellite to the ground stations. “He views the 
government,” Milton Rosen observed, “as a subcontractor to the Martin 
Company to provide whatever services the Martin Company needs to do 
the whole job.” In spite of a pointed reminder that in the telegram sent to 
Admiral Sides in mid-August the company had offered to act either as 
“systems agency” or as vehicle contractor, the company vice president now 
labeled the lesser role wholly unacceptable. When asked if Martin had full 
system responsibility for the Air Force Titan program, he had to say no, 
only a promise for the future. 
In an exchange that followed with Elliott Felt, Rosen not only rebuked 
the company for failing to submit the weight optimization study but 
charged the management with obstructing direct communication between 
NRL and subcontractors. Rosen wanted the design specifications in Martin’s 
purchase order to GE, Aerojet, and other subcontractors made part of the 
NRL-Martin contract. Felt contended that such a procedure would cause 
needless complications. He reiterated that, given “design freedom,” Martin 
would quickly produce a satisfactory vehicle. The exchange subtly revealed 
the different philosophies of the two men toward the undertaking that 
bound them into a reluctant partnership. The industrialist believed 
that production of a vehicle capable of putting a satellite into orbit was all 
that was necessary and all that time would allow, a point of view fortified 
by the Stewart Committee’s recommendation to depend as far as possible on 
proven design and “off-the-shelf” components. Rosen, impelled by longer 
range interests, countered: “Performance is not only a design target but a 
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minimum requirement.” Both men, however, realized that work on defini- 
tive specifications must move faster.9 By mid-December they were facing 
the uncomfortable fact that the size and weight of the vehicle might have to 
be increased if it was to accomplish its purpose. 
Everyone associated with the design problem had long recognized the 
desirability of using a more powerful first-stage rocket, but the GE X-405 
engine was the best available for a nonmilitary program and perforce would 
have to do. Under those circumstances reappraisal showed few changes in 
the rocket’s configuration necessary. Although a larger diameter would have 
advantages, the finless booster’s forty-four-foot length and the forty-five-inch 
diameter of the cylindrical casing were big enough. Those dimensions 
would allow for a transition section at the rocket’s front end containing a 
“well” in which the nozzle and part of the thrust chamber of the second 
stage would sit. 
Nor was a weight increase necessary. On the contrary, the specifications 
signed on 29 February fixed dry weight at approximately 1,789 pounds and 
propellant weight at 15,499, which, combined with an engine furnishing a 
specific impulse of 254 seconds, would ensure a vertical velocity of 3,903 
feet per second and a horizontal velocity of 4,023.1° Four factors accounted 
for keeping the total weight to 17,331 pounds, nearly 1,000 pounds less than 
NRL had figured earlier: first, the use of aluminum for the tank casings 
and a thin sheet of magnesium for the cylindrical rconocoque spacer be- 
tween the kerosene and the lox tanks; second, skillful design, notably in the 
placing of the tankage; third, the miniaturization of parts for the electrical 
system; and fourth, the reduction of telemetry equipment to a minimum. 
Hydrogen peroxide ( H 2 0 a ) ,  decomposed in a catalyst chamber to a 
gaseous mixture of oxygen and superheated steam, was to provide the 
energy for turbine-driven pumps to feed the lox and kerosene into the 
engine. The design put the H202 tank directly above and off-center from 
the engine motor but close to the peioxide decomposition chamber. The 
steam from the decomposition chamber would pass through the turbine and 
be vented through exhaust nozzles on opposite sides of the airframe. Pivot- 
ing of these nozzles would counteract roll motion of the vehicle. Helium gas 
was to pressurize the fuel tank. Venting the exhaust from the two helium 
spheres also into the turbine exhaust system would add sufficient thrust to 
maintain roll control during the period of separation of the first stage from 
the second. Helium was hard to handle, but its light weight was an asset. 
Pipes, valves, batteries, and electrical connections were all so located as to 
be readily accessible through structural doors in the frame. In the process of 
converting these specifications into reliably performing hardware, a succes- 
sion of difficulties would crop up and a number of changes would be 
necessary, such as additional vent valves and a new layout of the plumbing, 
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but few knowledgeable engineers ever found fault with the basic design.ll 
Interestingly enough, although the specifications of February 1956 
stated that the government would provide a destruct receiver for the first 
stage in keeping with AFMTC range safety rules, the table showing the 
maximum weights allowed for each subsystem did not include an entry for a 
fail-safe device which, complete with batteries and wiring, would add twenty 
to thirty pounds to the first stage. The omission was deliberate, based on 
hopes that the Test Center would relax that requirement for the satellite 
vehicle. The faith was justified, for in April Milton Rosen sought out 
Major General Donald N. Yates, commander at Cape Canaveral, and ex- 
plained why Vanguard designers felt sure that a second-stage destruct 
receiver would suffice. The general was convinced. Unwilling to imperil the 
project, he decreed that for Vanguard alone he would authorize the excep- 
tion.12 
Troubles over design of the second stage, however, worsened during the 
winter. And the second stage was critical, if only because it had to carry 
equipment that controlled the performance of the other two stages. It had 
to accommodate the guidance system for both the first and tde second stages, 
including a programmer and a three-axis gyro reference system capable of 
functioning with sufficient accuracy to ensure injection of the third stage 
into a trajectory leading to an orbit. In addition, the second stage had to 
carry the mechanism to jettison the protective nosecone which would shield 
the satellite from the intense aerodynamic heating that would build up 
during the vehicle’s journey through the atmosphere. It had to carry a radar 
beacon and a command receiver to initiate fuel cutoff and vehicle destruct 
as required by AFMTC range safety rules. It also had to carry the mecha- 
nism for spinning the third-stage rocket and a separation device to detach 
the third stage from the second after burnout. Although described as 
“intrinsically a simple unit of pressurized tanks with a rocket combustion 
chamber at one end,” the second stage contained ,most of the brain directing 
the functioning of the vehicle.13 
Since it had early become clear that uprating of the small Aerobee- 
Hi engine could produce at best only four fifths of the 7,500 pounds of 
thrust required for Vanguard, a bigger power plant with larger tanks to 
take more propellant and a redesign of the thrust chamber were essential. 
Yet “mass ratio,” that is, the ratio of the total weight including that of the 
propellant to the dry weight of the structure and its instrumentation, must 
be as high as possible; for every pound added to the dry weight would cause 
a loss of velocity of eight feet or more a second. T o  provide greater fuel 
capacity, Martin considered increasing the diameter of the oxidizer and 
fuel tanks from thirty-two to forty-five inches but discarded the idea in favor 
of lengthening the stage to more than sixteen feet. Although the elongated 
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tanks could hold some 2,464 pounds of nitric acid and about 897 pounds of 
UDMW as fuel, even then the resulting thrust would barely suffice to inject 
the third stage into an orbital path at 300 miles altitude.14 
Aerojet engineers repeatedly urged adoption of a turbopump system 
for forcing fuel into the thrust chamber; the scheme had the advantage of 
saving dry weight by using lighter gauge metals for the tanks than would be 
feasible in a pressure-fed system. But Martin believed the latter, utilizing 
heated helium gas as the pressurizing agent, more reliable. And reliability 
of operation, particularly in starting the engine at thirty-four miles of 
altitude, was vitally important. Still, the difficulty of devising an econom- 
ical and workable method of heating the helium and of developing 
aluminum or magnesium tankage strong enough to withstand the 
pressures to which it would be subjected apparently inspired Aerojet to 
announce that the company, if held to Martin’s current specifications, could 
not make a first delivery before mid-April 1957 at the earliest. The flight test 
schedule, as it stood at the time, called for launching a complete three-stage 
vehicle, TV-3, on 29 March 1957. Manifestly MarFin was facing much the 
same kind of conflict with its subcontractor as NRL had with GLM. In mid- 
January Kurt Stehling, appalled by “the nebulous and confusing state” of 
second- and third-stage design, attempted to discuss the problem with 
Martin engineers, but they regarded his offer as a reflection upon their com- 
petence. They nicknamed him “the hit-and-run engineer.” Complaints from 
company officials about NRL “interference” sounded loud enough to lead 
Commander Berg, Hagen’s special emissary at the contractor’s plant and 
by now the chief dispenser of oil on turbulent waters, solemnly to suggest, 
tongue in cheek, that Martin withdraw in favor of the General Electric 
Company as primary contractor: Martin could then become a subcontractor 
under GE’s aegis. A half hour later two Martin executives called John 
Hagen to assure him that they preferred the existing arrangement.16 Berg’s 
light touch rapidly reduced tensions. 1 
Time, moreover, was forcing the pace of contract negotiations. When 
the interim contract between the government and the Martin Company was 
about to expire in late January, the Office of Naval Research in arranging an 
extension refused to remit more than a part of the additional $3.5 million 
requested by the company until the final specifications were ~omp1eted.l~ 
Both Vanguard teams, furthermore, knew that decisions on some features 
of the design would have to evolve as work progressed. The upshot was 
Martin’s acceptance of the NRL version of specifications with a provision 
for amendments when necessary. As Rosen had promised earlier, the gov- 
ernment allowed the contractor design freedom on a number of matters, 
but carefully spelled out performance requirements and major character- 
istics. Gross weight of the 16.16-foot second stage was to be approximately 
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4,770 pounds, of which dry weight was to be 937, propellant weight 3,240, 
and payload 484, thus achieving a mass ratio of 0.679. Thrust was to be 
7,500 pounds, fuel burning time 120 seconds, and specific impulse 278 
seconds-which would provide a vertical velocity increment of 2,022 feet 
per second and a horizontal velocity of 8,339. The oxidizer was to be white 
fuming nitric acid instead of red as originally called f0r.l’ 
Without describing the type of mechanism to be used, the specifications 
stipulated that the separation system must jettison the protective nosecone 
before the second stage separated from the third stage, and the system must 
function without interfering with the structure of either stage. Since the 
second-stage shell which surrounded the third-stage motor had to retract 
about five feet longitudinally without contact in order to avoid collision 
with the third stage, weeks of work would have to go into devising means of 
accomplishing that delicate feat some three hundred miles above the earth’s 
surface. In February 1956 neither Martin nor the Laboratory dared say 
just how to do it. Similarly the question of whether the tankage should be 
aluminum or stainless steel was left unsettled. Aerojet, having *had con- 
siderable experience in forming and welding stainless steel, later succeeded 
in persuading Martin that steel had a better strength-to-weight ratio than 
aluminum and would be the most satisfactory material to use. Although 
several Martin and NRL engineers deplored that choice, in December 1956 
a backup contract with the A. 0. Smith Company of Milwaukee to produce 
welded steel tanks would allay some anxieties.18 
Intensive discussion of the specifications for the third stage went on 
concurrently with plans for the second stage. While acknowledging the 
necessity of lengthening the third stage and slightly increasing its diameter, 
Martin engineers flatly declared that the rocket could not support a thirty- 
inch spherical satellite unless the entire vehicle were to be bigger. Chal- 
lenged by Hagen to produce mathematical proof of that assertion, they 
presented data on 3 February that convinced the project director. At the 
same time Hagen received an alternative proposal from an unexpected 
source, namely from James Van Allen, who was a member of the National 
Academy’s IGY Technical Panel on the Earth Satellite Program (TPESP) 
and head of a newly appointed Working Group on Internal Instrumenta- 
tion. 
Critical of NRL’s “schematic design” which, he contended, allotted 
only 2 pounds of the 21.5-pound body to experimenters’ instruments, Van 
Allen urged that “half the initial group of satellites” carry a payload of 
cylindrical configuration, 18 inches long, 6 inches in diameter, which would 
reduce the weight of the inert structure from 11.5 to 5.5 pounds and thus 
leave 8 pounds for scientific instrumentation. This plan carried the discus- 
sion full circle. Hagen was irked. He observed that he had agreed to aban- 
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don the original, efficient conical-shaped satellite (see p. 80) to accede to the 
desires stressed by Whipple and endorsed without a dissenting voice by the 
Academy’s panel. Adoption of the 20-inch sphere had been a concession 
that had already caused delays and otherwise avoidable expense. Further- 
more, if Van Allen had counted in the telemetry equipment, he would 
have had to chalk up the weight allowance for instrumentation in the 
sphere at 10 pounds, not 2. The White House and the Defense Department 
had refused to act upon the Academy’s plea for twelve satellite vehicles, 
and the Vanguard staff considered the chances slim of getting more than one 
successful launching out of the six authorized. An alternate design for three 
of the six would add to problems at this juncture. And if the Minitrack 
system were to fail a t  any point, tracking would have to depend on the 
visibility of the tiny object orbiting in space. The 20-inch sphere appeared 
to be the most practical choice.19 
That agreed upon, the Laboratory and the Martin Company had com- 
paratively little trouble in fixing the configuration, weight, and power 
requirements of the third stage. The engine was to be bottle-shaped, 55.45 
to 57.5 inches long and 18 inches in diameter; the rocket’s dry weight was to 
be about 67.5 pounds, propellant weight 395, and payload 21.5 pounds, 
thrust nominally 2,350 pounds in vacuum, fuel-burning time 41.5 seconds, 
minimum specific impulse 245 seconds, and the velocity increment 13,405 
feet per second. As the government was to supply the satellite package and 
the structure for attaching it in and separating it from the rocket casing, the 
contractor had to adapt his design to fit.20 Martin and NRL had already 
concluded that a dual approach to design and fabrication of the third-stage 
engine was desirable. So, in early March Martin placed a purchase order 
with the Grand Central Rocket Company of Redlands, California, while the 
government negotiated a direct contract with the Allegany Ballistics Labo- 
ratory of Cumberland, Maryland, to produce an alternative model.21 
The struggle over vehicle specifications ended with the Martin Com- 
pany’s yielding to the Laboratory’s every demand except for the thirty- 
inch satellite, and, in view of the strong convictions of Martin engineers 
that their methods and plans were generally sounder than the customer’s, 
they yielded with good grace. NRL engineers were satisfied with the final 
design and indeed Milton Rosen called it “magnificent” ten years later. 
Many of its features were well ahead of its time. Yet the contract contained 
several passages-those dealing with the controversial “policy considera- 
tions”-that are likely to look deceptively innocuous to anyone unaware of 
their implications. Today a standard type of National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration contract with industry, the agreement of 1956 had to 
be painfully worked out to meet novel managerial problems.22 It fixed a 
relationship between government and industry whereby a federal agency 
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responsible for procuring precision hardware to use under unknown con- 
ditions of scientific exploration became manager of the project, wielding 
authority to direct the work of an industrial prime contractor and sub- 
contractors. The arguments that delayed negotiations in 1955 and 1956 
revolved around four issues: the parts of the system which the government 
declared it must procure and operate, government supervision over Martin’s 
subcontractors, deviations from specifications, and the “margin of safety.” 
The final agreement listed in detail what the government was to 
supply, even the number of desks and chairs to be put in the blockhouse 
at the Cape. Appendixes I and I11 entitled respectively “Government 
Furnished Equipment” and “Government Support Facilities and Services” 
contained the particulars that amplified statements given in the first 
paragraphs of the specification document. Under the heading “General Pro- 
cedures’’ two sentences defined the extent of NRL’s authority: “The 
Government will exercise such direction and controls as are necessary to 
assure itself that launching and test vehicles meet their objectives in both per- 
formance and reliability. The Government will determine the performance 
and degree of reliability that can be reasonably expected within the time- 
scale framework.” The contractor, in short, could not decide for himself 
what was good enough. Under the heading “Field Operations,” the wording 
ran: “The Government will arrange and control field operations. In addi- 
tion the Government will determine the requirements for and will provide 
equipment and services for telemetry, tracking, range safety, and data re- 
duction. The Contractor shall supply the Government with the Contractor’s 
requirements for data.” When asked ten years later why Martin abandoned 
its advocacy of using telemetry equipment already available and, in com- 
pany opinion, as good or better than the more complex that NRL demanded, 
Elliott Felt shrugged and said smilingly: “Oh, they were so insistent that it 
wasn’t worth fighting over any longer. Besides we were tired of going to 
meetings at the Laboratory. It was such a dreary place.” The Laboratory 
would have to bear the responsibility for any waste of time or money. In 
actuality by mid-1957 the accuracy of the NRL telemetry system would be 
an eye-opener to Air Force officers and contractors at the Cape.23 
NRL also had its way in requiring the specifications for subcontractors’ 
jobs to be incorporated in the government contract with Martin. The pro- 
vision automatically put the Laboratory’s staff in a position to monitor all 
Vanguard work in process. The technical director of the program believed 
it the only possible way to ensure that the quality of subsystems and parts 
was up to the Laboratory’s exacting standards and, if not, to institute 
corrective measures promptly. In spite of its initial objections, the Martin 
Company in time to come would find government intervention helpful, for 
example, in flying out new heat-treating equipment to the Aerojet plant 
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when the subcontractor was encountering troubles with the second-stage 
tankage.24 
Deviation from specifications was settled by a decree that every change 
must be recorded in writing whether approved in conferences between the 
government and the primary contractor or more formally by letter. The 
Bureau of Aeronautics Representative, BAR/Baltimore, might sanction 
minor revisions; NRL must endorse all major deviations. Although Martin 
complained about the one-sided nature of clauses empowering the govern- 
ment to direct changes which the contractor thought needless or undesir- 
able, the company knew that the customer, right or wrong, was paying the 
piper and could call the tune. 
In the section dealing with the safety of the rocket’s structure, one 
sentence alone took a week of angry discussion to draft in its final form: 
“The minimum margin of safety shall be greater than zero.” Martin, 
relying on its experience in extrapolation, believed its calculations of 
stresses as reliable a guide to structural design as the state of the art could 
furnish. NRL, doubting the capacity of anyone to compute with sufficient 
exactitude the structural strengths required to meet unknown conditions, 
insisted on safeguards. Company officials argued that the customer must 
trust to company competence. And company pride was involved. What 
Martin considered redundancies, the Laboratory labeled necessary pre- 
cautions. So one paragraph covering structural design set the minimum 
yield factor of safety at 1.10 and the minimum ultimate factor at 1.25. 
“Where structural failure would endanger personnel during ground 
handling, erection and checkout, . . . the minimum ultimate factor of safety 
shall be 1.50. . . . For pressure vessels other than fuel and oxidizer tanks, 
where failure would endanger personnel, . . . the minimum ultimate factor 
of safety shall be 2.00.’’ These additions to the strength of the Vanguard 
structure, as Martin pointed out, increased the rocket’s weight, but, in the 
view of most NRL experts, that was a lesser penalty than the loss of public 
endorsement of the satellite program which might well have resulted had 
the men working on the launcher suffered serious injuries.25 And even if 
men were not hurt, the loss of material and time from structural failures 
would have been disastrous, for estimates made later at the firing complex 
showed that every hour of delay in a countdown cost a t  least $25,000.26 
The wording of several passages of the specification was vague or at 
least subject to more than one interpretation. No  one could quarrel with the 
goal stated under the heading “Simplicity”: “Simplicity of satellite vehicle 
construction shall be emphasized in the interest of providing reliability and 
decreased weight. Every effort shall be made to keep the number and 
complexity of components . . . to a minimum. Applications of this principle 
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must not jeopardize attaining the mission.” The last sentence, however 
sensible, opened the door to new debates when testing began. Were two 
sets of batteries and valves, for example, a redundancy or necessary insur- 
ance? By the end of 1956 NRL acknowledged that some of its original 
demands were unrealistically cautious. Reliability, a universally acknowl- 
edged “must,” was obviously too elusive a term to define precisely. The 
requirement merely read: “The vehicle shall be designed and components 
selected on the basis of available reliability data to insure reliability con- 
sistent with the state of the art. Reliability studies and statistical testing to 
establish such data shall not be required.” In other words, build as reliable 
a vehicle as you know how 
The inspection and testing requirements, on the contrary, were ex- 
plicit. The primary contractor was to conduct at his plant tests and 
inspections of parts, subsystems, and the assembled vehicle; inspection of 
materials, components, and subsystems was also to take place during manu- 
facture in Martin’s and subcontractors’ shops and, after assembly of each 
stage of the vehicle at the Middle River plant, again under the supervision 
of a government inspector. Thus there was to be a triple check before 
firing tests began and before government acceptance of each vehicle. Pro- 
cedures in Baltimore were to include, first, systems tests of stability, 
pressurization efficiency, and structural noise that might interfere with the 
functioning of the flight control system; and, second, environmental testing 
with simulation of vibration, shock, temperature, humidity, and pressure. 
But data required for design evaluation of the entire vehicle were to be 
obtained from flight-testing at Cape Canaveral. As the contractor was to 
have responsibility for directing and conducting the test programs, where- 
as, as noted above, the government was to “control all field operations,” 
the seeds of future controversy were embedded in the document. 
The purpose of each static firing and flight test in the field was, how- 
ever, clearly set forth. The program was to progress from static and then 
flight testing of TV-0, the name given to the’modified Viking 13 single- 
stage rocket, to Test Vehicle 1, the revamped Viking 14, carrying a dummy 
second stage and a live third stage. TV-3 would be the first live three-stage 
Vanguard to be fired, and T V 4  the first to carry the satellite package. The 
last test vehicle, TV-5, equipped with somewhat different instrumentation 
from that in T V 4 ,  would also carry a satellite?* Only after analyzing the 
performance of the test vehicles were launchings of the six SLVs, satellite 
launch vehicles, to begin. Events in 1957 were destined to change this 
schedule. 
One policy matter not expressly covered in the final contract was the 
question of releasing information to the public. Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Robertson’s directive of 9 September 1955 had, i t  is true, decreed that all 
releases dealing with the Pentagon’s share of the program must be cleared 
through the Office of Security Review, and the Navy had assigned a Con- 
fidential classification to the project. But those restrictions still left areas of 
doubt. The Martin Company naturally wanted freedom to answer news- 
papermen’s inquiries about company plans and progress that did not 
impinge on security rules; it seemed a reasonable form of free advertising. 
But ONR was adamant that every statement for public consumption must 
be cleared through government channels. The Vanguard teams at the 
Laboratory and at the contractor’s plant strove to abide by Edward Hulburt’s 
informal dictate that, whatever the omissions, the information must be 
strictly truthful. Yet well before all the design specifications were agreed 
upon, so many problems were arising about public relations that Hagen 
eventually asked Commander Berg to prepare a list of cIassified and non- 
classified items in the vehicle. A time-consuming task, it proved a valuable 
guide for briefings. Both Hagen and Berg believed that all Americans had a 
legitimate interest in the great venture. So, as Berg put it, “instead of 
brushing a few crumbs through the cracks to them, we invited them to the 
banquet table and merely omitted a few courses.” 29 
The signing of the design specification in itself constituted a mile- 
stone for the program. Reached six weeks after the date originally set, 
the agreement cleared the road ahead; manufacturing drawings and shop 
work could now proceed, even though addenda and revisions to the basic 
document were already under discussion. The Martin Company on 8 March 
submitted a list of minor changes clarifying the company’s responsibilities, 
appending a breakdown of costs now estimated at $26,2 12,938, and making 
some shifts in the test schedule. An addendum prepared by the Laboratory 
set forth the procedures for incorporating in the specification the decisions 
left unsettled in the agreement of 29 February. It also made more ex- 
plicit the duties of the contractor’s field crew and the relationship to 
obtain between Martin’s field project engineer and NRL’s test coordinator 
and project coordinator at AFMTC, and the amendment described the 
character of the supervision the Laboratory would exercise over subcon- 
tractors. Furthermore, it expressly assigned to the Martin Company respon- 
sibility for technical coordination of the work to be done on the third-stage 
rocket motor by the Allegany Ballistics Laboratory with that to be 
undertaken by the Grand Central Rocket Company. With these elabora- 
tions completed, both parties signed the final contract on 30 April.3O 
In the retrospect of a dozen years, the major participants viewed the 
battle over Vanguard specifications as inevitable, partly because similar 
fights, albeit on a smaller scale, still occur when a much-publicized con- 
tract is at stake, and more largely because the 1955-6 struggle, involving as 
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it did a controversial principle of management, had to go on under time 
pressures so severe as to make tempers peculiarly edgy. Just as the differ- 
ences of opinion over the design, as such, rarely if ever created animus, so 
by 1967 the former antagonists could see that neither side had been wholly 
and consistently right. Under the circumstances obtaining in the mid-l950s, 
it was little short of a miracle that a workable modus operandi had come 
into being by spring 1956. 
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6 
ROLE OF NAS AND TPESP, 
1955 -1 956 
IN AUTUMN 1955, while the Naval Research Laboratory and the Martin 
Company were starting work on specifications for the vehicle, the United 
States National Committee for the IGY had organized a Tkchnical Panel 
on the Earth Satellite Program (TPESP) to watch over the purely scientific 
phases of the project, to select the experiments to install in the birds, and, 
subject to USNC 2nd Executive Committee approval, to fix the policies and 
procedures in regard to financial commitments, institutional relationships, 
and educational releases to the public. In assessing the work of the National 
Committee, the technical panels, and the working groups-under the Na- 
tional Academy of Sciences (NAS) -it is essential to realize that, with the 
exception of the seven to eight men who composed the USNC’s secretariat 
and the handful of scientists whose government jobs extended to participa- 
tion in IGY planning and action, all members gave their services without 
compensation. Academy funds, derived from the National Science Founda- 
tion, paid travel expenses and in some instances a modest per diem to cover 
living costs during protracted committee and panel sessions. But most of 
the men who spent days, sometimes weeks, in directing IGY programs vol- 
unteered their time, despite demanding professional obligations on uni- 
versity campuses or in industry. In the earth satellite project, moreover, 
panel and working group members also risked their future standing in the 
scientific world, for the success of the venture was far from assured and 
failure could end in the men responsible for the scientific aspects of the 
undertaking being labeled incompetent. 
The Technical Panel on the Earth Satellite Program consisted of the 
chairman, Richard Porter, who was also a member of the Stewart Commit- 
tee, Joseph E. Kaplan and Hugh Odishaw, USNC chairman and secretary 
respectively, Homer E. Newell, Jr., of NRL, William H. Pickering of the 
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Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology, 
Athelstan Spilhaus of the University of Minnesota, Lyman Spitzer, Jr., 
of Princeton University, James A. Van Allen of the State University of 
Iowa, and Fred Whipple of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Laboratory. 
After Spitzer resigned in 1956, Gerald Clemence of the Naval Observatory 
and Michael Ference, Jr., of the Ford Motor Company brought the number 
to ten, and in the months after Sputnik the addition of Alan Shapley of the 
National Bureau of Standards and W. W. Kellogg of the RAND Corpora- 
tion further enlarged the membership. By invitation, a few guests and 
observers always attended the meetings to contribute information or repre- 
sent such agencies as the National Science Foundation, the DoD Comp- 
troller’s Office, and the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Deve1opment.l 
The most urgent task of the panel when it first met-was the drafting of 
a budget, since if the USNC was to get adequate supplemental funds in 
fiscal year 1956, the request had to reach the Science Foundation in the 
near future and go thence to the Bureau of the Budget and Congress. The 
panel’s main quandary was what to expect from the Department of Defense 
in keeping with the Department’s pledge “to furnish logistic support for the 
NAS-USNC Satellite Program within reasonable limits.” What were rea- 
sonable limits? The commitment as it stood encompassed plans for “six 
earnest tries” at a satellite launching, but the Academy’s goal was twelve, 
since scientists, doubtful of being able to locate in space and track every bird 
put into orbit, feared that fewer than twelve attempts would imperil ac- 
quisition of the scientific data at which the program was aimed. Irrespective 
of how many of the six shots authorized to date were successful, would the 
Defense Department share the cost of an extended program? The panel 
decided to divide its budget estimates into two phases, one covering from 
April 1956 through March 1958, during which time the six tries already 
approved would presumably be completed, and Phase I1 running for an- 
other one and a quarter years; assuming continued DoD participation, Phase 
I1 should permit another six launchings. The panel appointed a three-man 
working group to prepare this double set of estimates.2 
When the working group tendered its suggested budget in November, 
the report set $8.337 million as the sum needed to cover National Academy 
expenses for instrumentation for the six operation vehicles, ground sta- 
tions, and “certain scientific personnel” during Phase I; a “guesstimate” put 
Defense Department costs at about $19.1 million. Optimistically a staff 
member of the USNC secretariat explained that while “areas of overlap 
of responsibilities” between the Academy and the military would doubtless 
occur, “it is expected that mutual understanding will prevent difficulties.” 
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Inasmuch as the Defense Department had not yet agreed to support Phase 
11, figures for extension of the program through June 1959 were more 
tentative, but an additional $20 million appeared to be enough. Of that 
amount about $7.1 would be Defense money; IGY funds, if need be, could 
logically meet the $6 million cost of procuring six additional vehicles. All 
told, NAS-NSF expenditures for Phase I1 would come to approximately 
$10.87 million, a figure that would keep Academy expenditures for three 
and a quarter years well below the $20 million ceiling set by the National 
Committee for the satellite program. “With the understanding that some 
latitude would be given for minor adjustments,” the panel approved the 
 estimate^.^ The tabulation of costs to be financed by the Science Foundation 
are shown in the table.4 
In view of the stress the Stewart Committee’s original report had 
laid upon the advantages of the Minitrack system, the nearly $3 million 
allotted in the IGY budget for optical tracking may seem surprising. Years 
later John Hagen remarked that, as things turned out, the program would 
have lost little from omitting provision for optical tracking. But in 1955, 
and indeed long afterward, most of the IGY committee and satellite panel 
believed tracking by cameras, telescopes, and theodolites vitally important. 
Not only would it be more accurate, but it might well be a more depend- 
able, albeit a more restricted, method than a still untried electronic system. 
“One should act,” ran the panel minutes, “as though there were only a 
50-50 chance of the Minitrack’s operating successfully (although actually 
the Minitrack engineers estimate that on any one firing the chance of suc- 
cessful operation should be better than 95%) .” Athelstan Spilhaus further- 
more contended that many people would have little faith in information 
relayed by telemetry, that form of occult magic; they would put stock in a 
man-made moon only if they could see it with the help of simple instru- 
ments as it passed overhead. Consequently plans for optical tracking re- 
ceived careful attention. T o  begin with, a Working Group on Optical 
Observations and Tracking consisting of Fred Whipple and Lyman Spitzer 
presented a scheme of enlisting the help of professional astronomers, train- 
ing teams of amateur observers, and setting up central administrative, com- 
puting, and analysis facilities. The panel promptly voted to ask the USNC 
to obtain from the Science Foundation a grant of $50,000 for the Smith- 
sonian Astrophysical Observatory in Cambridge, Massachussetts, to 
oversee the establishment of twelve observation stations, arrange for pro- 
curement of special equipment, secure the collaboration of governmental 
and other professional scientific groups, and recruit amateurs for what 
later came to be called “Moonwatch.” The plan of operation appeared in 
the diagrammatic form shown on page 101.& 
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Diagram of the plan of operation for Project &loonwatch. 
Although formal action on the plan had to wait upon passage of a supple- 
mental appropriation for the IGY, Whipple at ,  once set about organizing 
SAO’s optical tracking scheme. 
The enthusiasm of amateur star-gazers over the opportunity to have a 
part in an important scientific venture early impressed the USNC’s Execu- 
tive Committee. Here evidently was a simple way of widening public inter- 
est in the IGY both at home and abroad. In response to the committee’s 
suggestions that the men in charge of other phases of the IGY open the 
doors to amateur participation, in early 1956 the technical panel authorized 
“Moonbeam” for ham radio operators; the Naval Research Laboratory 
accepted responsibility for indoctrinating licensed applicants in the essen- 
tial do’s and don’t’s, chiefly by means of a descriptive and technical manual 
to be prepared by John Hagen. At the same time Whipple agreed to draft 
instructions for Moonwatch teams.6 
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When hearings on the IGY supplemental budget began on the Hill in 
March 1956, spokesmen for the Science Foundation and the National 
Academy had some difficulty in justifying the request for $19.262 million 
for the satellite program, by far the largest single item in the $28 million 
budget. Patiently they explained that the undertaking had assumed new 
dimensions since the White House announcement of July 1955, that more 
nations, notably the U.S.S.R., were now participating, and that American 
universities would bear much of the expense of interpreting the scientific 
data picked up from the satellites. Congressional questions hammered away 
at why the Academy planned to share its findings with other nations and 
yet was asking the United States government to spend millions of taxpayers’ 
money to acquire the information. Would anything useful, congressmen 
asked, come out of the program? To a question posed by a senator, “How 
do you propose to get results from devices in the satellite?” Joseph Kaplan 
replied- 
We literally talk to the satellite, using radio waves, which is a technique 
known as telemetering . . . . 
In conventional rocket research, the techniques of recovering equipment 
by means of parachutes has been well worked out . . . . But in the satellite 
nothing but the radio signals will be recovered at first.7 
Richard Porter defended the request for money enough to expand the 
number of launchings from six to twelve: twelve, in the judgment of the 
Academy’s technical panel, represented “a realistic program.” Although 
Congress in the end pared $1 million from the Foundation’s IGY budget 
and NSF and the USNC then reduced the total for the satellite program to 
$18.364 million, the panel believed that it could still manage to finance the 
twelve shots. Kaplan’s summary of events ran: “Berkner sold the program to 
the Academy; Waterman sold it to the White House; I sold it to Congress.” 
He did not add that nobody sold it to Secretary of Defense Wilson or that 
Congress, though granting funds to the Science Foundation for it, never 
appropriated a cent to the Navy for the vehicle.6 
Meanwhile the TPESP had set in motion a plan for obtaining pro- 
posals for scientific apparatus to put into the instrumented satellites. Recog- 
nizing that selection of the most rewarding experiments would be simplified 
by full discussion of possibilities among geophysicists, the TPESP decided 
to organize a symposium on “The Scientific Aspects of Earth Satellites.” By 
briefing participants on the limitations which the vehicle would impose on 
satellite instrumentation, the panel should avoid exposure to a flood of 
impractical ideas and find the choice among useful proposals easier. The 
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originators of the approved experiments would then receive grants from 
the Science Foundation to assist them in developing the implementing in- 
struments. Publication of abstracts of the papers presented, furthermore, 
would serve the purpose of informing foreign scientists about the scope 
of the American program. Van Allen and Odishaw to whom the panel 
entrusted the task of arranging the symposium concluded that the tenth 
anniversary meeting of the Upper Atmosphere Rocket Research Panel 
scheduled for late January 1956 wouId be the most suitable occasion, for it 
would bring together men already familiar with high atmospheric research. 
Van Allen’s letter to members of the rocket group explained that the 
symposium was to be kept to not more than fifty persons, a number that 
would embrace most American scientists qualified by training and ex- 
perience to contribute to a meaningful discussion in this little known 
field. The papers to be read should be “specific, critically considered, and 
pertinent to the present state of technology and the reasonable projection 
of this technology into the next few years.” Plans for physical experiments 
and observations, theoretical and interpretative matters, ,and techniques 
and components of a novel nature would all be acceptable topics, but not 
space medicine, or the legal and political aspects of the satellite program, 
or essays dealing with vehicle propulsion and guidance? 
Although the scientists who presented papers two months later at the 
Ann Arbor symposium generally adhered to the rules Van Allen had 
laid down, the problem of appraising the relative value of their propositions 
led the panel to ask Van Allen to head a Working Group on Internal 
Instrumentation to screen out the best ideas for later panel consideration, 
unobtrusively to elicit proposals in neglected fields, and to recommend 
priorities for “on-board’’ experiments to be flown in the first satellites.1° 
T o  help the panel reach decisions on other complicated technical problems, 
in March the TPESP created also a Working Group on Tracking and 
Computation chaired by Pickering. Inasmuch as the panel had to review 
working group recommendations carefully and, where they involved IGY 
finances and international relationships, had to submit them to the USNC 
and its Executive Committee for final endorsement, the arrangement 
meant a good deal of thrashing over the same ground. But no other 
method of handling IGY business was feasible. Academic scientists, upon 
whose knowledge the usefulness of the IGY depended, had to parcel out 
their IGY chores among each other and rely upon reports to keep them- 
selves abreast of what their fellows were doing. That the system worked 
at all was due chiefly to Richard Porter’s contributions of time and thought 
and to the efficiency of Hugh Odishaw and his assistants on the USNC 
secretariat. 
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During the spring of 1956 the panel discussed a variety of questions: 
how, for example, to evaluate the chances of a successfuI Russian satellite 
launching before the year was over, how to explain to the public the goals 
of the American program effectively, and how to obtain from the Naval 
Research Laboratory greater flexibility in satellite design and the teleme- 
try and tracking systems to be employed. Discreet inquiries through the 
ruling international body for the IGY, CSAGI, appeared to be the best 
way to verify or put to rest the vague rumors of an early Russian satellite 
launching. Speakers at international scientific gatherings scheduled for the 
summer and autumn and at meetings of American societies should be able 
to disseminate accurate information about the Vanguard project. Publica- 
tion in May of the abstracts of the papers read at Ann Arbor offered an 
impressive summary of what the program might accomplish. NRL, how- 
ever, stood by its contention that all experiments installed in the birds 
should rely on the Minitrack and the types of telemetry NRL had already 
chosen. As for the satellite, Homer Newell reported that the Laboratory 
was going to produce at first some 6.4-inch as well as 20-inch spheres and 
thereafter would try other configurations, including perhaps the cylinder- 
shape that Van Allen advocated. Heavy instrumentation to check the per- 
formance of each stage of the launcher had to go into the test vehicles, but 
the Vanguard staff concluded that every test vehicle containing three live 
stages could carry also a small, lightweight satellite. If the 6.4-inch, 
4-pound bird got into orbit, that success would not only testify to the 
adequacy of the launcher but permit later flights, unburdened with the 
test instrumentation, to carry the bigger spheres and more scientific para- 
phernalia.ll All these problems, however, faded into the background when 
the panel discovered that a budgetary crisis was putting the entire satellite 
program in jeopardy. 
Paul A. Smith of the Department of the Navy had warned the satellite 
panel in March that then estimates pointed to a possible $20 million 
deficit in DoD funding for Vanguard. But panel members had not been 
seriously alarmed. Academy scientists, the Vanguard comptroller at NRL 
ruefully observed, looked upon the DoD as a “fat cat” that could afford 
anything it wanted. Surely the Department would find some way of honor- 
ing its commitments even though they were greater than originally ex- 
pected. And, with over $18 million appropriated to the Academy for the 
satellite program, the USNC could pay for the second six vehicles and thus 
carry out Phase 11. In April 1956 Newell and Ross Peavy of the USNC 
secretariat figured that the distribution of expenditures between the Acad- 
emy and the Defense Department would be approximately as follows: l2 
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Total USNC USNC DoD 
Phase Z Phase ZI Phase 1 
0 $ 6,094,000 $37,200,000 
$ 610,000 61 0,000 0 
1,362,000 382,000 0 
3,796,000 2,076,000 2,400,000 
1. Launching Vehicles 
2. Satellite Instrumentation 
2a. Scientific Data Telemetering 
3. Radio Tracking 
4. Vehicle Telemetering (launching 
phase) 
5. Optical Tracking 
6. Computation 
7. Scientific Coordination 
Totals 
(included in item 1) 2,900,000 
2,233,000 765,000 0 
25 1,000 95 1,000 1,300,000 
82,000 50,000 0 
$8,334,000 $10,928,000 $43,800,000 
A blow awaited the scientists when they met in June. A statement from 
the Pentagon informed them that since the preceding October the esti- 
mated costs to the military of providing six launching vehicles, building 
tracking stations and furnishing logistic support had nearly trebled and 
now ran to some $63 million. Only $21 million had been authorized. Sec- 
retary of Defense Wilson had consequently outlined to President Eisen- 
hower four possible courses of action: (1) proceeding with the full NAS 
proposal of six pilot launchers and then six more; (2) proceeding with 
the six launchings already approved; (3) proceeding to the extent of 
available funds; or (4) canceling the program. Upon the advice of the 
Defense Department and the National Security Council, the President had 
chosen course 2 and was requesting the Bureau of the Budget to find 
additional funds for it. Worse followed: the emergency fund on which 
the Naval Research Laboratory had been drawing to pay contractors’ fees 
was virtually exhausted, and the Defense Department, knowing that the 
congressional appropriation for the IGY included $10.728 million for a 
second six satellite launchings, now asked the Science Foundation and the 
Academy to turn over to the Navy $6 million immediately to prevent work 
stoppages on the test vehicles. 
Feeling that the pistol had been put to its head, the TPESP reluc- 
tantly admitted that it had little choice. I t  would have to acquiesce in the 
transfer of the $5.8 million that would be surplus in the IGY budget if 
only six firings were to occur. The President had decreed only six earnest 
tries. But panel members insisted that a letter to the Science Foundation 
make clear that they would accept the reduction in the program and the 
sacrifice of IGY money only under duress and not by free will. They would 
continue to seek means of restoring the number of launchings to twelve, 
since half that number would probably mean at best getting not more than 
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two satellites into orbit. They drew some consolation from a message from 
Alan Waterman “describing his understanding that ‘the need for and feasi- 
bility of constructing and launching six additional satellites will be a sub- 
ject of review on the part of DoD.’ ” With that bit of reassurance in mind, 
the scientists stipulated that release of their surplus funds to the Defense 
Department “should not preclude the ultimate availability of equivalent 
funds if the expanded program should be deemed again feasible.” The 
USNC and the Executive Committee agreed to the transfer of $5.8 million a 
week later.13 
The indignation of the IGY group subsided somewhat during the 
summer. That the threatened work stoppage on Vanguard did not occur 
lightened the earlier tensions considerably. Over dinner at the Cosmos 
Club in mid-July Porter, Waterman, Admiral Rawson Bennett, Director 
of ONR, and Clifford Furnas, who had succeeded Quarles as assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, had “a very useful 
and constructive discussion,” as Porter described it. Over the division of re- 
sponsibilities between the Academy and the military services, a differentia- 
tion supposedly clearly defined in 1955, confusion had risen in the 
intervening months. The four distinguished men, each speaking for his 
own organization, reached a general understanding that, in Porter’s view, 
ironed out many difficulties. In a letter to Kaplan, Porter summarized the 
results: 
1. The Earth-satellite program should be thought of as an IGY project 
in which the Department of Defense is cooperating, rather than as a D.O.D. 
project. 
2. The D.O.D. has accepted the responsibility for development, procure- 
ment, and launching of the vehicles, and for demonstrating that the ve- 
hicles have or have not successfully been placed in orbit, and for 
providing certain other technical and logistic support. 
3. The National Academy of Sciences retains the over-all responsibility 
for all phases of the scientific utilization of the satellite vehicles including 
precise determination of orbit and other measurements which may be made 
on . . . the vehicles for scientific purposes. Funds for this work have 
been appropriated by the Congress to the National Science Foundation, 
and the Foundation must properly account for these funds. 
Later paragraphs underscored the Academy’s delegation of authority 
to NRL to develop, procure, and operate high-precision radio tracking and 
telemetry stations, perform the analysis and computations of data, and 
devise and construct “certain instrumented experiments” to be carried on 
board the satellite. For those phases of the program, Porter’s interpretation 
thus made the Laboratory an agent of the Academy. The Laboratory was 
to report its fiscal estimates and commitments in these areas regularly 
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to the Academy and the Foundation. Publicity releases must obtain se- 
curity clearance from the DoD and “policy” clearance from the IGY com- 
mittee after consultation with the State Department. The USNC and the 
Defense Department would issue an official “Policies and Responsibilities 
document” as soon as both bodies had agreed upon the exact wording.l* 
The TPESP rested easier upon learning that Furnas, Bennett, and 
Waterman recognized the satellite program as an Academy project, in no 
sense a military venture. To the USNC, with its responsibilities to the 
international scientific community, it was important to have all doubts on 
that score removed. The verbal agreement, committed to paper only in 
Porter’s personal letter to the USNC chairman, could not, however, change 
the sober realities of the situation. The major tasks of the satellite under- 
taking still fell to NRL, to the men who had originated the Vanguard 
design and its tracking and telemetry systems, and to those responsible for 
getting the satellite into orbit. The Vanguard team at the Laboratory had 
too much respect for the stature of the scientists on the IGY panel to 
dismiss their ideas lightly, but the men sweating over the job of producing 
a reliable launcher and dependable tracking and radio Communication 
did not welcome gratuitous advice on how to do it.16 Although labeled an 
Academy program, in actuality its execution was divided into two unequal 
parts, the most costly and technically difficult of which was under Defense 
Department aegis. It was the problems arising out of this division of 
responsibility that later brought the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
ministration into the picture. 
If few people as yet fully perceived the handicaps of split control, 
in December 1956-when, at the USNC’s request, an ad hoc group consisting 
of Porter, Van Allen, Lyman Spitzer, William W. Kellogg of RAND, 
Newell, and Milton Rosen of NRL drafted a statement of the fields of 
research that a long-term, post-IGY satellite program should encompass- 
the group volunteered its comments on organization: 
for an extended scientific program of national scope, . . . it is important 
that clear ciuilian authority (as by the National Science Foundation) be 
established for the planning and execution . . . . In particular, it seems 
important to establish at the very beginning . . . a single comprehensive 
budget which will include all expenditures in connection with the program, 
including those to be made by organizations within the military establish- 
ments.16 [ItaIics added.] 
Before the autumn of 1958, the Department of Defense was account- 
able for expenditures for the satellite vehicles and radio tracking, the 
Science Foundation for the rest. Theoretically everyone understood these 
compelling facts. The TPESP, without relinquishing its plans for twelve 
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launchings, had to acquiesce not only in the transfer of $5.8 million to 
the Navy in summer 1956 but also in the release of another $5.5 million of 
IGY money in October. The result was to perpetuate strains in the relations 
between the Science Foundation and the Academy and to encourage the 
panel to watch the Laboratory’s performance with an increasingly critical 
eye. Homer Newel1 fortunately was usually able to explain to his panel 
members why engineering considerations obliged NRL to adopt features 
for the satellite that were unwelcome to the scientists and why delays 
occurred in the test program. Yet at times administrators of the Science 
Foundation felt impelled to intervene to keep relations between the 
Academy and the DoD on an even keel. Waterman, who had served 
as chief scientist at the Office of Naval Research before he became director 
of the Foundation, was a close friend of Admiral Bennett and at the same 
time understood the point of view of the gifted men attached to the 
Academy. Quiet and unassuming himself, he was an indispensable go- 
between in what was often a trying situation. His role was made harder, 
however, by the fact that most members of the ,TPESP and its working 
groups could allot only part of their time to the satellite program. They 
were only intermittently in Washington, and correspondence was a poor 
substitute for direct contact with day-to-day developments.l7 Anxiety over 
progress on the launch vehicle crept into panel discussions increasingly 
often. 
Relatively little controversy arose over NRL’s plans for tracking, 
orbital computations, and data reduction. While the panel inclined to 
think Army estimates for constructing and operating the Minitrack stations 
excessively high, the TPESP swallowed its protests, inasmuch as Defense 
money was to pay the costs. The Working Group on Tracking and Com- 
putation, which scrutinized every feature of NRL’s Minitrack and projected 
computing system, questioned every detail but generally endorsed the 
Laboratory’s arrangements. A NRL contract with International Business 
Machines was especially satisfactory, partly because of the free services the 
company offered the government. Despite this generous arrangement, the 
prospective costs of data reduction were beginning to rise alarmingly.l* A 
contract with Radiation, Inc., of Melbourne, Florida, fixed a price of 
$458,000 solely for equipment and services for data reduction in connection 
with the telemetry to be used in launching the vehicle. 
By comparison, the Smithsonian’s optical tracking scheme looked 
cheap and easy, although scientists eager to obtain continuously recorded 
and telemetered data from instrumented satellites may well have regarded 
it as an extravagance at any price. The establishment and operation of 
twelve observing stations would cost nearly $2.371 million, but other ex- 
penses would be fairly light. IBM had offered free access to the 704 com- 
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puter at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for an hour a day 
through June 1959 and supporting services elsewhere for orbit calculations. 
The Army Signal Corps was willing to release a number of elbow tele- 
scopes for amateur use at military installations and the Air Force Aero- 
nautical Chart and Information Center was ready to supply without charge 
some manpower and equipment for optical observation stations on islands 
in the Pacific. The panel, however, felt obliged to stipulate that all operators 
at these stations must be civilians to quiet fears of other nations that the 
United States was using the IGY for military ends. Yet the proffer of free 
services notwithstanding, as matters stood in the fall of 1956, panel chair- 
man Porter envisaged a deficit of $1 million for the scientific phases of the 
satellite pr0gram.1~ 
International cooperation was a basic element in the conception of the 
IGY, but whether other countries could or would contribute much to the 
American satellite undertaking long looked doubtful. Although scientists 
attending a western hemisphere regional conference of CSAGI in Rio de 
Janiero in July 1956 listened attentively to lectures given py John Hagen 
and William Pickering on the technical aspects of the American project, 
Gilman Reid of the USNC’s secretariat reported: “Apparently very little 
information on the satellite had reached the South Americans and they 
regarded the program as exclusively a United States effort. In the Working 
Group Session . . . there was small attendance and an apparent lack of 
interest on how there might be participation in the program.” This 
apathy was disconcerting, since several tracking stations along the north- 
south “fence” were to be located in South America. The International 
Committee, CSAGI, promptly urged that every National Committee ap- 
point a “satellite reporter” to facilitate the channeling of information.20 
Lloyd Berkner, American representative on CSAGI, already was function- 
ing in that capacity for the United States. CSAGI made further constructive 
recommendations at the meetings in Barceldna in September: every 
National Committeee should report on its capacity to set up amateur ob- 
servation stations, and standardization should everywhere obtain in radio 
tracking and telemetry systems so as to correspond to those announced 
by the United States. Members of the American delegation pushed the 
theme of collaboration with “strong invitations” to other countries to 
participate; the United States National Committee would issue a technical 
manual to assist them. 
At this point the Soviet National Committee formally announced to 
the international gathering that the U.S.S.R. also had inaugurated a satel- 
lite program, “by means of which measurements of atmospheric pressure 
and temperature, as well as observations of cosmic rays, micrometeorites, 
the geomagnetic field, and solar radiation will be conducted. The prep 
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arations for launching the satellite are presently being made.” Although 
by no means certain about how much technical information the Soviets 
would release, Americans were relieved to have Soviet intentions brought 
into the open. Hugh Odishaw suggested to the panel that autumn that 
here might be the means of inducing the White House to restore the 
Academy’s twelve-vehicle program. An inquiry sent a month later from 
the USNC to the Russians asked advice on where the United States should 
set up observation stations to track future U.S.S.R. satellites. As half 
expected, no explicit answer was forthcoming.21 
Publicizing of satellite plans at the CSAGI sessions nevertheless bene- 
fited the American program. Australian scientists opened negotiations for 
a Minitrack station at Woomera which they would maintain and operate. 
England, France, and Italy expressed readiness to contribute various serv- 
ices. And the World Meteorological Organization was considering offering 
its network for the transmission of data.22 Whipple reported that prospects 
were good for recruiting Moonwatch teams in Australia, Japan, South 
Africa, and possibly India, and that, provided the United States supplied the 
cameras, Australia, Spain, Ethiopia, Iran, and Japan wanted to establish 
optical tracking units. All told, by late autumn 1956, months before 
Lloyd Berkner and members of the secretariat completed the 415-page 
handbook entitled Rockets and Satellites, the response of the international 
scientific community was gratifying. It would not pay the bills, but it should 
inspire the White House and the American Congress to support the venture 
on a generous scale. 
In any case the Academy must keep other nations informed about 
American plans and progress. The satellite manual went out in draft form 
to all national committees in August 1957, an amended version in No- 
vember after the first Sputnik flight. Every National Committee, the TPESP 
agreed, should receive advance notice of launching schedules, the pre- 
dicted orbit of each bird, what telemekry signals to watch for in tracking, 
the nature of each onboard experiment, and the method of coding data. 
Within five months of a successful launching, standard astronomy periodi- 
cals with an international circulation should carry detailed reports on 
orbital observations, and the results of scientific experiments should be 
released within eight months “in reduced, corrected and calibrated form,” 
together with pertinent interpretations. 
The panel’s chief worry as 1957 approached was the steadily rising 
cost of every phase of the scientific program, particularly the Baker-Nunn 
tracking cameras, orbital computation and data analysis, and the sums 
needed to supplement the grants to scientists preparing apparatus for on- 
board experiments. Porter and Van Allen argued that if expenses must 
be cut sharply, it would be better to drop one or more tracking stations 
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rather than to reduce the funds for experiments. Meanwhile the TPESP 
must make a final decision about which experiments were to be flown in 
the first satellites.= Postponed until Van Allen and his Working Group 
on Internal Instrumentation had analyzed the pros and cons of every 
proposal, the selection could not be put off further. 
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7 
ONBOARD EXPERIMENTS 
AND INSTRUMENTATION 
THE FIRST plan for an onboard satellite experiment to reach the chairman 
of the USNC was “A Proposal for Cosmic Ray Observations in Earth Satel- 
lites’’ submitted by James Van Allen, George Ludwig, and several colleagues 
at the State University of Iowa. It bore the date 28 September 1955, several 
days before the National Committee appointed the technical panel. Eager 
to start on the scientific work that constituted the reason for setting up a 
satellite program, the Iowa group had not waited for information on the 
configuration of the Vanguard satellite or the weight of instrumentation it 
could accommodate, or whether it could be launched into either a polar or 
an equatorial orbit. Van Allen’s covering letter set forth his belief “that the 
needs and desires of those contemplating use of the vehicles for scientific 
work [should] be adequately taken into account in connection with all 
major technical decisions.” He took for granted that “a technical committee 
of broad interest and competence” would decide on “the assignment of pay- 
load space” in each satellite. As he assumed also ’that the program would be 
“a continuing one in which there will be many satellites flown over an indef- 
initely extended period of time,” he envisaged development of a succession 
of vehicles, capable of placing in orbit increasingly capacious satellites from 
two feet to three feet and over in diameter and weighing from five pounds 
to fifty and m0re.l 
It is not surprising that Van Allen had an experiment planned so 
promptly, for he had had long talks with Ernst Stuhlinger, chief scientist at 
the Army Ballistic Missile unit, when both men were at Princeton in 1953- 
1954. Stuhlinger’s technical knowledge and vision had inspired the younger 
man to prepare for the day when satellites would carry scientific instruments 
beyond the earth’s atmosphere. What he learned from Stuhlinger about the 
work afoot at Huntsville, furthermore, led him to believe in 1955 that a 
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sizable payload would be possible in an IGY satellite, even though he real- 
ized that the Vanguard first stage would have far less power than the Red- 
stone rocket. In fact, as he acknowledged long afterward, from the beginning 
he designed the pot of instruments for the cosmic ray observations in a form 
that would readily adapt it to installation in the satellite of the bigger vehicle 
were that eventually to be available.2 
“Cosmic ray observations above 50 kilometers altitude,” Van Allen 
stated in the original proposal, “have a special simplicity and importance 
because only above such altitudes can one’s apparatus be placed in direct 
contact with the primary radiation before its profound moderation in the 
earth’s atmosphere.” Over the preceding nine years he and his associates had 
pursued investigations by means of sounding rockets, but an instrumented 
earth satellite could provide in a week more satisfactory data than scientists 
could obtain from rockets in twelve years of work. A worldwide survey from 
a satellite would furnish information on the geographical distribution of 
arriving cosmic radiation and permit deductions about the magnitude and 
nature of what is solar in origin. If the satellite oxbit were pole to pole, or 
even equatorial, the survey would produce a mapping of the earth’s effective 
geomagnetic field and reveal the correlation of fluctuations in cosmic ray 
intensity with terrestrial magnetic and solar activity. Cerenkov detectors, 
already successfully used in Skyhook balloon flights, could measure the rela- 
tive abundance of the light elements of cosmic radiation-hydrogen, helium, 
lithium, beryllium, boron, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen and fluorine-and thus 
establish the distribution of nuclear species in the primary radiation before 
it encounters the atmosphere. Simple measurements would also increase 
knowledge of the nature of the cosmic ray albedo of the atmosphere. (Albedo 
is the ratio of the amount of electromagnetic radiation reflected by a body to 
the amount incident upon it.) As the albedo consists of products of nuclear 
reactions, in the upper levels of the atmosphere, which happen to proceed 
in upward directions, measurement of the total cosmic ray intensity as a 
function of distance from the earth should permit determination of the 
magnitude of the albedo. A simple detector in the satellite should, more- 
over, furnish means of charting the arrival of auroral radiations at the top 
of the earth’s atmosphere. 
The necessary instrumentation, consisting of a Geiger counter, Ceren- 
kov detectors, and telemetry equipment using conventional batteries would 
not weigh more than fifty pounds, or, if solar batteries were available, not 
more than thirty pounds. If the telemetering of data were to be continuous 
to ground stations, the usual methods of data transmission would be used; 
if communication were to be intermittent, a coded integrated system would 
be employed. Preparatory work at the university laboratory could begin at 
once, and the flight apparatus could be completed in about a year, provided 
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the government-supplied telemetry system were ready by then. The experi- 
menters wanted to share in choosing the characteristics of the system and in 
its preliminary testing. They planned to construct twenty sets of apparatus, 
fifteen to expend in preliminary tests, five to be flown in satellites. Van Allen, 
whom a government financial expert once characterized as “a small-town 
boy, a backyard scientist” who believed in keeping things simple, estimated 
the cost for approximately three years’ work at $66,125, including $1,000 for 
the time spent on reduction of the scientific data and publication of the 
findings. That estimated cost would rise six months later to $106,375.3 
A second proposal came a few weeks later, when Fred Singer of the 
University of Maryland outlined a plan for “Measurement of Meteoric Dust 
Erosion of the Satellite Skin.” Singer’s idea was to design a radioactive gauge 
to place on the satellite’s shell in order to measure the flux of integrated 
cosmic dust and compare the results with those obtained by optical observa- 
tion from the earth. The method should gauge the effects of erosion on dif- 
ferent surfaces of the satellite and reveal the changes of surface and 
aerodynamic properties as well as the subsidiary effects on ,satellite albedo 
and temperature. He proposed to measure erosion by observing the decrease 
in the activity of a radioactive portion of the satellite skin. A beta ray 
detector could monitor the activity on the interior surface of the shell by 
incorporating in the skin such beta emitters as phosphorous 32, strontium 
89, and others. The investigator could analyze the resulting data in compar- 
ison with those obtained in the laboratory from charging dust particles, ac- 
celerating them electromagnetically, and then examining the surface under 
a microscope. The experiment would take about two and a half years to 
complete and would cost about $52,900.4 
Because of Hagen’s reluctant agreement to discard plans for a conical 
satellite and employ a sphere instead, it was late November before Homer 
Newell could present to the TPESP a summary of what the major character- 
istics of the Vanguard satellite were to be. Since the entire satellite was to 
weigh in the neighborhood of ten kilograms, Newell explained, only about 
one kilogram could be devoted to the scientific payload exclusive of the 
telemetry and batteries. That news was obviously disconcerting to Van Allen. 
The satellite system was to include two concentric sphere4, an outer sphere 
twenty to thirty inches in diameter, and a smaller central sphere, about a 
foot in diameter, which would house much of the research instrumentation. 
Each sphere would be pressurized independently with helium. Welded seals 
were to be used throughout. “The various equipments will, however, be 
designed so as to operate even though the outer sphere loses its pressure.” 
Just as tracking considerations dictated the configuration of the shell, so the 
Laboratory designers believed a spherical inner container would simplify 
temperature control.5 
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“Temperatures between 5 O  and 5OoC will be acceptable to all of the 
items operating in the satellite.” Transistor characteristics were the princi- 
pal limiting factor. “More advanced transistors probably will be able to 
operate successfully in the range from - Z O O  to +80°C. It is expected that 
this temperature range can be maintained within the central sphere pro- 
vided the surface sphere is coated with an appropriate material such as 
ALSAC. This material is highly reflective to solar radiation, yet highly 
emissive with respect to infra-red radiation.” 
“Spin rates between 250 and 400 r.p.m. will probably occur in the 
Project Vanguard satellites.” Expectations ran that all equipment could be 
so designed as to withstand the accelerations to which the vehicle would sub- 
ject it. The telemetering system was to be tied in with the Minitrack system. 
Estimates put the telemetering reception interval during each revolution at 
a minimum of eight seconds at a ZOO-mile perigee, but an increase to as 
much as a minute might be possible.s 
Every scientist preparing an experiment would have to take these condi- 
tions into account. Transistorized circuitry, desirable because of its light 
weight, had the disadvantage of sensitivity to extremes of temperature. Simi- 
larly the capacity of the satellite’s outer shell to resist puncture by meteoric 
and micrometeoric particles and to withstand the action of atmospheric ions 
would affect the level of pressures on the inner sphere and might thus modi- 
f y  performance of the instruments housed in a centra! insular region. To 
accumulate exact data on surface and internal temperatures, surface erosion, 
and internal pressures, NRL proposed to conduct environmental studies in 
the first satellites launched. 
Hermann LaGow and several NRL associates were designing instrumen- 
tation for these studies. A pair of thermistors mounted on the satellite’s 
outer surface and one thermistor on the “instrumentation island” thermally 
insulated from the skin would measure, the temperatures. Surface tempera- 
tures would probably vary widely as the satellite passed successively through 
daytime and night conditions, but changes would probably be relatively 
small on the instrument package itself. T o  gauge pressures inside the outer 
sphere NRL planned to install snap switches which would relay signals when 
the internal pressures dropped below predetermined levels: a final signal 
would start the operation of a Pirani gauge to measure leakage rates. The 
experts believed it possible to distinguish between leakage cawed by mete- 
oric punctures and that caused by imperfections in welding and sealing of 
the outer sphere. A coating, with suitable electrical resistance characteristics, 
on a portion of the satellite’s outer skin was to form a circuit element capable 
of transmitting data on the rates of surface erosion; as erosion decreased sur- 
face thickness, resistance would increase. About five seconds would be 
enough telemetry time to transmit the data to ground stations. The instru- 
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mentation would weigh about one hundred grams, the miniaturized 
batteries about two hundred.’ 
At the same time Newel1 described two physical experiments that NRL 
considered well adapted to installation in an early Vanguard. Either of these 
could be flown along with the equipment for the environmental studies and 
use the same batteries. Leslie H. Meredith had prepared one of these pro- 
posals, namely, an investigation of the rigidity spectrum of primary cosmic 
rays, but he withdrew it some months later because it appeared unlikely to 
net enough information to be worth pursuing. The other, more promising, 
scheme came from Herbert Friedman and associates in the Electron Optics 
Branch of the Laboratory’s Optics Division. They sought to determine the 
variation in the intensity of solar Lyman-alpha radiation during each revo- 
lution of the satellite about the earth. Lyman-alpha radiation is the emission 
from the strongest line within the ultraviolet region of the hydrogen atom’s 
spectrum. Light of this short wavelength is not transmitted by the earth’s 
atmosphere, but delicate instruments in a satellite might record the increases 
in the radiational intensity to be expected during the minutes of a satellite’s 
flight through sunlight in comparison with the level of radiation registered 
during darkness. The experimenters planned to use an ion chamber sensi- 
tive only to the narrow region of the spectrum centered on the Lyman-alpha 
line, and circuitry to store the peak signal developed by the detector. Photo- 
ionization of the nitric oxide filling the ion chamber would create the spec- 
tral sensitivity. A photocell would relay data on the satellite’s aspect relative 
to the sun. Five seconds would probably suffice to read out all informa- 
tion by telemetry. The instrumentation, capable of operating continuously 
for approximately five hundred hours, would weigh about six hundred 
grams and occupy about five hundred cubic centimeters of space in the 
instrument package.* 
Thus at the end of 1955, a month before the creation of the Working 
Group on Internal Instrumentation, the TPESP had on hand five possible 
experiments to consider. As anticipated, the symposium held in Ann Arbor 
late in January 1956 brought in an additional crop of proposals-indeed, a 
number of sufficient interest to the scientific world to warrant publication 
in book form.s But by no means all the presentations described specific 
experiments: some dealt with problems awaiting solution but offered no 
explicit plan for using instrumented satellites to answer the questions; a few 
papers were directed at engineering or tracking techniques; one or two 
called for the use of apparatus which admittedly was unlikely to be perfected 
during the IGY. Nevertheless, by March, when the panel’s Working Group 
on Internal Instrumentation held its first meeting, the WGII, so-called, had 
before it eleven propositions that merited serious consideration and another 
four that needed clarification.1° 
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Of the men whom Van Allen chose to serve with him, Porter, Odishaw, 
and Lyman Spitzer, as members of the parent panel, and Herbert Friedman 
of NRL were already familiar with the satellite program; William W. Kel- 
logg of the RAND Corporation, Leroy R. Alldredge of the Operations Re- 
search Office of the Johns Hopkins University, and Michael Ference, Jr., of 
the Ford Motor Company alone needed briefing. Van Allen began by sum- 
marizing the outcome of a conference he and Porter had attended in late 
February at NRL to discuss plans with Hagen, Rosen, and Newell. The  
conferees had agreed that the objectives of the program were, first, to place 
an object in orbit and prove by observation that it was there; second, to 
obtain a precision optical track for geodetic and high-altitude atmospheric 
drag measurements; and, third, to perform experiments with internal instru- 
mentation. After achieving the second objective in one or two flights, the 
third goal would take precedence over the second. Rosen had emphasized 
the necessity of keeping satellite weight to a minimum until such time as the 
vehicle proved able to carry more. “If necessary to buy improved perform- 
ance by reduction of payload,” the best way, the five men thought, would 
probably be to start flights with an empty third-stage bottle 18 inches in 
diameter by 50 inches in length, try next a 6-pound payload consisting solely 
of the Minitrack instrumentation in a minimum size capsule, next an 8.5- 
pound payload in a 20-inch sphere, and thereafter payloads ranging from 
14 to 18.5 pounds with 2 to 5.5 pounds allowed for scientific instrumentation. 
Larger loads might be feasible later. The Laboratory would supply experi- 
menters with “black-box” specifications for payload capsules, and a list of 
pertinent Minitrack characteristics. The salient features of the telemetry 
system were not yet determined.ll 
These terms left open the possibility of using a cylindrical package of 
instruments, if not the cylindrical or conical outer body which Van Allen 
and Hagen had wanted, but the chance5 looked slight of getting as much as 
eight pounds of instrumentation into any IGY satellite. Van Allen and 
George Ludwig, in an attempt to meet the Vanguard specifications, had 
already scaled down their plan for cosmic ray observations, but the severe 
restrictions on weight automatically knocked out several otherwise useful 
proposals submitted at the Ann Arbor symposium.12 
With these conditions in mind the working group turned to establish- 
ing the criteria that should govern the selection of onboard experiments. 
First was that of scientific importance, “to be measured by the extent to 
which the proposed observations, if successful, would contribute to the 
clarification and understanding of large bodies of phenomena . . . and/or be 
likely to lead to the discovery of new phenomena”; the second was that of 
technical feasibility as established by use of similar techniques in rockets or 
other scientific vehicles, by the “adaptability of the instrumentation to the 
118 
physical conditions and data transmission potentialities of presently planned 
satellites,” by “the nature of data to be expected,” and by “feasibility of inter- 
pretation of observations into fundamental data”; the third was that of the 
competence of the persons or agencies making proposals, an assessment based 
on past achievements in work of the kind proposed; and the fourth was that 
of the necessity, or strong desirability, of using as the vehicle for the 
experiment a satellite rather than a sounding rocket or a balloon. The group, 
however, went on record as wanting to encourage proposals that would help 
develop a “reservoir” of scientific competence in devising experiments for 
future satellite flights “even though such work may not yield practical appa- 
ratus for the short-range IGY program.” l3  The WGII, in short, saw its task 
as extending to plans for space exploration long after the IGY ended. 
With long-term objectives in view, the working group also decided “to 
give further consideration to the establishment of a worldwide net of telem- 
etering receiving stations for the continuous or nearly continuous recep- 
tion of observed data” and “to consider concerted action on development of 
solar batteries, telemetering systems of more general applicability, data stor- 
age and read-out devices.” The main business of the session, however, was 
the preparation of a preliminary listing of priorities among the experiments 
already submitted, despite the virtual certainty that the months ahead would 
bring in a number of new propositions, some of which might fill existing 
gaps in the fields of inquiry thus far covered. The consensus ran that the 
selection of internal instrumentation was lagging behind other parts of the 
satellite program; since the apparatus for every experiment chosen would 
have to undergo rigorous laboratory tests and, if possible, flight tests in 
rockets in order to check its capacity to withstand the vibration, the shock 
of accelerating velocity, and the environmental conditions to be encountered 
in the vacuum of space, the least complicated instruments might well take 
at least two years to perfect. There was no time to lose. So the WGII then 
and there ranked the proposals before it, putting in order of choice the 
experiments that appeared to have most scientific value and be best suited 
to early satellite flights, and, in a second, “B,” category those that might be 
flown later but were as yet of doubtful utility or fea~ibi1ity.l~ 
After appraising the WGII’s report, the panel voted to limit for the 
time being “the positive standing on the Priority Listing” to nine projects, 
thereby discarding three. The subsequent voluntary withdrawal of two 
others further reduced the number. By common agreement, Friedman’s 
Lyman-alpha experiment, the environmental studies, and the proposal from 
the State University of Iowa headed the list from the beginning, even though 
sounding rocket experts at NRL had pointed out that a series of rocket 
probes could provide cosmic-ray observations as well as could an instru- 
mented satellite.lS The plan of Van Allen and Ludwig by now called for 
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apparatus that was to consist of two parts: instruments for continuous trans- 
mission of signals marking the instantaneous intensity of cosmic rays 
registered by the Geiger-counter, and, second, equipment to store the 
instantaneous intensity data during each orbit for read-out on command 
over the Minitrack stations. A small cylinder would house batteries, a 
receiver, a transmitter, tuning forks, a tape recorder driven by a ratchet 
system, scalers, and generators. The Geiger-Mueller tube would project 
about 4.5 inches from the top plate of the cylinder. 
Fourth on the priority list was an experiment entitled “Measurement 
of Interplanetary Matter,” submitted by Maurice Dubin, E. R. Manring, 
and others of the Geophysics Research Directorate at the Air Force Cam- 
bridge Research Center. Their plan was to detect the spatial distribution 
and size of particles colliding with the satellite-even those as small as one 
micron in diameter-by recording the acoustical energy generated on impact. 
Instrumentation would consist of a sensitive piezoelectric transducer on the 
inside surface of the satellite shell, a transistorized amplifier, a storage device, 
a power package, and a time-delay switch set to operate after the Minitrack 
telemetry began to transmit. The memory device was to count the number 
of stored impacts, record the distribution of particles by size, and transmit 
the information when the amplifier was in use. Somewhat similar in purpose 
to Singer’s rather simple meteoric dust erosion experiment, Dubin’s appeared 
to have greater scientific utility; perhaps the two might. be combined. The 
panel recommended that Dubin receive the grant of $89,045 that he 
requested, Singer, though his plan stood in category B, a grant of $47,150. 
At the top of the B list was a proposal for meteorological observations, 
prepared by William G. Stroud of the Signal Corps Engineering Labora- 
tories (SCEL) . Its primary objective was to measure the global distribution 
and movement of cloud cover and to relate it to the gross meteorology of the 
earth. Contrasts in terms of sunlight reflected from cloud, sea, and land 
masses, as viewed from a spinning satellite during the telemetry time, should 
furnish the basic data. Two photocells using a single telemetry channel 
would look out in diametrically opposite directions at a known angle to the 
spin axis of the satellite. The signals from the photosensitive cells would be 
stored in an airborne magnetic tape recorder and, at interrogation, be played 
back during a one-minute interval over a one-watt transmitter. A switch 
would turn off the equipment during periods of darkness and turn it on 
again when the satellite reemerged into sunlight. Although the question 
would later arise as to whether the data could be transmitted in form that 
lent itself to meaningful scientific interpretation, the panel recommended a 
grant of $93,000 to develop the apparatus.l* 
An experiment of great scientific interest but of somewhat doubtful tech- 
nical feasibility was H. E. Hinteregger’s proposal to develop photoelectric 
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techniques for study of extreme ultraviolet solar radiation. A member of 
the Geophysics Research Directorate of the Air Force Cambridge Research 
Center, Hinteregger hoped to trace the high yields of photoelectric emission 
in this range of radiation. Although the probability of adapting the equip- 
ment to an IGY satellite looked small, the WGII and the panel believed the 
plan worth encouraging. An award of the $5,000 Hinteregger requested 
would keep the total figure recommended for grants to date to $37 1,320. The 
panel therefore could allot $275,000 for NRL experiments and keep 
$570,000 for pending projects without exhausting the $1,262,000 earmarked 
in the satellite budget for internal instrumentati0n.l’ 
During spring 1956 several men tendered proposals for ionospheric 
studies, but all of them called for use of ground station receivers and air- 
borne transmitters with radio frequencies incompatible with the Minitrack‘s 
108 megacycles. While suggesting that the authors discuss possible compro- 
mises with John Mengel, the WGII undertook to remind all experimenters 
that their equipment must not interfere with Minitrack and should rely on 
the Vanguard telemetry system. Telemetry time during ;an initial orbit 
would be only thirty seconds, although after the orbit was determined, the 
time could be increased to two or three minutes by changing the positioning 
of the ground station antennas. A Vanguard development still in the tenta- 
tive stage might provide a sixteen-channel memory circuit for storage of data 
during orbit and a read-out system responsive to command from telemetry 
at the ground stations. Magnetic tape running at a constant speed would 
record the signals at ground stations and playback tape would give the data 
on wide film or paper strips with time markers.18 Experimenters who re- 
ceived grants, the panel decreed, must be informed promptly of their chances 
of having their apparatus flown during the IGY. The working group had 
decided to assign each high priority project to a particular vehicle; if a bird 
failed to orbit, the next vehicle launched would carry the experiment, but, 
if a second failure occurred, the untried experiment would have to yield to 
the next on the list. A prototype of the apparatus for every project in the 
A category should be ready by January 1957 for WGII appr0va1.l~ 
Of the three propositions the WGII added before the end of 1956 to 
those tentatively chosen earlier, one was an experiment called “Geomag- 
netic Measurements” prepared by James Heppner and colleagues at NRL. In 
essence it was the magnetometer experiment outlined in NRL’s original 
presentation to the Stewart Committee, later described in a paper at the Ann 
Arbor symposium, and now reworked to accommodate it to the small pay- 
load of a Vanguard satellite. Its objectives were, first, to gauge the intensity 
of the earth’s main magnetic field during magnetic storms and measure its 
contribution to the total storm disturbance as a function of time and lati- 
tude; and, secondarily, “to determine the existence or nonexistence of extra- 
terrestrial currents during the initial phase of a magnetic storm and to 
improve our knowledge of ionospheric currents giving rise to diurnal and 
irregular variations of the magnetic fields, especially near the magnetic 
equator.” The principal instrument was to be a nuclear magnetic-resonance 
magnetometer in the form of a coil around a sample of liquid that contained 
a high proportion of protons. A magnetic field would be produced by passing 
a current through the coil, thus polarizing the protons’ magnetic moment. 
Upon cutoff of the polarizing current, the proton moments would precess 
about the earth’s field at a frequency determined by the field’s strength and 
induce a voltage at that frequency in the coil. This signal, following amplifi- 
cation, would be fed to the telemetering transmitter for transmission on 
command to the Minitrack stations. At each Minitrack station there was to 
be “a proton precessional magnetometer to simultaneously measure accu- 
rately the total scalar field, declination and inclination.” The paucity of 
observation time and the lack of a recording and storage device in the 
satellite led the working group to question the value of the attainable results, 
but Van Allen, after displaying a model of a magnetometer built and used 
successfully in rocket flights by the State University of Iowa, testified to the 
probable workability of the special model under design by Varian Associates 
of California. With this experiment approved for funding, the sum allowed 
for NRL‘s three onboard projects rose to $597,000.20 
The second new experiment the WGII recommended-rather hesi- 
tantly, to be sure-was a plan largely worked out by William O’Sullivan of 
the staff of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) at 
Langley Field, Virginia. It required no scientific instruments and little 
equipment other than a gas-filled bottle and a device to eject a thirty-inch 
inflatable sphere from the satellite at the moment of third-stage burnout. It 
was designed to permit optical observers to compute air densities and to 
measure atmospheric drag on the aluminum-foil-covered plastic body. If the 
perigee of the satellite were less than 200 miles, the life of the sphere would 
be extremely short, but as the weight of sphere, gas tank, valve, and ejection 
trigger together would not exceed nine ounces, the paraphernalia could go 
into a satellite carrying fairly heavy instrumentation for another experiment. 
NACA would meet most of the costs.21 
Verner E. Suomi of the University of Wisconsin proposed the third 
experiment recommended at the end of 1956. The objective of Suomi’s 
experiment, known as “Radiation Balance of the Earth,” was to measure the 
long-wave radiation emitted from the earth, from direct sunlight, and from 
sunlight reflected from the earth, and also the short-wave radiation reflected 
from the earth and either shielded from or insensitive to the other radiations. 
Harry Wexler of the Weather Bureau, who had submitted a somewhat simi- 
lar but more complicated plan, warmly supported Suomi’s proposal as scien- 
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tifically important and technically feasible. It should supply means of 
charting the gains and losses in the earth’s heat budget during a satellite’s 
lifetime. Of four small thermistor sensors mounted on the ends of the 
satellite antennas, one sensor would be sensitive only to long-wave radiation 
emitted by the earth, the second equally sensitive to other types of radiation, 
and the third and fourth sensors only to short-wave radiation reflected from 
the earth. During the satellite’s orbit a selector switch would monitor each 
sensor and feed signals from a coding oscillator to each for a preselected 
time. An airborne magnetic tape recorder would store the data until, upon 
passage of the bird over a Minitrack ground station, a command turn-on 
signal initiated the playback sequence. While the intricacy of the instrumen- 
tation militated against the chances of its being ready for use during the 
IGY, the panel recommended an initial grant of $50,000.22 
Although priorities necessarily would change if tests of instrumentation 
so dictated, in February 1957 the panel made its selection of experiments to 
fly in the first full-size Vanguard satellites. Assuming four successful shots 
during the IGY, the WGII had proposed to assign a “package” containing 
two experiments to each of the first three birds, a single experiment to the 
fourth. The panel concurred. Package I was to take the equipment for the 
environmental studies and the Lyman-alpha experiment. Package I1 was to 
contain the apparatus for Van Allen’s cosmic ray observations and either 
for Dubin’s measurements of interplanetary matter or for Singer’s, of mete- 
oric dust erosion, provided either of those could employ a masked photocell 
instead of the radioactive method. By April progress on Dubin’s instrumen- 
tation captured for it the coveted place in package 11. Package 111 was to 
carry the instruments for Heppner’s geomagnetic measurements and O’Sulli- 
van’s inflatable sphere. For package IV the panel wavered between Stroud’s 
cloud-cover experiment and Suomi’s radiation balance. The upshot was a 
decision to let both proceed until the work was further advanced and then 
request the country’s leading meteorologists td name the more useful of 
the 
Although the expense of developing internal instrumentation was begin- 
ning to run unexpectedly high, the panel assigned “back-up” status to several 
projects. So Hinteregger’s scheme of measuring extreme ultraviolet solar 
radiation won official endorsement and, later flown in a rocket, produced 
some significant data. Singer got funds to complete his radioactive meteor 
erosion gauge, money which the panel switched in 1958 to support his en- 
deavor to devise means of determining the electrostatic charge accumulated 
by a satellite, but he never submitted detailed designs or an experimental 
prototype. A grant went also to the group of men, headed by William Pick- 
ering, at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for development of instrumentation 
to measure the integrated light from various parts of the celestial sphere, 
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using a set of color filters and a photomultiplier detector. Planned for use 
in case more experiments could be flown during the IGY than anticipated, 
the JPL equipment was never put to the test in a satellite, but the work on 
it proved useful in preparing later projects. An experiment proposed by 
Martin Pomerantz of the Bartol Research Foundation and Gerhardt Groet- 
zinger of the Research Institute of Advanced Studies was in turn given funds, 
even though the ion chamber and circuitry designed to identify the heavy 
primary cosmic ray nucleii and the possible variations in their flux appeared 
unlikely to be available for IGY satellites. 
Interestingly enough, no experiment in the life sciences received en- 
dorsement. Yet in I951 and 1952 Kaplan had viewed the possibilities of 
medical research in the aeropause as an impelling reason for a satellite pro- 
gram, and the NRL proposal to the Stewart Committee had alluded to the 
feasibility and utility of studying the behavior of living cells in the vacuum 
of space. Early in 1957, a biologist at the National Institutes of Health sub- 
mitted a plan for recording the effects on yeast cells placed in an orbiting 
satellite, but the panel postponed action on the ideq. 
All told, the panel rejected seventeen proposals and, counting those 
dealing with tracking and engineering problems, approved over twenty 
before October 1957.24 
In backing experiments too heavy or too elaborate for Vanguard satel- 
lites or adapted primarily to space probes in rockets, the TPESP was adher- 
ing to the principle announced by the IGY National Committee at the end 
of 1956. If, as the committee and the panel assumed, the scientific explora- 
tion of space continued after the IGY was over, technological advances would 
surely supply the bigger vehicles needed for the purpose. Indeed as early 
as May 1957 the panel had reason to think the time near when larger satel- 
lites than the twenty-inch Vanguard sphere could be circling the earth, for 
Pickering reported that the Army already had available a launcher capable 
of putting a thirty-pound payload-which would include the rocket casing 
-into an orbit of 1,000-mile apogee and 200-mile perigee. Pickering knew 
whereof he spoke, inasmuch as the Jet Propulsion Laboratory under an 
Army contract had been working closeIy with the Army Ballistic Missile 
Agency on developing the Jupiter-C rocket. Despite Vanguard’s configura- 
tion and the relatively slow spin rate of its last stage, at least one package of 
satellite instrumentation, notably that for the Van Allen experiment, could 
be fairly easily adapted to flight in the Army vehicle. When Porter asked 
why the Defense Department did not sanction use of the new rocket as a 
backup for the NRL-Martin launcher, Paul Smith explained that the DoD 
had considered the plan but vetoed it as needless; Vanguard tests were on 
schedule and sati~factory.~~ 
Work on the satellite structures and instrumentation meanwhile had 
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moved along rapidly at NRL. Since every experimenter was to furnish his 
own apparatus, the na’ive reader might assume that the team at the Labora- 
tory would have relatively little to do: merely supply the satellite shell, the 
telemetry, the antennas, and the tracking transmitter, and then install 
the package of experiments. But those tasks in themselves were formidable. 
The satellite as planned had to carry a device for separating the sphere 
from the rocket casing after third-stage burnout; the shell and every mech- 
anism in it must be sturdy and lightweight; and to fit all the items into a 
twenty-inch sphere required miniaturization of an order never before 
thought attainable. The layout of instrumentation, furthermore, had to vary 
from one satellite to the next so as to adapt each to the particular experi- 
ments it was to accommodate. Nor did the job end there. Thermal control 
presented enormous difficulties, and the entire testing program demanded 
scientific knowledge, great ingenuity, and endless patience. 
Common background simplified the dealings of the Vanguard scientific 
unit with the authors of the IGY experiments, for, like most of the latter, 
a number of men at the Laboratory, as pioneers in space exploration with 
sounding rockets, had had to design and build their own instruments in the 
past. Mutual respect and cordial relations between the two groups could not, 
however, greatly lessen the steadily mounting burden of work carried on for 
Vanguard by NRL scientists. Homer Newel1 and his deputy, John Town- 
send, who were in overall charge and directed the program through a so- 
named Satellite Steering Committee, accordingly asked Robert w. Stroup 
early in 1957 to serve as general coordinator and trouble-shooter. In late 
April 1957 the steering committee, with Hagen’s approval, arranged a three- 
day conference which brought all the experimenters to the Laboratory where 
they could see the work in progress, observe the testing arrangements, and 
discuss their individual needs and 
There Robert C. Baumann, head of the mechanics and structural unit, 
described the separation device under manufacture by the Raymond Engi- 
neering Laboratory of Middletown, Connecticut. He also displayed models 
of the twenty-inch satellite shell that Brooks and Perkins of Detroit were 
spinning from flat sheets of magnesium into two hemispheres which skilled 
craftsmen at NRL then riveted together; a small trap door gave access to the 
interior. The mechanical features of the folding antennas to be affixed to 
the outer surface were largely of Baumann’s design; the electronic parts were 
the work of Martin J. Votaw and Roger Easton; NRL shop hands were 
building the arrays. Mechanics in the shop were also fabricating the 6.4-inch 
“grapefruit” to be flown in the test vehicles. For the satellites carrying pack- 
ages I, 11, and IV, the original scheme of an inner sphere to house the scien- 
tific instrumentation had given way to a cylindrical container attached to the 
outer shell by a spider framework of tubular metal; teflon-covered supports 
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shielded the pot from the grids. The satellite carrying the magnetometer 
experiments, on the other hand, was to have a different configuration: a 
thirteen-inch fiberglass sphere with a fiberglass stem projecting from it sev- 
eral inches to support the sensor. At a later date the steering committee 
would discover the necessity of providing a spin-reduction mechanism for 
the satellites flying the cloud-cover experiment and the NACA inflatable 
sphere in order to allow, in one case, a longer scanning interval for the 
photocells and, in the second case, ample time to inflate the plastic 
sub~atell i te.~~ 
Whitney Matthews, who was in charge of the electronic layout within 
the spheres, demonstrated the general scheme of stacking the layers of 
“cards” of miniature mechanisms and locating their power supply. As was 
true of other features of the satellites, each package would differ somewhat 
in both content and arrangement from every other. Although little of the 
work was in final form in April 1957, the economy of the intricate layouts, 
the complexity of the tiny parts, and the delicacy of the workmanship were 
already plainly visible. Roger Easton then exp1a;ned in detail how the 
tracking and telemetry equipment would function. The tracking signals 
would be amplitude modulated for telemetering the scientific data obtained 
from the satellite-borne detectors. A transistorized transmitter in the satel- 
lite weighed 1.25 pounds, including the weight of Minitrack batteries for 
two weeks’ operation, and used about 7.5 pounds of mercury cell batteries 
that would give three weeks of continuous operation at fifty milliwatts out- 
put for telemetry. Telemetering might be continuous or could function on 
command. When commanded, a receiver weighing twelve ounces including 
its power supply would pick up the signals sent from the ground. While the 
command receiver in every satellite would be standard, the telemetry trans- 
mitter might differ in type, depending on the requirements of the experi- 
ments carried. On the ground the telemetry receiver was to be located at 
some distance from the tracking receive?. NRL had built the first tracking 
transmitters in its shop; testing and evaluation of performance had been 
going on at the Blossom Point station since July 1956. 
Of equal or perhaps even greater interest to the visiting scientists 
attending the conference were the accounts of the methods under develop- 
ment to provide thermal protection for the satellite shell and its payload. 
Solving these problems, above all those deriving from the effects of radiation 
under various conditions, called for pooling the talents and experience of 
several men, notably Hermann LaGow, who had planned the environmental 
studies accepted for the first satellite flight, Richard Tousey and Louis Drum- 
meter of the NRL Optics Division, Milton Schach of the Electronics 
Division, and George Hass of the Engineer Research and Development 
Laboratories at Fort Belvoir. 
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Tousey had made some of the first calculations in the fall of 1955, con- 
tributing his knowledge of optics to ensure that protective coatings on the 
exterior of the booster and on the satellite shell would have sufficient reflec- 
tivity to permit telescopic observation of the course of the rocket as it rose 
and then optical acquisition and tracking of the satellite in space.28 Schach 
undertook the “thermal design,” that is, the calculations of what tempera- 
tures to expect at various points in the satellite’s orbit, in darkness and in 
daylight, the selection of the optimum thickness of coating materials to 
emphasize their emissiveness of solar heat radiation, and methods of keeping 
the satellite’s surface free of contaminating substances such as soot which 
would ultimately raise the satellite’s temperature. Hass worked out the 
techniques of applying the successive surface coatings-the gold plating, the 
chromium evaporated to vapor and deposited to serve as a primer, 
the silicon oxide to serve as a barrier, the thin layer of evaporated aluminum 
to give a mirror-like finish, and finally a film of silicon oxide to control 
emitted radiation. Drummeter and Schach were chiefly responsible for 
developing the sunlight simulator with carbon arcs as the source of high- 
intensity light. Through windows in the large cylindrical vacuum tank in 
which the coated sphere sat for two or three days of testing, the simulated 
sunlight beat upon the satellite’s surface and indirectly heated the inner pot 
of instruments. Measurements of the effects furnished means of determining 
the most desirable material and thickness of the layering required. LaGow 
acted as advisor and monitor on all these operations. Every man concerned 
with temperature control worked closely with every other.29 
Newel1 and Townsend, who had initially objected to launching a 6.4- 
inch satellite with no internal instrumentation, were reconciled to the plan 
as thermal testing proceeded, for the agreement to place temperature sensors 
on the 6.4-inch shell promised to verify the findings of the Laboratory tests 
or else supply data that would permit development of better thermal control 
for the larger instrumented satellites. Although the research and testing was 
still going on when the conference with IGY experimenters took place in 
the spring of 1957, the NRL thermal experts were already fairly confident 
that they could limit temperature changes within the instrument container 
to some two or three degrees during any one orbit. While expectations ran 
that a Vanguard satellite would have only a few weeks’ life, the possibility of 
its lasting longer led to endeavors to adapt thermal controls to seasonal as 
well as diurnal changes. 
The men attending the conference received, moreover, thorough indoc- 
trination in the standards of performance which the Vanguard group de- 
manded of every experimenter’s equipment. If, when put through the whole 
gamut of tests at NRL, his instruments could not withstand extremely high 
random and sinusoidal vibrations, changes of temperature ranging from Oo 
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J .  Paul Walsh (left),Deputy Project Director of 
Vanguard, and Homer Newel1 participate in a 
conference in the director's ofice. 
to 60" C, and a simulation of the sudden acceleration that would occur when 
the second-stage rocket separated from the first or the second from the third, 
then the Satellite Steering Committee could reject the experiment outright, 
unless the originator was able to correct the weaknesses thus revealed. He 
was to test his work carefully in his own laboratory before sending his instru- 
mentation on to NRL. If possible it should also be tried out in a rocket 
flight. After testing each item, the Vanguard group would need a minimum 
of three months to check the reliability of the assembled package. The pre- 
cious space in a satellite must not be wasted on faulty scientific parapher- 
nalia. All electronic and experimental equipment should have a life of at 
least 1,000 hours.30 
At Van Allen's request, a special session explored the progress of the 
development of dependable solar batteries, especially the work going on at 
the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratory. Using chemical batteries, Vanguard 
satellites and most of the onboard apparatus thus far proposed would have 
an active life of only a few weeks. Satellites with longer life consequently 
needed a solar battery system for long-term power. All experiments would 
have far greater value if they could operate for several months. Although 
the SCEL during the past year had solved a number of problems, others 
remained, notably the sharp decline of open circuit voltage when tempera- 
tures rose from 20" to 80" C. A new type of cell, however, might provide an 
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answer. Use of clusters of solar batteries, moreover, might charge a low- 
voltage secondary battery, while transistor d.c.4.c. converters could supply 
the higher voltages, such as the twenty-three volts needed for the Minitrack 
transmitter. Every experimenter undertook to supply the SCEL with a 
statement of his power requirements. On the whole, the prospects looked 
bright for having usable solar batteries available before the end of the IGY. 
But if so, and if the batteries extended observing time significantly, “then 
the radio tracking, telemetering, data analysis and computation items in the 
budget must be correspondingly increased.” T o  prepare for that contin- 
gency, the Academy’s satellite panel believed $200,000 necessary in the im- 
mediate future.31 
John Hagen had earlier suggested that every experimenter or one of 
his associates should be present at NRL during “the final preparation 
period” of his apparatus. In any event, two months in advance of a flight 
he must send the Laboratory an instruction manual explaining how his 
instruments would work; the field crews would need the manual to learn 
how to set up the recording mechanism. During the conference, each team 
of experimenters met separately with the Vanguard staff to draft an explicit 
agreement about what services the Laboratory would perform, what the 
outside scientists were to be responsible for. Each team, moreover, reported 
on the then status of its project. Van Allen and Ludwig expected to have 
the entire package of their instruments in the Laboratory’s test rooms by 
August. The tape recorder, a source of trouble earlier, was now functioning 
smoothly, the circuitry working well. Photographs showed the 9-inch cylin- 
der 4.5 inches in diameter containing eight modules encapsulated in foam 
to provide mechanical rigidity and thermal insulation, the electrical system, 
and the overall layout. The package weighed 13.41 pounds, the framework 
7.09. Testing of the instrumentation for the Lyman-alpha experiment and 
the environmental studies was also well advanced. Progress on other 
projects was somewhat slower.32 
When the impending start of the IGY brought a number of inter- 
nationally known scientists to the National Academy in June 1957, the 
presence of several eminent Russian astronomers and geophysicists added 
greatly to the interest of the occasion. Contrary to later popular hearsay in 
the United States, the Soviets talked of their plans, and I. P. Bardin turned 
over to Lloyd Berkner a document entitled “U.S.S.R. Rocket and Earth- 
Satellite Program for the IGY.” In the section of the exhibit hall given over 
to the satellite program, reporters clustered around John Hagen and his 
Russian counterpart. Hagen in answering questions repeatedly spoke of the 
NRL satellite, whereupon a very junior member of the IGY staff corrected 
him with “The National Academy’s satellite, Dr. Hagen.” 33 The incident 
revealed the constant stress the Academy felt obliged to put on the non- 
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military character of the program. July publication of the first issue of the 
IGY Bulletin served again to remind readers that the National Academy 
was responsible for the undertaking. 
The summer of 1957 was not a time of rejoicing for the men handling 
satellite finances. The expenses of the Glenn L. Martin Company and sub- 
contractors had increased steadily since October 1956, as indeed had the 
costs of the scientific parts of the program. Despite the transfer of $5.5 
million of National Science Foundation funds’to NRL in October 1956 and 
another $1.862 million in March 1957, the Vanguard comptroller estimated 
in April that the bill for the entire satellite program would run to $110 
million, NRL’s costs alone to $96.162 million.34 The Navy budget was not 
the direct concern of the IGY satellite panel, but it would become so if finan- 
cial exigencies caused serious slippages in the Vanguard launching schedules. 
As every setback to the program dimmed the chances of the Academy’s 
winning endorsement of its cherished plans for twelve shots, the USNC 
secretariat awaited with anxiety the results of the Navy’s appeal to Congress. 
Thanks to inaugurating in September 1956 a new financial reporting 
system which required the Martin Company and other NRL contractors to 
submit detailed cost data monthly, Thomas Jenkins, the Vanguard comp- 
troller, was able to refine earlier estimates; the Laboratory was going to need 
$34.2 million more than was then available to see the satellite job through 
to completion. Rather than ask for piecemeal allotments, the Defense 
Department and the Bureau of the Budget concluded that the wiser course 
was to seek authorization from Congress to turn over to the Navy the whole 
amount in a lump sum.35 Jenkins tabulated the figures for the congressional 
committees: 
FINANCIAL SUMMARY 36 (In thousands of dollars) 
Total 
Funds for Program Costs 
Funding of and Agency Responsible 
Required N R L  Other DoD NSF (NAS) 
A. Available 
I. DoD emergency fund 46,300 46,300 X x 
2. Miscellaneous 2,500 2,500 X X 
3. DoD direct funding- 4,411 X 4,411 X 
4. Estimated range-use 4,227 X 4,227 X 
logistic support 
charge by Air Force 
5. NSF I956 Supplemental 18,362 13,126 X 5,236 
Total 75,800 61,926 8,638 5,236 
Total 1 10,000 96,126 8,638 5,236 
-
B. 1958 request to Congress 34,200 34,200 X X 
His figures were all-inclusive, a fact rarely understood, then or later, 
by people not intimately involved with Vanguard. From the cost of the new 
radar, the blockhouse, and telemetry equipment-all destined to serve Cape 
Canaveral for years-to the pay of NRL shop hands for part-time work on 
Vanguard hardware, every iota of expense was taken into account, even 
items that a less meticulous person might think properly chargeable to 
Laboratory or Navy overhead. 
The accompanying text gave no precise explanations of why costs for 
the vehicle, estimated at $28.1 million in March 1956, had risen in fourteen 
months to $57.111 million, or why the Navy’s overall costs, including its 
work on radio tracking, telemetry, data reduction, and the satellite itself, 
now in May 1957 seemed certain to exceed $96 million. Yet at hearings in 
August the Senate Committee was on the whole astonishingly amenable, in 
spite of nearly universal confusion among committee members over the 
differences between sums voted to the Science Foundation for the PGY and 
funds allocated to the Navy for the same program. “We appropriate money 
to the National Science Foundation,” said Senator Magnusop, “and then we 
appropriate extra money to them for the International Geophysical Year, of 
which they then gave you some. . . . Now the Navy is asking for extra money 
for their part of the Vanguard program, which is part of the International 
Geophysical Year.” John Hagen simply replied: “It never has been very 
straight in the record.” Ten days later Congress authorized the Secretary of 
Defense to release to the Navy the $34.2 million requested. The hand-to- 
mouth financing of the previous two years need no longer hamper Project 
Vanguard.37 
But money alone could not solve the Laboratory’s problems. A measure 
of the discouragement pervading NRL as summer turned into autumn was 
an exchange between Rosen and Hagen. “John,” said the technical director 
despairingly, “we’re never going to make it in time,” to which the older 
man replied gently: “Never mindl It’s a good program, worth following 
through.” 38 At Cape Canaveral the TV-2, originally scheduled for flight 
tests in June, had not left the launch pad at the beginning of October.39 
While Richard Porter and the IGY staff at the Academy were aware of 
the successive delays, when CSAGI gathered in Washington on 30 September 
for a week-long conference on rockets and satellites, most members of the 
TPESP knew relatively little about Vanguard tribulations. The panel had 
not met since 1 May. At that time news emanating from the Pentagon had 
been blandly reassuring. Now panel members learned that the flight test of 
a Vanguard test vehicle with two dummy stages and minus a satellite was set 
for mid-October. The panel meeting held on 3 October was thinly attended: 
Lyman Spitzer had resigned; Odishaw, Spilhaus, and Newel1 were engaged 
with the CSAGI sessions; Van Allen was en route to the South Pacific. 
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Chairman Porter was worried, but if the other men present shared his un- 
spoken belief that a Russian satellite was nearly ready for launching, they 
kept their foreboding to themselves. Most of the discussion focused on 
optical tracking and how to speed up deliveries of the Baker-Nunn cameras. 
Whipple, to be sure, raised the question of whether the Academy was satisfied 
with the Vanguard flight schedules, but Porter pointed out that launchings 
were solely a DoD responsibility. The panel adjourned without pursuing 
the subject.'O Twenty-four hours later everyone even remotely interested in 
the American program was asking when the United States would put its 
first satellite into orbit. 
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CREATING A HOME 
O N T H E R A N G E  
DURING the closing months of 1955 and well into the new year the process 
of siting Project Vanguard checkout and launch facilities at the Air Force 
Missile Test Center (AFMTC) at Cape Canaveral proved nearly as trouble- 
some, discouraging, and time-consuming as the negotiating of the prime 
contract between NRL and Martin. 
In the fall of 1955 the 15,000-acre missile firing range on the snake- 
infested and palmetto-covered sand dunes of the Florida flatlands was com- 
pleting its sixth year as the Long Range Proving Ground for American 
guided-missile development. Congress had established the range for this 
purpose in 1949. In 1950 the Department of Defense had assigned responsi- 
bility for its operation to the United States Air Force, and had named it the 
Air Force Missile Test Center (AFMTC) . By the end of the following year 
the Air Force had set up administrative and telemetry headquarters eighteen 
miles south of the range at a former coast guard and seaplane base just south 
of the village of Cocoa Beach, to be known henceforth as Mason M. Patrick 
Air Force Base (PAFB) . Three guided missiles’ had lofted from the Cape, 
and the range had received the official designation AFMTC that it would 
retain throughout the lifetime of Project Vanguard. The press called it 
“Cape Canaveral” and Air Force and Vanguard men often spoke of it as the 
Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) ,l the official designation it later received. 
Vanguard’s request to use the DoD launching site, aired unofficially in 
September 1955 and cast in formal form a few weeks later,2 elicited no cheers 
from AFMTC management or its parent body, the Air Research and Devel- 
opment Command (ARDC). On 2 December, ARDC Headquarters ap- 
proved of Vanguard’s request “in principle,” but made it abundantly clear 
that the Air Force viewed with alarm the prospect of making room at a 
high-priority military installation for a no-priority scientific program. Van- 
guard’s eventual acceptance at the range depended upon its ability to work 
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out with AFMTC a modus operandi consistent with the National Security 
Council’s order that the earth satellite project be so conducted that “it does 
not materially delay other major defense programs.”* Nor did ARDC’s 
statement in December that Vanguard could communicate directly with 
the field do more than smooth somewhat a rough path, since on an informal 
basis project representatives had been communicating vociferously with the 
men in charge at Cape Canaveral for many weeks. 
Since early fall, conferences at Patrick Air Force Base or conferences 
elsewhere relative to field problems had been taking place at frequent inter- 
vals. During September Vanguard’s telemetry boss, Mazur, made several 
exploratory trips to the Cape, accompanied by Captain C. B. Ausfahl, an 
Air Force officer attached to the Naval Laboratory, and Alton E. (“Al”) 
Jones, one of NRL’s bright young men, whose calculations prior to the sub- 
mission to the Stewart Committee of the NRL satellite proposal had been 
instrumental in the decision of the Laboratory and GLM to use two liquid- 
fuel rockets rather than one in the Vanguard vehicle.” 
At Patrick the NRL team talked at length with high-ranking officers 
and with a number of engineers working for Pan American Airways, indus- 
trial contractor charged with servicing AFMTC operations, or for Radio 
Corporation of America, subcontractor responsible €or field instrumentation. 
It was information gathered during these preliminary discussions that later 
impelled the Laboratory, in the face of objections from both the Florida 
test center and the Martin Company, to install at the Cape the newly 
developed radar antennas and data-acquisition equipment that would enable 
Vanguard to fly PPM/AM telemetry packages in the first stage of its 
vehicles.’ 
Although the NRL investigators’ primary purpose in Florida was to 
survey the instrumentation available at the Cape, they also made inquiries 
as to the form in which the Vanguard people should prepare and present to 
AFMTC a list of the facilities and ground support equipment they would 
need at the range to put up their birds. One of their first discoveries was 
that where material to be provided by the Air Force was concerned, the test 
center preferred a statement as to the accuracies desired rather than the 
names of particular items. For a time at least this idiosyncracy on the part 
of the missile management was a stumbling block to old NRL hands, 
accustomed to asking their procurement unit for what they wanted by name 
or by general description without as a rule bothering to explain what it was 
supposed to accomplish. 
“One of our problems in the early Vanguard days,” Mazur would 
confess later with characteristic forthrightness- 
was that we simply didn’t know how to deal with a paper-type organiza- 
tion like the Air Force. Those of us at NRL had got our rocket experience 
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flying Vikings at White Sands. That was a relatively informal and lei- 
surely program. When we needed this item or that we got on the phone 
or sent a note up to the Lab people in Washington, telling them to buy 
the damn thing or to whack it together themselves and send it down to 
us. We didn’t have to write up a thousand documents in quintuplicate, 
as we soon found we had to do for the Air Force. What we asked for in a 
hurry we got in a hurry because, as we were fond of telling the fly boys 
in those days, at NRL procurement existed for the Laboratory, not the 
Laboratory for procurement. The Air Force procurement cycle was a good 
deal slower, and for us at any rate a tough nut to crack. Quite frankly 
we might have ended up lacking many of the things we vitally needed 
at the field had it not been for the good offices of Colonel Gibbs.8 
Mazur’s reference is to Lieutenant Colonel Asa B. Gibbs, who in fall 
1955 was director of tests at AFMTC. I t  was a happy day for the scientific 
satellite effort when in late September Gibbs was relieved of his duties as 
test officer and ordered to “report aboard” the Vanguard management staff 
as Air Force liaison or project officer.9 Although the heavy-set, cigar-puffing 
colonel impressed members of the satellite group as joviallo he could be 
effectively tough when it came to procedures he considered important. Gibbs 
knew his way around the Air Force. Throughout what Mazur called the 
“agonizing period,” l1 the drawnout struggle to fit Project Vanguard into 
the Cape Canaveral picture, he made life considerably easier for the planning 
staffs by educating them in the ins and outs of the command setup at 
Patrick. It was a complicated one, and the planners escaped many irritating 
delays because of Gibbs’ skill in opening channels of communication be- 
tween Vanguard control center at NRL in Washington and Base head- 
quarters at Cocoa, Florida.12 Gibbs also served the project as a gadfly. 
Repeatedly he scolded at NRL and Martin, urging them not only to put 
their list of requirements in a form acceptable to AFMTC, but to make 
certain it covered every conceivable item, “right down to the number of 
rolls of toilet paper you may eventually need.” The conscientious project 
officer neglected to specify how the Vanguard people were to delineate the 
“accuracies” of this homely necessity; he did warn them, solemnly, that 
unless their list of requirements was complete they might come right up to 
the point of firing their first test vehicle, only to find that many of the items 
of equipment and supply essential to the undertaking were simply not on 
hand.13 
Drafting the requirements list was a Martin responsibility, but in actual 
practice it became a joint effort since NRL had to supply the designers and 
engineers at the big aircraft plant in Middle River with a vast amount of 
information. Hundreds of man-hours of work-and talk-went into the 
preparation of the document. In its finished form it reflected every prp- 
dictable aspect of the satellite operation, ranging from what those involved 
hoped to learn from the flight of each vehicle to the probable behavior aloft 
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of all vehicles and scientific payloads. A preliminary list submitted to the 
range command in November 1955 brought an immediate demand for 
extensive revisions. T o  make sure that these were properly executed, Colonel 
Gibbs organized a team of NRL and Martin experts and arranged for them 
to spend a week at Patrick Air Force Base, working directly with range 
officials and technicians. The outcome of this effort was a respectable docu- 
ment labeled “Test Program for Vanguard Launching Operations.” Satis- 
factory though it was, even this “final” list was tentative. Immediately after 
its acceptance by the range command in May, Project Director Hagen issued 
a directive outlining the procedures for making anticipated “changes, dele- 
tions,’’ and “additions.” l4 
The work of preparing the requirements list proceeded concurrently 
with other developments. ARDC’s approval “in principle” of Vanguard’s 
bid to use the Cape gave the project a foot in the door. The actual opening 
of the door required additional and in some cases ticklish maneuvers. These 
began to come to a head in mid-December during a four-day conference at 
PAFB attended by representatives of the Base, the Martin Company, and 
the Laboratory. Heading the Air Force contingent was slight, dapper, out- 
spoken Major General Donald N. Yates, USAF, commander at AFMTC. 
A newcomer to the Vanguard forces was Commander, later Captain, Winfred 
E. Berg, who only a few hours before had joined Vanguard as official Navy 
representative and senior project officer. Slender and striking under a plume 
of thick black hair that the problems of Vanguard would quickly sprinkle 
with silver, Berg was no stranger to the oldtimers at NRL. He had worked 
with them at the Laboratory, leaving in the early 1950s to take a staff 
position in the Comptroller’s Office at the Pentagon as technical adviser on 
missiles and related fields to Assistant Secretary of Defense Wilfred J. 
McNeil. As Vanguard’s chief trouble-shooter from 1956 on-its “fire 
brigade” to use his own expression-Berg would enjoy ample opportunity 
to deploy his notable talents for cutting through red tape and getting 
things done.15 
During the opening phase of the mid-December conference at Patrick, 
General Yates and his aides confirmed a worrisome fact, already spelled out 
in Air Force correspondence. T o  test and launch its hardware Vanguard 
must have a variety of facilities, notably a launching pad and adjoining 
blockhouse, and a hangar where it could assemble its three-stage vehicles and 
maintain offices, laboratories, and storage bins. For the time being all such 
installations on the Cape, including some under construction, or about to 
be, were assigned to high-priority military programs. T o  use the Cape, Van- 
guard must either construct its own launch complex and hangar or arrange 
to share facilities with some existing program. 
The meeting warmed up when, on top of this revelation, the NRL- 
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Martin representatives informed the Air Force Commander that they were 
planning to launch their first test vehicle during the coming June. Yates’ 
blunt reaction was “Ridiculous! It’ll take you that long to get the money.” 
At this point Commander Berg took over for Vanguard. Would the Air 
Force support use of the range, he inquired, if by the first of January, only 
two weeks hence, assurances were in General Yates’ hands that the requisite 
funds would be available as needed? Yates knew a sporting proposition when 
he heard one. “It’s a deal,” he snapped, and Berg hastened back to Washing- 
ton to make swift use of his connections at his old stamping grounds, the 
Comptroller’s Office in the Defense Department. His negotiations were well- 
advanced before he realized that it might be impossible to make good his 
end of the deal with Yates because the first of January was a holiday, with 
all government offices closed. He went ahead, hoping that either the desired 
assurances would reach him prior to the first or that Yates would overlook 
an insignificant delay. On the second he was able to inform the AFMTC 
commander that the authorization of funds was processing satisfactorily. 
Yates accepted this as fulfillment of their agreement. A week later formal 
authorization came from the Department of Defense, and Vanguard was 
assured a home on the missile range.le 
The chronic afflictions of the scientific satellite effort, too little time 
and too little money, accounted for the decision not to erect a new launch 
complex but to opt for space in one already up or soon to go up. In 1956 
the rocket team headed by von Braun for ABMA, the Army Ballistic Missile 
Agency, was in the midst of a five-year flight program at the Cape, testing 
versions of the Army’s Redstone rocket, including the Jupiter-A and Jupiter- 
C intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Acting for Vanguard, Berg, Rosen, 
Mazur, and Roger Easton visited both Cape Canaveral and the ABMA offices 
in Alabama in an effort to obtain quarters at the Redstone launch complex 
on a joint-use basis. The facts uncovered during these sessions were dis- 
couraging. The Redstone firing schedule at AFMTC was too tight to make 
a sharing arrangement feasible. In other words the Redstone people said no, 
and the Vanguard negotiators had to look elsewhere. Fortunately the Air 
Force had recently undertaken the development of the Thor, another in- 
termediate-range missile, with Douglas Aircraft Company as prime con- 
tractor responsible for design and fabrication. No firing installations for the 
Thor were in existence as yet at AFMTC, but plans were underway for the 
construction of two blockhouses and four pads on what would shortly be 
labeled launch complexes 17 and 18 on the southern rim of the easternmost 
bulge of the Cape. The Thor program did not call for a flight from complex 
18 for several years-a situation that enabled General Yates to accede to 
Milton Rosen’s request in January 1956 that Vanguard occupy some of the 
facilities projected for that complex, sharing the blockhouse with the Thor 
project and testing and firing its vehicles from an adjoining launch area, 
subsequently designated as 18A.l‘ It was understood that the use of these 
facilities and any changes required in them were to be financed with Project 
Vanguard funds. 
Shortage of time and money also entered into the decision not to build 
a new gantry crane for servicing the Vanguard vehicle but to adapt to Van- 
guard use the one the Laboratory rocket crew had recently developed but 
never used for its now abandoned Viking program at White Sands Proving 
Grounds in New Mexico. At a request from the Navy, the Jacksonville 
(Florida) District of the Corps of Engineers agreed to supervise the transfer 
of the ninety-five-foot Viking gantry to its new home. In April the Corps 
negotiated a contract under which the Treadwell Construction Company, of 
Midland, Pennsylvania, designers and makers of the Viking gantry, under- 
took to dismantle the crane at White Sands and see that i t  was reassembled 
and ready for use at AFMTC during the forthcoming September. The con- 
tract directed Treadwell to provide the crane with an additional working 
platform and other modifications, and the Air Force took steps to install at 
complex 18A a 225-foot railroad track on which the huge service tower 
could be moved up to and away from the vehicle-launching structure.l8 
The crane was not the only Viking hardware to become part of the 
scientific satellite development. During March a group of GLM and 
Laboratory men spent six days at White Sands examining the ground sup- 
port equipment left over from the Viking program and tagging for shipment 
eastward those items that they believed Vanguard could ~ti1ize.l~ Efforts to 
make do with what was “on the shelf” and other penny-pinching stratagems 
were a commonplace of the program. The usually stately, although at times 
opaque, official correspondence yields a plea from the Martin Company 
“that we be allowed to use a spring removed from a Victor Mouse Trap, 
manufactured by the Animal Trap Company, Liditz, Pa., for our magnetic 
disconnect doors in the second and third stages of the Project Vanguard 
vehicles. . . . Allowing us to use this spring will save considerable time . . . . 
The spring will be cadmium plated with an Iridite Number 1 finish . . .” 2o 
Signed by D. J. Markarian, Vanguard Project engineer for GLM, this letter 
was dated 18 April 1956. A decade later John T. Mengel, NRL’s radio- 
tracking genius, could still recall with a chuckle a trip to Sears Roebuck 
and Company to purchase 200 inexpensive screw-jacks for use on his multi- 
million-dollar antenna arrays.21 
T o  AFMTC as the Defense Department’s agent fell the task of pro- 
viding the permanent field facilities Vanguard would require. In February 
the Secretary of Defense authorized the Center to have built for the project 
a combination office and vehicle-assembly building, to be designated as 
Hanger § and located four and a half miles northwest of launch complex 18. 
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Blockhouse used by Project Vanguard at Cape CanaGeral. The horizon 
window overlooks the launch pad. 
Word from the Corps of Engineers, responsible for the supervision of the 
construction work, was that the hangar would not be ready until April 1957, 
at the earliest. Meanwhile, Vanguard was to occupy half of an existing 
building, Hanger C, in the vicinity of th old lighthouse some two miles 
northeast of the Thor launch Plans approved by the base put all the 
Thor pads 600 feet from the blockhouse. This was the standard distance, 
acceptable to range safety officers bent on making sure that the men 
assigned to the remote control room in the blockhouse during firings enjoyed 
as much protection as possible. Some groans arose at the range safety office 
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when Vanguard requested a separate pad only 200 feet from the blockhouse. 
Following a few conferences, however, the Base command in the person of 
General Yates bowed to Vanguard’s argument that the shorter distance 
would be a worthwhile economy since it would eliminate the “repeater” 
equipment necessary for the longer line-runs of a 600-foot installation. When 
in April the Corps of Engineers employed the j. A. Jones Construction Com- 
pany of Charlotte, North Carolina, to build the six-million-dollar Thor 
launch complexes, an amendment to the contract required Jones to provide 
a simplified pad for Vanguard at a point about midway between the Thor- 
Vanguard blockhouse and Thor pad 18A.B 
The made-to-order pad was one of several concessions Vanguard suc- 
ceeded in obtaining from the Air Force. NRL and Martin insisted also on a 
“wet pad,” one equipped with a plumbing system capable of supplying water 
for cooling the flame duct of the launch structure and for other purposes 
connected with static and flight firing tests. For Yates this request posed 
problems. It meant piping off the main line water intended for the Thor 
project. It also called for the emplacement of a spilbff basin for catching the 
water poured through the flame duct, and Yates feared that a basin in the 
Vanguard launch area would create later difficulties for the Air Force’s 
IRBM program. He agreed to the wet pad only after receiving assurances 
from NRL and Martin that no interference with the Thor schedule would 
ensue.24 
During the many conferences at Patrick, some of the Vanguard spokes- 
men reacted with what one of them called “incomprehension” to the 
punctilious manner in which General Yates carried out his duties as com- 
manding officer of the range. In a report covering a lively session in February, 
Robert L. Schlechter, GLM’s field manager for Vanguard, regaled his 
colleagues at Middle River with a picture of the General “fulminating” into 
the meeting room to assert that “some structural monstrosity Douglas [the 
Thor manufacturer] proposed” building on Complex 18 “would be erected 
over his corpus delicti.” According to Schlechter, the general then asked 
Commander Berg what the Vanguard people would do if their desire for 
special facilities on the Thor complex were not met. Schlechter quoted 
Berg as replying that if “this were the case,” Vanguard would make another 
effort to share the Redstone facility. “After further questioning,” the 
eloquent Martin engineer’s account continued, “General Yates learned that 
we still proposed to static fire on the Redstone pad in the event of sharing.” 
This would have required a major modification of the Redstone complex, 
a prospect that brought violent repercussions. Schlechter’s recollection was 
that “the well known matter hit the fan, with General Yates bringing his 
corpus delicti into the picture again. Whereupon the U.S. Navy told him 
he would have to accept this situation if directed by the Department of 
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Defense. There was some profanity from the general, but the Navy held its 
ground.” 25 
But if tempers flared occasionally in the heat of battle, the ultimate 
consensus in Vanguard circles was that on the whole General Yates was a 
good friend to the scientific satellite program. It was Yates who slipped into 
the contract covering erection of the Thor facilities a clause ordering the 
Jones Construction Company to complete the blockhouse on complex 18, 
the one scheduled for Vanguard use, two weeks ahead of the one on the other 
Thor complex. Nobody noticed this effort to speed things up for the 
satellite-orbiting program until November 1956, when glass for the heavy 
“horizon-seeing’’ windows arrived at the Cape. In the words of a Project 
official, “all hell broke loose” when the builder discovered that for the 
time being he had only enough glass for one window, and proceeded to put 
it into the Vanguard blockhouse in accordance with contract. 
“Yates didn’t always take kindly to our propositions,” Berg has com- 
mented, 
but he was open minded. He was responsible for providing service to 
all of the projects at AFMTC. He had no choice but to honor their 
priorities, but he did a wonderful job of finding ways of helping his one 
no-priority program, Vanguard, to meet its commitments. In the beginning, 
for example, he was most reluctant to let us install at AFMTC the then 
new high-precision radar, AN/FPS-16, for the purpose of tracking the Van- 
guard vehicle during and immediately after the launch sequence. He 
contended that the Azusa tracking system already there was quite adequate, 
and that he didn’t want every new project ‘clobbering up my range’ with 
its own special equipment. Later, when he saw how effective our tracking 
system was, he made some changes in his own and went out of his way 
to point out that ours had proved an asset. AFMTC still uses the Azusa 
system as improved by Yates, but it also uses the AN/FPS-16 brought 
in by Vanguard.26 
Late spl‘ing 1956 found site-clearing crews gathering at Cape Canaveral 
to begin work on the Vanguard launch complex and hangar. NRL and 
Martin had established a series of “beneficial occupancy” dates, a schedule 
best described as a demonstration of the unending triumph of human hope 
over the facts of life. First the national steel strike of that summer, then a 
spate of local strikes created what scientists and engineers quaintly insist on 
calling “slippages,” meaning delays2’ 
Since AFMTC’s responsibility for construction extended only to 
permanent facilities, the Vanguard managers asked Martin to provide the 
“Static and Flight Firing Structure” the Vanguard field hands would need 
to test-fire and launch their vehicles. Beginning in January, Martin de- 
signers rapidly produced a set of acceptable drawings. The structure they 
called for consisted essentially of a flame deflector tube surmounted by a 
steel platform 9% feet high and capable of supporting two removable 
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rocket stands. One of these was for use during static or free firings of either 
the first stage of the Vanguard vehicle or of the entire vehicle, the other 
during static firing tests of the second stage only. In all, the structure con- 
sisted of five major components: deflector tube, tube support, test platform, 
plumbing system, and rocket stands. There were also access stairs and such 
facilities as a shower and a fireman’s pole-type escape hatch for the protec- 
tion of men working on the erected rocket.28 
In July both NRL and Martin experienced an uneasy weekend when 
an examination of blueprints revealed a discrepancy between the water 
outlet the Jones Construction Company had installed in the Vanguard pad 
and the corresponding water inlet on the launching structure, then still in 
the New York plant of Loewy Hydropress, the subcontractor charged with 
its manufacture. The opening of the manhole-like outlet in the pad was 
thirty-six inches, that of the inlet on the structure thirty inches, and the 
interphase-the elbow created by the makers of the structure to link the 
two units-was thirty inches at both ends. The situation was potentially 
troublesome. Vanguard construction had already suffered serious slippages. 
In an effort to hold these to a minimum the Jones gang at Cape Canaveral 
was working at top speed. Discovery of the discrepancy came on a Friday, 
and Jones was planning to pour concrete on the following Monday for that 
portion of the pad wherein the water outlet was located. 
Commander Berg came to the rescue. At his urgent request, Jones 
agreed to delay the concrete pouring for one day. Berg then put in a phone 
call to John Manning, deputy engineering services officer for production at 
the Naval Laboratory in Washington. On Saturday and Sunday Manning’s 
shop crew cast a 1,700-pound, thirty- by thirty-six-inch reducer to replace 
the unusable interphase. Early Monday morning the new elbow was on a 
plane. That evening it was at Cape Canaveral, ready to be installed. “A 
miracle!” said Berg. “Nothing of the, sort,” retorted shop-boss Manning. 
“At NRL doing the impossible is routine procedure.” 29 
Since Project Vanguard was a step into the unknown, frequent changes 
of policy were inevitable. In the beginning the project managers thought 
of their launching program as consisting of two major phases, a test phase 
and a mission phase. For the test phase they had asked the Martin Company 
to manufacture at least seven vehicles-TV-1 through TV-5, plus two or 
more backup vehicles. For the mission phase, they called for at least six 
satellite-launching vehicles, SLV-1 through SLV-6.30 Their plan, in those 
early days, was to use the first four test vehicles for vehicle-testing purposes 
only. Not until the time came to launch TV-4 did they intend to try 
sending a satellite into orbit. Soon after the project started, however, those 
in charge began changing these plans. By the summer of 1957, the Naval 
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Research Laboratory had informed the Martin Company that from TV-3 
6n, all Vanguard vehicles were to have satellite-bearing capacities, and the 
company had reoriented its production plans accordingly. Meanwhile, the 
scientists and engineers working in the so-called “ballroom” at NRL had 
developed the “grapefruit” satellite, having a diameter of only 6.4 inches 
and weighing only 4 pounds, much smaller than the 20-inch, 21.5-pound 
sphere the project managers had previously contemplated for use in their 
first attempt at orbit. 
The official record fails to reveal the reasons behind these changes, but 
the memories of the men responsible for them supply the deficiency. The 
complete success of the launch of TV-I in May 1957 had demonstrated 
the capacity of the new solid-propellant third-stage rocket, flown then for 
the first time, to meet all of its requirements. In addition the excellent 
performance of the previously untried spin stabilization system removed 
the necessity of carrying a heavily instrumented load on TV-3. In July 
1957, therefore, the project planners decided to substitute the smaller six- 
inch spherical package. Outfitted with a beacon transmitter, it was to per- 
form two functions: one, test the downrange instrumentation that the 
Vanguard people had installed to convert the Atlantic Missile Range into a 
satellite launching range and, two, lighten the load on TV-3 so that if all 
went well in this first test of the entire three-stage vehicle, a satellite would 
result. Current or foreseeable slippages in the launch schedule prompted 
the decision to begin trying to orbit a satellite with TV-3 instead of waiting 
until T V 4 .  The project managers reasoned that unless they attempted to 
fly a satellite earlier than planned they might find themselves unable to 
make good on their commitment to put one in orbit during the forth- 
coming International Geophysical Year. From Donald J. Markarian, who 
served as Martin’s project engineer for Vanguard, comes a convincing 
summary of the thinking behind the development of the grapefruit satel- 
lite: “We had to put more instrumentation in the test vehicles than in the 
mission or satellite-launching vehicles. We were confident that the lighter 
SLV-the mission vehicle-would launch a 2 1.5-pound ball into orbit, 
but we were doubtful about the ability of the heavier TV-the test ve- 
hicle-to do so. Common sense suggested that we’d be better off succeeding 
with a smaller satellite than failing with a bigger one.”31 
Recurrent difficulties notwithstanding, Vanguard entered the fall of 
1956 in fair condition. T o  be sure its hopes of launching a rocket during 
the preceding summer had gone glimmering. There was reason to believe, 
however, that its adjusted schedule calling for an initial firing in December 
was realizable. By the end of October an advance unit of the field crew 
had set up shop in the project’s temporary hangar near the old lighthouse, 
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the launching complex was far enough along to be used, the access 
roads to it were being completed, the gantry crane, freshened by a coat of 
green paint, stood ready for use, and the first of Vanguard's test and launch 
vehicles, TV-O, had arrived at Hangar C and was undergoing 
Progress was relatively satisfactory also in other aspects of the program, 
notably in those connected with tracking and with the acquisition of 
tracking and telemetered data. 
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THE TRACKING SYSTEMS 
TRACKING, as the term indicates, means measuring the position of a 
moving object, natural or man-made. Optical tracking with sighting in- 
struments is as old as astronomy, which is at least as old as written history. 
A child of modern science, radio tracking using radar, (radio direction 
finders, Dovap, and other electronic schemes, emerged during the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. Radio interferometry, the technique 
employed in Vanguard’s electronic tracking system, entered the picture in 
the 1940s. Like most of the electronic tracking techniques then in use, 
this one required the presence of a signal source, a transmitter, in the object 
being tracked. Employing two receiving points on the ground and com- 
paring the phases of the signals each of them separately received from the 
airborne source, radio interferometry had the advantage of yielding highly 
accurate angles. 
It achieved practical form in 1948 when engineers with Consolidated 
Vultee Aircraft Corporation (Convair) created for the Army the Azusa 
tracking system, using an interfer0meter.l Simultaneously with this devel- 
opment, NRL scientists were working with underwater sound interfer- 
ometers. The two groups of experimenters were in close contact. They 
frequently exchanged ideas, and in the early 1950s Milton Rosen and his 
NRL crew at White Sands built and field tested a tracking system, using 
the radio interferometer principle, for application to ballistic missile 
guidance for the Viking rocket.2 
When in early 1955 Hagen‘s people, specifically Rosen and his 
colleagues, began drawing up their plans for launching an earth satellite, 
they devoted much thought to the problem of tracking so small an object. 
Most upper-air research scientists advised them to rely on optical tracking. 
It was the tried and true method. More to the point, Fred L. Whipple’s 
camera observations of meteorites entering the earth’s atmosphere had 
demonstrated in the late 1940s that modern terrestrial optical instruments 
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could “spot” an object weighing only a few kilograms and moving at a 
substantial distance? 
Rosen had doubts. At his request Richard Tousey of NRL checked 
Whipple’s visibility computations. He confirmed these calculations, but 
found in them no answer to an important question: Granted optical in- 
struments could see the satellite if they could find it in the first place-but 
could they find it? In Tousey’s opinion their chances of doing so were 
only one in a m i l l i ~ n . ~  There was the further consideration that optical 
tracking, although highly accurate, has limitations. The best of sighting 
instruments can pick up a satellite only when the sun is five degrees below 
the horizon-that is, at dusk and dawn-and even then only under certain 
weather conditions.6 Convinced from the beginning that NRL must look 
elsewhere for an adequate satellite-acquisition method, Rosen had asked 
John T. Mengel and his NRL Tracking and Guidance Branch to develop 
an electronic system for use in conjunction with an optical one. 
For guidance purposes, the Azusa system had performed satisfactorily at 
White Sands and elsewhere. For tracking a satellite, however, it was out of 
the question since it required an airborne transmitter far too large for a 
small scientific payload weighing no more than thirty pounds, if  that much. 
Refinements and modifications were indicated, and Mengel and his as- 
sistants shortly came up with an arrangement that, although based on the 
Viking radio interferometry techniques, required instead of a heavy trans- 
ponder only a thirteen-ounce transmitter 8 and employed different oper- 
ating frequencies and antenna configurations. It was in essence a new 
system. 
Mengel’s name for the system, Minitrack, derived from the system’s 
utilization within the satellite of “an oscillator of minimum size and weight 
. . . to illuminate pairs of antennas at a ground station which measures the 
anguIar positions of the satellites using phase-comparison techniques.” ’ 
As eventually developed, the thirteen-ounce Minitrack oscillator, quartz- 
crystal controlled and fully transistorized, had a ten-milliwatt output, 
operated on a fixed frequency of 108 megacycles, and had a predicted life- 
time of ten to fourteen days.* 
In a series of papers and speeches prepared over a two-year period 
beginning in 1956, Mengel and his colleagues-notably Roger L. Easton, 
his assistant at NRL, and Paul Herget, director of the Cincinnati Observa- 
tory and a consultant to Project Vanguard-assessed the role of tracking in 
the satellite program and described some of the characteristics of the 
Minitrack. In March of 1956 Mengel told a group of scientists and engi- 
neers: 
The final realization of man’s efforts to place a satellite in orbit about 
the earth will immediateIy pose a new series of problems: how to deter- 
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Schematic of a typical Minitrack station. 
mine the precise orbit that it is following; and how to measure what is 
happening within the satellite from the vantage point of a ground station. 
The immensity of the first of these programs, how to prove that the 
satellite is in fact orbiting-the acquisition phase-can be realized by . . . 
an analogy . . . . Let a jet plane pass overhead at 60,000 feet at the speed 
of sound, let the pilot eject a golf ball, and now let the plane vanish. 
The apparent size and speed of this golf ball will closely approximate 
the size and speed of a satellite 3 feet in diameter, at a height of 300 
miles . . . . The acquisition problem is to locate the object under these 
conditions, and the tracking problem is to meaFure its angular position 
and angular rate with sufficient accuracy to alert non-acquiring tracking 
stations, those trying to follow the satellite by optical means, as to the 
time and position of expected passage of the object.9 
In a popular article,1° Mengel and Herget likened the antennas of 
Vanguard’s Minitrack stations to human ears. “An individual,” they 
pointed out, “locates the source of sound by virtue of the phase differences 
in the sound waves, arriving at different times at his two ears. Similarly the 
listening units of the minitrack system are pairs of receiving antennas, 
set a measured distance apart, which indicate the direction of the signal by 
phase differences in the radio waves . . . .” They described the reception 
pattern of a Minitrack station as a fan-shaped beam making an arc of “100 
degrees north and south and 10 degrees east and west. In the long direction 
of the beam we have three pairs of antennas, spaced respectively 500, 64, 
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and 12 feet apart; in the narrower east-west dimension, two pairs with 
spacing of 500 and 64 feet. The north-south and east-west [antenna 
arrays] give us two angles which [combine to indicate] the actual direction 
of the satellite.” 
The Minitrack stations, as they came into being, showed minor varia- 
tions. Generally speaking, however, their major components were the fixed 
arrays for angle tracking, one fixed antenna array for telemetering recep- 
tion, a rhombic communications antenna, a ground station electronics 
trailer, a telemetering trailer, a communications trailer, and associate 
power sources and maintenance units. These components required about 
twenty-three acres with a minimum gradient of the land less than one de- 
gree in the region of the angle tracking antenna arrays. Those in charge 
of choosing the sites took care to place each station where the adjacent 
terrain did not exceed an elevation angle of ten degrees for at least half a 
mile, twenty degrees for five miles. They also took care to select a site at 
least two miles from heavy electric power installations and at least five 
miles from airports or airways.1l 
The inclusion of Minitrack in the satellite-launching proposal NRL 
submitted to the Stewart Committee had had direct bearing on the com- 
mittee’s decision in August 1955, to accept the Laboratory’s proposal in 
preference to the Army-Orbiter proposal, which originally contained no 
provision for electronic tracking.12 The NRL proposal also mentioned in 
passing the creation at the Laboratory of a less elaborate version of the 
Minitrack system. Developed by Roger Easton, this abbreviated system 
would come to be known officially as the “Mark 11,” unofficially as the 
“Jiffy” or “Poor Man’s’’ Minitrack. Using radio-frequency phase-compari- 
son techniques by means of hybrid junctions, the Mark I1 later became the 
nucleus of “Project Moonbeam,” a program sponsored by Project Van- 
guard to encourage radio hams and their organizations to build their own 
stations and participate in tracking satellites. 
There were two forms of the Mark 11, known, respectively, as the 
“simple” and the “advanced.” The amateurs who joined Project Moon- 
beam used only the simple form. Costing about $5,000 to erect as against 
twice that much for the advanced Mark 11, this arrangement consisted of 
two matched antennas in an extended base array, a receiver, and oscillo- 
graph. Passage of the artificial earth satellite produced a pattern of rein- 
forcement and cancellation, successively, of the signals received at each 
antenna. These were recorded as a pattern of peaks and nulls. A difficulty in 
interpreting these records, even where satisfactory time signals were re- 
corded in an auxiliary channel, was in determining which null corre- 
sponded to the time of the passage of the satellite through the principal 
plane of the antenna array. In general these ambiguities were resolved at 
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the Vanguard satellite computing centers by references to the data re- 
ceived at the prime Minitrack stations operated by professionals.13 
As soon as Project Vanguard became official in the fall of 1955, the 
individuals charged with tracking began work on its implementation. In 
view of the technical hurdles to be cleared and the problems incident to 
coordinating the work of numerous military units, university laboratories, 
individual experts, private industries, and elements of the world scientific 
community, the progress of the electronic tracking group was remarkably 
smooth. Years later Mengel would be able to recall “a few personality 
clashes,’’ but in his opinion these were “par for the course for a program 
that made use of some of the best astronomers in the country.” In addition, 
the middle months of 1957 saw two slippages: the late arrival of con- 
struction material at one of the Minitrack installations and a one-month 
delay in completing the communications network set up to tie together all 
of the far-flung elements of the system.14 
In April 1956, the technical panel’s Working Group on Tracking and 
Computation (WGTC) , stamped “approved“ on the plans for the optical 
tracking system, as drawn up by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, 
that is, by Whipple and J. Allen Hynek. Simultaneously the group gave its 
blessing to Whipple’s budgetary estimates, an action that soon thereafter 
had the effect of setting aside $3,380,610 for the optical tracking program.15 
The plans prepared for the optical system envisaged the use of two separate 
but cooperating groups, one to acquire or “find” the satellite, the other to 
track it. Acquisition was the responsibility of the group known as Project 
Moonwatch. Whipple’s initial announcement of his intention to use 
amateurs in this fashion brought expressions of skepticism from members 
of the technical panel. “Some of my colleagues,” the feisty, personable SA0 
director would recall later, “were convinced that too few amateurs would 
volunteer, and that those who did would not a1,ways perform satisfactorily. 
Time, I’m happy to say, has proved these fears to be groundless. The 
amateurs joined up in droves all around the globe. They did a splendid 
job for Project Vanguard, and they have been doing an increasingly more 
effective one for the American space effort ever since.” 
The nucleus of the other phase of the optical system, the precision 
tracking phase, would consist of the twelve observation stations, set up 
around the world and operated by professionals. Each station was to have a 
high-precision camera and associated clock. It was assumed that reduced 
data obtained from these installations would permit the calculation of 
definitive orbits for use in correlating with satellite-borne and ground- 
based experiments, thus providing valuable scientific information. Early 
in the planning period staff members of the Smithsonian Astrophysical 
Observatory undertook to develop a list of possible camera locations. On 
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The Baker-Nunn satellite tracking camera and diagram of its components. 
visits to more than a score of countries, Hynek and other SA0 scientists 
met with local scientists and government representatives to work out col- 
laborative methods for setting up and operating the units. In the beginning 
thought was given to placing all of them at Minitrack stations. This ar- 
rangement would have saved money, but it turned out to be impractical 
because of the differing requirements of the two systems. “A camera 
station,” Whipple has explained, “needs clear skies, whereas the principal 
need at a radio tracking station is a flat surface away from noise. The 
Minitrack station in Ecuador, for example, was ideally located for radio 
tracking purposes) but it stood in an area where the skies are overcast most 
of the time. Joining our camera stations with the Minitrack network would 
have spared us many logistic headaches, but generally speaking we just 
couldn’t do it.” In the end an optical and a Minitrack station were com- 
bined at only one point, Woomera, Australia. Of the remaining optical 
locations, two were in the continental United States-at Jupiter, Florida, 
and Organ Pass, New Mexico. The others were at Olifansfontein, Union of 
South Africa; Cadiz, Spain; Mitaka, Japan; Naini Tal, India; Arequipa, 
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Peru; Shiraz, Iran; Curaqao, Netherlands West Indies; Villa Dolores, 
Argentina; and Haleakala, Maui, Hawaii.le 
T o  cope with the unprecedented task of picking up a tiny man-made 
satellite orbiting at a great altitude, Whipple and Hynek supervised the 
development of the Baker-Nunn high-precision telescopic camera with an 
unusually large aperture. 
The Baker-Nunn took its name from its principal creators: James G. 
Baker, consultant to the Perkin-Elmer Corporation of Norwalk, Con- 
necticut, and Joseph Nunn of South Pasadena, California. Baker designed 
the camera, Nunn, its mechanical elements. Perkin-Elmer fabricated the 
optics, and the Boller and Chivens Company of South Pasadena built the 
camera pr0per.l’ 
Although the performance of the cameras was destined to fulfill expec- 
tations,18 their production was plagued by setbacks. The October 1957 meet- 
ing of the technical panel at IGY headquarters in Washington found the 
scientists present discussing the lagging camera-delivery schedule with 
such heat that for once lean-faced, high-domed Fred Whipple lost his calm. 
Why so much fuss, he wondered, over the delays in the optical tracking 
program? Was the panel satisfied with the Vanguard launching schedule? 
His reference, of course, was to the inability of the NRL-Martin field crew 
to meet its flight-firing dates. 
Panel chairman Porter took care of Whipple’s query with his statement 
that the launching schedule was a Defense Department responsibility, not a 
panel responsibility. With a sharpness that the formal phraseology of the 
minutes fails to disguise, he added gratuitously that for Whipple’s informa- 
tion the radio tracking program, also a Defense Department responsibility, 
was practically on schedule. 
Whipple promptly changed the subject, or rather shifted it to different 
grounds. He described himself as miffed by a recent newspaper story charg- 
ing that delays in the camera-delivery schedule were holding up the entire 
Vanguard project. Porter agreed that the newspaper story was in error. 
He offered to so inform the panel’s parent body, the IGY committee, but 
the panel as a whole took no action on this suggestion and the matter was 
dropped. 
Whipple reported that the first Baker-Nunn camera had been as- 
sembIed and was under test at Pasadena. It would go to its station in a few 
weeks. A second camera was expected to arrive at Pasadena for assembling 
and tests by early December. Whipple anticipated that after that the 
“optics would be completed to allow for camera completion at about one- 
month intervals.” In time he hoped to cut this to three weeks. Clock 
production was good. The same could be said for the station-building 
schedule. Basic materials had been shipped to six of the twelve stations, 
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although recently the ship bearing material to Japan had caught fire- 
damage as yet undetermined. 
Porter lost no time in getting to the heart of Whipple’s summary. It 
was plain that the precision-camera network would not be in full operation 
until August 1958. At that point only four months would remain of the 
International Geophysical Year as then projected-the period during which 
Project Vanguard was committed to the launching of at least one satellite. 
Porter concluded his gloomy observations by raising-and in effect 
answering-a pointed question. Should the camera program simply be 
canceled? In his opinion the answer depended on whether the satellite 
program did or did not continue beyond the termination of the IGY year. 
As to that, no one could yet say. A general discussion followed, at the end 
of which the sense of the panel found its way into the minutes. It was that 
the members viewed the slipping “delivery schedule of the cameras with 
grave concern.” They had even considered their elimination, but had con- 
cluded that such a step would be inadvisable. Implicit in this action, as in so 
many of the actions of the panel scientists, was an abiding faith that Project 
Vanguard was only the beginning of a long American space program. Their 
final word on the camera-delivery problem was that the IGY committee 
should “adopt every means in its power to expedite the schedule.” l9 
In this respect, regrettably, the powers of the National Committee were 
limited by the severe technical problems involved in the production and 
testing of a highly advanced optical camera. Observations at the first com- 
pleted station, Organ Pass, would not begin until November 1957. Not 
until June 1958-only a month ahead of the date so dolefully forecast by 
Porter-would the entire precision-camera network be in operation.20 
The delay would have been even greater had not Porter visited the 
plant of the fabricators of the camera optics, Perkin-Elmer, where he 
learned that the Perkin-Elmer people had underestimated the job, bid too 
low, and were reluctant about lavishing expensive overtime on an under- 
taking that was going to leave them with a loss. Having discovered the 
trouble, Porter persuaded the Smithsonian Institution to renegotiate its 
contract, raising the price to a point where Perkin-Elmer could break 
even. This was an intricate transaction, calling as it did for coordination 
with the National Science Foundation, the Smithsonian Astrophysical 
Observatory, and the American TGY Committee; but it was accomplished 
rapidly and had the effect of accelerating the camera-production program 
considerably. 
Lest the delays in establishing the optical network take on more 
significance than they should, it is worthwhile anticipating a little to point 
out that its long-run contributions to the scientific satellite project were 
substantial. Nor do the Technical Panel minutes reflect all of the difficulties 
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confronting the supervisors of the optical program. Actual release of the 
funds allotted to them was a function of the Smithsonian Institution, and 
in the 1950s the administrative procedures of the Smithsonian were not 
geared to a fast-moving project like Vanguard. As a result, Whipple and his 
associates in Cambridge had to spend an undue amount of time cajoling 
the firms with which they dealt into supplying them with material and 
services on credit while they waited for the creaking fiscal wheels in Wash- 
ington to revolve. Project director Hagen sagely characterized the optical 
program as a “prudent” backup to NRL‘s radio tracking system.21 The 
program also engendered great interest in the project as a whole by its 
sponsorship of Project Moonwatch. This visual observing program- 
“visual” rather than “optical” since its members made no use of cameras- 
gave amateur astronomers around the world the opportunity of playing a 
useful role in the Vanguard tracking system. Organized and directed by the 
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, Project Moonwatch received as 
much if not more attention from the press than any other aspect of Project 
Vanguard. Newspaper readers were intrigued by the picture of hundreds 
of small groups of enthusiastic star-gazers getting together in open fields or 
on lonely hilltops in an effort to “catch the satellite” with their binoculars 
and small telescopes. 
Guided by instructions from SAO, the amateurs gathered preliminary 
orbital data on the satellites. These they transmitted to Cambridge, whence 
they were distributed in the form of ephemerides to the technicians 
orbital data on the satellites. These they transmitted to Cambridge, whence 
As Whipple had anticipated, the announcement of the formation of 
Moonwatch in early 1956 brought an enormous response. Visual observa- 
tion teams sprang up in North America, South America, Africa, Europe, 
and Asia, in the Middle East and at such remote specks on the map as 
Station C and Fletcher’s Ice Island T,3 in the Arctic Basin. Before the 
Vanguard program terminated, 250 teams with approximately 8,000 mem- 
bers were functioning. Teams were organized by universities, high schools, 
government agencies, commercial organizations, private science clubs, and 
groups of laymen. The United States alone accounted for 126 groups. 
The volunteers furnished their own equipment. As the program took 
form, however, SA0 succeeded in obtaining some special equipment from 
army surplus. The observatory sent these items to some of the more effec- 
tive groups.22 For a time, ironically, the success of Project Moonwatch was a 
source of embarrassment to the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory. 
The minutes of the technical panel find Whipple complaining that the 
unanticipated growth of the program was putting a severe strain on his 
small administrative staff .= So much for the penalties of glamor. 
In projecting the electronic tracking program, during the early Van- 
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guard days, the Naval Research Laboratory contemplated using only four 
Minitrack stations along with a prototype station, but by the time Van- 
guard was ready to issue its first full-scale report of progress in December 
1955, the radio tracking experts were thinking in far more elaborate 
terms.24 In its final form the Minitrack network would consist of fourteen 
ground installations. 
One of them, the prototype Minitrack station at Blossom Point 
Proving Ground in Maryland, forty miles south of Washington, was a 
service-station for the other elements of the network. Here the electronics 
engineers, the foreign scientists, and other technicians chosen to operate the 
stations received the bulk of their training. Blossom Point also provided a 
center for the development of system tests and of procedures for calibrating 
the Minitrack antennas, principally by using ground-based cameras to 
photograph aircraft carrying Minitrack test transmitters and ground- 
controlled flashing lights against a background of stars.25 
Three stations, set up immediately downrange from Cape Canaveral 
on the islands of Grand Bahama, Antigua, and Grand Turk, functioned in 
connection with a fourth unit, a radar installation at Patrick Air Force 
Base, to keep tabs on the Vanguard vehicle during launch and shortly after 
the third-stage powered-flight phase of the launch sequence. Supplemented 
by a station in South Africa and another in Australia, the remaining 
elements, the so-called prime Minitrack stations, were strung out in a 
north-south line along the east coast of North America and the west coast 
of South America so as to form a “picket line” across the expected path of 
all satellites launched from Cape Canaveral. Mengel was confident that 
with this arrangement-this “fence of” stations located generally along the 
seventy-fifth meridian in the northern and southern hemisphere 26-“we 
have a 90 percent chance of intercepting every pass of a satellite which is 
higher than 300 miles.”27 In accordance with a decision reached in De- 
cember 1955, all prime Minitrack stations and some of the subsidiary 
units of the network included high-gain (TLM 18) antennas for gathering 
telemetered data from the satellite.28 
All branches of the military contributed to the erection, operation, and 
maintenance of the radio tracking system. Three Army agencies-the 
Corps of Engineers and its Army Map Service and the Signal Corps-took 
responsibility for most of the construction work and for setting up the 
communications network. The Bureau of Yards and Docks, a Navy unit, 
obtained use of the necessary lands for the Prototype Station at Blossom 
Point, and the Air Force arranged for the installation at PAFB and Grand 
Bahama Island of the two high-precision tracking radars, the XN-1 and 
XN-2 models of the AN/FPS-16.29 
With assistance from native scientists, Army men operated the five 
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Interior of the Minitrack tracking van at Blossom Point, Maryland. 
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prime Minitrack stations in Latin America. They also operated the prime 
Minitrack station at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The Naval Electronic Labora- 
tory took care of the prime station at San Diego, Califmnia, with NRL 
assuming responsibility for Blossom Point and for the vehicle-tracing units 
on Grand Bahama Island, Antigua, and Grand Turk. In Australia an 
agency of that country’s Joint Service Staff, the Weapons Research Estab- 
lishment, built and ran the prime Minitrack station at Woomera. In South 
Africa, the National Telecommunications Research Center discharged 
these functions at the prime Minitrack station in Esselen Park near 
Johanne~burg.~~ 
Choosing sites for the Minitrack stations was also a cooperative effort. 
The Corps of Engineers supplied Mengel and his associates with a map 
study pinpointing potentially appropriate locations. The Department of 
State conducted negotiations for the lease of lands on foreign soil, and a 
Vanguard reconnaissance party under Commander Berg received sub- 
stantial assistance from local representatives of the Inter-American Geodetic 
Survey during a tour of seventeen Latin American countries in the spring 
of 1956. 
Using criteria previously drawn up at the Naval Laboratory, Berg’s 
group chose six Latin American sites. They were Batista Field at Havana, 
Cuba; P h m o  de Cotopaxi at Quito, Ecuador; Pampa de Anc6n at Lima, 
Peru; Salar del Carmen at Antofagasta, Chile; Peldehune Military Reserva- 
tion at Santiago, Chile; and Rio Hata in the Republic of Panama. Shortly 
after the return of the Berg group in early May, NRL eliminated the 
Panamanian site, studies having indicated that a station at San Diego would 
be more useful. Indeed the day was not far off when the eyes of everyone 
connected with Project Vanguard would be fixed on this California station. 
Such was its position in the path of the critical orbit that it was always the 
first ground unit to receive and promulgate the glad tidings that what ap- 
peared to have been a satisfactorily launched satellite was actually in orbit.31 
While Captain Berg’s party and another Vanguard group scouted the 
world for real estate, tracking and telemetry specialists in Washington drew 
up specifications covering the material and services their electronic net- 
work would require. The Towson, Maryland, plant of Bendix Radio 
Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation built the Minitrack ground sta- 
tion assemblies, exclusive of the ground antenna arrays and the antenna 
feedlines. Installed for the most part in government-furnished commercial 
trailers, the ground stations consisted of ten major components, including 
rf receiver and rf power supply racks and operating consoles, rf phase 
measurement and phase measurement power supply racks, time standard 
racks precisely controlled by a crystal oscillator and analogue and digital 
recorder ~ni t s .~2  
I 
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As for the Minitrack antenna arrays: In May 1956 the Laboratory 
authorized two companies to develop these. Both produced prototypes in 
keeping with Vanguard requirements, so the contract went to the Technical 
Appliance Corporation of Sherburne, New York, as the lower bidder.33 
Melpar, Inc., of Falls Church, Virginia, developed for the Vanguard ve- 
hicle a radar beacon (the AN/DPN48), capable of furnishing tracking 
information on the vehicle during flight.34 With minor exceptions, all of 
the companies involved in supplying hardware and services to Vanguard’s 
combined radio tracking-telemetry network succeeded in meeting their by 
no means easy schedules. In August 1956, the finesse exhibited on NRL’s 
side of the bargaining table moved the Chief of Naval Research, Admiral 
Rawson Bennett, to place on record a “comment upon the exceptionally 
competent manner in which Mr. J. T. Mengel . . has conducted the pre- 
contract phase of the Minitrack Ground Station Units . . . .” 35 
Vanguard scientists were aware that the value of their radio tracking 
network would be directly proportionate to the speed with which they could 
convert the data acquired into usable form. For this reason they began work- 
ing intensively in early fall 1955 on plans for a data-processihg system. 
To  assist in this development Paul Herget of the Cincinnati Observa- 
tory joined the Vanguard project on a consulting basis in October. A 
universally respected astronomer, scholarly and firm-spoken, Herget im- 
pressed his Vanguard co-workers by the aplomb with which he performed 
the complex mathematical chores assigned to him. He worked closely with 
Joseph W. Siry of NRL, a lanky young mathematician, given to interlarding 
his remarks with thoughtful grunts like a doctor examining an intriguing 
symptom; and with tall, wispy-haired James J. Fleming, a genial data- 
reduction specialist with a striking resemblance to Alastair Sim of British 
movie fame.36 
As the data-reduction program took form, NRL brought in two more 
distinguished astronomers as consultants, Gerald M. Clemence and R. L. 
Duncome of the United States Naval Observatory, and Hagen set up a 
Working Group on Orbits, consisting of Siry, as chairman, Fleming, Herget, 
and the two Navy astronomers. Cooperating closely with the tracking people, 
the group established and supervised computational procedures, prepared 
an ephemeris, and extracted geodetic and geophysical information from 
orbital data?’ 
Since the data-processing system called for the services of large-scale 
computers, the welcome mat was out at project headquarters when in Sep- 
tember 1955 Cuthbert C. Hurd, then director of electronic data processing 
machines for International Business Machines, and other IBM representa- 
tives dropped in “to discuss the probable computer needs of the earth 
satellite program.” 38 
159 
In a letter thanking the IBM experts for their visit, NRL pointed out 
that “as now foreseen, a high-speed digital computer (similar in speed and 
storage capacity to the IBM 704) will be required for calculating the orbit of 
the satellite, [but] . . . computer plans are now in the formative stage, and 
it may be some time before detailed specifications can be formulated for 
bidding.” 
As a matter of fact, progress toward the bidding stage was reasonably 
rapid. In March 1956, the Office of Naval Research invited proposals “from 
several possible sources for the renting of computer facilities and the furnish- 
ing of mathematical and programming services to the NRL for . . . Project 
Vanguard.” During April, IBM and two other companies responded. IBM’s 
bid was substantially lower than the others, and the only one that fulfilled 
all Vanguard requirements. At a cost of $900,000, IBM was to supply six 
weeks’ full-time operation of its 704 computer, in addition to a number of 
other services at no cost whatsoever to the government. Under the free 
items were orbit computations during the lifetime of the satellite or the 
lifetime of the Minitrack, whichever was shorter, for the first three successful 
satellites; the services of mathematicians for coding,’ programming, numeri- 
cal analysis and related tasks beginning on the signing of the contract: one 
hundred hours of computing time to check programs; the establishment in 
the District of Columbia of a computing center EO be made available on de- 
mand: a secondary backup center to be available for emergency use within 
five minutes of the need; necessary communications between the primary 
and secondary centers; and any rehearsals necessary for working out the 
routine of taking Minitrack data and computing the orbit. 
In June the Navy and the big business machines company entered into 
the requisite contract. In July NRL announced that IBM was planning to 
create a computing facility for Vanguard in downtown Washington. In the 
spring of the following year IBM’s proposed remodeling of the building 
leased for this purpose received the blessing of the District of Columbia 
Fine Arts Commission, and on 30 June 1957 the attractive Vanguard Com- 
puting Center at 615 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., opened with appropriate 
fanfare. Later in the summer IBM provided Project Vanguard’s data proc- 
essing system with standby facilities by installing a transceiver connection 
between the Vanguard Computing Center in Washington and the com- 
pany’s Research Computing Center in Poughkeepsie, New York. Although 
this backup arrangement would prove unnecessary, the presence in upstate 
New York of a 704 computer, capable of handling Vanguard data should 
anything go wrong with the machines in the Washington Center, was 
comforting to the reliability-conscious managers of the scientific satellite 
project .40 
Preparation of the 704 for Vanguard use began at the Naval Research 
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Architect’s sketch of the central IBM computing center in Washington, D.C. 
Laboratory where the Working Group on Orbits determined the formula- 
tions their projected launching schedule would require. The bulk of this 
work fell to Herget, assisted by Peter Musen of the Cincinnati Observatory. 
When the Laboratory’s calculations were ready, IBM mathematicians and 
programmers translated them into computer language. In all they wrote 
some 40,000 discrete operations into the machine. 
Throughout most of the Vanguard launching program-from Decem- 
ber 1957 on, to be exact-the project utilized still another high-speed 
computer, an IBM 709 that the Air Force had installed in the vicinity of 
Patrick Air Force Base on Cape Canaveral. As, during each firing, the 
satellite-bearing Vanguard vehicle rose from its pad at nearby AFMTC, 
the 709 followed its early flight with calculations based on sightings made 
by the big tracking radar, the AN/FP§-16. While the vehicle coasted up 
to the altitude where its third stage could power the payload into orbit, the 
preliminary information concerning the coasting phase traveled by teletype 
to the Computing Center in Washington. 
This preliminary data indicated the speed and velocity of the vehicle 
at that moment. At the Washington Center technicians fed it into the 704. 
The machine combined it with previously prepared data on the anticipated 
161 
performance of the third stage, and in this manner produced the first 
computations showing whether the satellite had a chance of orbiting and, 
if so, what the orbit would look like. 
These initial computations came off the 704 while the third stage 
of the rocket was burning itself out above the Atlantic ten to twelve minutes 
after liftoff. From the Center the preliminary orbit predictions went by 
teletype to the Minitrack stations, enabling them to make accurate ob- 
servations as the new satellite passed overhead. Each station recorded 
data about the satellite during the brief time it remained within range, 
then relayed the readings so obtained to Washington where the experts 
at the Center converted them to punched cards and fed the cards into the 
704. 
As the satellite continued to orbit the earth, the Minitrack stations 
reported further sightings to the Center. With these, the 704 continuously 
refined its preliminary orbit prediction. Eventually, usually between seven 
and nine hours after launching, the 704 was able to issue a definitive 
calculation, showing the shape of the orbit and the speed, position, and 
altitude of the satellite for every minute throughout the following week 
or ten days. Simultaneously the 704 determined the geographical locations 
from which the observers of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory 
and the Project Moonwatch participants could make visual observations 
of the ~a te l l i t e .~~  
At Cape Canaveral the Vanguard technicians achieved a technological 
first by merging the 709 computer and the high-precision AN/FPS-16 
radar into an arrangement whereby the radar fed tracking data directly 
into the computer and the computer, in turn, drove the plotting boards 
in the Central Control room on the firing range. This radar-computer- 
controls linkage was a case of multiple applications of the same equipment. 
Not only did it yield data on orbit determination for transmission to 
Washington, it also provided the men ’at the range control rack with the 
information they needed, during the critical early phase of a launch, to 
make certain that their vehicle was performing safely and according to 
plan. 
Driven by the computer, the displays in the Central Control room 
gave the range safety officer a second-by-second picture of the path the 
vehicle was following. If the rocket swerved from its appointed trajectory 
and appeared likely to fall on ships or land masses below, the safety officer 
could press the “panic button” and destroy the flying hardware before it 
became a hazard. The computer-activated displays performed a similar 
service for the man at the third-stage firing console. A mechanism in the 
vehicle was set up to ignite the third stage at a precalculated point in the 
trajectory. Utilizing data relayed by the computer from the tracking radar, 
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the display boards at Central Control indicated whether this mechanism 
was functioning properly or not. If not, the operator at the third-stage 
console known as “Fire-When-Ready Gridley” could push his button, 
thus actuating ignition of the stage from the ground.42 
Installation of the radar-computer-controls system proceeded con- 
comitantly with development for use at the Cape of a system for greatly 
accelerating the reduction to usable form of data telemetered from the 
Vanguard vehicle. A joint product of the Naval Laboratory and Radiation, 
Inc., of Melbourne, FIorida, this time-saving arrangement brightened the 
scientific world’s burgeoning list of acronyms by receiving the designation 
ARRF, for Automatic Recording and Reduction Facility. Housed first 
on a mobile trailer, later in the project’s permanent hangar at the Florida 
missile center, ARRF provided the Vanguard scientists with final informa- 
tion on the performance of their birds in flight within seventy-two hours 
after liftoff.43 
Creation of the project’s tracking and data-processing systems required 
about a year and a half of planning and labor. The Minitrack network 
became operative in October 1957, prior to which date ‘Vanguard relied 
for tracking data on existing AFMTC facilities, supplemented by a proto- 
type of the advanced version of the simplified Minitrack station, a Mark I1 
that NRL had established at the Cape toward the end of the preceding 
year. ARRF began functioning in late fall 1957 and the radar-computer- 
controls system began functioning in December of that year. Meanwhile 
other phases of the scientific satellite program had moved ahead, although 
in the view of hard-pressed participants, dogged by the sense of urgency 
implicit in their commitments, progress was never totally satisfactory. 
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EARLY TEST FIRINGS 
VANGUARD launching operations were the responsibility of the Glenn L. 
Martin Company, and long after the project had become history, square- 
jawed, cigar-chewing Robert Schlechter, GLM’s man in charge at the 
Florida missile range, was still grousing over the failure of the press to give 
his hands “a fair shake.” It was “pretty irritating,” in Skhlechter’s view, 
“to read in the newspapers such headlines as ‘Devoted Navy Men Work 
Around the Clock at Cape Canaveral to Put Up Vanguard Vehicles.’ As a 
matter of fact, most of those ‘devoted navy men’ were Martin employees.” 
Known as the Vanguard Operations Group, or VOG, the field crew 
consisted of four major elements. Of these the Martin contingent was by 
far the largest. The others were a small group of NRL engineers, a unit 
charged with coordinating all phases of the field operation, and a Project 
Office made up of the liaison officers that the military services cooperating 
in the Vanguard program had assigned to the field. In addition, representa- 
tives of Martin’s subcontractors and NRL’s contractors joined VOG from 
time to time to help cope with problems connected with the services or 
hardware their companies or laboratories were wpplying. 
Headed throughout most of the program by Dan Mazur, the NRL 
Canaveral unit was essentially managerial. As the Laboratory’s chief 
representative in Florida, Mazur served as VOG manager, responsib!e for 
overall technical direction of the field effort. His second in charge, with 
the title of test conductor, was Robert H. Gray, a slight and scholarly 
looking engineer who had been persuaded by Milton Rosen to leave a 
rocket-engine development program in private industry to participate in 
the satellite venture. Mazur reported directly to project director Hagen or 
to Paul Walsh, one of whose functions as Hagan’s deputy was to keep tne 
VOG manager abreast of Vanguard policy decisions. 
As Martin’s chief representative, Schlechter served as base manager, 
responsible for the performance of his company’s field obligations. His 
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Project Vanguard‘s major line, policy, and working channels. 
contingent consisted of a group of supervisory engineers with offices in the 
Vanguard hangar and two crews composed of test technicians, one at the 
hangar, the other at the launch complex. Before February 1958 the base 
manager reported directly to project engineer Markarian at the Martin 
plant near Baltimore; after that, to G. T. Willy, vice president and general 
manager of Martin’s then newly created division at Cocoa, on the F!orida 
mainland near Cape Canaveral. Schlechter’s top assistant, with the title 
of operations manager, was Stan Welch. A West Point graduate, Welch 
took the edge off some of the more trying moments in the field with his 
running commentary on Vanguard’s quaint methods. “Boy oh boy,” he 
was fond of reiterating, “this is not the way we did things at West Point.” 
Other top Martin men were Robert Neff as launch-comp!ex manager, 
Robert Adcock and James Stoms as test conductors, Leonard Arnowitz as 
controls supervisor, Robert Beale as propulsion supervisor, Dave Mackey 
as instrumentation supervisor, and K. (Nobby) Matsuoka as mechanical 
engineer. 
As Vanguard senior project officer in the field, Commander Harold W. 
(Gal) Calhoun, USN, constituted the principal link between the VOG 
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and the missile test center command. Responsible for test control, he saw 
to it that the VOG carried out its field operations in a manner consistent 
with the capabilities and rules of AFMTC.2 
For a brief period beginning in late spring 1956 Matsuoka of GLM 
was the lone occupant of the Vanguard hangar. His duties during this 
interval were to procure and store materiel. He also arranged for the in- 
stallation of the facilities the range command had agreed to provide. In 
his spare time he erected a sign in the vicinity of the hangar. Reading 
“The Martin Vanguard Operations Group,” it remained in position until 
it came to the attention of Commander Calhoun. Calhoun promptly re- 
placed it with another, reading “The Navy-Martin Vanguard Operations 
Group.” 
The battle of the signs left no scars. Although along the Washington- 
Baltimore axis disagreements over policy and procedure continued to exer- 
cise the vocal cords of project big-shots, the Martin and NRL men sweating 
it out at Cape Canaveral got along reasonably well in spite of what 
Schlechter once ‘described as “a rather excessive togetherness.” 
Life at the Cape in the 1950s did not offer much in the way of distract- 
tions or comforts. Even today’s Apollo lunar launch complex at John F. 
Kennedy Space Center, and the vastly enlarged and more developed Eastern 
Test Range, successor to AFMTC, have wastelands where only the changing 
cloud patterns of the bright Florida sky afford some relief from the monot- 
ony of the terrain. Much of the smaller range of Vanguard days was a 
desolation of sand and palmetto-topped boondocks, interspersed with 
mosquito breeding swamps and an occasional orange or grapefruit grove. 
The Air Force had provided access roads for the other projects at 
AFMTC, mixing gypsum powder with the sand to give them a hard surface. 
It did the same for Vanguard, but hurried crew members frequently pre- 
ferred to make their own shortcuts, using halftracks and weapons carriers 
for this purpose. The practice had its risks. Before the area became govern- 
ment property, it had supported a few isolated farms. Forcing a path 
through the tangled marsh reed one day, a young NRL engineer found 
his pickup truck suddenly sinking beneath him, into the decaying remains 
of an abandoned septic tank.* 
The hot salt breezes and mildew of the Cape created financial prob- 
lems, accelerating car obsoletion and playing hob with dry-cleaning budgets. 
Now one of the fastest growing areas in the United States, the Cape was 
sparsely populated in the 1950s. Commuting distances were great and 
costly. Living facilities were scarce-and costly. A young bachelor attached 
to the VOG found himself paying $170.00 a month for a hotel room barely 
large enough to hold a single bed and a washstand. In the beginning 
Laboratory personnel assigned to the field received a $12.00 per diem. 
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There were groans when in April 1957 this fell to $8.00, more groans 
when it disappeared altogether.6 
Danger is always present at a rocket launch complex because of the 
highly volatile liquid fuels, oxidizers, and acids crew members must handle. 
It is a tribute to the endlessly nagging safety officers of AFMTC that Van- 
guard accidents were minimal, with only two or three casualties so far as 
the record shows.6 One of these occurred on the second-stage platform of 
the gantry when a workman failed to remove his arm fast enough from the 
interior of a vehicle afflicted with a leaking valve. Crazed by the pain from 
the escaping acid, he would have run off the platform and crashed on the 
concrete pad below had it not been for the quick thinking of John R. 
Zeman, the NRL engineer in charge. Grabbing the worker in time, Zeman 
plunged his arm into a pail of cold water. His action helped save the man’s 
arm, but the burns were severe enough to leave permanent scars. Men 
working on the service tower wore terry-cloth underwear and acidproof 
suits. In winter, Zeman would later recall “you couldn’t find one of the 
heavy suits, they were that popular.” In summer: those obliged to don 
them were always “looking for an excuse” to visit the “clean room” atop the 
gantry, the only air-conditioned spot on the pad. “Clean room” was the 
name given to the chambers where specialists could assemble, examine, 
and repair the sensitive Vanguard satellites in an atmosphere relatively 
free from dirt. At AFMTC the Vanguard Operations Group maintained 
two such rooms, one in the hangar, the other on the third-stage platform 
of the service tower. 
When a rocket explodes in the launch-complex vicinity, there is always 
the possibility that the fumes released will find their way through the air- 
intake vents of the blockhouse, jeopardizing the lives of the men stationed 
in the control and instrumentation rooms-about eighty during each of 
the Vanguard launches. Stored in the hall of the blockhouse were piles 
of Scott Air Packs (gas masks). When on one occasion the vehicle did 
blow up on the pad, the men rushed for the packs, only to discover that 
nobody knew how to use them. One gathers from Kurt Stehling’s lively 
account of the launchings that the highly trained engineers and technicians 
assigned to the Vanguard blockhouse never did master the Scott Air Pack. 
Not that the packs went to waste. Their copious folds provided useful 
storage space for extra cigarettes, lunch boxes, and girly magazines.? 
As the field program gathered momentum and the stresses multiplied, 
VOG members invented ways of letting of€ steam. As soon as the road 
around their launch complex was completed, they began staging drag 
races. The range police objected, citing the danger to life and limb. The 
Vanguard crew retorted that they had a right to do what they pleased 
with their own lives and limbs, and went on racing. Dan Mazur contributed 
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to the merriment with his by no means infrequent wails that someday 
the range safety officers might find it necessary to command-destruct one 
of his precious Vanguard vehicles in the air before it could complete its 
appointed course. So feelingly expressed were Mazur’s fears on this score 
that one day some members of his crew packaged up a piece of battered 
Vanguard hardware and sent it to friends in Germany. With it went 
appropriate instructions. These the Americans abroad conscientiously ful- 
filled, with the result that in time the damaged steel returned to AFMTC, 
addressed to base-commander Yates. Lettered on the steel, as the general 
discovered on opening the package, was a message reading, “Attention, 
Mazur: What’s the big idea, impacting your damned hardware on German 
soil!” 
Each of the fourteen Vanguard launchings raised particular problems. 
In every case, however, the procedures leading up to and during the launch 
of the complete vehicle were roughly identical. The major subcontracted 
elements-notably the engine for the first stage, the second-stage power 
plant, and the third-stage solid-propellant rocket-received acceptance tests 
at their points of origin before moving on to the big Iklartin plant at 
Middle River, Maryland. There men working in the Vanguard shop area 
“married” the components of each stage, insofar as was necessary, and 
installed instrumentation. Then followed a series of systems tests, after 
which the plant crew assembled and tested the entire vehicle in a “silo” 
or tower built for this purpose on the plant grounds. None of these tests 
at the Martin plant was a “hot” or “static” test: none, in other words, 
necessitated the firing of the rocket engines, a much too hazardous operation 
for a plant located in a heavily populated area. Working out of an office 
at the Martin plant, James M. Bridger, director of the Vanguard vehicles 
branch, functioned as project engineer for the Naval Research Laboratory. 
He, Walsh, Berg, and other NRL experts monitored the proceedings at 
the factory and took delivery of the vehicle, subject to the approval of 
Hagen and his technical director, Milton Rosen. Following NRL acceptance, 
plant workers disassembled the vehicle and shipped it south, each stage 
traveling on a specially built trailer.9 
At AFMTC the field crew put the vehicle through further inspections 
and tests, first in the hangar and then at the Vanguard launch complex, 
pad 18A. At the pad all first-stage rockets underwent static tests. A static 
test can be defined as a flight firing of a liquid-propellant rocket without 
flight. With heavy bolts holding the rocket to the launch stand, the crew 
ignited the first-stage engine and permitted it to fire for a specified period. 
No Vanguard rocket ever got away during these hot runs, but such 
things have happened. Jim Bridger still enjoys recalling a static at White 
Sands in the early 1950s when a portion of one of the Viking rockets 
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broke loose. T o  Bridger, the sight of the escaped hardware soaring to an 
altitude of 17,000 feet was “startling.” The spectacle put Bridger in mind 
of Maurice Maeterlinck’s hilarious description, in one of his nature essays, 
of the flight of the bumblebee.10 
The primary purpose in static firing the Vanguard first stages was 
to make certain that the engine, previously tested at Martin, was properly 
mated to the rest of the rocket, and that propulsion systems, instrumenta- 
tion, stabilization systems, and controls were in working order. As for the 
second-stage rocket, the question of the extent to which that too should 
undergo statics evoked considerable debate. Everlastingly concerned with 
reliability, NRL’s vehicle experts favored a fairly extensive use of such tests 
as a means of verifying the satisfactory behavior of the second-stage pro- 
pulsion system. Martin experts conceded the need for such data but wanted 
the tests held to a minimum to save time. Over the long pull the company’s 
position prevailed. Only three stages underwent static firings in the field. 
Statics performed in connection with TV-3 and its backup vehicle, TV-SBU, 
yielded useful information, but a static firing in the fall of 1958 of the 
second stage of one of the mission vehicles, SLV-3, damaged the rocket. As a 
result, the Vanguard management abandoned the practice for the remainder 
of the program.ll 
The first-stage statics brought the prelaunch operations at the pad 
more or less to the half-way mark. Next came alignment checks, instrumen- 
tation calibrations, and system functional tests, culminating in the vertical 
functional test. Conducted with full range support, this test was in effect 
a dry run of the forthcoming countdown and flight. A l h i t e d  version of it, 
the flight readiness test, completed prelaunch operations. 
Preparations for the flight itself usually began two days or more 
before T-0 (takeoff). At the AFMTC solid-propellant storage area, mem- 
bers of the VOG assembled and resistance-checked the third-stage motor 
and other ordnance items. They then transported these to the pad and 
installed them in the erected vehicle. Other preparations on the day before 
flight included checks on the satellite, the vehicle propulsion system 
pressures, the pipelines supplying water to the launch stand, and the 
fire-fighting facilities. 
On flight day, operations began approximately eighteen hours in ad- 
vance of launch with checks to ensure that all vehicle systems were in 
order and the first two stages were ready to receive propellants. About 
eight hours before launch, technicians installed the satellite on the third 
stage of the vehicle. 
Those responsible for preparing the last phase of the preparatory 
sequence-the countdown-normally wrote into it a one-hour planned 
hold. Scientific considerations prompted the practice. From TV-3 on, the 
I 
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main objective of every Vanguard launch was to place an experiment- 
bearing satellite in orbit. T o  render it possible for the experiments to 
acquire the data desired, it was often important that the satellite enter 
orbit under certain circumstances having to do with the position of the 
earth relative to the lunar system and other variables. The built-in hold 
increased the likelihood of the satellite achieving orbit under these pre- 
viously calculated optimum conditions by providing the launching crew 
with extra time in which to cope with unforseeable delays. If the count- 
down proceeded perfectly, the crew did nothing during the planned hold. If 
forced holds carried the procedure beyond a previously computed time 
point, the crew had no choice but to scrub the launch and start all over 
again. 
Ordinarily the countdown began five hours before launch.lZ At T-255 
minutes technicians turned on the satellite and checked it. At T-95 
minutes liquid oxygen (lox) began pouring into the oxidizer tanks of 
the vehicle. At T-65 minutes the gantry crane retired from the flight 
firing structure. At T-3  minutes the time-unit p e d  for the countdown 
changed to seconds, and instrumentation men shifted the telemetry, radar 
beacons, and command receivers to internal power. At T- 30 seconds 
the cooling-air umbilical dropped and the lox-vents on the vehicle closed. 
At T-0 the fire switch closed, the electrical umbilical dropped from the 
vehicle, and about six seconds later (T+6),  if all was well, the vehicle 
lifted off.13 
During peak periods the VOG ranged from one hundred to one 
hundred fifty men. In October 1956, about fifty were working in the 
project’s temporary assembly building, Hanger C, or at its still unfinished 
launch complex when Viking 13, refurbished and renamed Vanguard Test 
Vehicle Zero, or TV-0, arrived at the hangar. A month later crewmen 
had transported it to pad 18A and were erecting it on the old Viking 
launch stand recently shipped from White Sands for use at the Cape 
pending arrival of the more advanced flight firing structure Martin had 
designed and Loewy Hydropress was fabricating for the Vanguard program. 
TV-0 consisted of only one stage. Flight testing of a full-fledged three- 
stage Vanguard vehicle lay in the future. The project managers had reasons 
for initiating their launching program on this modest level. It was important 
that before attempting to fly the entire vehicle they familiarize themselves 
with the operations and the range safety and tracking systems at AFMTC.14 
Rain was falling when an hour after midnight, 8 December 1956, 
the countdown reached its final seconds. A variety of difficulties had plagued 
the final launching procedures. Snarls at the range telemetry building and 
at Central Control had necessitated two holds, the appearance of a ship 
in the waters of the impact area, another. Nerves were jumping in the 
1 
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TV-0 on the launch stand at Cape Canaveral, launchtd 8 December 1956. 
crowded control room of the blockhouse, with Colonel Gibbs, the Air 
orce’s conscientious project officer, shouting dire predictions at Bob 
man in charge. “It’s gonna blow up, Bob,” Gibbs kept 
el! It’ll never fly!” 
ut it did fly. Lifting off at 1:05 m., TV-0 achieved an altitude of 
a range of 97.6 miles. ne of the objectives of the launch 
guard’s newly developed Minitrack transmitter. With this 
1’s tracking team had devised and Martin had installed in 
the vehicle a special Minitrack package. At + 120 seconds, two minutes 
after launch, the triggering device of the package-a timer-powered two 
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bellows-contained squibs, causing them to ignite and expand, thereby with- 
drawing a releasing key and allowing a compressed spring to extend and 
eject a small sphere equipped with “roll-up” antennas and enclosing a 
Minitrack transmitter. Without difficulty the ground receiving units at 
AFMTC, the Laboratory’s Mark I1 tracking station among them, picked 
up the little oscillator’s plaintive beep as the ejected package descended into 
the sea.l5 
In mid-December a conference room at AFMTC headquarters was 
the scene of a post-mortem on the first Vanguard flight test. Of the thirty- 
two men in attendance, twenty-five were members of the base command 
or Pan Am and RCA technicians involved in the intricate range-support 
activities connected with the satellite program. On hand for the Naval 
Laboratory, in addition to VOG chieftains Mazur and Gray, were Joseph 
Siry, head of the Vanguard theory and analysis branch, and his handsome, 
blue-eyed assistant, Richard L. Snodgrass. Martin’s representatives were 
Schlechter and dark, stocky, thoughtful Joseph E. Burghardt, the com- 
pany’s assistant project engineer for aerodynamics and propulsion, who, 
although stationed at the Middle River plant, was a frequent visitor to the 
field. 
Facts brought out in a lengthy briefing-all verified by subsequent 
analysis-showed that on the whole the TV-O launching had achieved its 
prescribed objectives. During powered flight of the vehicle, the performance 
of all components had been “either satisfactory or superior.” Rocketborne 
instrumentation and telemetry systems had functioned “excellently,” ground 
instrumentation coverage had been “adequate.” 
Back in Washington, however, expressions of pleasure in these results 
were muted. Concern over the general status of the program dominated 
the discussion. Several of Martin’s subcontractors were finding it impossible 
to meet their delivery schedules. Because of this and slippages in other 
aspects of the undertaking, all of the firing dates previously established for 
1957 had already been substantially advanced. Now little hope remained 
that even these frequently rescheduled dates could be realized.le 
The plodding progress of the next few months added to a mounting 
sense of frustration. At the range, the outstanding events of January and 
February 1957 were the arrival at the hangar of the second Vanguard test 
vehicle, TV-I, and the completion of all of the project’s permanent field 
facilities with the exception of hangar S. 
TV-1 was a two-stage vehicle. Its booster was the last of the Viking 
research rockets, No. 14, slightly modified for Vanguard purposes. A product 
of the Grand Central Rocket Company, the second stage was a prototype 
of the solid-propellant rocket destined to become the third stage of the 
finished Vanguard vehicle. 
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Successful launch of TV-1, 1 May 1957. 
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Although the difficulties encountered during the prelaunch procedures 
at the hangar and on the pad were comparatively minor, their correction 
ate up precious time. Hopes for a February flight vanished rapidly. It was 
late March before the crew was able to erect TV-1 on the old Viking 
stand at the launch-complex. In early April static tests began, and in the 
dark hours of 1 May 1957-at 1:29 a.m.-the second Vanguard test vehicle 
lifted off. 
As set forth in the test plan, the primary purpose of the launch was 
to flight-test the third-stage prototype for spin-up, separation, ignition, and 
propulsion and trajectory performance. A secondary objective was to further 
evaluate ground handling procedures, techniques and equipment, and the 
in-flight vehicle instrumentation and equipment. Studies of the telemetered 
data acquired during flight would show that all objectives were met. The 
first-stage rocket performed “about as expected.” The second stage (actually 
the Vanguard third stage) separated and fired “nearly as expected’ with a 
total burning time of about thirty-two seconds. It was this satisfactory first 
firing of the third stage that prompted NRL, during the following July, 
to inform the Martin Company that from TV-3 on all Vanguard vehicles 
were to possess satellite-bearing capacities.l? 
In the world of the mid-1950s two successful rocket launchings in a 
row added up to a singular accomplishment. As TV-1 roared to an altitude 
of 121 miles, Dave Mackey of GLM, unofficial comic of the blockhouse gang, 
voiced a common sentiment. “I wonder,” he mused, “if success will spoil 
Project Vanguard?” 
Less than a month later, the members of the VOG in general, and 
their ebullient boss, Dan Mazur, in particular, were telling themselves that 
Project Vanguard had become Project Impossible. Getting the project’s 
third test vehicle, TV-2, out of the Martin plant, down to the field, onto 
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the launch stand, and up in the air was an ordeal of more than five months’ 
duration. So many troubles beset the process that at one point Mazur 
would have resigned in disgust had it not been for the gentie-spoken 
persuasiveness of project director Hagen.lg 
TV-2 had the external configuration of a complete Vanguard vehicle, 
although strictly speaking it was not complete. All three Vanguard stages 
were there, but only the first stage, consisting of the Martin tankage and 
the General Electric X-405 liquid-propellant engine, was live. The second 
and third stages were inert dummies.20 
Today former Vanguard men can say calmly that the nightmare of 
TV-2 was “just one of those things.” Back in the Vanguard days, Jim 
Bridger has commented, 
we were aware that the ultimate souFce of our funds, the Department 
of Defense, had reservations about the value of a purely scientific missile 
development. Consequently we made political fodder out of saying the 
Vanguard vehicle was just an outgrowth of the Viking research rocket. 
Frankly, that was an exaggeration. We did indeed bring Viking experience 
to the Vanguard program and the first-stage engine was a take-off, albeit 
a complex one, from General Electric’s Hermes A-3B engine; but for all 
practical purposes the Vanguard vehicle was new, new from stem to stern. 
More to the point, it was an awfully high-state-of-the-art vehicle, especially 
the second-stage rocket. In the nature of things the business of developing 
the vehicle and getting the bugs out so it would work was fraught with 
difficul ties.21 
This fact, obvious as it would become in retrospect, was of no con- 
solation to the harried men who in the summer of 1957 began the long 
struggle to get the bugs out of TV-2. 
The extensiveness of these bugs came to light early in the summer 
during the vertical interference and acceptance tests of the vehicle at the 
Martin plant. Some of the structural discrepancies uncovered at that time 
gave only minimal trouble, the company coming up quickly with remedies 
satisfactory to NRL. More serious was the failure of the roll jet and pres- 
surization systems to perform in accordance with specifications. TO some 
extent these had to be redesigned. Since this was a time-consuming job 
and time was of the essence, Martin asked the Laboratory for permission 
to ship TV-2 to Cape Canaveral where the field crew could begin receiving 
inspections in the hangar while GLM redeveloped the faulty systems. 
Reluctantly the Laboratory acceded to this suggestion. In a stern letter 
to the contractor, Hagen pointed out that although Martin’s proposal for 
sending to the field “an unaccepted, incompletely developed vehicle” 
violated “sound principles of operation, the Laboratory agrees that this 
is the only way to have at least some chance of maintaining the firing 
schedule.” The Laboratory, therefore, “will provisionally accept TV-2” 
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with the understanding that in the near future “Martin shall qualify and 
deliver all outstanding components of the roll jet and pressurization 
systems.” 
Hagen’s letter got TV-2 out of the Martin plant. It also placed addi- 
tional burdens on the field crew. When the redeveloped systems were ready, 
members of the VOG had to install them, a procedure normally carried 
out at the factory. By this time-late July-NRL and Martin had con- 
cluded that all along the line many modifications of the vehicle were going 
to have to be made in the field instead of at the factory as originally planned. 
Given the time pressures on the program, no other arrangement was pos- 
sible, but it did not make the field workers happy. Frequently the required 
modifications were so basic as to amount to design changes. Taking care 
of these at AFMTC was difficult since more often than not the necessary 
tools and spare parts were unavailable there and had to be improvised on 
the spot or procured from distant points.% 
With the arrival of TV-2 at the Cape in early June, new troubles 
presented themselves. Profound groans and profane gripes filled the Van- 
guard hangar as inspection revealed that both the first-stage tankage and 
engine contained “fine filings, metal chips and dirt.” The VOG crewmen 
could clean the tankage, but getting the dirt out of the engine was beyond 
their capacities. Back went the motor to the General Electric plant at Malta, 
New York, with orders for its makers to send another to the field. In July 
Rear Admiral Rawson Bennett, Chief of Naval Research, covered the 
situation in one of his always admirably dispassionate reports to the Chief 
of Naval Operations. The presence of “extraneous material” in the motor, 
the admiral wrote, along with the delay “occasioned by repairs to damaged 
items, the clean-up procedure, . . . and now the installation of a new motor 
makes it appear that the earliest possible flight firing will be the last week 
in August’’-a statement that piled optimism on eupherni~m.~~ 
August passed with a “possible flight firing” seemingly as remote as 
ever. At pad 18A the only encouraging sign was the disappearance of the 
old Viking launch stand and its replacement by the Vanguard static and 
flight firing structure. Even this was not for keeps. Some of the Martin 
Company specialists were fearful that under some circumstances the gim- 
baled engine of the first stage might not clear the fixed opening in its stand 
during liftoff. Already they were working on designs for a stand with 
movable components, capable of springing away automatically as the vehicle 
rose. There was disagreement at the company as to the necessity for this 
change, but those in favor won the argument. Eventually the Martin- 
designed retractable or breakaway firing stand would find its way to Cape 
Canaveral, to become one of Project Vanguard’s several contributions to 
the advancement of missilery.25 
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Second stage of Vanguard being hoisted into position. 
The replacement engine ordered from General Electric arrived at the 
hangar in good time. Not until 22 August, however, did the prelaunch 
preparations reach the point where the crew at the pad could attempt a 
static firing. 
A static test, like a flight test, involves a lengthy countdown. The 22 
August one began on schedule, but at T-290 minutes accumulated dif- 
ficulties forced Mazur and Schlechter to call a hold that lasted for more 
than five hours. Soon after resumption of the countdown, new diffi- 
culties arose. During the first attempt to pressurize the fuel tanks, a lox vent 
failed to relieve excessive pressure. When the vent refused to close fully 
during several succeeding attempts, the VOG bosses did the only thing 
they could. They scrubbed the test and instituted an investigation. The 
presence of water in the lox vent indicated that freezing had prevented 
it from closing. During all future launching operations, as a result of this 
discovery, the crew subjected the lox system to a constant nitrogen purge 
from the start of the countdown until the point at which lox servicing 
begana26 
For Mazur the first attempt to static fire TV-2 was a domestic as well 
as a professional disaster. During the test, his wife, who had not yet joined 
him at the Cape as she would later, sent a telegram, informing him that 
she and two of their three children had contracted the mumps and needed 
daddy at home. Mazur stayed with his job. Mrs. Mazur, he would reveal 
later, “never forgave me. T o  this day, whenever we have an argument, 
she reminds me how back in the summer of 1957, I let her down in her 
hour of need.” At some point during that trying summer, Admiral Bennett 
paid the field crew a visit. Closeting himself with Mazur and Schlechter, 
he demanded, “what’s going wrong down here anyhow?” Mazur’s reply 
was, “Just one thing: Instead of rockets, Martin is sending us garbage”- 
only, according to Schlechter, Mazur’s final word was shorter and more 
colorful. Later, in a more relaxed mood, the VOG boss snapped off to his 
friend Schlechter a teletype reading: 
Rockets are large, rockets are small, 
If U get a good one, give us a ca11.27 
The project bosses at the Naval Laboratory in Washington shared 
Mazur’s chagrin at the situation. As Vanguard technical head, Rosen found 
only occasional fault with Martin’s design work on the vehicle. On the 
whole he regarded it as excellent, but where the company‘s shopwork on 
the vehicle was concerned he deplored what seemed to him at times to 
be a carelessness bordering on indifference. Repeatedly he urged project 
director Hagen to “crack down” on the company. The frequent disputes 
between his staff and the contractor had convinced him that he was dealing 
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with “two tigers.” In the interests of keeping the program moving, he 
hesitated to take a step likely to exacerbate existing differences.28 
The difficulties with TV-2, however, were too much even for the 
judicious and even-tempered project chief. As complaints continued pouring 
in from the field, he got off a sharply worded remonstrance to GLM. “The 
performance of the Martin Company in regard to TV-2,” he wrote, “has 
been unsatisfactory and increases the laboratory’s concern about the ability 
of the contractor to meet launch schedules in the future. Specific items have 
been discussed in detail during conferences and will be further stated in 
writing if the contractor so desires. The contractor is urged to bend every 
effort toward maintaining or bettering the present launch schedule.’’ 29 
Hagen’s reprimand failed to alter the course of events with respect to 
TV-2. Its long-range effect on the Vanguard program, however, was a 
salutary one. Hardware difficulties would continue to arise, but in the 
future the source of few of them would be in the Martin plant. It is of 
interest to add in connection with this aspect of the program that some 
members of the Martin company’s Vanguard group havel criticized their 
top management’s handling of the satellite project. In the beginning, to 
quote one of them, “the Martin managers didn’t ride herd on the Vanguard 
job as vigorously as they should have. In a job of this sort the managers 
of the company should walk the floor. The Martin managers failed to do 
that at first: when later on, they did so at least to some extent, things 
improved immensely. The three most successful Vanguard launches were 
all preceded by a tightening up of procedures and a greater watchfulness 
on the part of the management.” According to this same critic, “another 
mistake” of the GLM officials was their failure “to get into bed with the 
customer. The Martin people did a swell job, but somehow the Martin 
managers were never able to convince the Naval Research Laboratory that 
they had. All along the line there was an unfortunate breakdown in com- 
munications between company management and customer.” Evidence that 
in the beginning at least the Martin managers regarded the scientific 
satellite program as though it were a “poor relation” is provided by what 
has come to be known as “the era of the bird-droppings.” For several 
months the company installed the designers of the Vanguard vehicle in 
the upper reaches of an old plant where broken windows provided con- 
venient passageway for the sparrows living in the girders. Drawings left 
open on a draftsman’s table at night were seldom quite the same by the 
following morning.30 
The second TV-2 static test, attempted four days after the first, en- 
countered even worse luck. Among other things, the blast deflector tube of 
the firing structure suffered serious damage. During the helium pressure 
tests, excessive leakage showed up in the turbine and deflector-plate seals 
181 
of the engine. Again the crew thought it best to remove this component 
and ship it back to General Electric. By this time, fortunately, TV-2’s 
backup vehicle TV-2BU, had arrived, so a spare motor was available. The 
crew installed it, and grimly prepared for a third attempt on 3 September. 
That, too, had to be scrubbed when at T-245 minutes the main pressuriza- 
tion system regulator exhibited behavior characteristic of a dangerously 
dirty valve.31 
September saw three static-test attempts in all-and three heartbreaking 
scrubs. October was well underway before static-test number seven satisfied 
the VOG bosses that TV-2 was ready for launching. Two flight firing 
attempts during the second half of the month had to be called off long 
before the completion of countdown. The third was a resounding success: 
with a long succession of difficulties now overcome the first flight to be 
attempted with the Vanguard external configuration carried a 4,000-pound 
payload to an altitude of 109 miles and to a downrange distance of 335 
miles as planned. All test objectives were realized. Performance of all com- 
ponents was “superior.” The flight showed that the Vanguard first stage 
operated “properly at altitude,” that “conditions were favorable for suc- 
cessful separation of the first and second stages,” that launch-stand clearance 
in low surface winds was “no problem,” and that “there was structural 
integrity throughout flight.” The test also demonstrated the existence of 
“dynamic compatibility” between the control system of the vehicle and 
the 
At the tinie of the flight, however, there was little rejoicing in the 
Vanguard blockhouse. Relief was the prevailing sentiment there when the 
word came that the vehicle had completed its appointed course and fallen 
into the ocean. According to Kurt Stehlir~g?~ the unspoken thought of 
the men who had carried TV-2 through its many trials and tribulations 
was, “Let the fish have it.” 
They got it on 23 October 1957. By that date, drastic changes had 
overtaken Project Vanguard. Some reflected policy decisions within the 
project itself. Others were the outgrowth of that turning point of the 
Space Age, the launching into orbit by the Soviet Union of the first man- 
made earth satellite, Sputnik 1. 
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Launch of the difficult TV-2,23 October 1957. This  was the first three-stage 
configuration of Vanguard, although the upper two stages were inert. 

FROM SPUTNIK I TO TV-3 
THE VANGUARD field crew was still struggling at Cape Canaveral to put up 
TV-2, its third test vehicle-the one designed to test the first stage-when 
on Friday, 4 October 1957, the news broke that Sputnik I, a 184-pound 
sphere had been launched about 5:30 p.m. that day by the Soviet Union 
and was circling the earth. 
Earlier in the week, on Monday, 30 September, scientists representing 
the Soviet Union, the United States, and five other nations had assembled 
at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., for a six-day 
CSAGI conference on the rocket and satellite activities of the International 
Geophysical Year. A speaker at the opening session was Sergei ltl. Poloskov, 
member of the Soviet delegation. Poloskov’s subject was “Sputnik,” the 
Russians’ word for “traveling companion” and the name they had chosen 
for the satellite they were preparing to launch. The U.S.S.R. had long since 
served notice of its intent to develop a satellite-launching program as one 
of its contributions to the IGY. Nevertheless, there was a stir among 
Poloskov’s listeners when he used an expression that could be literally 
translated as ‘how, on the eve of the first artificial earth satellite.” There 
was another stir when he revealed that the transmitters in the projected 
Soviet satellite would broadcast alternately on frequencies of 20 and 40 
megacycles. In 1956, CSAGI, the international ruling body for the IGY, 
had adopted a resolution stipulating a frequency of 108 mc as standard for 
all IGY satellites. Speaking for the United States at the CSAGI session 
in Washington, Homer Newel1 pointed out to the Russian scientist that 
Project Vanguard’s radio tracking stations were set up to receive signals 
on the IGY established frequency. Since adapting the American Minitrack 
to receive the lower Soviet signals would require time and money, he asked 
Poloskov to specify when his country hoped to put its first satellite in orbit. 
The deftness with which Poloskov sidestepped Newell’s question, along 
with similar questions from other delegates, produced a roar of laughter 
185 
in which the Russian scientist himself finally joined. All he would say was 
that when the Soviet satellite materialized, he hoped the Vanguard tracking 
stations would collect the data it transmitted and send them to Moscow.1 
On the following Friday evening the delegates to the conference were 
guests of a reception in the ballroom on the second floor of the Soviet 
embassy. Among the reporters on hand was Walter Sullivan of the New 
York Times. When shortly after 6 p.m., Sullivan received a phone call 
from his Washington editor, he made a point of getting as quickly as 
possible to Richard Porter, member of the American IGY committee and 
chairman of its technical panel. “It’s up!” he whispered. Although Porter 
had been convinced for days that a Soviet launching was “indeed imminent,” 
his normally red face was redder than usual as he and Sullivan wedged 
through the crowd in the embassy ballroom to relay the news to Lloyd 
Berkner, this country’s official delegate to CSAGI. Berkner clapped his 
hands for silence. “I wish to make an announcement,” he said. “I’ve just 
been informed by the New York Times that a Russian satellite is in orbit 
at an elevation of 900 kilometers. I wish to congratulate our Soviet colleagues 
on their achievement.” 2 
It was a gracious and dignified beginning to a period of mental turmoil 
and vocal soul-searching in the United States that can scarcely be described 
as dignified. In retrospect it is easy to smile at some of the exaggerated 
alarms and groundless assumptions that filled newspaper columns and 
trumpeted from public platforms as the significance of the Soviet feat 
became apparent. The smug chuckle of hindsight, however, cannot efface 
either the importance of the event or the intensity of the change it wrought 
in American thinking. Girdling the earth once every 96.17 minutes, the 
first Russian satellite-later referred to as Sputnik I to distinguish it from 
its successors-was a sphere approximately twenty-two inches in diameter, 
made of aluminum alloys and equipped with four spring-loaded whip 
antennas. It carried two continuously signaling transmitters and an instru- 
mentation package primarily designed to disclose the effects of meteoritic 
collision. The power supply for telemetering information to ground sta- 
tions was a chemical battery. The perigee of the initial orbit was 142 miles, 
the apogee 588 miles. The inclination to the equator was 64.3O; speed at 
perigee was 18,000 miles an hour, and at apogee, 16,200 miles an hour. The 
satellite itself would fall from orbit on 4 January 1958. Its two trans- 
mitters would fail twenty-three days after launch-but their arrogant beep- 
beep would continue to sound in the American memory for years to come. 
“Sputnik night,” as the night of 4-5 October 1957 came to be called, was 
an historic watershed. Almost immediately two new phrases entered the 
language-“pre-Sputnik” and “post-Sputnik.” In England the London Daily 
Mirror proclaimed the birth of the “Space Age” in huge headlines, and 
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changed its slogan to claim, not the “biggest daily sale in the world” but 
the “biggest . . . in the UNIVERSE.” Gone forever in this country was the 
myth of American superiority in all things technical and scientific. The 
Russian success alerted the American public to deficiencies in their school 
system, to the need for providing their young people with an educational 
base wide enough to permit them to cope with the multiplying problems 
of swift technological change.3 
American response to the Russian triumph varied considerably, de- 
pending on its source. The alarm exhibited by large sections of the public 
did not materialize immediately. In New York City, on “Sputnik night,” 
phone calls poured into the offices of the Hayden Planetarium and the 
American Museum of Natural History. Practically all were from people 
seeking more information than the Soviet bulletin to the American press 
had provided-mostly amateur astronomers and ham radio operators eager 
to get down to the happy business of trying to acquire and track the 
world’s first man-made satellite. At central police headquarters, a spokesman 
at the big switchboard, the activity of which is regarded as an index to 
public anxiety, reported no inquiries whatsoever. On the following day 
a Newsweek correspondent in Boston wrote that the “general reaction here 
indicates massive indifference.” From Denver another Newsweek writer 
wired his home office that there “is a vague feeling that we have stepped into 
a new era, but people aren’t discussing it the way they are football and 
the Asiatic flu.” Before a week had gone by, New York‘s silence, Boston’s 
“massive indifference,” and Denver’s bewilderment had melted away before 
a mounting and all but universal furor. T o  the majority of Americans 
the Soviet feat came as a total surprise. It needn’t have, according to some 
of the commentators participating in the storm of charge and counter- 
charge that followed. For some time the United States government had 
been in possession of intelligence reports showing that Russian missilry 
was well advanced and that the U.S.S.R. had hardware capable of placing 
a satellite in ~ r b i t . ~  In the confused post-Sputnik days, science reporters 
and others contended that if the Administration had made its knowledge 
public, the launching of the Soviet satellite would have had a less traumatic 
effect on the American people. Perhaps so, perhaps not. In the halcyon 
pre-Sputnik days the American people would probably have paid little 
more attention to such information, its official source notwithstanding, 
than they had paid to already existing evidences that Soviet science was 
developing at a phenomenal rate. Most Americans were aware that Russia 
had created an atom bomb more quickly than American authorities had 
considered likely. They knew that Soviet work on the hydrogen bomb had 
kept pace with that of the United States. As recently as August 1957, 
the U.S.S.R. had claimed a successful intercontinental ballistic missile 
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Cartoon reaction to Sputnik I. 
(Courtesy Thomas Flannery, 
Baltimore Sun.) 
test. None of these facts, however, had registered deeply in this country. 
Nor had the occasional story in the press hinting at an upcoming space 
breakthrough by the Soviet Union. When Sputnik appeared, the reaction 
of the public, taken as a whole, was a compound of awe, surprise, chagrin, 
and fear. The Russians had beaten us into space! More to point, if they 
could put up a harmless scientific satellite-assuming it was harmless- 
what was to prevent them in the near future from putting up a larger one 
equipped with nuclear warheads! To be sure, not all was gloom and worry. 
The Americans invented Sputnik jokes, and laughed at jibes originating 
overseas. Bars around the country advertised “Sputnik cocktails,” one third 
vodka, two thirds sour grapes. In Poland the people quipped that at last 
Russia had a smaller satellite than Albania, and in West Germany they 
coined a new name for America’s still unorbited Vanguard. They called 
it “Spaetnik,” spaet being the German word for late. After Russia had 
launched a second and even more spectacular satellite, a reporter’s query 
to Nikolai A. Bulganin, the Soviet premier-“When are you putting up the 
third one?”-brought the grinning riposte, “It’s America’s turn now.” 
Official reaction to Sputnik I-which is to say, high-level government 
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reaction in Washington-was also marked by surprise, but of a different 
sort. The  government was startled by what Defense Secretary Wilson de- 
scribed as the public’s “jitters.” At an October press conference and in two 
subsequent television appearances, President Eisenhower undertook to re- 
assure an agitated nation. The chief executive conceded that the Soviet 
achievement was a “political defeat” for the United States. He stressed, 
however, that this country and the U.S.S.R. were not engaged in a space 
race, a statement that the Russian leaders, with the same indifference of 
officialdom to the facts of life, had also made. Granting the remote military 
potentialities of Sputnik, the President asserted that it “does not raise my 
apprehensions . . . one iota” about the national security.” 
Political reaction, emanating principally from Congressmen and state 
governors, ploughed a familiar furrow. Most of it was not so much con- 
cerned with what the Russians had done as with what the Americans had 
so far failed to do. Why was this country behind in the space race? Who 
was to blame? As always in cases of national distress, the White House 
headed the list of targets. Spokesmen from both major parties accused 
the Eisenhower Administration of “penny-pinching,” “complacency,” “lack 
of vision,” and “incredible stupidity” where both the American missile 
program and Project Vanguard were concerned. They reiterated the Presi- 
dent’s frequently quoted description of scientists as “just another pressure 
group” and cited Secretary Wilson’s confessed indifference to basic research 
and the avowed indifference of presidential aide Sherman Adams to “an 
outer space basketball game,” a heavy-handed reference to the small Van- 
guard satellite. Former President Truman mirrored a segment of public 
opinion when he attributed the space-lag to the “[Senator Joseph] 
McCarthy era.” He charged that “official persecution” of prominent scien- 
tists in the early 1950s had deprived America’s missile and satellite programs 
of some of the country’s “best brains,” a statement scarcely calculated to 
flatter the highly capable scientists working with Project Vanguard. 
American scientists, including those associated with Vanguard, had 
for some time been aware that the U.S.S.R. possessed the capacity to launch 
a satellite. It would be an exaggeration, however, to say that all of them 
had faced up to the full implications of their own knowledge. Even scientists 
are not immune to wishful thinking. Before Sputnik some of those in 
America had been as willing as the general public EO discount Soviet claims. 
After Sputnik many were quick to praise. Joseph Kaplan, chairman of 
the American IGY committee, pronounced the Soviet launch “really fan- 
tastic.” Kaplan pointed out that the Russians obviously had developed a 
launching vehicle of tremendous thrust, since the sphere they had orbited 
was eight times heavier than the larger of the two spheres then available 
to the American satellite program. A further indication of the power of 
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the Soviet launching vehicle lay in the orbit the Russians had used because 
of the more northern latitude of their launch site. The Vanguard managers 
were planning to take advantage of the earth’s rotational velocity, about a 
thousand miles an hour at the equator, by putting their satellite into a 
west-to-east orbit, between 30° north and south of the equator. Russia was 
denied much of this advantage. Circling roughly from 6 5 O  north to 65O 
south latitude, Sputnik’s orbit was more north-south than east-west. 
In the absence of an official explanation from the U.S.S.R., American 
scientists offered varying theories as to why the Russians had used 20-mc 
and 40-mc frequencies in their payload instead of the 108-mc frequency 
prescribed by CSAGI and used by the United States. One theory was that 
the Russians saw a propaganda value in using the 20- and 40-mc frequencies. 
These could be picked up by the sets of amateur radio operators around 
the world whereas the higher frequency required more sophisticated re- 
ceiving equipment. Another theory held that the Russians simply did not 
have receivers capable of picking up signals at the higher frequency. A 
third theory, easily the most convincing in view of the advanced state of 
Soviet science and technology, was that the lower ‘frequencies were more 
suitable to the scientific objectives of the Soviet launch and to the relatively 
low altitudes of Sputnik’s orbit. Another subject of speculation among 
American scientists was whether or not the Russians were trying to follow 
their satellites with cameras. A few months prior to the launching of 
Sputnik I ,  a group of Soviet scientists participated in a symposium on 
cosmical gas dynamics at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Laboratory in 
Cambridge. Two members of the group, both famous astronomers, talked 
at length with Fred Whipple, director of the Observatory and head of the 
Vanguard optical-tracking program. Although the Russian astronomers 
were noncommittal as to their country‘s plans, Whipple got the impression 
that the U.S.S.R. had already developed some sort of optical-tracking sys- 
tem in connection with its satellite program.‘ 
As for the reaction of the Vanguard managers to Sputnik I, the state 
of their feelings can be left to the imagination. It was one thing to have 
surmised, ’as many of them had, that Russia was on the verge of orbiting a 
satellite. It was another to realize that the satellite was actually up there. 
Lured before the television cameras of a news program on the evening 
of 4 October, before he could put his thoughts in order, Admiral Rawson 
Bennett dismissed Sputnik as “a hunk of iron almost anybody could launch.” 
The statement was a tribute to the naval research chief‘s loyalty to Project 
Vanguard but as an assessment of the situation, to quote the Russian chair- 
man Nikita Khrushchev, it was a “cosmic boo-boo.” 
Russia’s use in her satellite of lower broadcasting frequencies than 
those of the United States presented the Vanguard radio-tracking people 
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with a severe problem. Soon after the news of Sputnik reached Washington, 
Mengel and his aides, accompanied by Joe Siry and other orbit-computation 
experts, were on their way to the Vanguard control room on the second 
floor of building 72 at the Naval Research Laboratory. Most of them 
would remain there around the clock for the next three days. The six prime 
Minitrack stations along the Vanguard “fence” were ready-ready, that is, 
to receive signals from a satellite transmitting on the IGY-established 
frequency of 108 mc. The job of the tracking technicians was to convert 
them to the Sputnik frequencies fast enough to enable the big computing 
machines in Washington to calculate and predict the course of the Soviet 
satellite. Toward the end of the sumnier building crews had completed 
191 
construction work on the six major Minitrack stations, the men selected 
to operate them had reported for duty, and the tracking-system heads were 
laying plans for a series of dry runs to test the network. The dry runs never 
took pIace. Sputnik arrived before they could start, and when three weeks 
later the Russian satellite ceased transmitting, the network had become 
operational, tracking Sputnik and relaying its position to Washington. 
By that time, as an Army engineer remarked later, the U.S.S.R. had pro- 
vided Minitrack with “the wettest dry run in history.” s 
One of the difficulties created by the launching of Sputnik was that 
by fall 1957 the Signal Corps had not yet completed the communications 
network it was in the process of establishing between Vanguard headquar- 
ters and all Minitrack units. Direct communication from the Washington 
area reached only to the stations at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and Antofagasta, 
Chile. T o  reach the other prime stations, headquarters had to resort to 
slower means-commercial cable, the Inter-American Geodetic Survey radio 
net, amateur radio, and long-distance telephone. Over whatever means 
were available, messages went quickly from the Fontrol room at NRL, 
providing station crews with such technical information as the men at 
NRL could coIlect, and suggesting ways for putting emergency equipment 
to work and for modifying antenna arrays. In addition, NRL air-shipped 
special receivers to all stations. 
No one could take serioudy the na’ive statement of one bitter but ill- 
informed observer that “Sputnik caught Project Vanguard with its antennas 
down.”1° Certainly they did not stay down long. In mid-October C. B. 
Cunningham, senior NRL scientist for the station at Lima, Peru, was able 
to send his superiors a glowing report.ll “Our first track of the USSR 
satellite,” he wrote- 
occurred on Friday morning, 11 October. It was a thrill for all hands. 
Since that time we have tracked every passage but one. In accordance 
with the NRL request and instructions, we constructed two dipole antennas, 
tuned to 40 megacycles, which we mounted 34 inches above the 108 
mc dipoles, and at the center of the 108 mc array. We used 2x4 end 
supports and lacing cord. We did have to improvise for coaxial panel 
connectors and T connectors. We just didn’t have any, so we got along 
without them. Anyway, the antennas worked, and we received beautiful 
signals. 
Our second major difficulty was the elimination of the beat note when 
we connected in the General Radio Oscillator. Thanks to a radio Con- 
ference on the amateur rig with Vic Simas, we were able to track down 
and cure the difkculty. However, after about 36 haurs of operation the 
Hewlett Packard frequency counter gave up the ghost, and again we were 
off the air! This time it took the combined efforts of Jim Crane and 
myself to get the frequency counter working . . . . The difficulty was 
finally traced to an open-circuited resistor in a plug-in “trigger unit.” To 
compound our difficulties, there was no adequate description of the unit 
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in the instruction room, we had no spare unit, and we couldn’t get to 
the unit to check the components under operation because of inacces- 
sibility. Jim Crane finally soldered in leads from the plug in socket and 
wired them to the plug in unit outside the counter. The failure was finally 
traced to an open resistor which was in parallel with a second resistor 
for adjustment to an exact value. The open could be only detected by 
lifting each resistor from the circuit and testing. Needless to say, it was 
a long slow search, requiring about 8 hours. We did get the repairs made, 
and the counter operating about an hour before passage. At about - 5  
minutes the overheat cutout in the counter kicked out, and only by hold- 
ing it in with a screwdriver could we keep on frequency. At - 1  minute 
we shifted to higher speed recording, and the pens stopped writing. After 
frantic shifting to several speeds, we finally got the pens to writing at 
maximum speed, so that the 5 minutes record used practically an entire 
roll of paper, but we did get a beautiful record. What an experience! 
Needless to say, we got everything ready by the next run, but it was a 
rough day. 
In addition to trying to get the minitrack running, we had the com- 
munication team working hard on installing the communication equip- 
ment. Everybody really worked. I was proud of the whole group. As 
of this date, the low power transmitter (about 1 kw) is working, but there 
is trouble with a water coil in the high power rig. Both rhombics are up, 
and the teletype machines are clicking away like mad. The‘ crew is trying 
to learn army communication procedure, which is something like learning 
the ancient Sanskrit in two weeks! 
Similar activity was underway all along the Minitrack fence, with the 
result that long before the Soviet satellite ceased transmitting, five of the 
stations were capable of limited tracking at the Sputnik frequencies. The  
data they obtained, supplemented by data from amateur radio operators 
and visual and optical observers, although approximate, were sufficient to 
permit the computation experts to improve knowledge of the Russian orbit 
and to predict the course of the satellite days in advance. A measure of the 
spirited efficiency with which the Minitrack crews adapted their equipment 
to the Russian frequencies is found in the statement of Homer Newell, 
made during the opening session of the CSAGI ‘conference in Washington, 
that it would take them “several months” to accomplish what in fact they 
succeeded in doing in a fortnight.I2 Amateur radio operators played a 
substantial role in this achievement. On Sputnik night the national IGY 
committee got in touch with the American Radio Relay League in West 
Hartford, Connecticut, calling on its 70,000 members-a11 “hams”-to lend 
assistance. Although ordinary radio sets were unable to acquire the signals, 
those equipped with short-wave receivers and beat-frequency oscillators- 
standard equipment among the hams-could do so. In a matter of hours 
amateurs in this country and abroad were picking up the signals and logging 
them. On Sputnik night they forwarded their findings to the National 
Academy of Sciences, where Porter, Berkner, Pickering and other scientists 
had established a temporary control room, setting it up with such speed 
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that they were able to compute the orbit of Sputnik and inform the press 
of its whereabouts by 8 o’clock the next morning. Subsequently the hams 
communicated with the permanent control room at NRL.13 
Word of the Soviet launch reached the headquarters of the Vanguard 
optical-tracking program at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory in 
Cambridge at 6: 15 Sputnik night. The Observatory Philharmonic Orchestra 
was holding its first rehearsal of the season, but one by one, as the session 
proceeded, members of the group quietly left the room. Whipple had been 
attending sessions of the CSAGI conference and was en route home from 
Washington. At the Cambridge Observatory his assistant, J. Allen Hynek, 
got the news in the form of a phone call from a Boston newspaper reporter, 
asking, “Do you have any comments on the Russian satellite?” An hour 
later Kittridge Hall, home of most of the tracking offices, was so ablaze 
with light that a woman living in the neighborhood reported that the 
building was on fire and a pumper and a hook-and-ladder went clanging to 
the scene. 
No Baker-Nunn cameras were operational on Sputnik night, but with 
the aid of a hastily installed teletype machine and lavish use of the telephone, 
the SA0 staff got the word to Moonwatch teams and astronomical observa- 
tories in this country and around the world. Fortunately some of the 
amateur units had undergone successful practice runs. During the night the 
Observatory received what Whipple described as “observations of a sort” 
and the early morning hours of Saturday brought “fairly good observations” 
from the Geophysical Institute in College, Alaska. From these data the 
Observatory was able to advise Moonwatch groups as to when and where 
they might be able to sight the satellite. The first confirmed observations 
came on 8 October. They were the work of Moonwatch teams in Sydney 
and Woomera, Australia. The first confirmed observation in the United 
States was the work of a team in New Haven, Connecticut. It came on 
10 October. Thereafter observations cafne in steadily, with approximately 
363 confirmed sightings, most of them by amateur teams, during the lifetime 
of Sputnik I. According to Whipple, none of these sightings was of the 
satellite itself. What his visual observers were seeing was the casing of the 
satellite’s burnt-out carrier. This piece of hardware, the shell of the last 
stage of the launching vehicle, had gone into orbit with its payload and was 
chasing Sputnik I around the world. On the basis of reports pouring into 
the Cambridge center, Whipple concluded that the Russians had painted 
their payload black for reason9 that were never made p~b1ic . l~ 
Although the first of the 12 Baker-Nunn cameras projected for the 
Project Vanguard optical-tracking stations had been completed some weeks 
before the Soviet launch, tests at the factory of its makers, Boller and 
Chivens in South Pasadena, California, had revealed defects, and the large 
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and complex instrument was dismembered for repairs. On Sputnik night, 
consequently, the only Baker-Nunn in existence was “literally scattered all 
over the plant,” l5 and some of its gears and other parts had been returned 
to contractors for refinishing or remachining. Even so, work on the camera 
was so far advanced that when on the night of 4 October news of the Soviet 
launch reached the people at Boller and Chivens, they hopefully started to 
assemble the camera for observation on the following night, only to desist 
after Fred Whipple informed them that at that time the Russian satellite 
could not be sighted from Pasadena. By the evening of 17 October the 
camera was in good operating condition and the orbit of the Russian satel- 
lite was within range of the California city. When the orbiting carrier- 
rocket of Sputnik I appeared, according to the Smithsonian Institution’s 
report of the event,l* “it looked like a large airplane light.” So low was it 
orbiting that “one probably could have photographed it with a Brownie 
camera.” The satellite carrier went from horizon to horizon in approxi- 
mately a minute and a half. During this period, the Baker-Nunn picked up 
“four or five” pictures of it, and would have had more if the operators of the 
camera had been more experienced in the handling of their intricate in- 
strument. During the next few days the press carried the first pictures ever 
made of an artificial moon in orbit around the earth. On the Thanksgiving 
day following, scientists associated with a Harvard-sponsored meteor project 
picked up pictures of Sputnik I itself, the actual payload, with two super- 
Schmidt cameras in New Mexico. Their achievement prompted Whipple 
and Hynek to institute an interim program at some of their optical-tracking 
stations and elsewhere, utilizing super-Schmidt cameras and cinetheodolites, 
along with two small missile telecameras, borrowed from Army Ordnance. 
Started during the lifetime of Sputnik I, this backup phototrack program 
would remain in effect until mid-1958, by which time the full Baker-Nunn 
network was in 0perati0n.l~ 
The swift accumulation of limited but usable information from the 
world’s first artificial satellite was not the only product of the struggle to 
track Sputnik I. For those who participated in the effort, it would prove to 
be an unforgettable experience in international camaraderie. The sleepless 
experts at NRL and SAO, the crewmen straining to convert their facilities 
to the Russian frequencies at the prime Minitrack stations, the ham radio 
operators glued to their earphones, the Army technicians manning the Mark 
I1 stations they had installed, the men and women making up Moonwatch 
teams around the world-in the years to come all these people would be 
proud to think of themselves as members of a rule-less and officer-less organi- 
zation fondly spoken of as ROOSCH or Royal Order of Sputnik Chasers. 
The foremost practical outcome of their cooperative labors was that the 
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American tracking teams were ready when on 3 November 1957 the Russians 
sent their second satellite, Sputnik IZ, into orbit. 
Unlike its predecessor, the second Soviet moon was not a special device, 
orbiting apart from its carrier. It was the last stage of the launching ve- 
hicle. Circling the world once every 103.7 minutes, Sputnik I I  had an apogee 
of 1,038 miles, a perigee of 140 miles. It remained in space 162 days, falling 
into the earth’s atmosphere on 14 April 1958. Weighing at least 1,120 
pounds, it carried the 11-pound test dog, Laika, in a sealed compartment, 
along with instrumentation for measuring cosmic rays, solar ultraviolet and 
x-radiation, temperature, and pressures. Although its transmitters func- 
tioned only seven days, they supplied the world scientific community with 
disclosures concerning the biomedical effect of space travel on animal life, 
solar influence on upper atmosphere densities, and the shape of the earth.ls 
For everybody connected with Project Vanguard the immediate post- 
Sputnik period was one of swiftly developing and often overlapping events. 
Some Americans had always been deeply interested in the earth satellite 
program: now the majority of them were. After 4,October 1957 the Van- 
guard scientists and engineers found themselves working quite literally in a 
goldfish bowl. Unofficially their mission ceased to be merely one of putting a 
payload in orbit during the IGY. It became instead an effort to salvage the 
national prestige. Their thinly funded, modestly conceived, no-priority 
undertaking had become the great white hope of a people profoundly 
wounded in its amour-propre. 
Within hours after the first Soviet launch, the Senate Preparedness Sub- 
committee chairmanned by Lyndon B. Johnson initiated a “full, complete, 
and exhaustive inquiry into the state” of the nation’s satellite and missile 
efforts. On 9 October Hagen and Admiral Bennett went “up the Hill” to 
tell the Vanguard story to attorney Edwin L. Weisl of New York, the John- 
son subcommittee’s chief investigator, and his staff. Accompanying them was 
Brigadier General Austin W. Betts of the Department of the Army, whose 
task was to answer questions concerning the possibility, then under intensive 
discussion, of using the Army’s Jupiter C, a version of its intermediate-range 
ballistic missile, as the basis of a backup satellite-launching program for 
Project Vanguard. Most of the Senate investigators’ questions reflected cur- 
rent criticisms of the manner in which the United States had handled its 
satellite program. Considerable discussion dealt with the President’s order 
that the satellite effort be kept “separate and distinct” from the country’s 
military missile effort. There were rocket men in and out of the Army who 
viewed this arrangement as an inadvisable “division of the indivisible.” In 
answer to the Senate investigators’ queries, Hagen and Bennett explained 
that “the decision” to separate the two programs arose from the fear that 
“the military program might be delayed if this were not done.” They added 
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that subsequent to the separate-but-highly-unequal decision, it had become 
“apparent that the Jupiter C missile of the Army” could be “used as a 
booster for an earth satellite. However, the time required to make the 
necessary modifications to the Jupiter C would not have resulted in a mate- 
rial saving in time and might have reduced the scientific value of the earth 
satellite.” The investigators concluded the session with a request that the 
Vanguard managers supply them with a report on the background, status, 
and plans of the project. During the preceding summer, fortunately, Hagen 
had directed his aides to prepare a chronological history of the project. 
Within a reasonably short time, this and other pertinent material were on 
their way up the Hill, to be digested by the Johnson subcommittee staff 
in preparation for a projected series of hearings by the subcommittee 
itselfP 
Eisenhower also requested a briefing, and a few days after Sputnik I, 
Hagen and William M. Holaday, recently appointed director of guided 
missiles for the Department of Defense, called at the White House for this 
purpose. The official record covers Hagen’s subsequent briefing of the 
White House staff on 15 October, but it fails to fix the date of his earlier 
session with the President, and those involved no longer remember. Later 
events, however, place it on 9 October at the latest, possibly the day before, 
since on the 9th Hagen was tied up with the Senate investigators on the 
Hill. In a fifteen-minute presentation to Eisenhower, Hagen and Holaday 
stressed the then experimental status of the Vanguard program. TV-2, then 
being prepared for firing at Cape Canaveral, was not a complete Vanguard 
vehicle, consisting as it did merely of a Vanguard first stage and two dummies 
in lieu of the second and third stages. So far no complete Vanguard vehicle 
had been flight-tested, and the one scheduled for launching in December- 
TV-3was  still at the factory. Moreover, this first complete Vanguard was 
not a mission vehicle; it was a test vehicle, designed primarily not to orbit a 
payload but to measure the performance of the launching vehicle itself. 
Plans, however, called for TV-3 to carry a minimal payload, an instrumented 
6.4-inch, 4-pound satellite. Preliminary calculations indicated that it could 
put such a satellite into orbit, but no guarantee to this effect was possible 
under the circumstances. In short, were TV-3 to accomplish its mission, the 
Vanguard people would regard their success, in Hagen’s words, as “a 
bonus.” 2o Having given the chief executive a realistic summary of the situa- 
Eion, Hagen and Holaday-and everybody else associated with the Van- 
guard program-were understandably startled and dismayed when on 9 
October presidential press secretary James Hagerty informed reporters that 
during the forthcoming December, Project Vanguard would launch a 
satellite-bearing vehicle. “In May of 1957,” the White House statement read 
in part, “those charged with the U.S. satellite program determined that 
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small satellite spheres would be launched as test vehicles during 1957 to 
check the rocketry, instrumentation, and ground stations and that the first 
fully instrumented satellite vehicle would be launched in March of 1958. 
The first of these test vehicles is planned to be launched in December of this 
year.” 
It is worth noting that the White House news release was an accurate 
enough reflection of the Hagen-Holaday briefing of the President. It did not 
say that the Vanguard people were going to place a satellite in orbit in 
December; it said only that they “planned’ to launch one of their satellite- 
bearing “test vehicles,” a far less difficult procedure, especially for a group of 
men who had already put up two test vehicles in a row and were on the 
verge of improving this record by their successful launching of a third one, 
TV-2, on 23 October. In the emotionally overwrought atmosphere of the 
early post-Sputnik era, however, it was perhaps too much to expect reporters 
to distinguish between a promised launch and a promised orbit. Apparently 
few, if any, did. The press bristled with stories saying that before the end of 
the year America’s answer to the U.S.S.R. satellite, would be circling the 
globe. Hagen and his staff had no choice but to regard the ill-timed White 
House release, or more exactly the news media’s interpretation of it, as a 
command; and all units of Project Vanguard braced for an accelerated effort 
beset with uncertainties.21 
What must have been welcome news to many anxious Americans came 
five days after Sputnik I I  with an announcement from the Pentagon that the 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, 
Alabama, a unit commanded by Major General John B. Medaris, had re- 
ceived permission to participate in the American satellite program on a 
backup basis. “The Secretary of Defense today,” the department’s 8 Novem- 
ber release read in part, “directed the Department of the Army to proceed 
with launching an earth satellite using a modified Jupiter C. This program 
will suppIement the Vanguard program . . . . The decision to proceed with 
the additional program was made to provide a second means of putting into 
orbit, as part of the IGY program, a satellite which will carry radio trans- 
mitters compatible with minitrack ground stations and scientific instruments 
selected by the National Academy of Sciences.” 
T o  people close to the satellite program this announcement was no 
surprise. They had been expecting it since Sputnik I. Some of them had been 
discussing the feasibility of such a move since the fall of 1955 when the 
Stewart Committee rejected Project Orbiter, the Army’s satellite-launching 
proposal, in favor of the Navy proposal that had become Project Vanguard. 
For Project Orbiter the Army-directed rocket team headed by Wernher von 
Braun had designed a four-stage launching vehicle, to consist of the liquid- 
fueled Redstone rocket, the Army’s short-range tactical missile, and three 
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Sketch of the minimum six-inch satellite intended for TV-3. 
solid stages made up first of clusters of Loki and later of scaled-down Sergeant 
rockets. When subsequently the Army rocket experts embarked on a series 
of tests designed to bring their nosecones safely back into the atmosphere 
during flight, common sense dictated that they use the four-stage vehicle they 
had planned for Project Orbiter as the basis for creating a suitable test 
missile. To this end they had developed what by 1957 was known as the 
Jupiter C, the “C” standing for “Composite Re-entry Test Vehicle.” In this 
way the Army was able to carry on its vehicle development under military 
priority, an advantage denied the Vanguard program. Had the Jupiter 
missile been chosen in the first place as the IGY vehicle, it too might have 
had to undergo development outside military priority. Created by the 
Army in collaboration with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California 
Institute of Technology, the Jupiter C was an elongated Redstone with three 
solid-fuel upper stages-two of them live, and the top one filled with sand 
to preserve the balance of the vehicle.% 
As early as 1956 the performance of one of the predecessors of the 
Jupiter C convinced the experts at Redstone Arsenal that they already had a 
vehicle capable of putting a small satellite in orbit. Later reentry tests, 
carried on with the more elaborate Jupiter C itself, further strengthened 
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their conviction. Late in 1956 the Department of Defense authorized ABMA 
to develop and fire twelve Jupiter Cs as part of the Army’s nosecone re- 
entry development program. The first two shots, attempted in 1957, were 
failures, but a third, fired in August of that year, was such a definitive success 
that General Medaris, the ABMA commandant, ordered the reentry test 
program stopped and directed that the remaining Jupiter Cs-“nine 
precious missiles in various stages of fabrication”-be “held for other and 
more spectacular purposes.” 
By “other and more spectacular purposes,” the dynamic ABMA chief 
meant a satellite launch. Twice, during the preceding year, he and his 
colleagues had requested permission to establish a backup satellite program; 
twice the Department of Defense had turned them down-but the Army 
missile team had no intention of taking “no” for an answer. Shortly after the 
successful reentry test in the summer of 1957, Medaris wrote Lieutenant 
General James M. Gavin, then Chief of Research and Development for the 
Army, that “we could hold two of the missiles in such condition that one 
satellite shot could be attempted on four months’ notice, and a second one a 
month later.” In his own vivid, engaging, partisan account of his stewardship 
of the Army missile program, Medaris confesses that in the summer of 1957 
he was convinced that Project Vanguard’s chance of effecting an orbit in the 
IGY was “so small as to constitute a ridiculous gamble.” 24 
In October 1957 the Department of Defense was in the midst of a 
change of hierarchy. Secretary Wilson had announced his imminent resigna- 
tion, and his designated successor, Neil H. McElroy, was making an “orienta- 
tion” tour of the country’s military installations preparatory to taking office. 
The fourth of October found McElroy at Redstone Arsenal. His party in- 
cluded Army Secretary Wilber M. Brucker, General Gavin, and other dig- 
nitaries. Their presence gave Medaris and von Braun an opportunity to 
renew their plea that the Army be given a role in the satellite effort. A 
briefing session and a tour of the arsenal were followed by an evening cock- 
tail party. Hosts and guests were enjoying a relaxed chat when General 
Medaris’ public relations officer hurried into the room. “General,” he said, 
breaking into the conversation without apology, “it has just been announced 
over the radio that the Russians have put up a successful satellite! It’s 
broadcasting signals on a common frequency, and at least one of our local 
‘hams’ has been listening to it.” There was a momentary silence. Then von 
Braun burst into speech. Medaris quotes the famous rocket scientist as 
exclaiming, “We knew they were going to do it. Vanguard will never make 
it. We have the hardware on the shelf. For God’s sake turn us loose and let 
us do something. We can put up a satellite in sixty days, Mr. McElroy! Just 
give us a green light and sixty days.” Von Braun talked on compulsively. It 
was some time before Medaris could interrupt long enough to observe that 
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“sixty days” was too fast. T o  prepare vehicle and payload for launch, the 
Army and its working partner, JPL, would have to have “ninety days.” 
Neither von Braun’s sixty days nor Medaris’ ninety could be called an ex- 
cessively optimistic prediction. The Jupiter C was already a flight-tested 
vehicle, and there was no reason to believe that the modifications required to 
make it operational as a satellite-launcher would take much time. Moreover, 
it was a foregone conclusion that the Army team would have at its disposal 
the tracking system developed by the Naval Research Laboratory along with 
one or more of the scientific experiments prepared for Project Vanguard 
under the aegis of the National Academy of Sciences. Nothing could be more 
inaccurate than the subsequent popular impression that in a mere three 
months the Army team went through all of the time-consuming develop- 
mental work and testing necessary to produce an operational satellite- 
launcher.25 
McElroy, of course, could make no commitments to the ABMA leaders, 
but by the time he and his entourage had departed on the following day, 
both Medaris and von Braun were under the impression that the “green 
light” would flash soon after the secretary-to-be took office on 9 October. 
Medaris’ confidence took the form of immediate action. He ordered von 
Braun and his assistants to take “Missile 29,” one of the Army’s stored 
Jupiter Cs, off the shelf and start working on it. “I stuck my neck out,” the 
ABMA chief would write later, but “I was convinced that we would have 
final word inside of a week, and that week was too valuable to be lost. If we 
still did not get permission to go, I would have to find some way to bury 
the relatively small amount of money we would have to spend in the 
meantime.” 
Even as Medaris and his aides pushed ahead in this informal manner, 
scientists connected with Project Vanguard were giving consideration to a 
cooperative Vanguard-Army venture that, in the opinion of some of them, 
just might permit the United States to launch a satellite within as little 
as thirty days. Basic to this scheme were calculations that Joe Siry of the 
Vanguard team had prepared. These indicated that the now tested and 
highly efficient solid-propellant third stage of the Vanguard vehicle could be 
fitted onto the basic Jupiter missile, thus providing a simple but powerful 
two-stage launching vehicle capable of establishing one of the small Van- 
guard satellites in orbit. In October Siry, Milton Rosen, and Commander 
Berg spent a day at Huntsville, where they presented Siry’s figures to von 
Braun and his staff. The Army scientists agreed that Siry’s scheme was 
feasible, and when the Vanguard men departed that night it was with the 
understanding that the two groups would pursue the matter further at a 
meeting of the Stewart Committee scheduled to be held in Washington a few 
days later. There, however, the matter ended. Siry’s recollection, voiced ten 
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years later, was that “after that first meeting it was somehow never con- 
venient for us to get together again.” Berg’s guess, based on subsequent 
events, was “that apparently the scheme for marrying our rocket to theirs 
fell through because by the time we proposed it, the Army people were 
under the impression that they had a commitment from McElroy to go 
ahead with their Jupiter-C program. Under the circumstances a joint venture 
held no appeal to them, even though they conceded that Siry’s calculations 
checked out.” As for Rosen, his comment, also voiced a decade after the in- 
cident, was “that I don’t really recall that occasion. Even if the Army had 
gone along with the idea, I don’t believe I could have approved of it. No 
doubt the scheme looked good on paper, but difficulties involved in actually 
launching the proposed two-stage rocket would probably have put us be- 
hind rather than ahead of schedule. In those rather trying days, my feeling 
was that our best bet was to continue developing the Vanguard vehicle as 
planned and hope for the best.” 
One thing is certain. Throughout October the assumption that the De- 
partment of Defense was on the verge of authorizing an Army backup 
program prevailed at Huntsville. For General Medaris, to be sure, it was a 
less than comfortable period. Having ordered his men to go to work on the 
Jupiter C, he shortly found that his technically unallowed expenditures 
were becoming worrisomely large. When first one week and then three more 
weeks passed without a word from Washington, the general began awakening 
in the middle of the night and talking to himself. He would have rested 
better had he known that one of Eisenhower’s last orders to Charles Wilson, 
his retiring defense chief, was a directive on the morning of 8 October “to 
have the Army prepare its Redstone at once as a backup for the Navy 
Vanguard.” It was a month later, however, before the official directive estab- 
lishing the Army satellite program, subsequently known as “Project Ex- 
plorer,’’ wended its way from DoD to Redstone Arsenal.% 
It would be gratifying to report that the Vanguard people welcomed the 
Army to the satellite fold with expressions of delight and that the Army 
team refrained from gloating-gratifying but inexact. The Vanguard people 
detected in the situation causes for resentment that cannot be cavalierly dis- 
missed as normal to interservice rivalry. Many of the difficulties confronting 
their project grew out of the government’s decision in 1955 to keep the 
country’s scientific satellite effort separate from its missile program. The 
Vanguard leaders can be excused for viewing the government’s swift reversal 
of this position in the face of the Sputnik crisis as something short of an 
expression of faith in their endeavors. A further source of resentment lay in 
their conviction that the Army missile team had jumped the gun by pre- 
paring for a satellite shot years before getting authorization to do so. 
Apprised of this frequently advanced charge years later, former President 
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Eisenhower expressed surprise, saying “but that would have been a court 
martial offense!” As for the men in charge of the rocket team at Huntsville, 
Medaris concedes that their feelings were ambivalent. “We were angry and 
frustrated,” he writes, “at having our country so badly outmaneuvered. On 
the other hand, we were jubilant over the prospect of at last being allowed to 
get our own satellite off the ground.” 27 
During November the Johnson subcommittee investigators in Wash- 
ington completed their preliminary study, and Room 318 of the old Senate 
Office Building became the scene of a series of open hearings and executive 
sessions dealing with the country’s satellite and missile problems. Hagen’s 
appearance before the subcommittee in late November had its light mo- 
ments. At one point the noisy grinding of the television cameras brought 
complaints from some of the senators: they were having trouble hearing the 
soft-spoken Project Vanguard director. Chairman Johnson told the camera- 
men to do their work more quietly or get out. At another point a bulb 
suddenly tumbling from the chandelier gave rise to an exchange of 
pleasantries relative to “these strange flying objects” everybody seemed to be 
seeing in the heavens these days. One question came up repeatedly: could 
the United States have beaten the U.S.S.R. into space if the government had 
given Project Vanguard a higher priority? Quite likely yes, was Hagen’s 
reply, provided, he took care to add, the project had been given also the 
things that go with a higher priority, namely “men, materials, funds.” 
When Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee grumbled that “Well, Congress 
has given you all the money you asked for,” Hagen patiently pointed out 
that this was one of those cases of things looking better than they were. 
He reminded the senator that for almost two years all of Project Vanguard’s 
money had come out of the Defense Secretary’s emergency fund. “The proce- 
dure,” he explained, “was that we would go to the Department with a . . . 
request for funds for the remainder of that particular year, and some months, 
it would be 2 or 3 months after the request [before] the funds would be 
forthcoming.” Congress’ recent action in authorizing 34.2 million dollars to 
carry Vanguard to completion constituted the project’s single contribution 
from that source, and even it was not a direct appropriation to the satellite 
project. Apparently the senator from Tennessee found food for thought in 
Hagen’s words. At a subsequent hearing he saw to it that the subcommittee 
record included the statement published in a national magazine by Clifford 
C. Furnas, formerly assistant secretary of defense for research and develop- 
ment, that from the beginning Project Vanguard was “stymied by the 
chronic monetary constipation of the Armed Forces wherever expenditures 
which they consider non-military are concerned. Money was squeezed from 
odd corners of the various military budgets, and we got all the help which 
the National Science Foundation could give us. But the funds were dribbled 
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out in such a manner that work was often slowed up for weeks and months 
at a time.” 28 
While worried statesmen on Capitol Hill looked for answers to the 
country’s space-age dilemma, the Vanguard Operating Group at Cape 
Canaveral strained to fulfill its commitment to put a payload in orbit before 
the end of 1957. For the members of the field crew the happiest outcome of 
the successful launching of TV-2 in late October was that it freed them to 
concentrate on preparing their first complete test vehicle, TV-3, for a flight 
test in December. The scheduled test of this vehicle, which would carry a 
small payload equipped with a beacon transmitter, would mark the first at- 
tempt to flight-test the second stage, the highly advanced liquid-propellant 
rocket that Martin’s subcontractor, Aerojet General, had designed-and for 
many months the Vanguard vehicle experts had been struggling with a 
problem connected with the thrust chamber of the Aerojet rocket. To func- 
tion successfully in flight the second-stage thrust chamber had to have a 
burning time in the neighborhood of 150 seconds, which is to say it had to 
be able to fire that long over and above whatever time it had been fired for 
testing purposes prior to flight. Static tests conducted at the Aerojet plant 
in 1956 and 1957 showed that in this connection a steel thrust chamber 
presented no difficulties. Indeed the one steel chamber fabricated at the 
factory eventually accumulated 600 seconds of firing time without any 
evidence of erosion. Unfortunately a steel chamber raised a weight problem 
beyond the capacity of the Aerojet engineers to solve in the limited time at 
their disposal. To get around this they fabricated a series of lightweight 
thrust chambers, using tubes of 5052 aluminum, hand-welded and wrapped 
with stainless steel wire. The aluminum chamber weighed twenty pounds 
less than the steel one, but during the summer of 1957 test firings yielded 
discouraging results. Four of the aluminum chambers developed internal 
leaks after 327, 240, 364, and 278 seconds of accumulated firing time re- 
spectively. Jim Bridger, the Vanguard vehicle chief, and his colleagues 
viewed a chamber lifetime of something less than 278 seconds as inadequate, 
and instituted an intensive search for a coating capable of extending the life- 
time of the chamber, preferably to as much as 540 seconds. This proved to 
be a time-consuming process. Weeks of experimenting preceded the dis- 
covery that the application of a tungsten carbide coating to the chamber 
walls was the best available answer to the problem. In October the project 
managers ruled that beginning with TV-5 all second-stage thrust chambers 
must be so treated. Bridger would have liked to see a tungsten carbide- 
coated chamber in the second stage of TV-3, but that called for more time 
than Project Vanguards accelerated post-Sputnik schedule permitted. For 
TV-3 the field crew used a second-stage thrust chamber that had been test- 
fired for only 50 seconds; hopefully it would last for another 150 seconds in 
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ffight-assuming that the first complete Vanguard vehicle lifted off suc- 
cessfully.2s 
Compared with the difficulties the Vanguard field crew had experienced 
in preparing TV-2 for launch, those arising during the preparations of TV-3 
were encouragingly minor. On 11 October the vehicle arrived at Hanger S, 
the project’s permanent assembly building at the Air Force Missile Test 
Center. Inspection revealed a crack in the second-stage engine. This problem 
the Martin company took care of, promptly removing an engine from an- 
other test vehicle and shipping it to the field. Early in November TV-3 
made the four-and-a-half-mile journey from Hangar S to launch complex 18A. 
Static firings of the two lower stages, erection of the vehicle on the launch 
stand, electrical system tests, instrumentation system tests, other preflight 
operations-all proceeded smoothly. The last weekend of the month found 
thousands of people converging on Cape Canaveral, ostensibly to witness 
America’s first attempt to put an earth satellite in orbit, actually to watch 
the first test of the vehicle designed to carry out this job. Hopefully scheduled 
for Wednesday, 4 December, this test-as was true; of all similar operations 
during this early period of rocket technology-should have been carried out 
in a quiet atmosphere. Unfortunately the Presidential news release of the 
previous 9 October 30 had been interpreted by the newspapers and then the 
public to mean that this was indeed Project Vanguard’s first serious launch 
attempt. The fat was in the fire, and the field crew had no choice but to 
proceed as though this was indeed a scheduled attempt to launch a satellite. 
Before the weekend was over accommodations had become hard to find in 
the sparsely settled Cape Canaveral area, and local stores were out of 
binoculars. A New York Times reporter provided his readers with a color- 
ful picture of the scene. “Last night from one of the coarse sandy beaches 
where the ‘bird watchers’ of the missile age watch the Cape Canaveral 
spectacles,” he wrote on Sunday, the first day of December, 
the Vanguard tower was clear against a starry sky, two bright white lights 
glaring at its base and a red beacon shining at its top. This morning 
the alternating red and white horizontal stripes of the big crane stood out 
against the chill morning. From the beach, the Vanguard crane is one 
of a community of launching structures [service towers], some taller, 
some broader than others. But the Vanguard clearly has next billing at 
the sprawling missile theatre here . . . . The audience includes Project 
Vanguard officials and correspondents from as far as Europe. 
For Florida the weather was disappointing. Sunday’s temperatures were 
near freezing. Of greater concern to project officials were the wind veloci- 
ties. These ranged from 20 to 30 mph. Field-manager Mazur and his staff 
could only hope for an improvement by Wednesday. According to NRL’s 
aerodynamics specialists, a successful launching was unlikely in the presence 
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of surface winds having a velocity in excess of 17 mph. Involved in these 
calculations was the “von KArmin effect,” named for Theodore von 
KArmAn, the scientist responsible for its formulation. The von KirmAn 
effect refers to the tendency of air as it flows past an object and reaches the 
other side to curl or produce eddies. The eddies set up an oscillation that 
may be reinforced by the natural frequency of the structure. The effect of 
this on a rocket standing on a launch stand, especially after its service tower 
has been withdrawn some sixty minutes prior to flight, is a strong vibration 
with destructive possibilities. In an effort to minimize the von KirmAn effect, 
Vanguard technicians equipped their seventy-two-foot vehicle with black 
rubber spoilers. These fin-like strips extended down the sides of the structure 
for about two thirds of its length. At the top of each was a protruding shoe, 
designed to catch downrushing air and strip off the spoilers at about a 
thousand feet altitude.31 
Director Hagen was not among the project officials at the launch site. 
He remained in Washington, supervising activities in the Vanguard Control 
center at NRL. At the Cape his deputy, J. Paul Walsh, who was in charge of 
operations acted as project spokesman. On Monday he answered reporters’ 
questions. One wished to know if the success or failure of the impending 
launch could be judged by whether or not the “baby moon” on the top of 
the vehicle went into orbit. “It depends on who’s judging it,” WaIsh re- 
plied. “Don’t misunderstand me. We’ll be pleased if it goes into orbit. We’ll 
not be despondent if it does not.” The schedule called for the countdown to 
begin at 9 o’clock Tuesday evening, but satisfactory completion of some of 
the last-minute tests took more time than anticipated. It was 4:30 Wednesday 
morning, with giant searchlights bathing the rocket with a blue-white light, 
before the countdown began. At 10:30 that night, two holds and eighteen 
hours later, Mazur scrubbed the shot for three reasons: a frozen shutoff valve, 
fatigue on the part of his crew, and meteorological readings showing that 
winds in a jet stream located over the launching site had reached velocities 
considered marginal for flight 
Wednesday night’s cancellation of the initial attempt to launch TV-3 
was followed by an announcement that the field crew would start another 
countdown late Thursday afternoon with liftoff scheduled for 8 a.m., Friday, 
6 December. Speaking at a business meeting in Florida on Thursday, George 
S. Trimble, Jr., a Martin Company vice president, flatly asserted that the 
first complete Vanguard vehicle would not succeed in placing its payload in 
orbit. He based his prediction on “the prevailing mathematics of trial and 
error.” According to these calculations three failures for every seven tries 
were normal in “this kind of testing experiment.” At a news conference in 
Chicago on the same day the chairman of the IGY committee, Joseph 
Kaplan, was only a little more optimistic. Cautioning reporters about the 
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“risk of failure in tomorrow’s shot,” he assured them that before the end of 
the International Geophysical Year on 31 December 1958, the United States 
“will have a full-fledged earth satellite in orbit.” These last-minute efforts to 
prepare the American people for the worst are of interest in view of the 
events of the next twenty-four hours?3 
The second countdown began shortly after 5 p.m. Thursday, approxi- 
mately on schedule. Shortly thereafter a long hold became necessary because 
of delays encountered in verifying the operations of the vehicle controls sys- 
tem. Subsequent holds were of short duration and of no significance. By 
10:30 Friday morning the countdown had reached T-60 minutes, the be- 
ginning of the final and critical phase of the procedure. At this point the big 
gantry crane began its slow withdrawal, leaving the vehicle standing alone on 
its flight-launch structure. A weather check, ten minutes later, showed winds 
of 16 mph at pad level with gusts up to 22 mph. For later Vanguard flight 
tests, the Martin Company would design a retracting launch stand that per- 
mitted the vehicle to lift off in surface winds up to 35 mph; but on 6 
December 1957 the original stationary stand was in use and Martin studies 
had fixed the allowable ground wind for liftoff at only 17 mph. In higher 
winds the engine nozzle, as it rose from the clearance hole in the platform 
of the stationary stand, might crash against the surrounding piping. At 
T - 50 minutes, in short, weather conditions were touch-and-go, but other- 
wise all looked well. At T-45 minutes the electronics telemetering crew in 
the backroom of the blockhouse began receiving “all clear” signals from 
the stations of the radio tracking network. Photographers in the employ of 
Pan American Airlines, responsible for range servicing and general engineer- 
ing, were busily immortalizing the occasion, snapping pictures of equipment 
and individuals. At T - 30 minutes fierce blasts from the bullfiddle warning 
horn on the launch pad sent people scurrying from the area. Some retreated 
to their assigned posts in the blockhouse, others made off in their cars to 
safely distant points. At T -25 minutes the heavy blockhouse doors clanged 
shut. The air of tension generated by the busy occupants of the building 
edged upwards from high in the direction of unbearable. At T- 19 minutes 
the blockhouse lights went out, the “No Smoking” sign blinked on. A report 
that surface winds were now “fifteen knots” brought a shrug from Dan 
Mazur. The figure was high, but the trend was downward. Indications were 
that by liftoff, the wind velocities would be acceptable. At T-5 minutes, 
propulsion-expert Kurt Stehling detected a “quaver” in the voice of his 
assistant, Bill Escher, who was counting off the minutes over the public ad- 
dress system. Five minutes later Escher changed the count to seconds. At 
T -45 seconds, the so-called “umbilical cords” that supply the rocket right 
up to liftoff began dropping away. At T-1 second test conductor Gray 
gave the command to fire and Paul Karpiscak, a young Martin engineer, 
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flipped the toggle switch on his oblique instrument panel. In the crowded 
blockhouse control room all eyes were on the big windows overlooking the 
pad. Sparks at the base of the rocket signaled that the pyrotecnic igniter in- 
side the first stage had kindled the beginning of the oxygen and kerosene 
fumes. With a howl the engine started, brilliant white flames swiftly filling 
the nozzle and building up below it as the vehicle lifted off. The time was 
11 :44.559 a.m. Two seconds later, a scream escaped someone in the block- 
house control room: “Look out! Oh God, no!” T o  Kurt Stehling, his gaze 
on the spectacle outside, it seemed “as if the gates of Hell had opened up.” 
With a series of rumbles audible for miles around, the vehicle, having risen 
about four feet into the air, suddenly sank. Falling against the firing struc- 
ture, fuel tanks rupturing as it did so, the rocket toppled to the ground on 
the northeast or ocean side of the structure in a roaring, rolling, ball-shaped 
volcano of flame. In the control room someone shouted “Duck!” Nearly 
everybody did. Then the fire-control technician pulled the water deluge 
lever, loosing thousands of gallons of water onto the steaming wreckage 
outside, and everybody straightened up. The next voice to be heard in the 
room was that of Mazur, issuing orders: “O.K., clean up; le?s get the next 
rocket ready.” Already the stunned crew had taken in a startling fact. As 
TV-3 crashed into its bed of flame, the payload in its nosecone had leaped 
clear, landing apart from the rocket. The satellite’s transmitters were still 
beeping, but the little sphere itself would turn out to be too damaged for 
reuse. It rests today in a file cabinet of the NASA Historical Archives, a 
battered reminder that “The best laid schemes 0’ mice an’ men/ Gang aft 
a-gley.” At the Vanguard assembly building, four and a half miles north- 
west of the blockhouse, Paul Walsh was on the phone to Hagen. The open 
hangar doors gave him a view of the launching pad. At T-0, he passed on 
the news: “Zero, fire, first ignition.” His next statement was a single word: 
“Explosion!” At the Washington end of the line, project director Hagen was 
equally succinct. “Nuts!” he ~a id .3~  
All components of the first stage of the Vanguard vehicle had functioned 
in a “superior” fashion during the successful launching of TV-2 in October. 
What had gone wrong with those same components during the flight firing 
of TV-3? Did the fault lie in the first-stage engine, the X405 liquid- 
propellant engine developed by GLM’s subcontractor, General Electric? Or 
did it lie in the other major component of the stage, the tankage built by 
GLM itself? During TV-3’s two seconds of life after liftoff, its onboard 
telemetry worked. Consequently the General Electric and GLM investigators 
had on hand a collection of telemetered data concerning the behavior of the 
rocket that Walsh described as “worth its weight in gold.” They also had 
ground instrumentation records and a series of photographic films of the 
disaster. Technicians of the two companies studied these, and came up with 
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different answers. The Martin people traced what they called an “improper 
engine start” directly to a low fuel tank pressure which was responsible for a 
low fuel injector pressure prior to the start of the turbopump operation. 
The low injector pressure allowed some of the burning contents of the 
thrust chamber to enter the fuel system through the injector head. Accord- 
ing to this version of the accident, fire started in the fuel injector before 
liftoff, resulting in destruction of the injector and complete loss of thrust im- 
mediately after liftoff. The General Electric investigators dissented. They 
traced the immediate cause of the explosion to a loose connection in a fuel 
line above the engine. Their reading of the telemetered and photographic 
data was that there was no “improper start.” On the contrary, the engine had 
come to full thrust, only to lose thrust when a little leaked fuel on top of a 
helium vent valve blew down on the engine. 
In a remote sense the General Electric investigators held the Martin 
work crew at fault. They claimed that members of the crew had used the 
fuel lines as “ladders” while working on the vehicle; hence the loose con- 
nection. At a conference attended by representatives of the companies and 
NRL, Milton Rosen, the project technical director, cut short what gave 
signs of becoming a heated argument. Conceding unofficially that the cause 
appeared to be “indeterminate,” Rosen said the Project managers would 
accept GLM’s findings. Although GE continued to hold to its position, its 
spokesmen appreciated the wisdom of Rosen’s decision under the circum- 
stances. In the aftermath of the TV-3 catastrophe, the time pressures on 
Project Vanguard were too severe to permit the luxury of a protracted 
family quarrel. In accordance with a specification change negotiated with 
Martin, GE increased the minimum allowable fuel tank pressure head of 
its engine thirty percent, and provided for manual override of the regulator 
to assure that this condition could be met. Time would confirm the prac- 
ticality of this procedure. In fourteen subsequent flight and static firings of 
the first stage, the engine as altered started without incident.3s 
These technical matters were of no moment to the American people. A 
wave of outrage swept the country. “Failure to launch test satellite,” the 
New York Times announced in big headlines, “assailed as blow to U. S. 
prestige.” Senator Lyndon B. Johnson spoke for millions when he termed the 
situation “most humiliating.” In New York City, members of the Soviet 
delegation to the United Nations asked American delegates if the United 
States would be interested in receiving aid under the U.S.S.R.’s program of 
technical assistance to backward nations. On the morning after the explosion 
sell-orders on Martin Company stock reached such proportions that at 11:50 
a.m. the governors of the New York Stock Exchange suspended trading in it. 
When they permitted a resumption of trading at 1 2 3  p.m., the stock was 
at 368/,, off 1%. At the end of trading it was 35%, off 2%. In the words 
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TV-3 launch, 6 December 1957. Two  seconds after launch, when 
the vehicle was four feet ofl the pad, thrust ceased. TV-3 crumpled on 
the pad and exploded. 
of Donald J. Markarian, the Martin Company’s project engineer, “Following 
the TV-3 explosion, Project Vanguard became the whipping boy for the 
hurt pride of the American people.” A few weeks after the event, Markarian 
encountered trouble in getting a painter to do some work at his Baltimore 
home. “Finally,” the tall, dark, broad-shouldered engineer would recall later, 
“one of the men I approached had the courtesy to level with me. ‘To tell 
you the truth, Mr. Markarian,’ he said, ‘I don’t feel much like working for 
anyone connected with Project Vanguard.’ From the quantity of criticism 
that came hurling at us, you’d have thought we had committed treason.” 
Here and there the voice of reason emerged. T o  Detlev Bronk, president of 
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the National Academy of Sciences, President Eisenhower put a pertinent 
question. “Were we Americans the first to discover penicillin?” he asked. 
“You know the answer to that, Mr. President,” was Bronk’s reply. “And did 
we kill ourselves because we didn’t?” Eisenhower asked. Bronk allowed that 
the President knew the answer to that too. In a letter to Hagen, Vice Presi- 
dent Nixon wrote that at “a time when you have been ‘catching it’ from all 
sides, I want you to know that I, for one, feel you should have every sup- 
port . . . . Keep up the good work.” Senator William F. Knowland of 
California pointed aut that “Everyone understands we may have some 
failures in these launchings. The Soviet Union may well have had a dozen 
before they launched the first Sputnik.” At a press conference in Washing- 
ton, Hagen rebuked the newspapers for “excessive publicity.” Murray Snyder, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, said there was no excuse for 
the exaggerated optimism with which reporters had covered events leading 
up to the unfortunate launch. “The Department of Defense,” he said, 
“exercised great restraint in its announcements, stressing the fact that a 
preliminary test was involved and if the test satellite was put into an orbit 
that would exceed the purpose of the test.” Reason, of course, had little 
popular appeal for the time being. What Americans wanted was an answer 
to the Russian Sputniks. With the failure of TV-3, Project Vanguard had 
ceased to be their great white hope. By the end of the year their attention was 
riveted on the efforts of the Army-JPL team to prepare Jupiter C for a satel- 
lite-launching attempt, tentatively scheduled for late January 1958.38 
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SUCCESS-AND AFTER 
THE ADDITION to the American satellite effort of the Army team-the Army 
Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Ala- 
bama, and its partner, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) of the Cali- 
fornia Institute of Technology in Pasadena-called for a series of high-level 
decisions in Washington. Some dealt with the scheduling of, launches. This 
was an involved maneuver since both the Vanguard and Army teams would 
be using the same Cape Canaveral range. They would also be using much the 
same tracking, telemetry and orbit-computation systems, namely those that 
the Vanguard electronics experts had developed for their project, supple- 
mented by microlock, a tracking and telemetry network that the Army had 
been using with its missiles since 1953. Because of these overlaps, sufficient 
time had to elapse between shots for AFMTC to prepare the requisite range 
support and for the units in charge of the electronics services to put their 
equipment in order. Complex as these arrangements were, most of them had 
been worked out by the end of 1957. By this time the Department of Defense 
had authorized the Army team to make two “earnest tries” to orbit a small 
cylinder-shaped satellite to be known as “Explorer,” and the Naval Re- 
search Laboratory had transferred to the Army 1 scientific experiment that 
it had originally assembled for one of the Vanguard sate1lites.l Scientists at 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory were modifying this instrumentation for use 
in the Army payload, and the Army’s four-stage Jupiter-C missile had 
reached Cape Canaveral, where a field crew was readying it for erection on 
the firing table at launch complex 26A, one of the Redstone pads at AFMTC. 
In addition, the Army had selected 29 January 1958 for its initial launch 
attempt, with the understanding that the Vanguard team would try to put 
up another of its vehicles earlier that month.2 
During the period covered by these develoments, Dan Mazur and his 
field crew had pushed ahead with the Vanguard program. The TV-3 disaster 
on 6 December 1957 found a backup vehicle, TV-SBU, ready to leave the 
hangar. Its erection at launch complex 18A;however, had to await repairs 
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to the Vanguard firing structure. Some of its components had been severely 
damaged by the explosion. By working around the clock, the crew com- 
pleted the necessary repairs sooner than had been anticipated. Even so, 
most of December had passed before all three stages of TV-3BU could be 
placed on the firing stand and the long and complex prelaunch operations 
begin. On 23 January the first attempt to put up the vehicle failed when 
heavy rains shorted some of the ground instrumentation cables during 
launch countdown. The next three days saw three more countdowns, two 
of them almost completed-and three more scrubs. Finally, on 26 January, 
the Vanguard crew removed a damaged second-stage engine, ordered a re- 
placement, and announced that it would make no further efforts to launch 
TV-3BU until 3 Febr~ary .~  
Since AFMTC could provide range support for only one shot at a time, 
this left the Army team with a discouragingly short period-less than a 
week-in which to make its first launch attempt. Fortunately its preflight 
preparations at Cape Canaveral were not excessively demanding. The 
Jupiter C had undergone several flight tests. Morqover, such static tests as 
the forthcoming attempt necessitated had been taken care of at Redstone 
Arsenal before the missile moved east. The major activities at the pad con- 
sisted of checking out the hazardous solid-propellant upper stages of the 
vehicle and of making sure that when the tub containing these rockets 
started to spin on top of the elongated Redstone booster, it would do so 
smoothly and without destructive vibration. Well in advance of the 
scheduled launch date, these procedures had been concluded, and prepara- 
tions for the flight test itself were moving at a satisfactory rate. 
Advance publicity was restrained and the launch date was withheld 
from the press until twenty-four hours prior to the anticipated firing. This 
policy reflected the determination of General Medaris, the ABMA com- 
mander, to protect the Army team as much as possible from the misleadingly 
optimistic type of attention that the press had heaped on Project Vanguard 
prior to the TV-3 explosion. Summoned to Washington in late 1957 and 
again in early 1958 to testify at the Johnson Senate subcommittee hearings 
on American missile and satellite programs, the general ducked the questions 
of reporters looking for more specific information. The Senate subcommittee 
itself gave him no problems on this score. When the matter of the Army’s 
launch schedule came up, Cyrus Vance of the investigating staff informed 
Medaris that “I am not going to ask you about the date.” Medaris’ reply was 
“I am thankful for that, Sir.” Appearing before the subcommittee on three 
occasions, the striking-looking ABMA chief was a colorful and articulate 
witness and both the senators and their staff handled him with a gentleness 
that must have made John Hagen, the beleagured Vanguard director, sigh 
with envy.4 
214 
On 29 January, launch day, the Explorer vehicle, its satellite and its 
field crew were ready, but disturbing reports were coming in from the 
AFMTC meteorologists. On the surface the weather was fine. Instrumented- 
balloon soundings, however, had revealed the presence high above the Cape 
of a jet stream, a swiftly-moving river of air, almost certain to destroy the 
missile. Heeding a teletyped advisory from his structural analysis engineers 
at Redstone Arsenal, Medaris decided to play it safe. Next morning’s 
weather reading was slightly more encouraging. At noon he authorized the 
crew to begin an eight-hour countdown, only to call it off a few hours later 
following a report that the jet stream was again menacing. 
At this point-Thursday evening, 30 January-time was running out 
for the Army team. Project Vanguard’s next flight test of TV-3BU was still 
tentatively set for 3 February, and word from IGY headquarters in Wash- 
ington was that the electronics units would need three days of preparation 
for it. The Army must either put up its vehicle on the following day-31 
January-or hold off until the Vanguard team had completed its scheduled 
attempt. Medaris and his crew could only wait and hope. Next morning’s 7 
o’clock weather reading, as interpreted by the structural analysis engineers, 
was just favorable enough. “Things look good,” it read. “The jet stream 
has moved off to the north, and by evening should be down to 100 knots.” T o  
Medaris that “still sounded like a lot of wind, but it meant the difference 
between a strain that we knew the missile could stand and one that was 
dangerous.” In a now-or-never spirit, the ABMA commander set in motion 
another eight-hour countdown, prayerfully heading, as on the day before, 
for a firing at 10:30 that evening. 
Beginning at 1 :30 p.m., the countdown encountered no serious hitches. 
Late in the afternoon there was a half-hour hold to complete a number of 
operations that had fallen behind schedule, seemingly because crew mem- 
bers were still suffering from exhaustion after the exertions of the day before. 
Later they made up for the lost time. At 9:45 p.m., with the countdown 
exactly on schedule, there was a second hold when someone spotted a hydro- 
gen-peroxide leakage in the tail of the missile. Workmen drained the line 
and stopped the leak. When at 10 p.m. the countdown resumed, it was only 
15 minutes behind. At T- 12 seconds-X-12, in Army terminology-the 
motors started to spin the top stages of the vehicle, technicians in the control 
room of the Redstone blockhouse transferred power from the ground power 
supplies to onboard sources, and at 10:48 p.m. the Jupiter C lifted off. It 
rose smoothly from its firing stand. A complex rocket, however, can fail even 
after a perfect start. There were jittery moments for the crew members 
while they awaited assurance that the upper stages had fired. For its later 
satellite-bearing missiles, ABMA would contrive an onboard system capable 
of igniting the upper stages automatically. No such system flew with the 
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University of Iowa, and 
William Pickering of Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory. 
first Explorer missile because the ABMA scientists and engineers had not 
yet contrived a dependable one. Instead they had developed a method for 
ground-command firing the second stage at almost the precise second the 
missile reached its absolute apex following liftoff. This was done from the 
Redstone hangar. There, at an exactly and swiftly calculated moment, 
approximately 404 seconds after launch, a scientist pushed a button to fire 
the second stage. A simple timer then controlled the ignition of the third 
and fourth stages, operating so as to allow the full thrust of each to be 
applied before the next one fired. 
Word that the upper stages had fired in response to ground command 
marked the start of still another period of nervous waiting and wondering. 
Was the satellite in orbit? Tracking stations on the West Coast would have 
to answer that. One or more of them would be the first to pick up the radio 
signal showing that the payload had circled the globe. General Medaris has 
described with understandable feeling the moment when “someone came 
up and shoved a piece of paper in my hands on which were these magic 
words: Goldstone has the bird.” This meant that at 12:51 a.m., 1 February 
1958-one hour and fifty-three minutes after liftoff-a newly installed track- 
ing station in California had picked up the satellite “on its first trip back 
around over the United States.” The big headlines in that morning’s 
newspapers invoked an all but audible sigh of relief across the country. The 
challenge of the Russian Sputniks had been met. America’s first artificial 
satellite, Explorer I, was orbiting the earth.6 
The Vanguard field crew’s plans for making its next launch attempt on 
3 February 1958, were a trifle optimistic. It was two days later before 
TV-3BU was ready to go, and again the Martin Company vice president’s 
“prevailing mathematics of trial and error” (Le., seven attempts to launch 
a satellite were likely to yield three failures) proved potentially valid.6 The 
Vanguard team’s fifth launch attempt turned out to be its second failure. 
This time, however, there was no spectacular explosion on the pad. The 
first-stage engine-the component involved in the TV-3 explosion-worked 
well. After a perfectly nominal start, the vehicle rose gently from its stand, 
but at about 1,500 feet altitude, after fifty-seven seconds of normal flight, a 
malfunction occurred in the control system. Subsequent investigation showed 
that spurious electrical signals had created motions of the first-stage engine 
in the pitch plane. These in turn developed dynamic structural loads, cou- 
pled with a rapid pitch-down that superimposed air loads of about the same 
magnitude. As a result, the vehicle broke up at the aft end of the second 
stage. It would appear that the ”prevailing mathematics of trial and error” 
were no respecter of satellite-launching teams, for a month later the Army 
suffered its first failure. On 5 March the second Explorer missile lifted off 
well, but the fourth stage failed to ignite and the satellite, Explorer 11, 
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fell into the Atlantic. The Army team had now completed the two “earnest 
tries” originally authorized. Within hours after the failure of the second 
one, however, the Department of Defense dispatched orders for Medaris and 
his crew to prepare for flight a duplicate Jupiter C that ABMA had shipped 
to Cape Canaveral, just in case, and preparations for a third try had been 
inaugura ted.7 
It was now Project Vanguard’s turn again. The vehicle this time was 
T V 4 ,  identical with TV-3 and TV-3BU save for minor modifications that 
the manufacturers had made as the result of the lessons learned from the 
unsuccessful efforts to launch a satellite with the two earlier vehicles. The 
Army’s failure to orbit its second Explorer was dispiriting to the members 
of the Vanguard field crew. If an old and tested rocket like Jupiter C could 
fail, they saw little reason to be sanguine about their relatively untried and 
far more sensitive and complicated bird. For TV-4 and all subsequent ve- 
hicles, the project managers instituted a change in the launching procedure. 
Instead of trying to run off the countdown on one day, they divided it into 
two phases, with the first one on T- 1 day-the day before scheduled liftoff 
-and the second and longer phase on launch-day itself. Scientific considera- 
tions were a factor in the decision to introduce this procedure. Some of the 
experiments scheduled for future Vanguard satellites were unlikely to func- 
tion effectively unless their carriers achieved orbit within specified hours of 
the day. The two-phase countdown, extending over two days, would make 
it easier for the crew to get the launch vehicle up within a time period 
limited by these considerations. 
During the opening weeks of March, erratic weather and recurring 
mechanical and electronic problems aggravated a general, if rarely ex- 
pressed, fear that T V 4  would go the way of its two immediate predecessors. 
Three canceled countdowns were the vehicle’s record when on 16 March 
the crew embarked on the first phase of what was to be the final launch 
operation. This phase of the countdown moved to its conclusion without 
incident, and at four o’clock the next morning, St. Patrick‘s Day, the second 
phase began. At 6:50 a.m. there was a short hold: more electronic problems. 
At almost literally the last second, there was another and even shorter hold, 
or more exactly, a “stretch-out,” when calculations showed that if the count- 
down concluded at that moment, ExpEorer I would be passing overhead just 
as TV-4 arched into the heavens. Passage of the Army satellite at that time, 
according to the electronics men, might interfere with the signals from the 
Vanguard payload. “An unprecedented event,” Kurt Stehling would later 
call this moment: “I must confess that never in my earlier life did I expect 
to see the day when one would have to wait until satellite traffic in the sky 
was cleared for the launching of another orbiter.” 
The seventeenth of March 1958, was a beautiful day. At 7:15:41 a.m. 
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after a nervewrackingly reluctant start that came close to carrying the launch 
stand itself into the air, TV-4 rose into a brilliantly sunny sky flecked with 
small white clouds. Now began the post-launch countdown. At the open-air 
communications center that the crew had improvised a thousand yards or so 
northwest of the blockhouse, Paul Walsh was again on the telephone to John 
Hagen in Washington. At approximately T+ 1 second he was shouting into 
the receiver, “There she goes, John . . . the flame is wonderful. Engine is 
burning smoothly.” At T+ 150 seconds, he was telling the project director, 
“John, the second stage is separated.” And at T +490 seconds, triumphantly, 
“John, the third stage has separated.” There was reason now to believe that 
the payload was in orbit, but already long-deferred plans for victory celebra- 
tions remained in abeyance while, “like expectant fathers,” everybody in- 
volved waited for confirmation from the Minitrack station at San Diego, 
California. In Washington, about 9:30 am., there was a clatter on the 
teletype linking the NRL control room with the California station. “We 
have got no signal yet,” San Diego reported. Then: “Stand by, we may have 
it.” The NRL operator tapped out a return message: “Give us the word 
ASAP [as soon as possible].” San Diego came back immediately: “This is it. 
We have 108.03 . . . also 108.00 [the two radio frequencies of the satellite] 
. . . . Good signal . . . no doubt . . . congratulations . . . .” In his cubicle of 
an office John Hagen put in a phone call to Alan Waterman, Director of the 
National Science Foundation. “It is in orbit,” Hagan said. “YOU can inform 
the President.” The little sphere that would be known as Vanguard I was 
circling the globe every 107.9 minutes-apogee, 2,466 miles; perigee, 404 
miles; expected lifetime of satellite and its trailing third-stage casing, about 
2,000 years. It goes without saying that, in the eyes of the public, the mem- 
bers of the Army team remained the heroes of the space age; it was they who 
had put up America’s first satellite. But the Project Vanguard people had 
the satisfaction of knowing that in record time-only two years, six months, 
and eight days-they had developed from J scratch a complete high- 
performance three-stage launching vehicle, a highly accurate worldwide 
satellite-tracking system, and an adequate launching facility and range 
instrumentation; more to the point, they had accomplished their mission, 
which was to put one satellite in orbit during the International Geophysical 
Year.9 
By the time Vanguard I went into orbit, several changes had occurred 
in the administrative framework of the country’s space effort, and an even 
more significant change was in the offing. The appearance of the Russian 
Sputniks in fall 1957 engendered a widespread clamor that the United 
States embark on a vastly expanded space program. Throughout the re- 
mainder of the year and into 1958, considerable discussion dealt with the 
question of who should operate this undertaking: one or more of the military 
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1958, putting Vanguard I into 
orbit. 
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achieved; right, Vanguard control room at NRL, 
showing the teleprinters for receiving data from 
the Minitrack stations. 
services, some existing civilian agency such as the National Advisory Com- 
mittee for Aeronautics or the Atomic Energy Commission, or a new organiza- 
tion, separate from existing governmental units? If a new organization, 
should its managers be military officers or civilians or both? Scientific 
opinion, emanating chiefly from the National Academy of Sciences and the 
American Rocket Society, favored a new agency under civilian aegis. A 
miscellany of bills, introduced in Congress during the first month of 1958, 
ran the gamut of possibilities. President Eisenhower proceeded slowly. 
Jolted by the intensity of public reaction to the Soviet space triumphs, he 
originated the office of Special Assistant to the President for Science and 
Technology, filling the position with James R. Killian, President of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Killian’s duties were purely advisory, 
but the creation of his office foreshadowed the administrative changes to 
come. 
While Congress and the Executive wrestled with the problem, Defense 
Secretary McElroy instituted first one and then a second reorganization of 
those elements of his department directly involved in the space effort. 
In November 1957, he named William Holaday, ’ his special assistant for 
guided missiles, to the position of Director of Guided Missiles, with enlarged 
powers where both the missile and space programs were concerned. A few 
months later Congress passed a law authorizing the Defense Secretary to 
“engage in advanced research projects,” and McElroy set up within the 
DoD a separate unit to be known as Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) . Holaday transferred his responsibilities to ARPA, and under 
the direction of Roy Johnson, a vice president of the General Electric 
Company, the new unit funded and supervised the country’s space projects 
for a few months. That this arrangement was to be a temporary one became 
apparent soon after its inception. ARPA achieved formal status in early 
February 1958, but by that date the prevailing opinion in Congress and at 
the White House was that America’s ncjnmilitary space program should be 
handled by a special civilian body set up outside the Department of Defense. 
In a message to Congress on 2 April, President Eisenhower proposed the 
of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency with the proviso that the 
functions of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics be absorbed 
into this new agency. In July, Congress passed and the President signed the 
necessary legislation, and on 1 October 1958 the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration began life, with Thomas Keith Glennan, president 
since 1947 of the Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, as its first ad- 
ministrat0r.l’) 
Under ARPA and later under NASA, the Army team continued to 
participate in the satellite effort throughout both the IGY and the one-year 
extension of it known as the International Geophysical Cooperation (IGC) . 
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During this two-and-a-half-year period, the Army made nine attempts to 
launch a satellite, with four successes, an impressive percentage given the 
state of the art at the time. The Jupiter C put up Explorers Z, ZZZ, and ZV. 
A more sophisticated version of the Army missile, the Juno 11, was the 
launching vehicle for Explorer VZZ, a 91.5-pound satellite established in 
orbit on 13 October 1959, about a month and a half before the conclusion 
of the IGY-IGC.ll 
Project Vanguard became a part of NASA on its inception. One of the 
NASA Administrator’s first official acts, however, was to delegate manage- 
ment of the project back to the Naval Research Laboratory. In actuality, 
therefore, no significant administrative change took place, and the mem- 
bers of the Vanguard field crew continued to put up their vehicles in ac- 
cordance with the one-a-month schedule established shortly before the 
launching of Sputnik 1. The success of TV-4 in March left them with a 
spare vehicle on their hands since the Martin Company had assembled and 
the hangar crew had checked out a backup vehicle, TVABU, against the 
possibility of failure. In accordance with a suggestion from the IGY com- 
mittee, TV4BU went back to GLM so that technicians at the Maryland 
plant could remove some of the test instrumentation and convert it into an 
SLV-a production satellite-launching, or mission, vehicle-for use in a later 
flight. Field preparations for the next scheduled launching proceeded in an 
atmosphere of some tension. Although the vehicle involved, TV-5, was 
only a test vehicle, its mission was to try to orbit the first fully instrumented 
Vanguard satellite, a 20-inch, 21.5-pound sphere. By the first week of April 
the first stage of TV-5 was on the firing stand at launch complex 18A, but 
the pad managers postponed erection of the upper stages because of facts 
brought out in a motion picture of the TV-4 launch. The film revealed 
that at the liftoff of that vehicle, the hydraulic disconnects had not separated 
smoothly. The belief was general that the pull-away stand that the Martin 
Company was in the process of completing would take care of this po- 
tentially troublesome situation. Unfortunately the new movable firing struc- 
ture would not be ready for some time. For the scheduled flight test of 
TV-5, the only course open to the crew was to make some modifications in 
the old stationary structure and hope for the best.12 
Once again hope exceeded accomplishment. Launched at 9:53 p.m., 
28 April 1958, the last of the Vanguard test vehicles lifted off without diffi- 
culty, but its intricately devised payload never reached orbit. Flight was 
normal through second-stage burnout. The second-stage sequence, however, 
did not complete itself electrically. Its failure to do so prevented arming 
of the coasting flight control system with the result that the third stage was 
unable to separate and fire. Three more failures followed. After a successful 
liftoff, the first mission vehicle, SLV-1, encountered trouble at second- 
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Sketch and photograph of the first of the “operationat?‘ twenty-inch 
Vanguard satellites. I t  was launched by TV-5,28 April 1958, but failed to 
achieve orbit because the third stage did not fire. 
stage burnout. At that point a disturbance in the control system had the 
effect of launching the third stage at an angle of approximately sixty-three 
degrees to the horizontal, thus precluding an orbit. SLV-2 also lifted off 
satisfactorily, but the second-stage propulsion shut down after eight seconds 
of burning. This action reduced the velocity of the vehicle to the point 
where the third stage could not fire. Launched in September 1958, SLV-3 
had the advantage of the new movable firing structure. During the liftoff 
period, flight was normal or better than normal, but the performance of the 
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second stage was below the anticipated minimum. The burned-out third 
stage and the payload reached an altitude of nearly 265 miles, but the 
velocity was about 250 feet per second short of the 25,000 required to orbit.l3 
T o  the Martin Company men responsible for the reliability of the 
vehicle, none of these failures was a total loss. In every case they obtained 
sufficient telemetered and filmed data to spot what appeared to be the 
pertinent deficiencies and to make corrections. Indeed the care with which 
these follow-up procedures were carried out was one of the causes for the 
program’s overall success. For the purpose of correcting deficiencies, the 
Martin design groups responsible for the various Vanguard subsystems kept 
in daily communication with their field counterparts by telephone and via 
direct teletype. In addition, they made constant use of a more formal chan- 
nel for liaison and reliability follow-up-a form known as the “Discrepancy 
and Trouble Report,” on which all malfunctions and actual or potential 
problem areas were recorded. At the plant the design men screened copies 
of these for problems requiring immediate action. Consisting of members 
from the engineering, manufacturing, quality, and procurement depart- 
ments, a group called the Corrective Action Team met periodically to re- 
view each discrepancy report and to initiate corrective action or to verify 
action already taken as a result of the informal liaison maintained between 
shop and field. The Martin design groups learned as much, if not more, 
from success as they did from failure. One of the project’s most successful 
flights, that of T V 4 ,  for example, engendered more remedial action than 
any other single flight. 
Thanks to Martin’s intensive follow-up activity, Vanguard’s fourth 
mission vehicle was considerably better than its predecessors. Launched on 
17 February 1959, SLV4 succeeded in establishing in orbit the 20-inch, 
23.7-pound satellite now known as Vunguurd 11. Not that SLV4 was a 
completely satisfactory vehicle in the eyes of its conscientious progenitors. 
Its payload, Vunguard 11, exhibited an uridesirable tumble rate. Telemetered 
data indicated that this had occurred because, following separation of the 
payload from the third stage, remnants of solid propellant remained in the 
rocket. When these ignited, they overtook and “nudged” the satellite, 
creating the undesirable tumble rate. Concluding that the trouble arose 
as the result of interference between the spring and a sharp shoulder on the 
separation device, GLM technicians placed in the separation hardware a 
thin metal sleeve. Their objective was to prevent binding in the succeeding 
mission vehicles, but although the identical problem did not present itself 
again SLV-5 and SLV-6 failed. SLV-5 was unable to orbit a 13-inch 
magnetometer and an expandable aluminum sphere because pitch-attitude 
control of the second stage was lost during first-stage separation. The re- 
sulting tumbling motion in the pitch plane aborted the flight. SLV-6 was 
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SLV-I was the first of the “operational” 
Vanguard launch vehicles. Left, the 
second stage, the “brains” of the 
vehicle, being hoisted into place; below, 
the third stage being lowered onto the 
stack; bottom, the launch on 27 May 
1958, which failed at second-stage 
burnout. 
unable to orbit a 20-inch, 23.8-pound payload because a restriction in the 
propellant tank pressurant lines created a rapid decay of tank pressures 
immediately after second-stage ignition, followed by bursting of the pres- 
surizing gas tank.l4 
The flight testing of SLV-6 on 22 June 1959 reduced Project Van- 
guard’s arsenal to only two vehicles. One of these, TV-2BU-a left-over 
backup vehicle-was no longer usable. Set aside for exhibition purposes, 
TV-2BU stands today in rocket alley, between the Air and Space Museum 
and the Arts and Industries Building of the Smithsonian Institution in 
Washington, D.C. The other remaining vehicle was TV4BU, the left-over 
backup test vehicle that the Martin Company had converted to mission 
status. The first two stages of this vehicle, as converted, reflected all the 
modifications that GLM had made in the Vanguard mission vehicles to cor- 
rect deficiencies discovered in flight. In addition it was equipped with a 
new third stage. The top stage of all previous Vanguard vehicles had been 
the solid-propellant rocket motor designed and fabricated by the Grand 
Central Rocket Company. Grand Central’s rocket consisted of a steel 
cylinder with a very thin-0.030-inch-skin, a hemispherical forward dome, 
and an aft dome fairing into a steel exit nozzle. At the center of the forward 
dome a shaft acted as the forward spin axis and supported the satellite. 
For TV4BU the Allegany Ballistics Laboratory had built and tested a new 
solid-propellant third stage. Its shape was similar to the Grand Central 
rocket, but both its case and nozzle were made of glass-reinforced plastic. 
Theoretically, according to project engineers, as a satellite-launcher TV- 
4BU was as perfect as a vehicle of its thrust and configuration could be, 
and hopes were high at Cape Canaveral when in September 1959 prepara- 
tions began for what was to be the Vanguard crew’s final launch attempt. 
On the eighteenth of that month theory became reality. TV4BU sent into 
orbit the fully instrumented 52.25-pound satellite now known as Vunguard 
111, along with its 42.3-pound third-stage motor case. The vehicle per- 
formed almost exactly as predicted. Thorough analysis of the flight brought 
forth no recommendations for change. In only fourteen launch attempts, 
the members of Project Vanguard had created an “operational” vehicle, 
capable of putting a 100-pound payload into orbit with a perigee of 180 
miles.16 
T o  appreciate more comprehensively the significance of this accom- 
plishment calls for a glance at the work of the public information officers- 
the PIOs-assigned to the project. In charge of this activity throughout 
most of the program was Larry G. Hastings, who prior to joining Vanguard 
in the fall of 1957 had been with the Public Appearances Branch of the 
Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. A tall and generously proportioned 
man, Hastings’ amiable manner and round face curtained a tough and agile 
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SLV-3 was launched 26 September 1958, from the new movable firing 
structure. T h e  velocity of the third stage fell short of orbital velocity. 
mentality. Assisting him was Mike Harloff, who came to Vanguard in May 
1955, from the Headquarters of the Civil Air Patrol at Bolling Air Force 
Base. 
Professionally both men were well seasoned, but a decade later both 
would admit in Hastings’ words, that “Vanguard produced situations for 
which we could find no precedents in our experience.” In the beginning, 
the two PIOs developed information procedures as they went along. “A 
project official might give us a ring,” Harloff has recalled. “ ‘Fellows,’ he’d 
say, ‘here’s a new problem. How do we handle it?’ We had to come up with 
an answer, so we’d say ‘Handle it this way’ or ‘Handle it that way.’ Then 
and there the ‘this way’ or ‘that way’ became public relations policy.” 
Many problems were bound to arise from the schizophrenic nature of 
the program. On the one hand Vanguard was a part of the International 
Geophysical Year. As such its operations and its scientific findings were, so 
to speak, public property. On the other hand national security required 
that some elements of the undertaking, notably the components of the 
launching vehicle, be withheld from unauthorized scrutiny. In their effort 
to preserve the fragile line between what could be told the public and 
and what could not, the information officers had the able guidance of James 
J. Bagley, head of the Security Review Branch of NRL and his assistant, 
H. W. “Ott” Ottenstroer. For each launch at Cape Canaveral, the Van- 
guard Project set up a crude communications control center for Project 
officers and the PIBs in and alongside a wooden shack-“of outhouse- 
dimensions,” according to Harloff, and some 1,200 feet from the Vanguard 
pad, well within the danger zone. Here they took turns manning the phone 
over which they relayed information for dissemination to reporters cover- 
ing the event both at the Cape and at the NRL news center in Washington. 
On these occasions, patient and understanding Jim Bagley was on hand. 
Every now and then the NRL security expert would tap the shoulder of the 
P I 0  at the phone, a signal that the infokmation he might be about to relay 
for use by the reporters might trespass on classified domain. 
Even had Project Vanguard been free of security elements, its scientific 
status would have been a source of friction to the news media at times. 
Since Vanguard was a research and development program, its hoped-for 
accomplishments could not be reliably forecast. “To ask us when we are 
going to put up our next satellite,” director Hagen once remarked, “is at 
this point somewhat like asking medical researchers when they are going to 
find a cure for cancer.” Like all experimenters, the Vanguard people could 
not say for certain what they were going to do until they did it. Obviously 
the policy of refusing to make public their unstable launch dates in advance 
was amply justified in those early days of the space age, It was scarcely cal- 
culated, however, to make life easy for Hastings and Harloff, one of whose 
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Vanguard I1 was put into orbit by SLV-4 on 
17 February 1959. Shown are the satellite in 
position, the launch, and “birdwatchers”: left, 
Robert Schlechter, head of the Martin Co. 
field crew; center, Captain Peter Horn, 
Director of NRL; and, far right, Richard 
Porter of GE and Daniel Mazur. 
, 
This photo of Vanguard I1 in orbit was taken by the Smithsonian’s 
Baker-Nunn camera emplaced at the combined radio and optical 
tracking station at Woomera, Australia. 
jobs was to cope with the gripes of some reporters, plagued by deadlines 
and editors hungry for “hard news” about the just-dawned space age. 
A painful example of the tensions inherent in this situation is found 
in one of the misunderstandings that arose following the explosion of TV-3 
in December 1957. At that time, one reporter seems to have made sub- 
stantial effort to set the record straight. Writing in England’s Manchester 
Guardian,16 Alistair Cooke pointed out that true to their established prac- 
tice, the Vanguard people had NOT announced the “great event” in advance. 
The premature release of the scheduled launch date of TV-3 was the re- 
sult of a “leak,” and NOT an announcement. Lyndon Johnson, the then 
Democratic leader of the Senate, clearly reflected worldwide feelings when 
he was quoted by Cooke as saying, “I shrink a little inside of me when the 
United States announces a great event and it blows up in our face. Why 
don’t they perfect the satellite and announce it after it is in the sky?” 
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Launch of Vanguard I11 on 18 September 
1959 by T V 4 B  U, ending Project Vanguard's 
flight program. Below, sketches of the three 
successful Vanguard satellites. 
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A source of unending irritation to the Vanguard team, and the PIOs in 
particular was the practice of some scientists not connected with the 
project to talk freely when approached for comment on Vanguard. Since 
they seldom, if ever, had access to the full picture of what was going on, 
their remarks were often misleading and sometimes unbelievably bizarre. 
T o  counter this stream of incorrect speculation, the information officers 
evolved techniques designed to eliminate error and to discourage speculation 
by placing correct, unclassified information in the hands of reporters as 
rapidly as circumstances permitted. T o  this end they prepared a simple, yet 
specific information plan for each launch for use by NRL and DoD per- 
sonnel. This contained instructions as to what project official should be 
phoned for what type of data. In addition, they prepared in advance for 
issuance to newsmen a series of so-called “contingency statements.” One such 
statement, for example, began with the words, “The Vanguard rocket was 
launched at today. (seconds) (minutes) after 
launch it (exploded) (fell back) (achieved orbit) ,” etc. Another statement 
was designed to take care of delays in meeting a scheduled launch date, this 
statement containing a blank space in which to record the reasons. After a 
launch or a postponement, when a reporter called in, he was quickly pro- 
vided accurate information, based upon the appropriate contingency state- 
ment. 
After the explosion of TV-3, the job of rebuilding the shattered public 
image of Project Vanguard was one long uphill climb. The orbiting of 
Vanguard I on 17 March 1958, of Vunguard II on 17 February 1959, and of 
Vanguard I11 on the following 18 September-even together, these successes 
failed to blot from the public’s consciousness the picture of TV-3 bursting 
into raging flame on its launch pad. On the eve of TVABU, the launch that 
successfully resulted in Vunguurd III, one reporter filed a story, the lead of 
which opened with these words: ‘‘Another ill-fated Vanguard stands poised 
on its pad at Cape Canaveral.” Chancing to meet the author of this piece 
shortly after its publication, Hastings lost his customary geniality and heat- 
edly said, “You must have knowledge that none of us on the Project have, 
and since you seem to have this advance information that the launch will 
fail, I think you have a duty as a citizen and taxpayer to call Washington and 
advise them that this launch should be scrubbed.” So taken aback was the 
reporter that his only reaction was a feeble, “Say, you’re mad about this, 
aren’t you?” 
During the life span of the project, the public relations officers 
undoubtedly had much to be “mad” about. “Our main problem,” Hastings 
has commented, “was the fact that Vanguard had the unique position in 
those early days of the space age of being a public, or basically unclassified 
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project. Vanguard was the only ‘open project,’ so it bore the brunt of the 
national displeasure with early space failures.” 17 
Under these circumstances, the Vanguard public information officers 
could only do their best, from day to day, to tell the true story as it devel- 
oped, taking what satisfaction they could from the knowledge that just as the 
Vanguard scientists and engineers were pioneering space-age hardware and 
procedures, they were also among the pioneers in space-age public relations. 
Following the launching of TV4BU in the fall of 1959, America’s first 
purely scientific satellite program came to an end. In the language of official- 
dom it was “phased out” with practically all the NRL members of the 
project assuming positions with the various research and development pro- 
grams of NASA. In the minds of those who were with the project more or 
less from start to finish, it remains vividly alive to this day. Its annual dinners 
on the seventeenth of March, anniversary of the launching of Vanguard I, 
draw in the neighborhood of a hundred of the team members, as well as 
veteran reporters who had sympathized with their efforts, to swap cherished 
reminiscences and to replay old Vanguard jokes. Dan Mazur ,speaks for all of 
them when he says that “for the great majority of us old Vanguard hands, 
putting up those rockets was never a job. It was a way of life.” l8 
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13 
T H E  NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES AND T H E  SCIENTIFIC 
FOR THE NATIONAL Committee on the IGY and the Academy’,s satellite panel, 
the United States government’s determination in fall 1957 to accelerate the 
American launching program had caused simultaneously satisfaction and 
apprehensiveness. Glad as scientists were to have their cherished project 
given a priority long denied it, they were uneasy lest haste to “get something 
up there” result in shortcuts that would lessen the quality of the scientific 
returns.l The intensive work put into tracking the two Sputniks and ex- 
trapolating scientific data from them proved the reliability of the Minitrack 
system, despite the differences in the radio frequency the Russian trans- 
mitters employed. It also established the utility of Moonwatch and Moon- 
beam operations and within a few weeks netted some useful geodetic 
information.2 But the mandate to hurry up American launchings placed an 
additional burden on the scientists responsible for other phases of the 
American program. 
In late October 1957 while waiting for official word of what the White 
House would authorize as a backup for Project Vanguard, the Working 
Group on Internal Instrumentation discussed the possibilities for the future. 
Repeating the suggestion that the panel’s ad hoc group had tendered to the 
USNC nine months before? Homer Newel1 opined that the United States 
should establish an “Astronautical Laboratory” under civilian control to 
direct a long-range space program. Here was the second mention of the 
scheme that would become reality a year later with the organization of 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Meanwhile men at 
the Academy had to struggle with the problems immediately confronting 
them. Anticipating DoD consent to the use of the Army’s Jupiter-C rocket 
as a satellite launcher, the panel had to decide which experiments to 
257 
switch to the Explorer and what redistribution to make of the remainder 
among Vanguard satellites. With a bigger payload in prospect, there 
was also the question of whether to sponsor the development of further 
experiments for installation in IGY birds. And should the panel support 
ionospheric studies that would require transmitters and receivers operating 
on longer wavelengths than the 108 mc chosen for Vanguard? At the same 
time the IGY secretariat must issue reports to other National Committees on 
orbital data acquired from Sputnik and forward for CSAGI approval Fred 
Whipple’s proposal that the nomenclature of IGY satellites consist of the 
year, a Greek letter, and, when appropriate, a number indicating the degree 
of brightness for each in turn-for example, 1957 Alpha for the first 
Sputnik. The strong probability that Soviet scientists would not release 
their findings until they had completed a thorough analysis led the panel 
and USNC, on the other hand, to postpone overtures for an exchange of 
technical and scientific data with the U.S.S.R.4 
Formal authorization of two Explorer shots as a backup for Vanguard 
came in early November. Pickering had pointed qut to the satellite panel 
six months before that the State University of Iowa experiment would lend 
itself fairly easily to use in the Jupiter-C pay l~ad ,~  but now he warned that 
the rapid spin rate of the Explorer satellite would jeopardize the perform- 
ance of George Ludwig’s cleverly designed tape recorder and playback 
mechanism. WhiIe the Jet Propulsion Laboratory stood ready to make the 
necessary adaptations, the time available would be too short to overcome that 
hazard in an Army satellite if it was to be launched in January. The only 
way to proceed was to omit the command receiver and the memory device 
and rely instead upon continuously operating telemetry to relay signals to 
ground stations. Sacrifice of the storage device would mean the loss of much 
of the scientific data, since ground receivers could record them only when the 
satellite was passing over the tracking stations. This circumstance might de- 
feat one of the primary purposes of the’experiment, namely the determina- 
tion of the latitude effect of cosmic radiation. Two factors, however, tipped 
the balance. Of the packages planned for the first four Vanguard flights, only 
two were in the last stages of testing at the Naval Research Laboratory, one 
containing the Lyman-alpha and environmental studies, the other the 
cosmic ray observations and meteoritic measurements; the former would 
need more extensive and therefore more time-consuming changes to fit into 
the Explorer configuration than would the latter. The second inducement 
was the Army’s promise to supply at the earliest possible moment a Jupiter-C 
vehicle so modified as to accommodate the data storage equipment omitted 
from the first Explorer. As the Army satellite was to remain attached to the 
casing of the fourth-stage rocket after burnout, the eighty- by six-inch 
cylinder-shaped body presumably would be no more difficult to track 
optically than the twenty-inch spherical Vanguard. So the TPESP voted 
for the transfer, provided Van Allen and his colleagues concurred. Van Allen 
was on an icebreaker in the South Pacific. The Navy was unable to com- 
municate with the ship by radio, whereupon someone suggested sending him 
a Western Union telegram. T o  everyone’s astonished amusement, the wire, 
relayed via Australia, reached him and he immediately sent back his ap- 
proval of the switch. Part of the instrumentation for measurements of inter- 
planetary matter was also to go into the first Explorer.6 
The press version of the transfer caused some heart-burning at the 
Naval Research Laboratory, for when Robert Baumann, who had done 
much of the work on the engineering layout of the instrument package, 
handed the pot over to William Pickering of JPL, the newspaper story gave 
no hint that the Vanguard team had spent months in working out reliable 
temperature controls, in testing the scientific instrumentation, and in pro- 
ducing the ingeniously miniaturized package. The caption of the accom- 
panying photograph labeled the pot in Pickering’s hands: “The 20-pound 
satellite the Army hopes to launch.” So far from realizing that Vanguard 
had contributed anything at all to the later success of Explorer, much of the 
American public thereafter assumed that the Army, notably Wernher von 
Braun with a minor assist from JPL, had prepared the Explorer payload 
from start to finish and in less than eleven weeks. Inasmuch as George Lud- 
wig and Jet Propulsion Laboratory engineers undertook the redesign and 
the testing, the assumption was unjust to them also. 
The panel meanwhile had little choice about reshuaing the packages 
to fly in the Vanguard satellites. In keeping with earlier plans, the gauges for 
environmental studies and the ionization chamber for the Lyman-alpha 
experiment should have the first priority. At Newell’s suggestion, however, 
with Herbert Friedman’s endorsement, the panel approved preparation of a 
solar x-ray experiment as an alternative to the Lyman-alpha, since the sub- 
stitution would necessitate only minor changes sin the ionization chamber 
and could easily constitute package I a; in fact, extreme solar activity at the 
time of launching might make I a more valuable than package I. The cloud- 
cover experiment was to go into package 11: the magnetometer and the 
NACA inflatable sphere, provided they were ready in time, were to be the 
next flown. Suomi’s radiation balance equipment was to make up package 
IV. If, before the expiration of the IGY, additional launchings were to 
provide space for other projects, one or more of those on the backup lists- 
Singer’s, JPL’s, or the heavy nuclei experiment under development by 
Martin A. Pomerantz of the Bartol Foundation and Groetzinger of RIAS- 
would be the logical choice. Just as the panel was unwilling to recommend 
cutting short the tests of the scientific instruments to be flown, so, with four 
of the eighteen months of the IGY already gone, members saw the im- 
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practicality of looking for new, still undeveloped, onboard experiments. 
They stood by that decision even after Sputnik I1 carrying the dog Laika 
on her week-long journey evoked questions about expanding the American 
program to include experiments in the life sciences. Although a biologist at 
the National Institutes of Health had already submitted a proposal to study 
the effects of radiation on yeast cells in the vacuum of space, and although 
the Vanguard scientific group thought the package would fit into the 6.4- 
inch satellite, the panel concluded that that experiment, like other more 
complex new schemes, would have to await a post-IGY program.8 
Nevertheless, as the Soviet satellites with their 20- and 40-mc radio trans- 
missions opened up a unique opportunity for radio propagation studies and 
ionospheric research, the TPESP believed it could not ignore that promising 
field of investigation. Accordingly it set up a Working Group on Satellite 
Ionospheric Measurements under the chairmanship of Alan Shapley of the 
Bureau of Standards to recommend particular projects. Most of the studies 
would not require changes in the instrumentation within the satellites and 
would rely on the use of ground receivers atturfed to the longer wave- 
lengths of Russian radio transmissions. Although the panel envisaged the 
possibility of later putting into American satellites 20- and 40-mc trans- 
mitters in addition to the far more accurate 108-mc-an eventuality that 
materialized in October 1959 in the last ICY bird put into orbit-the bulk 
of the work would concentrate on the data to be acquired from Sputniks. 
The ionospheric studies were thus ancillary to, rather than an intrinsic part 
of, the American satellite program. Still, in early 1958 the panel endorsed 
eight ionospheric projects and undertook to obtain grants to support them. 
Added to other expenses unforeseen earlier, the cost increased the demands 
on the ICY b ~ d g e t . ~  
Money indeed posed a problem to the United States National Commit- 
tee at every turn in the months following the appearance of Sputnik I. 
Within the first three weeks, Newel1 tdld the panel that the costs of track- 
ing and anaIyzing the telemetry signals from Sputnik were outrunning 
Vanguard’s financial resources, while Whipple estimated that Moonwatch 
would have to have at least $50,000 more a year, and as much as $200,000 
might be necessary to expedite delivery of the Baker-Nunn cameras. The IGY 
committee must also find money to cover the expense of completing the engi- 
neering and testing of instrumentation for backup experiments. Changing 
over the cosmic ray apparatus to fit Jupiter C would alone cost about $161,- 
200, considerably more than the $106,375 allotted to construction of the 
original. There was also the matter of solar cells. Although the Explorer 
would have to depend on conventional batteries inasmuch as redesign of the 
circuitry in its payload would delay an early flight, the panel was gratified to 
learn that the six-inch grapefruit to be launched by the first complete Van- 
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guard test vehicle was to carry six solar cells. The wisdom of providing for 
solar power in future American satellites seemed self-evident, despite the 
additional cost consequent upon the longer period of time during which 
radio tracking stations and data reduction centers would have to operate.1° 
New expenses meanwhile were growing out of the necessity of mailing out 
from the Academy thousands of pieces of literature and individual letters in 
answer to inquiries from people all over the country; good public relations 
forbade ignoring either the school child’s or the influential citizen’s request 
for information. 
On top of all these demands, in the opinion of the Academy’s IGY Com- 
mittee, larger sums should go into final interpretation of the scientific find- 
ings after reduction of the raw data. John A. Simpson, professor of physics 
at the University of Chicago, called this last phase all-important, as it con- 
cerned “the truly scientific aspects of the work.” Foreign scientists, Simpson 
contended, could exploit the data assembled by American experimenters un- 
less generous grants enabled the latter to spend time on “the fundamentals 
of research growing out of the IGY program . . . . Many nqw scientific dis- 
coveries await the full analyses of these data.” l1 The United States must not 
neglect the final harvest. Hence, whereas the TPESP concluded that a $2.2 
million supplementary appropriation would suffice, the National Committee 
believed $3.2 million necessary. Alan Waterman, however, remembered the 
assurances he had given Congress in 1956 that the universities would meet 
most of the costs of interpreting and publishing scientific results; the Science 
Foundation submitted a request for $2.2 million in January 1958. On 31 
March the President signed the bill appropriating an additional $2 million 
for the IGY, and somewhat later the USNC itself pared $294,334 from the 
amount allotted to the expanded and accelerated program. By then the 
United States had three satellites orbiting the earth.12 
Rejoicing over the triumphant flight of Explorer I on 31 January 1958, 
the much less touted orbiting of Vunguurd I forty-five days later, and Ex- 
plorer HI’S performance on 26 March calmed public furor over the Ameri- 
can program without noticeably lessening popular interest in what would 
come next. If much of the public was primarily eager to read of or see on TV 
further American exploits, and if Moonwatchers and Moonbeamers waited 
impatiently for chances to exercise their tracking skills on new satellites, 
scientists were above all anxious to learn what the accumulating data re- 
layed to earth added up to. By 3 April, when the Academy’s panel met to 
assess accomplishments to date and consider future plans, few precise data 
were on hand. Those from the cosmic ray apparatus in Explorer I, 1958 
Alpha, were confusing and, because it had not carried a storage device as 
originally planned for Vanguard, about eighty-five percent of the signals 
were lost, not received at ground stations. Most of the information obtain- 
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able from the scantily instrumented six-inch Vanguard, 1958 Beta 2, had to 
derive from analysis of its orbit and was still incompiete. Explorer I1 had 
failed to orbit. Although the instruments in Explorer 111 were working 
fairly well and its tape recorder and storage mechanism were enabling Mini- 
track and microlock stations by interrogation to receive about eighty per- 
cent of the telemetered signals, the results were as puzzling as and largely 
duplicated those from 1958 Alpha. Tentative reports on Dubin’s experiment 
were interesting but still inconclusive. Meaningful interpretations of what 
the American satellites were revealing would have to await more intensive 
study.la 
Dubin, however, was able to present at the Second Astronautics Con- 
ference in April a paper entitled “Cosmic Debris of Interplanetary Space” 
in which he discussed his initial findings. The signals recording the quan- 
tity, spatial distribution, and size of interplanetary matter colliding with 
Explorer I and Explorer I11 were easier to understand than those coming 
from the cosmic ray apparatus. The gauges for micrometeoritic measure- 
ments indicated fairly dearly that the average influx of particles of as much 
as ten microns in diameter was not more than one per thousand per square 
meter per second, while the influx of particles with diameters of four to nine 
microns was about ten times greater. Readings from twelve days of opera- 
tion of the equipment in Explorer I showed very much higher rates of im- 
pact during about eight hours of every twenty-four than occurred during 
the remaining sixteen hours. The experimenters’ hypothesis ran that 
“meteor showers” accounted for the difference, an explanation substantiated 
by ionospheric observations made at several ground stations, notably at 
White Sands, New Mexico. Extrapolation then permitted estimates that the 
earth may have a daily accretion of up to 10 million kilograms of cosmic 
dust. Later studies would confirm this thesis.l* 
Van Allen and his associates, on the other hand, were excited and baffled 
by the data coming in from the 1968 Alpha and Gamma satellites. At 
altitudes below 1,000 kilometers, the readings obtained from the Geiger 
counters were consistent with known theories of cosmic ray activities, but 
above 1,000 to 1,200 kilometers very high counting rates occurred and then 
at periods fell abruptly to essentially zero. At a special session of the Ameri- 
can Physical Society at the Academy on 1 May Van Allen gave a paper in 
which he described the enigma. The cause, he noted, might be malfunction- 
ing equipment, but that explanation seemed invalid because the instru- 
mentation in Explorer I differed from that in Explorer III; the latter carried 
a tape recorder. Possibly the satellites passed through regions to which few 
cosmic rays could reach, but Van Allen thought that “extremely unlikely.” 
The only remaining explanation, and the one Van Allen concluded must be 
correct, was that the Geiger counter tubes encountered such intense radiation 
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during the high-altitude portions of the orbits that the detectors had to 
operate above the overload level, greater than 35,000 counts per second. 
Analysis indicated the existence of radiation consisting in part of energetic 
particles, presumably protons and electrons, in geomagnetically trapped 
orbits. Further exploration of this phenomenon would greatly help scientists 
to understand it fully.15 
Explorer IV, launched in late July at a fifty-degree inclination to the 
equator in order to establish a different orbit, consequently carried one 
Geiger counter shielded with lead and one unshielded counter capable of 
handling 1,500 times the radiation intensity that had saturated the de- 
tectors in the first two Explorers; it also contained two scintillation counters, 
one to measure approximately the total energy and the other to count the 
incident corpuscular radiation. As the data came in, a plotting of the 
counting rates with reference to the earth’s magnetic fields revealed clearly 
and unambiguously a radiation zone related to the lines of force of the 
geomagnetic field. Since the Advanced Research Projects Agency in the De- 
partment of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commissiqn conducted in 
August a rocket test which produced a small high-altitude nuclear explosion, 
scientists had the additional benefit of data showing the effects of artificially 
introduced radiation of a known quantity and energy spectrum. By means of 
these observations and extrapolation, the State University of Iowa team 
mapped out the contours of the radiation zone and concluded that its 
structure must be more complex than they had suspected earlier. Deep space 
Pioneer probes launched by powerful rockets during the autumn of 1958 then 
enabled the experimenters to chart with some certainty what came to be 
known as the Van Allen radiation belts. This, the most significant scientific 
discovery achieved during the IGY, gave the United States a “first” in space 
exploration that wiped out most of the sting of having been second to the 
U.S.S.R. in putting a satellite into orbit.le Although American experts 
early realized that the first Sputniks might well’have detected the existence 
of this phenomenon, had the Russians launched them at a higher angle of 
elevation to the earth, the American feat was none the less gratifying to the 
National Academy and the American public. 
Each of the first three successful Explorer satellites had a short operating 
life, respectively under four months, less than three months, and just over ten 
weeks. From the six-inch Vunguard I ,  on the contrary, signals continued to 
come through clearly month after month despite the 2,460-mile apogee of 
the orbit; indeed receivers on the earth would be able to pick up the “beeps” 
for the next seven years. But because the grapefruit carried no instrumenta- 
tion except the transmitters and two thermistors on its shell, the scientific 
information it could furnish at first looked meager-at least compared to the 
cosmic ray data deriving from the Explorers-and initially it appeared to be 
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far less useful than that transmitted from the sophisticated Russian Sputnik 
IIZ, 1958 Del taeven  though signals from the latter were extremely difficult 
for American receivers to intercept.’? Nevertheless, the little 1958 Beta 
proved more valuable than most people expected. 
From study of the orbit, scientists at the Naval Research Laboratory and 
the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory were able to report some inter- 
esting discoveries: the earth is not a globe somewhat Battened at the poles, 
but is pear-shaped; the gravitational fields of the moon and the sun modify 
the orbit of earth satellites; the radiation pressure of light from the sun 
affects the movement of a satellite in its orbital path, and magnetic drag 
damps the rotational motion of metallic satellites. The repeated passages 
of the small artificial body enabled experts as time went on to determine the 
dimensions of the earth’s equatorial and polar diameters, to demonstrate 
variations in atmospheric density with the rotation of the sun, and to show 
that the density of the upper atmosphere is far greater than formerly sup- 
posed. In 1961 when Vunguurd I had been in orbit for three years, Hagen 
pointed out that if its life endured through the full solar cycle of eleven 
years, accurate estimates would be possible of the effect of atmospheric den- 
sity upon drag and the satellite’s length of life.’s Although the mercury cell 
batteries ceased to function in June 1958, the solar cells continued to supply 
enough power to transmit signals to the Minitrack stations until 1965; there- 
after optical tracking still permitted observation of orbital decay.I9 The 
probabilities are that the tiny object will remain in orbit for another 240 
years. 
With the highest apogee attained by any IGY satellite, Vunguurd I 
achieved “a highly useful orbit,” as the IGY summary report noted. Unlike 
the cylinder-shaped Explorer satellites, its spherical configuration saved it 
from tumbling and from developing propeller-like motions which hampered 
or prevented precision tracking. “The accelerations of 1958 Beta 2 correlate 
very well with occurrence of solar flares and the radio emission from the 
sun, and also show the 27-day solar revolution. This correlation, discovered 
by Luigi G. Jacchia, an eminent mathematician at the Smithsonian Astro- 
physical Observatory, is interpreted as arising from the heating of the atmos- 
phere by solar radiation, causing the atmosphere to expand, thus increasing 
the density at high altitudes. Jacchia also discovered a bulging of the atmos- 
phere, apparently from radiation heating, wherein the 600-km density level 
rises to about 950 km. The bulge follows the sub-solar point by approxi- 
mately two hours.” While 1958 Beta 2 was not the only American satellite to 
lend itself to calculation of a precise orbit, it furnished the material for a 
score of learned papers which like that of Jacchia, presented to the world 
new scientific knowledge.20 
Hagen declared with justifiable pride that Vunguurd I also contributed 
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“firsts in the space program” by proving the effectiveness of solar cells as a 
source of power and by revealing “the peculiar and operationally annoying 
after-burning of solid propellant rockets.” And, thanks to calibration of the 
crystal-controlled radio-frequency oscillator as a function of temperature, 
the tiny bird equipped only with two transmitters and two thermistors sup- 
plemented the data that came from the Sputniks and Explorer I and 111 
about the extreme of heat and cold encountered under various conditions in 
a satellite or space vehicle.21 
WhiIe the Academy’s Technical Panel, Army and JPL scientists, and 
the Vanguard team were appraising the results of the launchings undertaken 
during the first half of 1958, the administrative arrangements under which 
the satellite program operated underwent change. In February, the Depart- 
ment of Defense transferred the direction of its share from the Assistant 
Secretary for Research and Engineering to the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency, and in April, when the bill to create the new civilian space agency 
came before Congress, the National Academy, in turn, prepared to adopt a 
somewhat different regime for pursuing research in space. During the 
preceding December, members of the TPESP had drafted a report to the 
National Committee recommending a long-term plan, calling first for ex- 
periments adapted to vehicles already under development, progressing step 
by step to “planetary and interplanetary investigations,” and culminating in 
“manned space flight.” The USNC executive committee had approved the 
proposals in January, and the 11 April 1958 issue of Science published them. 
Two months later, President Bronk’s appointment of a Space Science Board, 
with Lloyd Berkner as chairman, to take charge of future planning, relieved 
the panel of one of its major responsibilities. The Working Group on Track- 
ing and Computation and the WGII had already held their last meetings. 
The panel, after its session on 17 July, saw its own usefulness diminishing to 
the vanishing point, not only because passage of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Act on 29 July meant that NASA would soon set up its own scien- 
tific advisory staff, but also because impending changes in IGY management 
were likely sharply to reduce panel activities in channeling information to 
CSAGI. 
At the CSAGI meeting in Moscow in August, the international commit- 
tee announced that the IGY would run till 1960, but after 1958 in somewhat 
different guise: its official name would become the International Geophysical 
Cooperation and a body known as the Comite Internationale Geophysique, 
or CIG, would direct the program. CSAGI would go out of existence at the 
end of June 1959. Although CIG would devote to some fields of IGY interest 
less intensive effort than had prevailed during 1957-1958, clearly the satellite 
program would not suffer, for in October 1958, the International Council 
of Scientific Unions established a new international Committee on Space 
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Research (COSPAR) to deal with fundamental research in the celestial 
regions. Since the attempted launchings of two Explorers and one Vanguard 
satellite had failed during the late summer and fall, the extension of the 
IGY was especially gratifying to Americans,22 
When NASA took over direction of Project Vanguard and the lunar 
probes in October 1958, the new agency absorbed most of NRL’s Vanguard 
team and, through a Space Science Section at NASA headquarters, assumed 
most of the duties of the TPESP’s working groups. As the Academy’s Space 
Science Board handled other responsibilities formerly resting upon the 
panel, the TPESP met only once more, in July 1959, to make a last appraisal 
of the program. The Army Ballistic Missile Agency meanwhile remained in 
charge of Explorer development in Huntsville, at JPL, and at the Cape. At 
the beginning of the International Geophysical Cooperation in January 
1959, Project Vanguard, still located physically at NRL, had four vehicles 
available for satellite flights; ABMA and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
were working to ready the powerful Juno I1 rocket for launching a 100- 
pound satellite.= 
When Vanguard 11, SLV-4, put 1959 Alpha inio orbit on 17 February, 
it flew the cloud-cover experiment. The sensor system worked well, indi- 
cating in considerable detail the variations of the reflected earth radiation 
received by the satellite, but the data proved difficult to reduce because the 
satellite developed a large precession that caused it to move erratically, shift- 
ing its attitude relative to the earth.24 Although the experimenters were 
therefore unable to make a complete mapping of the earth’s cloud cover, 
the experience gained from the flight helped in designing and carrying out 
later meteorological experiments. Three unsuccessful American launching 
attempts, two Vanguard and one Explorer, followed before Vanguard 111, 
1959 Eta, began its orbit on 18 September.25 As this was the last of the seven 
launch vehicles built under Navy aegis for the IGY, and as NASA decided 
not to commission more, Project Vanguard came to an official end shortly 
after this flight.26 
Equipped with the Allegany Ballistic Laboratory’s third-stage rocket 
with a fiberglass casing and nosecone, Vanguard III rose with a fifty-six 
pound payload, a weight made possible by the lightness of the fiberglass and 
by leaving the casing attached to the satellite during orbital flight instead 
of using a separation device. The twenty-inch sphere had a lower sector made 
of polished aluminum and an upper of fiberglass with a twenty-six-inch 
fiberglass tube projecting from it to support a magnetometer; it accommo- 
dated also the instruments for the solar x-ray and the Lyman-alpha experi- 
ments and the gauges for environmental study. The Lyman-alpha and solar 
x-ray experiments produced nothing useful because electrons in the Van 
Allen radiation belt swamped the ionization chambers with particles whose 
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energies exceeded 150 keV. A seventy-day monitoring of temperature re- 
corded changes ranging from about 40°C to -2°C; the average was about 
20°C. No meteoritic penetration of the shell occurred, inasmuch as pressure 
readings remained constant. The impact rate of interplanetary matter, on 
the other hand, was highly variable, during one brief interval running as 
high as 1,900 an hour; a preliminary analysis put the influx of cosmic dust 
impinging upon the earth at about 10,000 tons a daysz7 
Of the more than 4,200 magnetometer signals received during 1959 
Eta’s eighty-four day flight, 2,872 were designated as a “prime data” set on 
the basis of quality and freedom from possible coded time errors. This set 
permitted charting the magnetic field with greater accuracy than ground 
measurements provided. The proton magnetometer, moreover, acted as a 
receiver for “whistler” signals in the 0.4- to 10-kc range and for a few 
“risers.” The whistlers, very low frequency signals, came from dispersed 
lightning-produced ionospherics; the risers, according to some interpreta- 
tions, were radiation from trapped particles. These observations enabled 
analysts to estimate electron densities above the F-peak of the ionosphere, to 
check theories of whistler propagation, and to study the conditions that 
allowed propagation of very low frequency signals from the troposphere to 
the satellite in the whistler mode. Since six periods of magnetic disturbance 
occurred during the operating life of 1959 Eta, measurements of the effects 
were attempted, but with generally inconclusive results. Greater disturbance 
was observable, however, at the northern and southern limits of the inner 
part of the outer Van Allen radiation belt than at magnetic latitudes greater 
than 25°.28 
The finale of the IGY-IGC satellite program came with the launching 
of Explorer VI1  on 13 October 1959. A first Explorer VI1 had failed in 
July; eighteen months after the inception of the plan, the so-named “heavier 
payload” satellite with seventy pounds of instruments for six experiments 
was at last in orbit. Enormous effort had gone “it0 design of the multiple 
package. As early as April 1958 representatives from the Army Ballistic Mis- 
sile Agency had met with NRL experts in order, in Roger Easton’s phrase, 
“to permit ABMA to learn as much about satellites as possible in the least 
possible time.” As the heavily laden bird was to accommodate a 20-mc trans- 
mitter as well as two 108-mc transmitters, the layout had posed “a stiff prob- 
lem” in arranging the telemetering equipment and the complex scientific 
instrumentation. The Academy’s panel, deviating from its earlier decision to 
sponsor no new experiments for IGY-IGC flights, had requested the inclu- 
sion of instruments designed by Hermann LaGow of NRL to detect, by 
means of cadmium-sulphide photosensitive cells, micrometeoroid erosion 
and penetration. So the second Explorer VI1 z9 carried the NRL solar x-ray, 
Lyman-alpha, and micrometeor detection instruments, an elaboration of Van 
247 
Allen’s and Ludwig’s earlier cosmic radiation apparatus, the equipment for 
Pomerantz’s and Groetzinger’s heavy nuclei experiment, and, sixth, Suomi’s 
sensors for measurement of the earth’s radiation balance which, after the 
failure of the Vanguard SLV-6 launching in June, were redesigned to fit 
into the Explorer package.30 
The results obtained from several of the experiments were disappoint- 
ing. Again Friedman’s ion chambers were flooded by radiation electrons. 
This time, however, by plotting the latitude, longitude, and altitude of the 
points at which the saturation occurred, it was possible to identify trapped 
radiation as the cause and to plan an experiment to be flown in an orbit that 
would not enter the radiation belts. Carried out in June 1960, that scheme 
successfully recorded ultraviolet and solar x-ray radiation from a solar flare 
during its onset and development. In the micrometeoroid detection experi- 
ment in Explorer V U ,  1959 Iota, one of the three Cds cells was damaged and 
deserlsitized during the launching; another, designed primarily for calibra- 
tion of the sunlight penetrating it, was relatively insensitive; and the signals 
received from the third cell were of a character that: precluded reducing the 
data to satisfactory form. For a time, defeat also threatened the acquisition 
of usable readings of the flux of heavy primary cosmic ray nuclei, for the ion 
chamber encountered interference from the solar radiation experiment, and 
the circuitry associated with one channel early underwent a change in mode 
of operation. Although the consequent rather fragmentary data were hard 
to translate, study of recordings made over a six-month period around the 
world in the northern hemisphere eventually permitted plottings of the 
integral energy spectrum and of changes in its shape.3l 
The additional information collected about the Van Allen radiation 
belts, on the other hand, quickly supplemented that assembled from earlier 
satellites. Signals recorded a number of solar-terrestrial-coupled events-the 
arrival of solar protons following their acceleration in a solar flare, for exam- 
ple, and a polar cap display marked by increased ionospheric absorption 
inside the auroral zone. From observations made during a severe geomag- 
netic storm on 29 November 1959 an hypothesis evolved that, when solar 
plasma encounters the earth’s magnetosphere, a distortion of the magnetic 
field occurs in fashion that causes particles normally trapped in the outer 
radiation belt to be “dumped’ out of the belt so as to interact with the 
atmosphere at altitudes below the mirror points and to spread to lower lati- 
tudes. The direct correlation shown by Explorer V1.Z between occurrences 
in the radiation belts and auroral activity in the high atmosphere supported 
the “dumping” theory. The delineation of zones of geomagnetically trapped, 
high-energy particles, to be sure, left many unknowns, but it widened knowl- 
edge of the “population identity” and energy spectrum of the trapped parti- 
cles. And it gave clues to the mechanism of trapping, helped explain the 
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behavior of the belts during solar and interplanetary disturbances, and clari- 
fied the relationships between terrestrial manifestations of solar disturbances 
and activity in the belts.a2 
The measurements of the earth‘s radiation balance were also signifi- 
cant, albeit less complete than Suomi hoped for. Even so, with as many as 
432,000 separate measurements made in a single month, the accumulation 
gave meteorologists more than they could work through in the next seven 
years. As Explorer VZI carried no storage unit, data reduction was difficult. 
Scientists first undertook analysis of the earth’s radiation losses, leaving till 
later the computation of the gains from the sun in the earth’s heat budget; 
the findings on gains were only beginning to emerge at the end of 1965. As 
redesigned for Explorer VII,  the essential instrumentation for this experi- 
ment consisted of glass-coated bead thermistors making contact with the 
sensors, two spheres, and four hemispherical bolometers, that is, electrical 
devices that register minute quantities of radiant heat. The spheres, one 
black-coated and one fitted with a shade to protect it from direct sunlight, 
were mounted on the spin axis of the satellite. The four bolometers were 
placed in the satellite’s equatorial plane close to, but thermally insulated 
from, a mirror so coated as to have high resistance in the ultraviolet. One 
hemisphere, coated white, was more sensitive to terrestrial than to solar 
radiation; two black-coated hemispheres responded about equally to solar 
and terrestrial radiation, while the fourth, coated with gold, responded 
chiefly to solar. 
Although the lack of a data storage unit prevented a synoptic mapping 
of fields of radiation outgoing from the earth, study of the measurements 
indicated that patterns of a large-scale outward flux of radiation exist and 
are related to large-scale features of the weather; cloud cover and circulation 
patterns control the earth’s loss of radiation; and within the atmosphere a 
pronounced vertical divergence of net long-wave radiation occurs. Further 
study permitted meteorologists in the course of’ time to estimate the heating 
and cooling of the atmosphere and to make a beginning on gauging the role 
of differential cooling in supplying atmospheric 
At the official termination of the IGC on 31 December 1959, some three 
weeks after Explorer VI1 had ceased to relay signals to the earth, reduction 
of the telemetered data had not progressed far; meaningful interpretations 
of all the findings would take years. Indeed, in 1967 experimenters would 
still be examining the results of IGY-IGC satellite flights. But by 1960 the 
richness of the scientific harvest from the satellite program was already mani- 
fest to the scientific world. “Space science,” a little ruefully defined by an 
academician as “any scientific inquiry that NASA will pay for,” had come 
into its own. 
249 
An ad hoc committee met at the Boulder Laboratories of the National 
Bureau of Standards, Boulder, Colorado, on 16 December 1959 to discuss 
continued operation of the US. World Data Centers. These centers- 
World Data Center A for Airglow and Ionosphere at Boulder and the one 
for Solar Activity at the University of Colorado-had been set up during 
the ZGY for collection and storage of research data. Present at the meeting 
(left to right): John Lyman, NSF; John R. Winkler, University of 
Minnesota; Homer E.  Newell, Jr., NASA; Alan H .  Shapley, NBS, convenor 
of the meeting and Vice-chairman of the United States National Committee 
for the ZGY; Hugh Odishaw, NAS, and Executive Director of the National 
Committee for the ZGY; and Pembroke Hart, NAS. 
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14 
T H E  FINAL ACCOUNTING 
FOR BILLIONS of years, planet Earth had been accompanied by one celestial 
body in its journey around the sun; in two years at the end of the 1950s 
nineteen new satellites with lifetimes ranging from a few months to more 
than a hundred years were launched.1 In evaluating the scientific accom- 
plishments of the IGY satellite program the layman must feel a sense of 
bewilderment. The terms used to describe experimental goals seem esoteric, 
and the significance of the results and their connection with phenomena on 
earth are even more difficult to grasp. In many respects the layman’s uncer- 
tainty is shared by scientists. The voyages of the IGY satellites were true 
voyages of discovery. Many of the findings were completely unexpected and 
often derived from experiments aimed at completely different phenomena. 
Areas of investigations which had hitherto commanded little attention were 
thrust into the forefront of scientific concern, and scientists found themselves 
learning a new vocabulary and confronting new problems. 
If it is possible to summarize the findings of the satellite program in any 
intelligible way, two statements may suffice: the studies revealed the extent 
of the earth’s influence in space, and at the same time they showed just how 
little we understood of the environment of the earth. Analysis of the motion 
of Vanguard I, for example, by establishing the fact that the earth is not 
spherical but rather has a bulge, disclosed unsuspected stress deep within 
the earth. Analysis of the drag exerted by the atmosphere on Vanguard I 
proved the atmosphere to be far more extensive and variable in extent than 
believed before. Explorer I revealed the complex region of charged particles 
and magnetic fields surrounding the earth. Since the end of the IGY scien- 
tists have studied the nature and extent of the Van Allen belts in detail, but 
physicists themselves as yet understand very little about the processes in- 
volved in the phenomena and their relationship to the more familiar 
atmosphere below. 
If much of the nonscientific public tended to dismiss the results of the 
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other IGY experiments as fragmentary and accordingly inconsequential, 
scientists attributed some importance to all data acquired in this new realm 
of research. In their endeavor to build up a body of knowledge about the 
earth‘s environment, they had to rely to a considerable degree on patiently 
piecing together scraps of information about extraterrestrial space. The IGY 
satellites had begun to pile up evidence about happenings beyond the iono- 
sphere; further investigations promised to establish causal relationships 
among obscure phenomena. The failure of the first two attempts to measure 
variations in Lyman-alpha intensity during a satellite’s orbit had in itself 
proved useful, first by the indication of strength of the radiated electrons 
that flooded the ionization chambers and then, after the plotting of the 
locations at which the saturation occurred, by showing what orbital paths 
a satellite must avoid when seeking data on ultraviolet radiation. Thus a 
third try brought success. 
In appraising the satellite program, it is important to realize how much 
the success of its scientific phases owed to the efforts of the Vanguard team 
and other NRL scientists intimately associated with the project. It was they 
who worked out the principles and methods of thermal control, devised 
electronic equipment of exceptional reliability, and tested every mechanism 
in the packages of experiments. Whether flown in Explorers or Vanguards, 
the experimenters’ apparatus had a dependability that stemmed in no small 
measure from the work lavished upon it at the Laboratory. That several 
experiments failed to produce the kind of data scientists hoped to obtain 
was never due to weaknesses in the construction of the instruments or in the 
telemetry, or to the integration of parts into the satellite structure. The 
adaptations JPL made to fit experiments designed for Vanguard into Ex- 
plorers were skillful, but the basic problems were already solved before JPL 
engineers undertook the assignment. 
What Project Vanguard, as the hardware part of the program, contrib- 
uted to space exploration is widely misunderstood, doubtless partly because 
questions about the might-have-beens obtrude themselves. Some ask, for 
example, if the choice of launching system had fallen on the Army Orbiter, 
and if, as is highly probable, the United States had therefore been first to 
put up a satellite, would not the gains in American prestige have outstripped 
any benefits that ultimately accrued from developing a vehicle employing 
novel features of design and engineering and equipped with miniaturized 
instruments? Or, again, might not long-term progress have been faster if the 
National Security Council had assigned the program a top priority and the 
Department of Defense had then authorized production of the vehicle on a 
crash basis, or if DoD policy-makers had decided to risk the perils of service 
rivalries and made the Army responsible for the launcher, the Navy for the 
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instrumentation, including the telemetry and tracking systems? Others, con- 
versely, raise a very different question: wasn’t the jolt to American pride in 
American technological superiority to all other nations a salutary blow? If 
the United States had beaten the Russian time-table, would not that success 
have perpetuated our national complacency and delayed disastrously the 
reexamination of our educational system and the teaching of mathematics 
and science in our schools? All these speculations tend to becloud judgments 
on Project Vanguard. 
In the opinion of well-informed people, a major handicap that beset 
Project Vanguard from the start was its relegation to a status secondary to 
the ballistic missile program. The White House decree that procurement 
and testing of the satellite vehicle must not interfere with top-priority mili- 
tary projects left the Laboratory and its prime contractor more than once 
in an awkward position; certainly Vanguard’s low priority slowed the flow of 
money and delayed progress on the vehicle in less obvious ways. A number 
of members of the Academy’s IGY committees and panels and some of the 
Laboratory’s staff named three other factors that, in their view, hampered 
Project Vanguard: first, the Martin Company’s taking on tlie Titan contract 
and a consequent dilution of the contractor’s interest in the satellite 
launcher; second, the appointment of a radio astronomer instead of an 
experienced rocket engineer as project director; and, third, the blaze of 
publicity in which the Vanguard teams had to operate, subjecting them 
constantly to Sunday morning quarterbacking and inflating their every 
setback to the proportions of a disaster born of ineptitude or negligence. 
Time has disposed of the once frequently voiced belief that John Hagen 
permitted things to get out of hand, for all the men deeply involved in the 
project have come to see that his handling of Vanguard’s many-faceted 
problems preserved a necessary balance between the scientific and technical 
aspects of the program. Whether the other two conditions cited as obstacles 
were indeed the source of serious trouble may be debated. Had they not 
obtained, one can only conjecture whether Vanguard engineers would have 
bettered their score of placing three satellites in orbit out of eleven tries. In 
any case, insofar as these factors affected Project Vanguard adversely, the 
damage done was chiefly to the time schedule rather than to the ultimate 
performance. The only valid estimate of the degree of success or failure in 
the undertaking must rest upon what the Naval Research Laboratory and 
the Martin Company did accomplish, not upon what a different regime 
might have achieved, or what other circumstances would have permitted 
under Navy aegis. 
Some critics have contended that NRL’s approach to design of the 
launching system was intrinsically faulty: in attempting to employ a first- 
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stage rocket of marginal power, the originators of the plan had to rely on 
over-elaboration, compensating for minimum engine thrust by recourse to 
lightweight materials, miniaturization, and precision work, instead of using 
off-the-shelf components that otherwise would have served as well and at far 
less cost in time. Yet these very limitations led to many of Vanguard’s most 
valuable contributions to the art of rocketry and miniaturization of elec- 
tronic components. The engineering feat of designing, constructing, and 
testing within thirty months a vehicle that could and did launch an earth 
satellite was in itself extraordinary, especially at a time when the art of 
rocketry was still in adolescence. Wernher von Braun, chief architect of the 
Redstone, Jupiter-C, and Juno rockets, called it a miracle. Whereas the 
“man on the street” today is likely to look blank at mention of Project 
Vanguard or else identify it as “that thing that blew up,” James Bridger of 
NRL, when asked how he ranked it, replied: “I’d call it 300 percent success- 
ful. Our job was to get one satellite into orbit during the IGY; we put up 
three.” Ultimately more important were the technological innovations intro- 
duced in Vanguard-advances in design and in the use of materials that 
have influenced rocket engineering for a decade. While one school of thought 
has contended that Vanguard’s mission did not extend to the development of 
models for post-IGY satellite launchers and that such work cannot properly 
count in any assessment of Vanguard achievements, most space engineers 
consider it an important entry on the asset side of the ledger. 
Of the major innovations, the use of miniaturized circuits and batteries 
was one of the most valuable. The solar cells developed by the Signal Engi- 
neering Laboratories and so placed by Vanguard experts on the satellite shell 
as not to interfere with the functioning of the internal instrumentation set 
a new standard of efficiency and accounted for the long operating life of 
Vanguard I. Later satellites produced by NASA have similarly employed 
solar power. The use of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine as fuel in the 
second-stage rocket was another signifidant new departure, as indeed was 
much of the design of the Aerojet rocket. Impressed by the economy and 
utility both of the second stage and the Grand Central Rocket Company’s 
third-stage rocket, the Air Force bought and used them in its Thor-Able 
booster. The fiberglass-encased third-stage motor devised by the Allegany 
Ballistic Laboratory and flown in Vunguard 111 was in turn a pioneering 
development; with a mass ratio of 0.91, it achieved a specific impulse of 251 
seconds, a notable record for a solid-propellant rocket. Furthermore, the use 
of a “strapped-down” gyro platform, the rotatable exhaust jets of the first- 
stage turbopump which ensured efficient roll control, and the C-band radar 
beacon antenna employed on the Thor-Able vehicle all originated with 
Vanguard. Nor can a fair appraisal overlook the importance to the emerging 
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spacecraft industry of the elaborate and original techniques the Martin 
Company developed to define and solve such problems as optimization of 
the trajectory and preflight predictions of the vehicle’s performance.2 
The most striking evidence of Vanguard’s rich legacy to the design of 
later spacecraft came with the appearance of the Delta launcher, built to 
NASA specifications by the Douglas Aircraft Company and first flown in 
May 1960. The Delta second stage is the Vanguard with a few modifications 
-repackaged electronic components, a stainless steel instead of an alumi- 
num thrust chamber, and a new radio guidance system. Delta’s third stage 
is a replica of the Allegany Ballistic Laboratory’s rocket used in the last 
Vanguard. The most versatile and reliable of all American space vehicles, 
Delta between 1960 and the spring of 1968 put into orbit fifty-two satellites 
ranging in type from weather satellites to orbiting solar observatories. “An 
equally important story,” Milton Rosen declared, “can be told about the 
Stadan network, a living descendant of Minitrack, through which flows day 
after day, week after week, year after year, the major portion of NASA’s 
scientific output.” 
Another product of Vanguard experience was a new method of budget 
forecasting and cost reporting specially adapted to contracts in which re- 
search and development features made expenditures peculiarly difficult 
to estimate in advance and hard to keep track of in orderly fashion. This 
scheme to enable the project director to report on contractors’ progress and 
financial needs was inaugurated by Tom Jenkins in the autumn of 1956. 
Under its provisions, the forms sent out by the comptroller to the Martin 
Company, and to the firms with whom the Laboratory had direct contracts, 
contained columns specifying the breakdown of the information required 
monthly. These forms quickly proved helpful to company finance officers 
and a boon to the government. NASA made use of the system, and, after 
Jenkins drafted a study explaining its workings, it was adopted by other 
agencies.4 
Finally, the “development-testing philosophy” worked out at the Naval 
Research Laboratory constituted a contribution to the program that NASA 
recognized as basic and has acted upon consistently. The Laboratory applied 
it both to the vehicle and the payload. After suffering from proven charges 
of careless workmanship in the fabrication of the vehicle, the Martin Com- 
pany in 1958 adopted the standards held up as a must by Commander Berg 
and, in order to proclaim the meticulous exactitude thereafter demanded of 
its manufacturing and inspection units, the company used as its advertising 
slogan: “The margin of error is zero.” While static and flight testing in the 
field differed little in most respects from the routines observed by the Air 
Force and the Army, rigid calibrations of the first-stage engine during static 
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firings and precise procedures of loading the propellant enabled Vanguard 
engineers to keep first-stage propellant outage at a low level without instdl- 
ing an automatic fuel utilization ~ystem.~ After the failure to get the TV-3 
backup into orbit, the Martin and Laboratory staffs always undertook a 
thorough analysis of the performance of every part of every vehicle fired, 
whether the flight was successful or failed. In this way engineers were able 
to identify and correct deficiencies and thus greatly improve the reliability 
of each successive vehicle. 
The techniques of testing the satellite’s instrumentation were still more 
exacting. Assembling equipment that would simulate the conditions to be 
encountered in the vacuum of space and developing processes that would 
reveal the nature of weaknesses in experimenters’ apparatus required scien- 
tific knowledge and expert craftsmanship. From the shake table used in 
measuring vibration resistance to the vacuum tank and the gauges 
employed in registering temperature changes in the satellite placed within 
it, every test device was carefully constructed and operated. Testimony to 
the quality and thoroughness of the procedures lay in the fact that all the 
instrumentation flown in IGY satellites functioned properly. 
All in all, the record is clear. Project Vanguard justified the faith of its 
supporters not only by putting instrumented satellites into orbit during the 
IGY but by developing a vehicle with “growth potential,” and in the proc- 
ess, by advancing the art at a cost in money that, in 1961, looked incredibly 
small to experts. The one black mark against it is that it did not “get thar 
fustest.” Homer Newell’s summary judgment ran: “A failure? Vanguard 
was a resounding success!” 
The oblivion to which most Americans consigned Project Vanguard at 
the end of the 1950s no longer distresses the men who gave three years of 
their lives and ate their hearts out in the endeavor to make Vanguard a 
landmark on the unending road to new scientific knowledge. They know 
that it was and is a landmark. Scientists at the National Academy and experi- 
enced leaders at NASA acknowledge it as a progenitor of all American 
space exploration today. “The overall scientific program developed for use 
with the Vanguard launching system,” stated the satellite panel toward the 
end of its life, “has made possible the total program of space vehicle instru- 
mentation, observation, and data reduction carried out under IGY auspices. 
Additionally, it has provided the original basis of the present expanding 
program of scientific experiments for space research for the United States.” 
True, it did not produce the first artificial satellite to circle the earth; true 
also, the initially rejected launching system nurtured by the Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency and refined by JPL put up the apparatus that netted the most 
valuable data collected during the IGY. But those facts have become largely 
details of history. Recognition of the Explorer achievement should not 
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denigrate Vanguard’s, just as Vanguard’s cannot detract from Explorer’s. 
T o  the pure scientist all that matters is that a new research tool became 
available and its proven utility has ensured its continuing use. To thousands 
of imaginative Americans of the 1960s, the expansion of knowledge of inter- 
planetary and solar space represents a creative undertaking in its own realm 
as inspiring as the work of the cathedral builders of the Middle Ages, 
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sub: UDMH heat transfer stability and igni- 
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and Thomas Jenkins, 19 Mar 1968; GLM 
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NRL Memo Rpt 548, p. 7. 
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ment; conf rpt, 4 Nov 1956, sub: FPS-16 
Radar; interview Hagen, Captain Winfred E. 
Berg, and Thomas Jenkins, 19 Mar 1968. 
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Telemetering System Requirements; Martin 
Semi-Monthly Progress Reports 1 and 2, pp. 
6, 9, 3, p. 4, 7, p. 6; interview, Robert Schlech- 
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Vanguard staff meeting, 2 Dec 1955. 
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‘NRL Memo Rpt 548, pp. 7, 9-10: memo, 
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System; Memg, Robert MacKay, Jr., for 
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Stations; conf rpt, 6 Dec 1955, sub: Progress 
of Antenna Development. See also chapter 9. 
* Minutes, NRL Project Vanguard staff 
meeting, 2 Dec 1955; interview Paul Walsh, 18 
Apr 1967. 
8Conf rpt, 6 Dec 1955, sub: NRL-GLM 
Relationships; conf rpt, 6 Dec 1955, sub: 
Meeting of Scientific O5cer and Operations 
Manager. 
lo Martin Semi-Monthly Progress Letters 6, 
p. 5, 10, p. 2; conf rpt, 19 Jan 1956, sub: Weight 
Optimization Study; NRL Design Specification 
No. 4100-1, Design Specification for Vanguard 
Launching Vehicle, Contract Nonr-1817 (00), 
29 Feb 1956, Appendix 2; interview Paul 
Walsh, 18 Mar 1967. 
Klawans and Burghardt, Vanguard Launch 
Vehicle, pp. 26-28, 40-51. An example of un- 
expected problems encountered in preparing 
the specifications is to be found in Martin 
Semi-Monthly Progress Letter 13, p. 13. 
Interviews: Daniel Mazur, 2 Mar 1967; Alton 
Jones, 14 Mar 1967; and Milton Rosen, 28 
Mar 1967. 
=.See NRL Design Specification No. 4100-1, 
29 Feb 1956, p. 18, and Appendix 2, p. 1; 
interview, Rosen, 28 Mar 1967. Like many 
another decision critically important to the 
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how this agreement came about. Only the 
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Vanguard Launch Vehicle, pp. 51-62; Conf 
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Model Specifications; Comparison of Van- 
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Capt. Berg, 10 Apr 1967. 
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Contract Nonr 1817(00), Return of Amend- 
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l'NRL Design Specification No. 4100-1, 29 
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No. 1 to Contract; Martin Progress Ltr 9, 
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=Ltr, GLM to NRL, 3 Feb 1956, sub: Re- 
quest for Approval of Clearance of Subcon- 
tractors for Third Stage Engine; ltr, NRL to 
GLM, 7 Mar 1956. 
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"NRL Design Specification No. 4100-1, 29 
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and Capt. Berg, 10 Apr 1967. 
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Project Vanguard, p. 33. 
NRL Design Specification No. 4100-1, p. 6; 
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aeInterview, Capt. Berg, 10 Apr 1967. 
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"Zbid., pp. 24-30. 
=Interview, Hagen and Captain Berg, 19 
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29 Mar 1956, and 4100-1, addendum 1, 27 Apr 
1956. 
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Bilf, 1956, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 21 Mar 1956, 
61nterview, John Hagen, 17 Mar 1967. Min 
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(p. 10); note 3 to NRL B-123, June 1957, 
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ment A, p. 2), and 5th mtg, 20 Apr 1956 
(p. 2); Funding History of Project Vanguard, 
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laMin 6th mtg TPESP, 7-8 June 1956, pp. 
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1957. 
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“Min 7th mtg TPESP, 5 Sept 1956, pp. 7-8. 
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=Min 8th Mtg TPESP, 15 Oct 1956, pp. 
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=Min 9th mtg TPESP, 3-4 Dec 1956, pp. 
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min special session TPESP. 5 Dec 1956, pp. 
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‘Cover ltr, James A. Van Allen to Joseph 
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posal for Cosmic Ray Observations in Earth 
Satellites,” Satellite Experiments file, folder 
32.1, Archives of the National Academy of 
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*Interview, James Van Allen, 20 Dec 1967. 
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Dust Erosion of the Satellite Skin,” 20 Oct 
1955, Satellite Experiments file, folder 32.2, 
NAS Archives: IGY USNC. 
6 “Project Vanguard Scientific Research Pro- 
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Funding History of Project Vanguard, end 
85 Interview, Thomas E. Jenkins, 6 Mar 1967. 
88 Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 
Hearings on Supplemental Appropriation Bill 
for 1958, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 2 Aug 1957, p. 
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1955, sub: Technical Program for NSC 5520 
(capability to launch a small scientific satellite 
during IGY); min staff mtg, Project Van- 
guard, 2 Dec 1955. 
6Min staff mtg, Project Vanguard, 2 Dee 
1955. 
E Interview, Robert Schlechter of Martin, 
13 Mar 1967. 
VThe consultations at  Patrick in Sept 1955 
are covered in the following Consultative Serv- 
ice Records (conference reports) in NHF: 
Ser. C-7140-292/55, -293, -294, -295, and -296 
of 15 Sept; and -305, -308, -309, -310, -311, 
-312, and -315 of 29 Sept. Except as otherwise 
indicated further references to the September 
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as Jones Contract). 
18 Conf rpt 4120-125/56 (4124), 26 Mar 1956; 
Vanguard Progress Report 6, p. 1. 
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Nov 1965, pp. 587f; min 4th mtg TPESP 
Working Group on Tracking and Computa- 
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mary of progress; Memo 105 Ser: 9147, Chief/ 
Naval Research to Chief/Naval Operations, 
5 Sept 1957, sub: Project Vanguard Weekly 
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Technology, p. 137. 
!a House of Representatives, Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department 
of Defense Appropriations, Hearings on De- 
partment of Defense Appropriations for 1960, 
part 6, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 Apr 1959, pp. 
62f; memo, Chief/Naval Research to Chief/ 
Naval Operations, 29 Oct 1957, sub: Project 
Vanguard Status Rpt No. 80. 
=Quoted in Medaris and Gordon, op. cit., 
p. 166. 
aJ Ernst Stuhlinger, “Army Activities in Space 
-A History,” IRE Transactions in Military 
Electronics, vol. MIL-4, Nos. 2-3 (Apr-July 
1960), pp. 65f; min 14th mtg TPESP, 1 May 
1957; ltr, Hagen to authors, 9 Jan 1968. 
c4 Stuhlinger, op. cit., Medaris and Gordon, 
NASA Chronology, p. 87; Eisenhower, op. cit. 
(n. 4). p. 210; see also conf rpt 4110-46, 18 
Oct 1957, purpose: to Explore Capability of 
Jupiter Vehicles. 
2F, Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 244 n.; Medaris and 
Gordon, op. cit., p. 155. 
281nterviews with Siry, Rosen, and Berg, 21 
Mar 1968; Medaris and Gordon, op. cit., pp. 
157-167; Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 211; rnin 13th 
mtg TPESP, 22 Oct 1957. 
?-I Interview, Eisenhower, 1966; Medaris and 
Gordon, op. cit., p. 157. See also JUNO [a re- 
port], Pasadena, the Jet Propulsion Labora- 
tory, no date; and Johnson Subcommittee 
Hearings 1957, pt. 1, pp. 207, 319, 374, 5441 
557, and 569. 
=Zbid., pp. 151, 162, 165f, and 318-320; see 
also memo, Sec/Navy to Sec/Defense, 31 Oct 
1957, sub: Project Vanguard. 
28 Klawans and Burghardt, Vanguard Launch 
Vehicle, p. 58f; end (1) ltr, Dir/NRL to Chief/ 
Naval Research, 23 Dec 1957, sub: Preliminary 
Report on TV-3 (cited hereafter as Prelimi- 
nary Report on TV-3), forwarding of; inter- 
views, Bridger, 3 Aug and 13 Nov 1967; ltr, 
Vanguard Project engineer to BAR, Azusa, 
Cal, 25 July 1957, sub: Second Stage Vanguard, 
Status of; Burghardt Ms. Diary, 8-23-57; 
Weekly Progress Report 4104-47, Vanguard 
Planning Office to Vanguard Project Director, 
3 Sept 1957; end to memo for Mr. James 0. 
Spriggs, Office Asst Sec/Def, 17 Sept 1957, sub: 
Draft of Proposed Report to the President, 
Submittal of; conf rpt 4120-498, 16 Sept 1957, 
purpose: Second-Stage Thrust Chamber Coat- 
oP. cit., pp. 119-20, 122, 134-36, 147, 151; 
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ings . . . ; memo, Chief/Naval Research to 
Chief/Naval Operations, 12 Sept 1957, sub: 
Project Vanguard Weekly Status Rpt No. 82; Itr 
4120-558 Ser:01857, Dir/NRL to BAR, Azusa, 
27 Nov 1957, sub: Second Stage Improvement 
Program, Decisions Concerning; encl (1) ltr, 
Dir/NRL to Chief/Naval Research, 27 Nov 
1957, sub: Project Vanguard Weekly Status 
Rpt No. 92. 
“See chapter 11, pp. 197-198, 
a Klawans and Burghardt, Vanguard 
Launch Vehicle, p. 66; Preliminary Report on 
TV-3; NYT, 2 Dec 1957; Martin Monthly 
Progress Letter 18, p. 16; Vanguard Planning 
Office to Vanguard Project Dir, Weekly Prog- 
ress Rpt of 4 Nov 1957; Martin Monthly 
Progress Letter 19, p. 9; encl (1) ltr, Dir/ 
NRL to Chief/Naval Research, 19 Nov 1957, 
sub: Project Vanguard Weekly Status Rpt No. 
91; interview, von Khrmhn, Sept 1961. 
82NYT, 4 Dec 1957; Preliminary Report on 
TV-3. 
Ibid.; NYT, 6 Dec 1957. 
a4Preliminary Report on TV-3; NYT, 7 Dec 
1957; Kurt Stehling, “Vanguard,” in Arthur C. 
Clarke, ed., The Coming of the Space Age 
(see n. l ) ,  pp. 15-20; Klawans and Burg- 
hardt, Vanguard Launch Vehicle, pp. 66f. 
Verses are from Robert Burns’ “To a Mouse,” 
and mileages at AFMTC are given in Itr, 
Commanding Office [PAFB] to Dir/NRL, 17 
Jan 1958, sub: Mileage in Patrick-Cape Area, 
Forwarding of. 
Klawans and Burghardt, Vanguard Launch 
Vehicle, pp. 112f; phone interviews, 17 Nov 
1967, with Richard Porter, Bernard Klawans, 
and N. J. Constantine; NYT, 7 Dec 1957; copy 
of memo in GE files, Klawans to Bridger, 
Burghardt and [Louis] Michelson, 15 Nov 
1960, sub: Revision to Vanguard Flight Test 
History Summary; memo, Code 4101 to Codes 
4100, 4110, 4120, 4160, 2 Jan 1958, sub: TV-3 
Failure. 
“NYT, 7 Dec 1967; interview, Markarian, 
13 Oct 1967; Medaris and Gordon, op. cit.  (see 
n. 19), p. 197; ltr 4100-340, Hagen to All 
Members of the Vanguard Staff, 18 Dec 1957, 
and enclosures. Bronk, speech at tenth an- 
niversary Vanguard dinner, 16 Mar 1968. 
Chapter 12 
1 For details concerning this transfer, see 
chapter 13, pp. 238-239. 
Lloyd V. Berkner, op. cit. (see ch. 7 ,  n. 17). 
p. 478; Medaris and Gordon, op. cit. (see ch. 
11, n. 19), pp. 267, 174, 190, 197f, and 200; 
Johnson Subcommittee Hearings, pp. 557-60 
and 1704; memo, Chief/Naval Research to 
Chief/Naval Operations, 2 Jan 1957, sub: Proj- 
ect Vanguara Weekly Status Rpt No. 93; min 
15th mtg TPESP, 7 Jan 1958; NYT, 1 Feb 1958; 
ltr, Thomas J. Killiam [Dept/Navy] to 
J. G. Reid, Jr. [National Academy of 
Sciences], 20 Feb 1958. For information on 
the Army’s microlock system, see Corliss, The 
Evolution of STADAN, pp. 57 and 61; and 
W. K. Victor, H. L. Richter, and J. P. Eyraud, 
“Explorer Satellite Electronics,” IRE Transac- 
tions on Military Electronics, vol. MIL-4, nos. 
2-3 (April-July 1960), pp. 83-85. 
* Vanguard Planning Officer to Vanguard 
Director, 17 Dec 1957, Weekly Progress Rpt; 
2d endorsement on GLM Itr 0459 of 5 Mar 
1958, Dir/NRL to Chief/Naval Research, 1 
Apr 1958, sub: Contract Nonr 1817 (00) , Proj- 
ect Vanguard Restoration‘ of Launching Com- 
plex at AFMTC, Proposal for; memo, Dir/ 
Navy Tests to Office, Information Services, 
Historical Branch, 13 Jan 1958, sub: Vanguard 
Project Case History Rpt, Dec 1957; Van- 
guard Planning Office to Vanguard Project 
Director, 17 Dec 1957, Weekly Progress Rpt; 
memo, Chief/Naval Research to Chief/Naval 
Operations, 23 Dec 1957, sub: Project Van- 
guard Weekly Status Rpt No. 92; Vanguard 
Planning Officer to Vanguard Project Director, 
31 Dec 1957, Weekly Progress Rpt; memo, 
Chief/Naval Research to Chief/Naval Opera- 
tions, 7 Jan 1958, sub: Project Vanguard 
Weekly Status Rpt No. 94; Medaris and Gor- 
don, op. cit. (see ch. 11, n. 19), pp. 206f. 
Johnson’ Subcommittee Hearings, pp. 557% 
560, and 1715; Medaris and Gordon, op. cit. 
(see ch. 11, n. 19), pp. 197f, 200ff, and 218. 
Wernher von Braun, “The Explorers,” in 
ZXth Znternational Astronautical Congress . . . 
1958 Proceedings (Amsterdam, 1959), pp. 9 1 6  
928; NYT, 1 Feb 1958; Medaris and Gordon, 
of. cit., pp. 204-226; min 16th mtg TPESP, 12 
Feb 1958. 
6See chapter 11, p. 207. 
Memo, Chief/Naval Research to Chief/ 
Naval Operations, 15 Feb 1958, sub: Project 
Vanguard Weekly Status Rpt No. 98; Klawans 
and Burghardt, Vanguard Launch Vehicle, pp. 
112f; Medaris and Gordon, op. cit., p. 229. 
8Stehling, Project Vanguard, pp. 190 and 
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206; memo, Chief/Naval Research to Chief/ 
Naval Operations, 25 Feb 1958, sub: Project 
Vanguard Weekly Status Rpt No. 98; Van- 
guard Planning Office to Vanguard Project 
Director, 24 Feb 1958, Weekly Progress Rpt; 
memo, Chief/Naval Research to Chief/Naval 
Operations, 28 Feb 1958, sub: Project Vanguard 
Weekly Status Rpt No. 100; Vanguard Plan- 
ning Office to Vanguard Project Director, 4 
Mar 1958, Weekly Progress Rpt; memos, Chief/ 
Naval Research to Chief/Naval Operations, 
7 Mar and 14 Apr 1958; sub: Project Vanguard 
Weekly Status Rpts Nos. 101 and 106. 
OMin 17th mtg TPESP, 3 Apr 1958; Van- 
guard Planning Office to Vanguard Project 
Director, 17 Mar 1958, Weekly Progress Rpt; 
Stehling, Project Vanguard, pp. 21 1-215; NASA 
Chronology, p. 141; NYT, 18 Mar 1958; memo, 
Chief/Naval Research to Chief/Naval Opera- 
tions, 21 Mar 1958, sub: Project Vanguard 
Weekly Status Rpt. No. 102; Klawans and 
Burghardt, Vanguard Launch Vehicle, pp. 
114f; ltr, Dir/NRL to Dir/ARPA, 15 May 
1958, sub: Scientific Satellite Program. 
lo Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative His- 
(Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1966), pp. 6-40; Al- 
lison Griffith, The  National Aeronautics and 
Space Act: A Study of the Development of 
Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affiirs 
Press, 1962), pp. 9-16; Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
op.  cit. (ch. 11, n. 4),  pp. 257f; NYT, 8 Feb 
1958; Medaris and Gordon, op.  cit. (ch. 11, n. 
19), p. 227. 
uStuhlinger, 09.  n't. (ch. 11, n. 23), pp. 68f; 
Medaris and Gordon, op. c i t ,  pp. 240f. 
"Encl (1), ltr, Chief/Naval Research to 
Comptroller of the Navy, 26 May 1958, sub: 
Statement on Current Status of Project Van- 
guard dated 23 May 1958; ltr, GLM to Chief/ 
Naval Research, 16 May 1958, sub: Contract 
Nonr-1817 (00) , Project Vanguard Modifica- 
tion of TV-lBU to Provide for Satellite Ca- 
pability; ltr, GLM to Dir/NRL, 1 May 1958, 
sub: Contract Nonr-1817 (00) , Project Van- 
guard Employment of High Performance ABL 
Motor in TV4BU; Vanguard Planning O5ce 
to Vanguard Project Director, 12 Apr 1958, 
Weekly Progress Rpt; memo, Chief/Naval Re- 
search to Chief/Naval Operations, 7 Apr 1958, 
sub: Project Vanguard Weekly Status Rpt, 
No. 103; Memo, Chief/Naval Research to 
Chief/Naval Operations, sub: Weekly Status 
Rpt. No. 104; ltr, J. Paul Walsh to Hon. [U.S. 
tory Of NASA, 1958-1963, NASA SP-4101 
Rep] David Dennison, 12 May 1958; ltr, T. 
Keith Glennan to John P. Hagen, 29 Sept 
1958. 
15 Memo, Chief/Naval Research to Chief/ 
Naval Operations, 1 May 1958, sub: Project 
Vanguard Weekly Status Rpt. No. 107; ibid., 14 
May 1958, Weekly Status Rpt. No. 10% ltr, 
Dir/NRL to GLM, 11 June 1958, sub: Con- 
tract Nonr 1817 (00) , Project Vanguard, Cor- 
rection of Deficiency; Klawans and Burghardt, 
Vanguard Launch Vehicle, pp. 114f. For dates 
and details on the first three mission-vehicle 
launches, see Appendix I. 
* Klawans and Burghardt, Vanguard Launch 
Vehicle, pp. 116f; interviews, Homer E. New- 
ell, 21 Dec 1967, and Klawans, 9 Jan 1968. 
16 Vanguard Planning 05ce  to Vanguard 
Project Director, 25 Mar 1958, Weekly Progress 
Report; Klawans and Burghardt, Vanguard 
Launch Vehicle, pp. 20 and 116f. 
leg December 1957. 
l7 Public Opinion File, NHF; interview, 
Hastings and Harloff, 5 June 1968. 
28 The tenth anniversary dinner, a very 
special occasion, drew 250 veterans of the 
program, including some members of the 
media. 
Chapter 13 
*Min 14th rntg TPESP, 6 Nov 1957, pp. 
2See chapter 11, p. 195. 
aSee chapter 6, p. 107. 
4Min 7th mtg WGII, 21 Oct 1957; rnin 
13th mtg TPESP, 22 Oct 1957, pp. 2-6. 
GSee chapter 7, p. 124. 
6Min 14th mtg TPESP, 6 Nov 1957. 
'Associated Press releases, 17 Nov 1967. 
sMin 14th mtg TPESP, 6 Nov 1957, pp. 
2-6; and min 16th mtg TPESP, 12 Feb 1958, 
p. 9; interview, John Townsend, 12 Mar 1968. 
OMin 15th mtg TPESP, 8 Jan 1958, pp. 
2 4 ,  9, and rnin 16th rntg TPESP 12 Feb 1958, 
p. 4; IGY Report 21, pp. 560-61. 
l0See n. 4 and chapter 7, pp. 128-129; rnin 
15th mtg TPESP, 8 Jan 1958, pp. 7, 9-10: 
attachment E to min 14th mtg USNC, 16 Jun 
1958. 
UMin 11th mtg USNC, 8 Jan 1958, pp. 1-2, 
and attachment A, ltr, John A. Simpson to 
Odishaw, 6 Jan 1958; rnin 26 mtg USNC-ICY 
Executive Committee, 8 Jan 1958, pp. 1-3. 
7-8. 
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=See chapter 6, p. 102; IGY Report 21, p. 
Min 17th mtg TPESP, 3 Apr 1958, pp. 1-2, 
I’Min 14th mtg USNC, 16 Jun 1958, p. 2; 
=Min 14th mtg USNC, 16 June 1958, p. 1. 
“IGY Report 21, pp. 593-597; “Symposium 
on Scientific Effects of Artificially Introduced 
Radiation at High Altitudes,” Proceedings of 
the National Academy, vol. 45, no. 8 (15 Aug 
1959). 
171GY Report 21, p. 566; rnin 14th mtg 
USNC, 16 June 1958, appendix B, Summary of 
Oral Report on the Earth Satellite Program 
by Richard W. Porter, pp. 1-2, and rnin 15th 
mtg USNC, 23 Oct 1958, attachment 6, pp. 
”Memo, Hagen for James E. Webb, NASA 
Administrator, 2 Mar 1962, sub: Vanguard I, 
and enclosure, ltr, Hagen to Rear Admiral 
Coates, Chief Naval Research, 2 Mar 1961, 
NHF. 
Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1965, NASA 
SP-4006 (Washington, D.C.: NASA, 1966) p. 67. 
561. 
7. 
IGY Report 21, pp. 600-603. 
6-11, 15-16, 19-21, 28. 
=IGY Report 21, pp. 574-585. 592. 
“See n. 14. 
”Min 14th mtg USNC, 16 June 1958, pp. 
1-2, 7, 10, and min 15 mtg USNC, 23 Oct 
1958, pp. 1-3, 5-6, and attachment G; IGY 
Report 21, pp. 563-564; interview George Der- 
byshire IGY secretariat, 28 Nov 1967. 
“See Robert L. Rosholt, op. cit. (ch. 12, n. 
10) pp, 44ff.; min 20th mtg TPESP, 21 July 
1959. 
Usee chapter 7. 
ps IGY Report 21, pp. 566,604-605; Stuhlinger 
op. cit. (see ch. 11, n. 23), p. 69. 
zB The Advanced Research Projects Agency 
of the Defense Department and later NASA 
both sponsored a number of satellite flights 
during 1958 and 1959, eight of which were 
successful, but as none of these came under 
the aegis of the IGY National Committee and 
technical panels and all of them were subject 
to security classification that interfered with 
the release of information to other aations, 
they did not count as IGY satellites at all. 
87 IGY Report 21, pp. 607408,625. 
=Ibid., pp. 611-614. 
”Ibid. ,  p. 629; Stuhlinger, op. cit. (see ch. 
11, n. 23), p. 69; conf rpt, 3 Apr 1958, NRL 
master file, 4130-34; rnin 19th rntg TPESP, 17 
Jul 1958, pp. 2-3; Satellite Experiments file 
folder 32.32, NAS Archives: IGY USNC. 
=IGY Report 21, pp. 594, 616, 625. 
811bid., pp. 609, 621-623, 629. 
Ibid., pp. 594-595. 
381bid., pp. 616-620. 
Chapter 14 
I Of these nineteen, three were Sputniks, 
one was a U.S.S.R. Lunik, planned as a lunar 
probe, and eight were American military satel- 
lites developed by the military outside the 
framework of the IGY. See chapter 13, n. 26. 
Klawans and Burghardt, Vanguard Launch 
Vehicle, pp. 7, 171-175. 
*Ltr, Rosen to C. McL. Green, 15 Mar 
1968, with end, “A Brief History of Delta 
and Its Relation to Vanguard.” 
Thomas E. Jenkins, “Budget Forecasting 
and Cost Control of Cost-plus Development 
Contracts,” 26 Oct 1959, copy in NHF. 
61nterviews, Homer Newell, 19 Dec, and 
Capt. Berg, 28 Aug 1967; see Klawans and 
Burghardt, Vanguard Launch Vehicle, pp. 7, 
171-175. 
BInterview, Homer Newell, 26 Aug 1966. 
’ Min 19th mtg TPESP, 26 July 1958, p. 5. 
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3. IGY Satellite Launches 
[United States IGY launches in boldface. Satellites and probes other 
than United States IGY launches have been inserted to complete the 
1957-1 959 chronological listing.] 
Initial Znitial 
Experiments Down Perigee 1 Apogee * 
(Degrees) (Miles) (Miles) 
Name Inclination 
(Launch date) 
1957 
Sputnik Z 2 
1957 Alpha 
(4 Oct 1957) 
Sputnik I12 
1957 Beta 
(3 Nov 1957) 
1958 
Explorer I 
1958 Alpha 
(31 Jan 1958) 
Explorer I1 
(5 Mar 1958) 
Vanguard I 
1958 Beta 
(1 7 Mar 1958) 
Explorer III 
1958 Gamma 
(26 Mar 1958) 
Vanguard 
Test Vehicle 5 
(28 Apr 1958) 
Sputnik 1 1 1 2  
1958 Delta 
(15 May 1958) 
Vanguard 
SLV-1 
(27 May 1958) 
I 
Cosmic rays In orbit 33. 
Meteoroid erosion 
Temperatures 
Meteoric dust Failed to orbit 
Meteoroids 
Temperatures 
Cosmic rays 
Temperature In orbit 34 
Cosmic rays 28 Jltn 1958 33.4 
Meteoroid erosion 
Tempera tures 
Solar x-rays Failed to orbit 
Environmental 
Lyman-alpha Failed to orbit 
Environmental 
290 
224 
406 
119 
1,573 
2,465 
1,740 
Initial Initial 
Experiments Down Perigee 1 Apogee 
(Degrees) (Miles) (Miles) 
Name Znclina tion 
(Launch date) 
Vanguard Solar x-rays Failed to orbit 
SLV-2 Environmental 
(26 Jun 1958) 
Explorer ZV Trapped radiation 23 Oct 1958 50.3 163 1,373 
1958 Epsilon 
(26 Ju1 1958) 
Explorer V Trapped radiation Failed to orbit 
(24 Aug 1958) 
Vanguard Cloud cover Failed to orbit 
SLV-3 
(26 Sept 1958) 
Pioneer I 
1958 Eta 1 
( I1  Oct 1958) 
Explorer VI 3 12-ft inflatable Failed to orbit 
(22 Oct 1958) sphere 
Pioneer I1 (at 963 mi, 3d stage failed to ignite) 
(8 Nov 1958) 
Pioneer IIZ 
1958 Theta 
(6 Dec 1958) 
Project Score 
1958 Zeta 
(18 Dec 1958) 
1959 
Luna I 2 
1959 M u  1 
(2 Jan €959) 
Vunprd ZI Cloud cover 
1959 Alpha Internal 
(17 Feb 1959) temperature 
Discoverer Z 
1959 Beta 
(28 Feb 1959) 
In orbit 32.8 346 2,063 
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Appendix 3-Continued 
IGY Satellite Launches 
Initial Initial 
Experiments Down Perigee 1 Apogee 1 
(Miles) (Miles) 
Name Inclination 
(Launch date) (Degrees) 
Pioneer ZV 
1959 Nu 1 
(3 Mar 1959) 
Discoverer II 
1959 Gamma 
(13 Apr 1959) 
Vanguard 30-in. inflatable Failed to orbit 
SLV-5 sphere 
(13 Apr 1959) Magnetometer 
Vanguard Earth energy Failed to orbit 
SLV-6 balance 
(22 Jun 1959) 
Explorer Duplicate of Failed to orbit 
(16 Ju! 1959) Explorer VI1 
Explorer V I  
1959 Delta 
(7 Aug 1959) 
Discoverer V 
1959 Epsilon 
(13 Aug 1959) 
Explorer Duplicate of Failed to orbit 
(14 Aug 1959) Explorer VI 
Discoverer VZ 
1959 Zeta 
(19 Aug 1959) 
Luna 1 1 2  
1959 Xi 1 
(12 Sept 1959) 
Vanguard IZZ Magnetometer In orbit 33.3 317 2,326 
1959 Eta Solar x-ray 
(18 Sept 1959) LYman-alPha 
Environmental 
292 
Znitial Znitial 
Perigee Apogee 1 
(Miles) (Miles) 
Inclination Name 
(Launch date) Experiments Down (Degrees) 
Luna 1112 
1959 Theta 
(4 Oct 1959) 
Explorer VZZ Micrometeoroid In orbit 50.3 345 68 1 
1959 Iota Cosmic rays 
(13 Oct 1959) Heavy nuclei 
Earth energy 
balance 
Solar x-ray 
Lyman-alpha 
Radio signals 
Ground studies 
Discoverer VZZ 
1959 Kappa 
(7 Nov 1959) 
Discoverer VIZZ 
1959 Lambda 
(20 Nov 1959) 
I 
1 Orbit figures are approximate. 
3 Two payloads were named Explorer VI: an IGY payload that failed to orbit 
2 U.S.S.R. 
22 Oct 1958 and a post-IGY experiment launched successfully 7 Aug 1959. 
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INDEX 
A 
ABMA (Army Ballistic Missile Agency), 17, 
18, 51. 74, 113, 124, 137, 198, 200, 213, 214, 
215, 216, 217 
A-38 (rocket motor), 117 
Acid, 168 
Adams, Sherma?, 189 
Adcock, Robert, 166 
Advanced Research Project Agency. See 
Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, 35 
AEC. See Atomic Energy Commission. 
Aerobee (rocket), 6, 9, 14, 33 
Aerobee-Hi (sounding rocket), 12, 14, 44, 45, 
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